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Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of J 
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer , 
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in J 
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/ 
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to 
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in oJ 
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the 
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether 
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is J 
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments 
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Ken- J 
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to 
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific 
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood 
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa. .J 
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ABOUT ... 
[IK 
CLE 
The University of Kentucky College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education (UKlCLE) was organized in 1973 
as the ftrst permanently staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures 
with the threefold purpose to: 1) assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 2) develop and sustain practical 
lawyering skills; and 3) maintain a high degree of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations 
and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program of the College. No tax 
dollars, bar dues or public funds are budgeted in the Office's ftnances. 
Courses 
UKlCLE provides a variety of workshops, conferences, and institutes to satisfy the continuing education needs of 
lawyers and other professionals. Courses range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over 
several days. While most courses are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UKlCLE has a longstanding statewide 
commitment. Since its ftrst year of operation, beginning with a criminal law program in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has 
continued to bring the highest quality continuing education to attorneys across Kentucky, the Midsouth, the Midwest, and the 
nation. 
Publications 
Each course is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound materials are offered for 
sale following courses and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers. In 1987, UKlCLE began 
producing a series of publications which now consist of Practice Handbooks, Monographs, and Compendiums. Each Practice 
Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting of separately authored chapters, sequenced for 
the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their format allows for updating through supplements and cumulative 
indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author, designed to cover a topic of 
narrower scope than Practice Handbooks. Compendiums contain both official forms and sample documents. Designed to assist 
the lawyer by suggesting speciftc structures and language to consider in drafting documents, these publications are beneftcial in 
the resolution of legal drafting concerns. The Compendiums are often used most effectively in conjunction with UKlCLE 
Practice Handbooks and Monographs. 
Professional Management 
UKlCLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff 
manages course planning, publication content planning, course registrations, publications sales, course and publication market-
ing, publication composition and printing, as well as internal budgeting, accounting, and ftnancial reporting. As an "income 
based" program, UKlCLE's course tuitions and publications sales are designed to generate sufficient revenues for self-support. 
Commitment to Quality and Creativity 
UKlCLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLEA). As such, UKICLE subscribes to 
the Standards of Operation for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards of Fair Conduct and Voluntary 
Cooperation administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continu-
ing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UKlCLE has been actively involved in the activities of and discourse 
sponsored by ACLEA. UKlCLE's association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity 
to continually reassess instructional methods, quality in pUblications, and effective means of delivering CLE services at consis-
tently high levels of quality. 
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service 
An enormous debt is owed to the practitioners, professors, judges and other professionals who generously donate their 
time and talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience provide the fundamental components of our 
seminars and publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to the legal profession, high 
quality continuing legal education would not exist. As a non-proftt organization, UKlCLE relies upon the traditional spirit of 
service to the profession that attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement 
in the continuing legal education process. If you would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and 
indicate your areas of interest and experience. 
UKlCLE: A Self-SupportinG Entity 
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal 
Education (UK/ CLE) is an income-based office of the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is separately 
budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK/ CLE opera-
tions are similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all 
direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues. 
No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget. 
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and 
the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide 
professional development services. In the event surplus 
funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or 
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of 
services we provide. 
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EFFECflVE REPRESENTATION OF CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR 
Sandra D. Freeburger 
I. INTRODUCI10N 
It is the goal of the following paper to assist the bankruptcy practitioner in effectively, efficiently 
and ethically handling Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. Dealing with cases in this manner will bring plaudits 
from one's peers, but plaudits will not pay the rent. Therefore, an emphasis will also be placed upon 
obtaining, fostering and preserving the goodwill of your clients throughout the attorney I client 
relationship. After all, good recommendations from fonner clients are the best, most cost effective fonn 
of advertising. 
The paper is arranged chronologically as most cases unfold. So we begin with the initial client 
telephone call. 
U. INITIAL CLIENT CONTACT 
A. Role Of Secretary 
I am uncertain whether we lawyers truly appreciate a well trained staff. Fielding the initial 
telephone call from a financially distressed individual falls to one's secretary, receptionist, administrative 
assistant, etc., whatever title you chose to bestow upon that person who bravely addresses the unknown 
public each time the telephone rings. For the purposes of this work, I will refer to this staff member as 
"secretary." The truism that first impressions are the most important was never more accurate than in 
this setting. 
1. Specific Inquiries Referred to Attorney 
If the caller begins the conversation with a narrative of a specific event-a car has been 
repossessed, a lawsuit has been filed, a contract dispute has arisen-the secretary should go no further 
with the conversation. The caller should be promptly referred to an attorney. 
2. Basic Information and Fee Schedules 
However, many inquiries are received from individuals who know that their financial affairs 
are desperate. As the number of consumer Chapter 7 filings continue to grow, many individuals are 
facing their second or third bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Information about 
bankruptcy law is more widespread due to legal advertising, press coverage of high profile bankruptcy 
cases and word of mouth. From July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998, 1.38 million bankruptcy cases were filed. 
So often your secretary will receive a call from an individual who knows very well that a bankruptcy 
case will be required to deal with his or her debts. 
Your secretary must impart brief, accurate information about your services and fees. Highly 
visible advertising has increased the numbers of legal fee price shoppers. Unless your secretary can 
impart to the caller information about your fees in consumer cases, you may find your calendar cluttered 
with long office conferences with individuals who really only want to know your charges. 
In the author's office, the secretary will advise the caller of the finn's basic fee for consumer 
Chapter 7 cases but will infonn the caller that more complex cases requi~ higher fees. Care must be 
taken to differentiate between the court costs and attorney fees. Further, the secretary will tell the caller 
that there may be a charge for the initial consultation unless the finn is retained. This practice has 
eliminated some unproductive office conferences and distilled those would-be clients with whom the 
attorneys meet. 
3. Specific Inquiries and Preparation for Initial aient Interview 
The caller will make inquiries of the secretary about substantive matters. It is important that 
one's secretary understand that bankruptcy protection from creditors will occur immediately upon filing; 
so when asked by a caller about the length of time required to stop a wage garnishment, the secretary 
can answer. See, 11 U.5.C.§362(a). In many areas a secretary is more competent to answer questions 
than the attorney. For example, when asked about the promptness of getting the petition filed, the 
secretary is often more aware of the existing workload and time demands. In the event a petition needs 
to be filed expeditiously, the secretary should know about the availability of skeleton and emergency 
filings, so the caller can be assured that the office and the court system can work with sufficient speed to 
meet a" critical situation. 
The secretary should ascertain the identities of the caller's major creditors. If the finn represents 
those creditors, then the secretary should advise the caller that a conflict of interest would prevent the 
finn from representing the caller. 
To allow for a productive meeting between the caller and the attorney, the secretary must instruct 
the caller to prepare for the meeting by gathering financial information which lists the assets and the 
debts of the caller. The potential client should be asked to value those assets and designate which assets 
are encumbered by mortgages and liens. If the caller has been sued, the secretary should direct that 
copies of the complaint and other relevant pleadings be brought to the meeting. Certainly any deeds, 
wills, notes, and security agreements which the caller has on hand should be included in the portfolio. 
Tax returns can provide important information. As such, the caller should be asked to bring his/her tax 
returns for the past two (2) years to the initial meeting. 
m. INITIAL CLIENT INTERVIEW 
A. aient Relations 
Many people who are forced to consider a Chapter 7 filing have never dealt with attorneys. 
Filled with the images of lawyers provided them by pop culture, they will arrive in the law office for the 
initial interview anxious not only about their circumstances, but about the lawyer. The attorney and 
support staff must put these interviewees at ease. Offering coffee or a beverage is elementary, but also 
think about dress and the conference room environment. By conductipg the meeting in your best blue 
suit you may never develop a rapport with an hourly worker who has come to your office wearing 
dusty work clothes. By meeting in an austere law library, you may never engage in an open dialog 
which will fully apprise you of the clients' problems. These guests in your office should be impressed 
not only by your credentials but also your compassion. 
While the stigma of filing a bankruptcy petition may have lessened since 1978, for most people 
bankruptcy is still an unthinkable act, the very consideration of which is emotionally wrenching. You 
are meeting people at a low point in their lives and you can observe their depression in their demeanor 
and posture. Realize that with the privileges afforded by the Bankruptcy Code, you have the power to 
help them. 
A-2 
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B. Ascertaining Conflicts Of Interest 
As you move into the actual interview, but before any discussion of specific legal issues, ask to 
review the list of creditors to whom the interviewee is indebted. Obviously, the attorney must ascertain 
if she/he has a conflict of interest which would prevent the fonnation of an attorney-client relationship. 
Any discussion of the client's particular circumstances which occurs prior to a review of the creditor list 
can disqualify the attorney from representing either the debtor or the creditor client. SCR 3.130-1.7, 1.9. 
aients will respeq an attorney who zealously seeks to avoid conflicts and appearances of impropriety. 
C. Immediate Problems And Future Concerns 
Assuming no conflict of interest, it is then logical to ask the client about the immediate problem 
which has brought him or her into your office. In that way one can determine the rapidity of action 
which is required. For example, a wage earner whose salary is being garnished will need to decide 
whether to file and which form of bankruptcy relief to seek before his/her next paycheck is issued. 
Someone who has been served with a summons will have limited time to decide whether a good defense 
can be raised or whether legal fees are best spent on obtaining a discharge from the claim of the plaintiff. 
A client who foresees difficult finandal times in the future may want to understand bankruptcy's 
ramifications and has time for careful analysis. 
D. Review Of Finandal Statement 
The discussion should now refocus on the financial statement. Many clients insist that they 
have limited credit problems and that but for a delinquency or disagreement with one creditor no 
bankruptcy relief would be required. As the discussion proceeds, it may become evident that the problems 
are widespread and the resources limited. As you review the client's financial infonnation, consider the 
issues discussed below. 
1. Are the Debts Jointly Owed by Husband and Wife? 
Assume the husband has partidpated in a failed business venture, leaving unpaid suppliers 
and business credit cards. The wife has liability only on bank notes which are secured by the residence 
and vehicles. The couple agrees that they wish to reaffirm the bank obligations. In such drcumstances, 
there may be no reason for the spouse to join in the filing. Assume the residence has value which 
exceeds the claim of the mortgagee and the statutory exemptions allowed by I<RS 427.060 and KRS 
427.160. Recognizing that the trustee can sell jointly owned property after obtaining a judgment in an 
adversary proceeding, consider whether the trustee is less likely to sell the residence if the co-owner 
spouse has filed no petition. See, 11 US.C§ 363(g), (h). The spouse will partidpate in on~half of the 
sale proceeds with the debtor's portion of the proceeds being surcharged with the sales expenses and 
the trustee's commission. Consequently, it is not as attractive for the trustee to sell marginally nonexempt 
jointly owned assets as it would have been had the couple filed a joint petition. 
2. Should the Debtors have their Assets Appraised? 
If the estate's assets consist of automobiles or other kinds of property which are the subject of 
independent, well publicized valuation guides, then there may be no need to incur the expense of an 
appraisal. However, if the asset is out of the ordinary, sayan antique automobile or specialty equipment, 
then an appraisal may be beneficial. It is the author's experience that clients who have never been 
involved with the bankruptcy process habitually overestimate the worth of their property. Without an 
appraisal the client may be adamant that the property is worth much more than the debt it secures; with 
the appraisal the client, and the trustee, can quickly see that no equity exists. 
A-3 
Conversely, an appraisal could reveal equity which the client did not know existed. Remember 
that the debtor must sign his/her schedules, under oath, valuing the assets at market value. See, FRBP 
1008, 1007(b) which incorporates Official Form No.6. An appraisal performed before filing must be 
considered by the debtor while affixing the value of the asset. Valuation of the asset at an amount 
significantly below the appraised value could conceivably create grounds for action against the debtor. 
11 U.5.C.§727(a)(4). . 
3. What are the Tax Ramifications of Filing? 
If the debtor owns property which is encumbered to secure debts far in excess of value, then in 
all likelihood, this property will be abandoned hom the bankruptcy estate and liquidated by the creditor. 
It is important to discuss the tax basis of such property. If the property is worth more than the taxpayer's 
basis, then the taxpayer will have a taxable gain when the property is sold, even if all the proceeds go to 
the creditor. See, 26 U .5.C.§ 61. The sale of depreciated equipment can lead to tremendous tax liability, 
for the debtor will be taxed on all the recaptured depreciation, even though the creditor receives all the 
proceeds. See, 26 U.S.C.§ 1245. These results will occur whether or not a Chapter 7 case was filed, but 
the attorney has a duty to advise clients of the ramifications of their actions. If the asset has equity and 
the Chapter 7 trustee decides to sell the property, then the taxpayer's basis passes to the estate and the 
tax liability will rest in the bankruptcy estate. See, 26 U.S.C.§ 1398. 
Occasionally a creditor will recognize that the value of the asset which secures its debt is the 
most the creditor can hope to recover. In return for a quick sale, the creditor may be willing to forgive 
any debt which remains after the collateral is sold thereby eliminating the necessity of a bankruptcy 
filing. The attorney must advise the debtor that this proposal is fraught with peril. Recall that debt 
which is discharged as a part of a bankruptcy proceeding creates no taXi but, outside a bankruptcy case, 
the discharge or forgiveness of debt will likely create taxable income for the debtor. See, 26 U.S.C.§108 
(a) (1). Once created, income tax debt can not be discharged for ~ (3) years. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 523 
(a)(1)(A),l1 U.5.c.§ 507 (a)(8)(A)(i). It may be necessary to decline the offer of the forgiving creditor in 
favor of filing a Chapter 7 case in order to escape debt forgiveness income. 
In cases where significant tax liability may be created as a result of the debtor's action in 
liquidating property, a tax professional knowledgeable about the tax aspects of bankruptcy law should 
be involved in the pre bankruptcy discussions. 
4. Does the Oient have Substantial Equity in His/Her Assets? 
Chapter 7 works best for those debtors who have accumulated Significant unsecured debt and 
whose assets are encumbered to the full extent of their value by mortgages which are being paid on a 
current basis. Counselling the client with unexempt equity must be undertaken carefully. Obviously 
the client must be told that a Chapter 7 trustee is under an obligation to liquidate assets which will 
benefit the unsecured creditors. See, 11 U.5.C.§ 704(1). Occasionally a client will respond to that disclosure 
by expressing a willingness to allow the trustee to sell the asset. In light of the potential tax aspects of a 
sale, it may be best for the bankruptcy estate to bear the tax consequences of the sale. 
Often the debtor will ask the attorney about ways to preserve the asset. For an attorney, danger 
attaches to the response. Law journal articles and lectures have addressed the role of the attorney in 
prebankruptcy planning. See, Safford, The Slippery Slope: The Road from Ethical Practice to Attorney 
Negligence, Contempt or Fraud in Bankruptcy Cases, 2 Workshop for Bankruptcy Judges 227 (NCBJ 1996). 
These scholars examine the fine line that lawyers must draw between advising the clients of the status 
of the law and actively participating in defrauding creditors. If the lawyer crosses the line between 
counselor and becomes an active participant in a scheme to defraud creditors, sanctions can attach. 18 
U.s.C.§ 157i SCR 3.130-83(c) and KBA v. Newcomer, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 20 (1998). 
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Oients are entitled to fully understand how state Jaw exemptions can be applied to their property. 
If a client has significant equity in an asset, the attorney should advise that by selling the assets or 
borrowing against the equity the client may invest the proceeds in a retirement account approved by 
I<RS 427.150 and protect the equity (albeit in a different fonn). 
If asked about giving property to the client's family, the practitioner should advise the client of 
the bankruptcy and state fraudulent conveyance statutes. See, 11 US.c.§ 548, I<RS 318.010 et seq. Advise 
them that such gifts made within a year of the filing of a bankruptcy case can be easily set aside by the 
trustee. Oients should also be counseled that while Kentucky fraudulent conveyance law has a five (5) 
year statute of limitations, its requirements are more difficult to prove than the bankruptcy cause of 
action. The statement of affairs contained within the petition requires disclosure of gifts made within 
one (1) year of the filing date, so the overworked trustee may never discover transfers made outside the 
one (1) year time frame. See, FRBP 1007 (b)(1) incorporating Official Form No.7. 
If the client does not have at least $5,000.00 ($10,000.00 if a joint petition has been filed) equity in 
his/her home, the homestead exemption will not be fully utilized. See, I<RS 427.060. In advance of 
filing, clients may consider liquidating an asset which has equity and investing those funds in their 
home. Either real property or mobile homes qualify. Beware that the exemption statute, I<RS 427.060, 
limits the availability of the exemption, for it can be claimed only against creditors with claims acquired 
after the homestead was purchased. In re Bush. 196 B. R. 378 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky.1995). The trustee can use 
the powers granted under 11 US.C.§ 544 (b) to exercise the rights held by any unsecured creditor. So if 
any creditor's debt was incurred before the homestead equity was created, the trustee can sell the 
homestead. 
When in doubt, the attorney should claim any exemption to which the client is arguably entitled 
and place the burden on the trustee to object to the petitioner's entitlement. Under Thylor v. Freeland & 
Kronz. 503 US. 638,112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1992) , the trustee has only thirty (30) days to object 
to the exemption. 
5. Has the Oient Made any Payments to Creditors Other than Regular Installment Payments or 
Monthly living Expenses Within the Last Year? 
This information may not appear on the client's financial statement, so it is important that you 
probe. Often the payments which fall into this category are made to family members. It is understandable 
that the debtor would want to devote his/her limited resources in repaying a relative or friend. The 
debtor must know that filing a bankruptcy petition within one (1) year of the payment to an insider and 
within ninety (90) days of the payment to other creditors will entitle the trustee to investigate the 
preferential payment and probably recapture it for distribution to all creditors. See, 11 US.c.§ 55O(aXl). 
Garnishments are considered transfers by the debtor for the benefit of creditors, even though 
involuntarily done. In re Winters. 182 B. R. 26 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1995). The date of the transfer is the date 
of service of the garnishment order upon the garnishee. If the date of transfer is outside the preference 
period, then even payments received by the creditor within the preference period escape recovery by 
the trustee or debtor. In re Edwards. 219 B. R. 970 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1998). If the garnishment order is 
served within ninety days before bankruptcy and the amount of the funds paid to the creditor exceed 
six hundred dollars ($600.00) but do not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), the debtor may seek to 
have the preferential conveyance set aside and recoup the garnished funds under his/her general 
exemption provided by K.RS. 427.160. In re Towery. 53 BR 76 (Bkrtcy W.O. Ky.1985). Presumably, the 
trustee will act on behalf of the estate if the amount of the funds exceed the general exemption. Any 
garnishments which do not exceed $600.00 are not preferences under the Code. See, 11 US.c. § 547 
(c){8). 
Many Chapter 7 debtors have liability on which third parties have cosigned. These debtors 
must realize that payments to a bank on an unsecured note that has been cosigned by their parents (or 
other insiders) can entitle the trustee to recover the payments from the parents if a bankruptcy is filed 
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within a year after the payments are made. See, 11 US.C.§ 547 (b)(4)(B). Those payments benefited an 
insider by decreasing the liability of the insider, so the payments are preferential. Note that voluntary 
payments on the same debt after. bankruptcy are not preferential. 
Understanding basic preference law can lead the client to consider Chapter 13 relief and thereby 
protect the preferential payment, to delay the filing of the bankruptcy to allow the payment to fall 
outside the preference period, or to accelerate the filing to enable the trustee to recover a preference that 
has been paid to a creditor in order to benefit other creditors, particularly tax creditors. 
6. Has the aient Granted any Mortgages or Security Interests to Secure Antecedent Debt Within 
One Year? 
aearly granting a creditor a mortgage to secure an otherwise unsecured debt can fall within 
the purview of a preferential conveyance, for such a transfer enables that creditor to receive more in 
repayment of debt than would have been the case without the transfer. In a Chapter 7 case, the recipient 
of a preferential security interest or mortgage is likely to be a creditor whose good opinion the debtor 
believes hel she needs to survive after bankruptcy. In such circumstances, the debtor will want to make 
every effort to avoid filing a bankruptcy petition until after the preference period has passed. 
E. aient Desires And Goals 
Afte~ a thorough analysis of the debtors' financial information, it is helpful to ask the clients 
what they realistically hope to accomplish through the bankruptcy process. Often the clients will say 
that they will be happy if they can save their home or their car. They may proclaim that they just want 
out from under all their debt. Consider writing the clients a letter after the initial meeting and reiterating 
your understanding of their purpose. It is important to have this discussion at the very beginning of the 
representation. Expectations tend to soar as·the bankruptcy case progresses, for the protection of the 
bankruptcy court is narcotic to some debtors, lulling them into false optimism while they are protected 
from making payments. When the caSe concludes and the debtors are faced with the reality of having to 
make payments on debts they have reaffinned or new debts they have undertaken since filing, one can 
tactfully remind them that their initial goals have been met. They will feel more positively about their 
experience and about your representation. 
Commonly clients will advise their lawyer that they want to pay all their debts. Attorneys are 
obligated to discuss Chapter 13 with clients and present it as a means of paying their debts, or at least a 
substantial portion of them. See, FRBP 1002 incorporating therein Official Form No.1. As a part of the 
initial interview the practitioner must give clients an overview of both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 
bankruptcies. 
RChapter 13 Versus Chapter 7 Bankruptcies 
1. Design of Chapter 13 
In general, Chapter 13 is designed to permit the payment of a significant amount to unsecured 
creditors and to return to secured creditors the value of their collateral, be it through the actual surrender 
of the collateral or the payment of the value of the collateral over the term of the plan with interest at the 
market rate. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 1325 (a)(5) and Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman. 692 F.2d 427 (6th Or. 
1982). Discrimination between creditors who are similarly situated is prohibited. See, 11 U.s.C.§ 1322 
(a)(3). Chapter 13 cases tend to be more complicated from the perspective of both the debtor and debtor's 
counsel; consequently legal fees are higher than fees in Chapter 7 cases, although the payment of these 
fees through the trustee's office in installments may be easier on the debtor's budget than Chapter 7 fees 
which are typically paid in one or two installments. At a minimum, Chapter 13 cases require a three (3) 
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year commitment from the debtor, with court supervision of any additional, nonmedical debt. 11 U.S.C.§ 
1322 (d). However, Chapter 13 offers a means of dealing with debts which are non dischargeable in 
Chapter 7 and it offers protection for the debtor's cOsigners, to the extent that the debtor proposes to 
pay the debt under his/her plan. 11 U.S.c.§ 1301(a). No assets will be sold or preferences recovered by 
the Chapter 13 trustee, as long as the debtor's plan proposes payment of an amount equivalent to these 
potential recoveries. See, 11 US.C.§ 1325 (a)(4). 
2. Design of Chapter 7 
On the other hand, Chapter 7 is designed to completely discharge unsecured debt, at the cost of 
the debtor's equity. Most Chapter 7 proceedings are no asset cases, so debtors risk no equity by filing a 
Chapter 7 proceeding. Congress has limited the filing of Chapter 7 cases by prohibiting a debtor from 
filing more than once every six (6) years. See, 11 US.C.§ 727 (a)(8). A Chapter 7 case is concluded 
quickly, requiring only one court appearance. 11 US.c.§ 341(d). The economic value of a Chapter 7 
case can be tremendous. The debtor can obtain a discharge from many thousand dollars of debt, while 
attorney fees rarely exceed one thousand dollars. There is no prohibition against discriminating between 
creditors after the filing, so a Chapter 7 debtor can voluntarily repay one unsecured creditor, ignoring 
all other unsecured claimholders. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 524(0. Some debts will not be effected by a Chapter 7 
filing. See, 11 U.S.C.§§ 523 (a){l),{3),{5),{7),{8),{9),{lO),{11),{12),{l3),{l4) and (l6). Taxes, child support 
obligations and student loan debts are examples. Other debts may be excepted from discharge if the 
creditors assert their rights in a timely manner. These debts include debts predicated upon a false 
financial statement, certain credit card debts incurred immediately before filing, debts arising out of 
fraud, etc. See, 11 U.S.C.§§ 523(a)(2),(4),(6), and (l5). 
Having discussed the differences between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 in general terms, it is then 
necessary to discuss these alternatives using the specific circumstances of the client. Ask the client if 
any money remains from his/her salary after payment of living expenses. Most will respond negatively. 
In those cases, no further exploration of Chapter 13 is required for there is no ability to fund the plan. If 
the client believes that he/she could make a Chapter 13 payment and meet his/her living expenses, 
then have the client complete Schedules I and J of the bankruptcy petition and delay further discussion 
of Chapter 13 until you have reviewed these schedules which list living expenses and income. 
G. Discussion Of Bankruptcy Process And Procedure 
1. Generally 
If your clients have not previously asked how the bankruptcy system works, they will surely do 
so before the conclusion of the initial conference. Reassure them that bankruptcy relief goes into effect 
as soon as the petition is filed. Most of these clients will be concerned about their jobs and will ask 
questions like, "Will my employer be notified?" You can assure them that in all likelihood there will be 
no need to inform the employer, but that it will be necessary for the client to take off work to attend the 
creditors' meeting. Advise the client that the notice of the creditors meeting will come to him/her at the 
same time as it comes to you and that the ''Notice of Commencement of Case Under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Order for Relief, Meeting of Creditors and Fixing of Dates" (herein referred to as 
"creditors' meeting") will be received several days in advance of the meeting, so that he/ she can schedule 
time off. 
Explain to clients that the filing of a bankruptcy case draws a line between their prepetition 
activities and·their postpetition affairs. They will be comforted to learn that earnings generated after 
filing are free and clear of prebankruptcy debt and that property which they acquire after the bankruptcy 
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filing can not be subjected to the payment of the prepetition debt. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 541(a). There are 
exceptions to this rule. Advise your clients that any property inherited within six (6) months of the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition is drawn into the bankruptcy estate and divided between creditors. See, 
11 U.S.C.§ 541 (a)(5)(A). A client with an elderly or ailing parent, sibling, etc. may want to suggest to 
that potential testator that his/her will be rewritten. Further any funds paid to the debtor as a beneficiary 
under a life insurance policy within 180 days of the petition date may be drawn into the bankruptcy 
estate for payment of creditors. See, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(5)(C). Fmally, any property received by the 
debtor in a property settlement agreement or divorce decree within 180 days of filing will become part 
of the bankruptcy estate. See, 11 US.C. § 541 (a)(5)(B)." 
2. Surrender of Property 
Reaffirmation, redemption and surrender of property should be discussed during the initial 
client meeting. Often the client has been attempting to sell a boat or vehicle, having decided that they 
are unable to make the monthly payment on the collateral. Being told that they can surrender this 
property to the secured creditor-paying the creditor no additional monies-will be well received. See, 
11 U.S.C.§ 506 (a). Redemption of property from the secured creditor is more difficult to explain and, in 
the author'S opinion, underutilized by Chapter 7 debtors. 
3. Redemption of Property 
Typically, redemption is used with creditors which hold purchase money security interests in 
household goods. A revolving charge account may retain for the merchant a security interest in anything 
that was ever financed on the account as long as a debt is outstanding. Appliances, furniture and stereo 
equipment purchased several years ago may still be held as collateral for substantial debt, even though 
the property has minimal value. A debt of several thousand dollars may be secured by property worth 
only a few hundred dollars. Ask the client how much the property is worth in its current condition. 
Explain to the client that by offering to pay that amount, usually in a lump sum, the creditor's interest in 
the property can be purchased. See, 11 U.S.c.§ 722. Both debtors and creditors are aided by redemption. 
Debtors are spared the humiliation of having their personal items repossessed, and creditors are spared 
the expense of repossession and sale. You can not force the creditor to allow your client to make 
installment payments on a redemption, but increasingly, creditors have allowed Chapter 7 debtors this 
flexibility. Redemption must be approved by the Court and a dispute over the value of the property can 
lead to a hearing. These disputes are best resolved through negotiations, for the Chapter 7 debtor can 
rarely afford additional attorney fees arising out of the hearing, and the Court will not deal kindly with 
lawyers who take up courtroom time to determine the value of a ten year old refrigerator. 
4. Reaffirmation of Debt 
Frequently the Chapter 7 case will involve at least one reaffirmation of a secured debt. Oients 
will tell you that they want to "resign" with a creditor. The attorney is advised to inform the client of the 
legal consequences of such an act. Make sure they realize that by reaffirming the debt, they are 
recommitting their personal liability on the debt and will be subject to suit and garnishment if they 
default on the payment. 
Reaffirmation is easily accomplished if the clients are current on their payments to the creditor 
and if the collateral is worth approximately the same amount as the debt which is owed. Local Rule 22 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky provides a simple 
reaffirmation agreement form to be signed by the client, the creditor and the debtors' counsel. See, 
Appendix A to this paper. The completed form must be filed with the court within the time period set 
forth in the notice of creditors' meeting. It is unclear whether a debtor has an absolute right to reaffirm 
a debt which is being paid according to contract terms. 
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Reaffirmation is somewhat complicated when the client is delinquent in the payment of the 
debt. Oearly, the creditor must consent to this reaffirmation, and the creditor will require some agreement 
on curing the arrearage in the account. If the debtors have been habitually delinquent in their payments, 
creditors may refuse to negotiate a reaffirmation of the debt and the Court will not intervene on behalf 
of the debtors. It has been this author's experience that creditors will usually allow the debtors reasonable 
time to cure the delinquency and will consent to the reaffirmation. Again, an agreement must be drafted 
setting forth the terms of the agreement and the document must be filed with the court after it has been 
signed by the debtors, debtors' counsel and the creditor. 
Debtors may want to reaffinn an unsecured debt. Courts rarely approve such reaffirmations 
and only then if the reaffirmation is done in settlement of a nondischargeability case. You can remind 
your client that he/she may voluntarily pay any prepetition debt, without reaffinning the debt and 
resubmitting his/her personal liability to the creditor. 
Pursuant to 11 US.C.§ 524 (d), as a part of the reaffirmation procedure as debtors' counsel, you 
must sign an affidavit stating: 
I, . attorney for the debtors in the above 
captioned bankruptcy proceeding declare that I represented the debtors during 
the negotiation of the foregoing Agreement and that said Agreement represents 
a fully infonned and voluntary agreement by the debtors which does not impose 
an undue hardship on the debtors or a dependent of the debtor. I have fully advised 
the debtors of the legal effect and consequences of this agreement and any 
default under the agreement. (Emphasis added). 
The emphasized language is of concern. Can the creditor assert a claim against debtors' counsel if there 
is a subsequent default? Conceivably debtors' counsel makes an actionable misrepresentation by signing 
the affidavit knOwing that the clients do not have the ability to repay the debt. There have been occasions 
when I doubted the wisdom of my clients' decision to reaffinn a debt. On occasions I have refused to 
sign the reaffirmation affidavit. If debtors' counsel does not sign the affidavit, then a hearing must be 
held on the reaffirmation. The hearing will necessitate the client's attendance. See, 11 US.C.§ 524 (cX6). 
H. TIming Of The Bankruptcy Filing 
By now, the attorney has fonned an opinion about the timing of the petition's filing. If an 
emeIg~mcy exists and you practice in a division of court other than Louisville or Lexington, you may 
need to ask pennission from the bankruptcy clerk to file a skeleton petition at the office of the U. S. 
District Court nearest you. See, LBR 4 (W.O. Ky). You may file the petition in the division of court which 
is most available to you, even though the case may actually proceed in another division. For example, 
assume you practice in Henderson, Kentucky which is about 30 miles from Owensboro, the nearest seat 
of the district court. Your client needs to file an emergency petition to stop a wage garnishment and that 
client resides in Princeton, Kentucky. The petition can be filed in Owensboro even though the case will 
. be designated a Paducah Division case. Verbal permission of the bankruptcy clerk must be obtained 
before an emergency petition is filed, but pennission is readily granted. Cessation of garnishments, 
avoidance of the entry of a judgment or cancellation of a judicial sale have all been deemed sufficient 
grounds for the accommodation. After the bankruptcy clerk has spoken with the attorney, she/he will 
call the district clerk's office in the division where you plan to file the petition. The deputy district court 
clerk will be given the bankruptcy number which will be assigned to the case. The district clerk will 
accept the petition and filing fee, stamp it and give it a case number. The district clerk will then mail the 
petition to Louisville or Lexington and will have no other dealings with the case, unless the case results 
in an appeal. 
Most emergency filings are also skeleton filings. A skeleton petition is composed of the first 
page of the petition and a list of creditors' names and addresses. Obviously one can complete the 
necessary paperwork to accomplish a skeleton filing in much less time than that required for the complete 
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petition and schedules. Your client need only estimate his/her total debt and total asset value for the 
skeleton petition; specifics about individual creditor claims are not required. Permission of court is not 
required to file a skeleton petition. After the petition has been filed, you have fifteen (15) days within 
which to file the statement of affairs and schedule. See, FRBP l007(c). 
Whether the attorney uses the shorthand procedure of a skeleton filing or delays the filing until 
the complete petition has been prepared, it is most important that one file the petition in conjunction 
with the timetable agreed upon with the client. Failure to timely file petitions have led to disciplinary 
sanctions. See, KBA¥ Watson, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 317 (1993); J<BA v. Goodrich, 851 S.W.2d 479 (1993); KBA 
v. Reeyes, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 478 (1993). 
L Petition Infonnation And Oient Questionnaire 
As the office conference concludes, give the client a questionnaire which will assist the client in 
gathering the infonnation necessary to complete the bankruptcy petition. The questionnaire is invaluable 
for it will allow your staff to work on the petition in the client's absence and more effident1y utilize staff . 
time. Further, the questionnaire will provide protection should a question ever arise about the failure to 
list an asset or creditor. A sample questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this work for your 
consideration. See, Appendix B. 
The Bankruptcy Court has developed two pamphlets which practitioners are asked to distribute 
to Chapter 7 filers. The pamphlets reiterate many of the concepts that you will discuss with your client 
during the initial conference. Supplying the pamphlets is ideal, for the clients can review the infonnation 
after they have left your office and refresh their memories about some of the important subject matters 
that you have covered. 
J. Discussion Of Attorney Fees 
Before the client leaves the office, attorney fees must be discussed. It is customary to require a 
retainer in Chapter 7 cases. If the retainer is eqUivalent to the total chatges for the representation, then 
technically the attorney has received a fraudulent transfer because the attorney is going to be paid for 
work which will not have been perfonned when the petition is filed -attendance at the creditors' meeting 
and creditor negotiations, for example. Fraudulent transfers are defined for bankruptcy purposes as 
transfers without equivalent value. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 548 (a)(2). However, the author is unaware of any 
challenges having been made to a retainer unless the amount appears excessive. If the client is unable to 
pay the entire fee before filing, an arrangement which requires the payment of one-half of the fee in 
advance of filing and one-half on or before the creditors' meeting is standard. The attorney is at peril 
under this arrangement, for he/she is required to attend the creditors' meeting whether or not payment 
has been received. See, LBR 3(d) (W.O. Ky.). 
IV. INFORMATION GATHERING 
A. Oient Inquiries And Additional Creditors 
As the client undertakes to complete the questionnaire, be prepared for many questions to arise. 
Queries about the questionnaire can often be handled by one's secretary. Often the client needs 
clarification of an issue which was discussed at the initial meeting. Many times the client will recall a 
creditor which was omitted from their financial statement and want to discuss that creditor's position 
after a Chapter 7 filing. 
During this phase of the case, the client may tell the attorney about a creditor that they do not 
wish to list on their petition - say a family friend or a credit card that they want to retain. Counsel must 
remind the client that the bankruptcy petition is a document, executed under penalties of perjury, and 
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that all creditors to whom they are indebted at the time of filing must be listed on the petition. See, 18 
U.S.C.§§ 152 and 3571. If the client has the financial wherewithal to pay the debt before filing, then there 
will be no need to list that entity on the petition. 
B. Credit Bureau Report 
For a nominal sum, the client-debtor can obtain a copy of his/her local credit bureau report. 
The report may assist the client in recalling all of his/her creditors and it may provide addresses of 
collection agencies which hold assignments of claims against the client. Giving notice to these agencies 
will hasten the notice process and eliminate future collection efforts against the client. 
C. Lien Search 
Ideally, a courthouse lien search is performed during this period. It is particularly important 
that counsel learn about any judgment liens which may have been filed against the clients' real property. 
Furthermore, the client may believe that a creditor has a lien or mortgage; yet a review of the records 
may indicate that the creditor did not properly perfect its mortgage or security interest. This knowledge 
may equip the attorney to negotiate with the creditor to avoid bankruptcy. It may make the bankruptcy 
more beneficial for the sale of the asset may allow the trustee to pay a priority claim such as a tax or 
child support. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 507. 
Conducting even a cursory lien search adds to the time expenditure on the case. Chapter 7 fees 
are very competitive. As such, charging an additional fee to conduct a lien search may well cost an 
attorney the representation. Whether a lien search is a necessity or a luxury is unclear. However, 
creditors are using the judgment lien statute with great frequency and you may not learn about the lien 
unless you search the records. It is difficult to explain to a client two years after the case is closed why 
you took no action to remove a judgment lien. The client's failure to advise you about the lien's existence 
will be forgotten; your failure to avoid the lien will be remembered. 
D. Inquiries From Creditors 
If the client is being hard pressed by collection efforts, the client may wish to tell creditors that 
he/she is filing bankruptcy is imminent. Be prepared to receive telephone calls from creditors asking 
whether a filing has occurred. It is best to discuss your handling of these calls with your client. See, 
HUShes v. Meade. Ky., 453 S.W.2d 538 (1970). In all likelihood, the client will most likely consent to your 
telling the creditor that you have been retained to file a Chapter 7 petition. Such information will gain 
the client a respite from collection calls. Make sure that the client understands that you must tell creditors 
the truth. Oients have been known to teIl their creditors that they have actually filed when they have 
merely made the decision to file. Counsel must not assist the client in misleading creditors. 
V. SECOND CUENT CONFERENCE 
Once the actual bankruptcy petition has been completed, it will be necessary for your clients to 
again visit your office in order to sign the petition. Provide them with a comfortable environment to 
review the petition if they have not already been supplied a copy of the document via mail. 
A. Fee Agreement 
If the clients have not already done so, they should be asked to sign a fee agreement. Ideally 
this contract would have been signed prior to preparation of the petition, although clients are rarely 
willing to commit to the filing of a bankruptcy petition after the initial conference. The occasion of the 
petition signing provides the best opportunity to memorialize the agreement of representation. 
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Attached as Appendix C to this paper isa copy of a fee agreement. Note that the contract leaves 
the attorney with the option of renegotiating the representation in the event that an adversary proceeding 
is filed against the client. 
B. Fee Disclosure Statement 
The attorney is required to attach a disclosure statement to the bankruptcy petition, advising 
the Court of the amount charged to represent the debtor in the proceeding. H the fee falls outside the 
normal range (S500 to SI,OO()), counsel should be prepared to justify the fee. If the Court concludes that 
there has been an overt:harge, the attorney can be required to tum over any excess fee to the trustee. See, 
11 US.C.§329(b). A sample fee disclosure statement is set forth in the appendix as Appendix D. 
C. Post-Execution Filing Deadline 
Once the petition has been signed, it must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk's office within 
fourteen (14) days. H the petition is held in the attorney's office any longer than fourteen (14) days, it 
becomes stale and the clerk's office will not except it. See, LBR 5(d) <W.O. Ky.). The filing fee must be 
submitted to the clerk's office in the form of cash, certified check, money order or an attorney's office 
check. The client's check will not be accepted. 
VI. TELEPHONE AND MAIL TRAFFIC 
A. Basic Information 
After the petition has been filed and the notices have been sent by the bankruptcy clerk's office 
to creditors, the attorney will get a flurry of telephone calls from creditors asking for very basic information 
such as the date of filing, the case number, and the date and location of the first meeting of creditors. 
These calls can be handled by your secretary. 
B. Secured Creditors And Statement Of Intent 
There may be inquiries from secured creditors about your clients' intention regarding 
reaffirmation of their debt. The Bankruptcy Code requires that all creditors with liens on consumer 
goods receive notice of the debtors' intentions concerning their collateral within thirty (30) days following 
the filing of the petition. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 521 (2)(A). Regardless of the fact that you have complied with 
this requirement, expect calls from large national creditors which involve many departments involved 
in the collection process. The Statement of Intentions will provide an easy reference for one's secretary 
in fielding the creditors' calls. 
c. Reaffirmation Agreements 
De:btor's counsel will receive reaffirmation agreements from creditors for the client's 
consideration. The author usually holds the reaffirmation agreements until the flI'St meeting of creditors. 
This procedure saves time and is not harmful to clients. Certainly you should review each reaffirmation 
agreement to make certain that the amount and debt being treated by the agreement is as expected. 
D. Creditor Activities 
Since most creditors have computerized billing systems, it is understandable that the debtor 
might receive a bill post-filing. However, bills which continue to be sent to Chapter 7 debtors sixty (60) 
days after the bankruptcy filing are inexcusable, assuming that the creditor's address used in the petition 
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is correct. The client is going to want immediate cessation of creditor contact. Tell him/her to ignore the 
first statement received after filin~ but to notify you if subsequent statements are received. Usually a 
short letter from counsel will bring a halt to postpetition collection activities. If collection activities do 
not cease, 11 US.C.§ 362 (h) provides for significant sanctions, including attorney fees, against creditors 
who violate the automatic stay of the court. 
Assume that prior to filing the bankruptcy case a motion for a default judgment against the 
client had been tendered in some pending litigation. If the judgment is entered before the judge gets 
notice of the bankruptcy filing, it is voidable. See, Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corporation. 990 F2d 905 
(6th Or. 1993). It is good practice to file notices in all pending litigation advising the trial court about 
the bankruptcy. Attached as Appendix E is a sample of such a notice. 
VII. CREDITORS' MEETING 
A. Preparation Of aient 
Counsel should arrange to meet with clients a short time before the first meeting of creditors in 
order to prepare them for their session with the bankruptcy trustee. Suggest that the clients review their 
bankruptcy petition before coming to court. 
It is helpful to get to the creditors' meeting early so to allow your clients to sit through some of 
the other debtors' meetings. Stay focused on your clients' case. This author once received a compliment 
and a business referral from a creditor's attorney, simply as a result of sitting with her clients while they 
waited for their case to be called and explaining proceedings rather than abandoning her clients. 
The rudiments of the first meeting of creditors are set forth in 11 US.C.§§ 341 and 343. The 
trustee will ask the debtors if they have listed all their property and debts in the bankruptcy petition. 
Remind the clients about the discussion which you had with them during the initial meeting concerning 
Chapter 13 options. The trustee may ask them if they considered filing a Chapter 13 petition and if they 
are aware of the effect that Chapter 7 will have upon their credit. The trustee will want to verify that the 
petition correctly sets forth the debtors' names and sodal security numbers. 
The trustee will then open the meeting up to creditors. Questions about the location of collateral 
and the status of insurance are common. 
If the client has sold collateral without turning over the proceeds to the creditor or has committed 
some other act which may constitute fraud or a criminal violation, she/he can claim the Fifth Amendment 
protection against self incrimination during their testimony. If the client does not testify and the 
bankruptcy court is asked to determine whether a debt should be excepted from dischatge or a dischatge 
should be denied this debtor altogether, then the judge can be expected to infer culpability from the 
debtor's refusal to testify. See, In re Edmond. 934 F2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1991). 
B. Trustee Report Of No Assets 
As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Chapter 7 cases are declared to be no asset cases as 
soon as the trustee has conducted his/her examination of the debtors. The trustee will tell the debtors 
and the assembled creditors that a no asset report will be filed. By so doing, the trustee will abandon 
any interest which the bankruptcy estate had in your clients' assets. See, 11 U.S.C.§ 554(C). Counsel is 
left to deal with the creditors who hold liens or security interests in the clients' property. 
A-13 
C. Dealing With Creditors 
After the hearing, creditors may encircle one's clients, trying to get signatures upon reaffirmation 
agreements. 'Iiy to meet with as many Creditors as possible, since clients are present and matters can be 
resolved quickly. If you return to the office without resolving an issue with a creditor, it will take several 
telephone calls and letters to get the debt reaffirmed or the property redeemed. If the client has chosen 
to surrender the asset to the creditor, then counsel can use the creditors' meeting to discuss the time and 
place of delivery. 
The attorney must discuss each reaffirmation agreement with the clients. Remember to tell 
clients that they are allowed to rescind any reaffirmation agreement if they do so in writing prior to the 
last date for filing nondischargeability complaints or sixty (60) days after the agreement has been filed 
with the court, whichever date is later. See, 11 US.C.§ 524 (c)(4). 
vm. FOLLOW UP 
A. Amendments To Petition 
In the event a client has omitted a creditor from his/her petition, it will be necessary to file an 
amendment. Again, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District has provided a straight-forward 
form for such an amendment. See, Appendix F. It will be necessary to serve a copy of the amendment 
upon the trustee, and it will be necessary to certify to the Court that you have mailed a copy of the notice 
of creditor's meeting to the added creditor. Each time you file an amendment which adds a creditor, an 
additional filing fee of $20.00 is required. Whether the amendment adds just one creditor or whether it 
adds 100, the cost is still $20.00. 
. If the client has failed to claim an exemption to which he/she is entitled or fails to list an asset, 
an amendment must be prepared and served upon the trustee but no additional fee is required. 
B. Redeeming Property 
The Debtor's option to redeem property which is the subject of a secured creditor's claim was 
discussed supra. A written motion seeking court approval of the redemption amount must be filed. 
Having met with the creditor and client following the creditors' meeting, the attorney will be able to 
complete the motion to redeem property. A copy of the Western District of Kentucky form, provided in 
Local Rule 23, is attached as Appendix G. The Eastern District of Kentucky has also adopted a form for 
use in redeeming property and it can be found in the local rules of that court. 
C. Uen Avoidance 
If any asset in which a client has claimed an exemption is subject to a judicial lien, counsel must 
consider filing a motion to avoid that lien under 11 U.S.C.§ 522(f). Let us consider an example. 
Assume that your client's residence was worth $12,000.00 and assume further 
that a debt of $3,800 was owed to a creditor which was properly secured by a 
real estate mortgage. A general creditor had obtained a judgment of $8,317 
and had recorded a judgment lien. Your client has a homestead exemption of 
$5,000, pursuant to KRS 427.060. You file your motion to avoid the lien of the 
general creditor because it impairs the exemption of your client. Without the 
judgment lien, the homestead is worth a sufficient amount, if sold, to pay the 
first mortgageholder and your client's $5,000 entitlement. Your motion will be 
granted, in part. The Court will conclude that the amount of the first 
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mortgageholder's debt and the exemption is $8,800 so the remaining value of 
the residence, $3,200, will be subjected to the judgment lien. If the sum of the 
valid mortgage and the exemption exceeded the value of the property, then the 
judgment lien would be avoided altogether. See, In re Powell, 173 B. R. 338 
(Bkrtcy. E. D. Ky. 1994). 
Lien avoidance has generated litigation in recent years. The Sixth Orcuit ruled that Ohio law 
prevented the use of lien avoidance unless a foreclosure proceeding had been commenced before the 
bankruptcy case was filed. In re Moreland, 21 F. 3d 102 (6th Or. 1990); In re Dixon, 885 F. 2d 327 (1989). 
Because of similarities in Ohio and Kentucky statutes, Kentucky practitioners generally regarded these 
cases were dispositive of the issue. In 1994, Judge William Howard was called upon to squarely address 
lien avoidance, comparing our Kentucky statutes with those of Ohio. He concluded that lien avoidance 
in the Commonwealth was appropriate even if the creditor had not sued for foreclosure. In re Powell, 
supra. The Western District of Kentucky followed the Powell decision, but imposed a sixty day time . 
limit, following the first meeting of creditors, within which to file the motion. In re Hunter.164 B. R. 738 
(Bkrtcy W.O. Ky. 1994). 
With lien avoidance firmly in Kentucky case law, more recent opinions have focussed on the 
effect of judgment liens prospectively, after bankruptcy. A judgment lien creditor was forced to release 
its lien after it had received the value of its judgment liens from estate property, thereby allowing the 
debtor to acquire additional property post petition without the specter of the lien. In re Stidham, 1995 
WL876391 (Bkrtcy E. D. Ky.). In another case, the debtor owned no real property; nevertheless a judgment 
lien had been filed to encumber any property which might someday be acquired. Cautioning that he 
would not make a practice ofissuing such orders, the bankruptcy judge required the creditor to release 
the judgment lien to facilitate the debtor's future real property acquiSition. In re Norvell. 198 B. R. 697 
(BkrtcyW.D. Ky. 1996). 
Bankruptcy Courts for both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky have adopted Official 
Forms for use in filing motion to avoid liens. Attached hereto as Appendix H is the Western District 
form. Also refer to Form Number 5(b) for the Eastern District of Kentucky in the Local Rules. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
1iiallawyers labor for years and risk thousands of dollars in costs to develop a case which may 
have an economic effect on their clients' lives as great as the relief which a properly handled Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case will bring. Through your efforts, clients can be discharged of thousands of dollars of 
debt which they otherwise would have struggled for years to satisfy. Within sixty (60) days, an attorney 
can actually see the fruits of his or her labors. Few other legal specialities provide such positive 
reinforcement. 
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A. 
Appendix 
Reaffinnation Agreement 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPl'CY COURI' 
FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRICI' OF KENTUCKY 
INRE: ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. _______ _ 
Debtors 
REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT 
The debtors reaffirmation agreement is as follows: 
1. REAFFIRMATION - The debtors reaffirm to pay , in accordance with the loan 
documents, <copies are attached), the sum of $ , the principal balance due, plus interest at the rate set forth 
in the instruments from , at the rate of $ per month until fully paid, beginning 
on _____ .
2. This agreement does/does not change the terms of the original contract. 
Payment is secured by the following property with the value to the secured creditor as indicated: 
3. PAST DUE PAYMENTS - In addition to the monthly payments provided in paragraph one (1) above, 
the debtors agree to make up payments as follows: __________________ _ 
(if applicable) 
4. RESCISSION PERIOD - THE DEBTOR(S) MAY RESCIND TIllS AGREEMENT BY GIVING 
NOTICE TO THE CREDITOR AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE LAST DATE FOR FILING DISCHARGEABILITY 
COMPLAINTS OR SIXTY (60) DAYS AFl'ER TIllS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT, 
WHICHEVER DATE IS LATE~ BY GIVING NOTICE OF RESCISSION TO THE HOLDER OF THE CLAIM. 
Executed this the __ day of _______ -', 19 __ • 
Debtor Debtor 
ACCEPl'ED AND AGREED TO: 
B~~------------------Creditor ntle 
A-17 
AfFIDAVIT OFATIORNEXFOR DEBTQR(S) 
I, • attorney for the debtors in the above captioned bankruptcy 
proceeding declare that I represented the debtors during the negotiation of the foregoing Agreement and that said 
Agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtors which does not impose an undue 
hardship on the debtors or a dependent of the debtor. I have fully advised the debtors of the legal effect and 
consequences of this agreement and any default under the agreement. 
Date Attorney for Debtor(s) 
A-IS 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
j 
J 
l 
J 
• 
• 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
1 
B. Bankruptcy Questionaire 
CLIENT QUESTIONS-Individual or Joint 
Name and Other Information 
You: 
1. a. 
Spouse: 
Name:~ __________________ ~ ____________________________________ __ 
(1) MaiUng _______________________ _ 
a) Addreu: ____________________________________________ _ 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
T~~hoM:(~--~),-----~-----------
Cou~----------------------------------------------------
Have you moved within the last two years? 
___ No ___ Yes 
(a) If Yes, enter addresses, occupancy dates, and names used: 
(8) Are mailing address and residence the same? 
__ No __ Yes 
If No, enter the residence below: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(9) Social security number: __ -__ -__ 
(10) Tax identification number: _________ _ 
(11) Gender: __ Male _Female 
(12) Marital status: 
__ Never Married 
__ Divorced __ Widowed 
__ Married and living together 
__ Married and living apart 
(13) Other names used in last six years: 
b. Name: __ ---------------~-------------~-------------------(1) Mailing _____________________________________________ __ 
a) Address: ________________________________________________ _ 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) Tel~hone: ( ) (6) County: _________ -:--____________________ __ 
(7) Have you moved within the last two years? 
__ No __ Yes 
(a) If Yes, enter addresses, occupancy dates, and names used: 
(8) Are mailing address and residence the same? 
__ No __ Yes 
A-19 
2. a. 
b. 
If No, enter the residence below: 
~)'---------------------------------------­~)-~---------------------------------­~)'-----------------------------------------------------(d) ____ ~--------------------(9) Social security number: __ -___ -__ _ 
(10) Tax identification number: 
(11) Other names used in last six years: 
Are you currently employed? _Yes _No 
If Yes, provide the following information about employment: 0) Emp~yer~n~, ____________________________________________ _ 
(2) Employer's address: __________________________________________ __ 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) Telephone: C ) ___ ' ___ __ 
(6) Occupation and natureofbusiness:, ____________________ __ 
(7) Dates employed:~----:---::__':"'""":'-------------------------------
(8) Relationship to business described above: 
_Employee ___ Owner 
If more than one emp~yer, provide the information requested 
above about other employer(s): 
Is your spouse currently employed? __ Yes No 
If Yes, provide the following information about employment: (1) Employer's name: ____________________________ __ 
Q) Emp~yer's address: _________________________ _ 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) Telephone: C'-_--J_-:--_ ___ _ 
(6) Occupation and nature ofbusiness:, _______________________ _ 
(7) Dates employed: ___ -:-~::--:--:--------------------------
(8) Relationship to business descn"bed above: 
_Employee _Owner 
If more than one employer, provide the information requested above about other 
employer(s): 
3. Please provide the ~ income received from your prindpal place of employment (If unemployed, write 
~ at Source(s): 
You 
(a) This year: 19 ___ (i) SOurce: _________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $, ___ _ 
~) Last year: 19 ___ (i) Source: __________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $, ____ __ 
(e) Previous year: 19 ___ (i) SOurce: _________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $, ___ _ 
A-20 
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Spouse 
b. 
4. a. 
b . 
c. 
(a) This year: 19 __ '_ ro ~__________________________________ _ 
(Ii) Amount: $, ____ _ 
(b) Last year: 19 __ G) Sou~:~ ______________________________________ _ 
(Ii) Amount: $, ____ _ 
(c) Previousyear:19 __ (I) Source:--:-__________________ _ 
(Ii) Amount: $, ____ _ 
Have you received any other income, other than income received from your principal employment? 
__ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide the following information 
You 
(a) This year: 19 __ 
(i) Source(s): _____________________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $, ____ _ 
(b) Last year: 19 __ 
(i) SO~(s): ___________________ _ 
(Ii) Amount: $, ____ _ 
(c) Previous year: 19 __ (i) Sou~(s): ___________________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $'---__ __ 
Spouse: 
(a) This year: 19 __ 
ro Source(s): ___________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $~ __ __ 
(b) Last year: 19 __ (i) Source(s): _____________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $'---__ __ 
(c) Previous year: 19 __ 
ro SOu~(s): _____________________________ _ 
(ii) Amount: $~ __ __ 
Have you made any PAYMENTS to anybody, within the past year of more than $600 other than 
normal scheduled payments? __ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each creditor: Name & Address _________________________ __ 
Amount and Date, _________________________ _ 
Relationship, if any, to you, ______________________ _ 
Has any creditor ATIACHED/CARNISHED/SEIZED property within last year? _No _Yes 
If Yes, provide for each garnishment or attachment: Name & Address _____________________________________ __ 
Date of garnishment or attachment, ______________________________________ _ 
Property garnished or attached, ________________________________________ _ 
V~ue, ________________________________________________________ ___ 
Has any creditor REPOSSESSED/FORECLOSED/RETURNED property within last year? 
___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each repossession/foreclosure or return: 
Name&Address, _____________________ ~----------------------------
A- 21 
d. 
e. 
Date of repossession, foreclosure or retum, __________________ _ 
Property repossessed, foreclosed upon or returned ______________ _ 
V~ue. _______________________________________________________ _ 
Have you given any creditor a mortgage or lien against any property within the last year? 
___ No _Yes 
If Yes, provide for each lien: 
Name&Address, ______________ ~-----------------------------
Date of lien. __________________________________________ __ 
Propertymort~~-----------------------------
V~ue; __ ~---~-----------------------Relationship to you, if any ___________________________________________ _ 
Has any creditor taken a SETOFF within last 90 days? 
___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each setoff: Name & Address ___________________________________________ _ 
Dateofsetoff _______________________________________________ _ 
Amountsetoff __________________________________________________ ___ 
5. Are you named in any LAWSUITS within last year? ___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each lawsuit: 
TItle of lawsuit. _________________________________________________________ _ 
Num~ __________________________________________________________ _ 
Type of suit _________________________________________________________ __ 
Starus~ ___________________________________________________________ _ 
Court name and location. ___________________________________________ _ 
TItle oflawsuit. ________________________________________________ ___ 
Numb~ ______________________________________________________ _ 
Typeofsuit. _______________________________________________________ __ 
Status, _______________________________________________________________ _ 
Court name and location _______________________________________________ __ 
6. Has any of your property been placed into a Court appointed RECEIVERSHIP within last year? 
_No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide the name and address of custodian; court name and location; title, num~, and date of the 
ord~; and property description and value: 
Name&Addressofcustod~n ____________________________________________ __ 
Courtna~eandlocation __________________________________________________ __ 
DateofCOurt~~ ___________________________________ ~----------------
Property placed into receivership ____________________ .:...-__ 
Value~ _______________________________________________________ ___ 
7. Have you made any GIFr or CONTRIBurION within the past year oth~ than the normal gifts to family 
mem~ or charitable organizations? 
__ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each gift or contribution: Name & Address. ___________________________________________________ __ 
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RemtioMhlpmyou~ ________________________________________________ ___ 
Da~of~ft~ ______________________________________________________ __ 
~~~wm, ____________________________________________________ __ 
V~ue, __ ~ ____________________________________________________________ __ 
8. Any LOSSES from fire, theft, etc. withln mst year? ___ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide of each loss: 
~~w~, _________________________________________________________ _ 
V~ue, ___________________________________________________________ __ 
n.~ofloss~~~ ____________________________________________________ __ 
CUamuumcesofw"~ _________________________________________________ _ 
COYeredbyiMunm~? ________________________________________________ ___ 
Name and address of insurance company ____________________________________ _ 
Smtusofc~ _____________________________________________________ __ 
9. Have you coMulted and paid any other attorneys Cor DEBT COUNSELING? ___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each attorney: 
Name&Address~ ________________________________________________ _ 
Da~ of payments and amounts ________________________________________ __ 
10. Have you made any TRANSFERS or CONVEYANCES of your property, within the past year? 
_No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each traMfer: Name & Address, ___________________________________________ _ 
RemtioMhip, if any, m you _________________________________________________ _ 
Da~oftraMfer ___________________________________________________ ~------
~pertytrans~ ______________________________________________________ _ 
V~ue~cived, _________________________________________________________ ___ 
11. Have you closed any bank ACCOUNTS within mst year? ___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each account: Name & Address ofbank ________________________________________________ _ 
Typeandnumberofaccourn, _______________________________________________ _ 
Final bala~, _________________________________ _ 
Da~ of closin,l!jg __________________________________ _ 
12. Have you maintained any SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES withln last year? ___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide for each box: 
Name & Address ofbank. ____________________________________________________ _ 
Name Address of person(s) with access m box ______________ -------------------------
Description of con~nts and values 
n.~ surrendered (if applicable) 
13. Are you currently in possession of any property belonging to another i.e. household goods, cars, etc.? 
___ No _Yes 
If Yes, provide for each property: Name&Addressofowner __________________________________________________ __ 
Descriptionofproperty __________________________________________________ ___ 
Locationofproperty ____________________________________________________ ___ 
Valueofproperty ________________________________________________________ __ 
A-23 
14. Are you currently a party to any contracts that have not been completed, unexpired lease Ilgreements, or 
timeshare agreements? __ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide the following information for each contract/lease: Name & Addns:. ____________________________________ __ 
Description of property involved:. _______________________ _ 
Terms of the contract _____________________________ _ 
Name & Addns: ___________________________ _ 
Description of property involved: ______________________ _ 
Terms of the contract ___________________________ _ 
Have you ever filed bankruptcy before? __ no ~es 
If Yes, provide the following information about petition: (1) Nameoffiler: _______________________ _ 
(2) Location (district) filed:. ____________________ _ 
(3) Casenumber:. ___________________________ _ 
(4) Date filed: --'_/_ 
(5) Judge:-=---:':"---:=-_--:-~-----------------(6) Status (Pending, Dismissed, Judgment): 
Has a business partner or your spouse ever filed bankruptcy? __ No _Yes 
If Yes, provide the following information about case: (1) Name of filer: ________________________________ _ 
(2) Relationship:. _________________________ _ 
(3) Location (district) filed: ____________________ _ 
(4) Case number: ________________________________________ _ 
(5) Date filed: _1_1_ 
(6) Judge and status: 
CUENT QUESTIONf-INDIVIDUALS IN BUSINESS 
15. Have you been a partner, etc., or five percent owner of any other businesses within the last two years? 
___ No ___ Yes 
If Yes, provide: 
Name&AddressofEnti~-------------______________________ __ 
Nature ofbusiness __________________ _ 
Dates ofoperation. __________________________ _ 
17. Has someone other than yourself kept your books of account within last six years? 
__ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide: Name & Address ________________________________ _ 
Period of time books were kept ________________________ _ 
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18. Has any person AUDITED your books of account during last six years? _No _Yes 
If Yes, provide: 
Name&Add~: ____________________________________________________ ___ 
Period of time books audited:, _______________________ _ 
19. Is any person, other than yourself, CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION of books of account? 
__ No_Yes 
If Yes, provide: 
Name&Add~ ____________________________________________________ ___ 
Are aU your books currently available? 
_No __ Yes 
IfYes,~plam ____________________________________________________ ___ 
20. Have you issued any FINANCIAL S1'ATEMENTS in last two years to creditors or others? __ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide the name and address of person(s) receiving statement(s), and date(s) issued: 
Name&Add~: ___________________________________ _ 
Dateissued: ________________ _ 
21. Have you preformed any inventories within the last two years? __ No __ Yes 
If Yes, provide the following information: 
a. Last inventory: 
(1) Date: _1_1_ 
(2) Name and address of person with records: 
(3) Inventory dollar amount (cost, market, other): 
b. Previous inventory (if no previous inventory, write None in date space): 
(1) Date: _1--'_ 
(2) Name and address of person with records: 
(3) Inventory dollar amount (cost, market, other): 
TAX CREDITORS: 
Do you owe any taxing authorities: ---Ye5 __ no 
If yes, please answer the following questions (use a separate sheet for additional tax creditors, if necessary): 
a. Name&Address, ___________________________________ ~ __ _ 
A-25 
~m~x. __ ~~--------------~~----------------------------------Person incurred debt --you __ spouse ---Pint 
Is anyone else responsible for debt --Ye5 __ no 
If yes, please provide Name&Address, ___ ~ _________________________________________________ __ 
Relationship to you. _____________________________________________________ _ 
Duedebt~smcurred ___________________________________ _ 
Amountdue. ________________________________________________________ _ 
Doyouagme~ththisamount~ _________________________________________ _ 
Does the creditor owe you money? __ no --Ye5 
Ifyes,~~n~------------------------------------------------------
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
------Yell ___ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
b. Name & Address. ______________________________________________________ _ 
~oftax.--~~--------------~~---------------------------------
Person incurred debt --you ___ spouse ---pmt 
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes __ no 
If yes, provide: Name & Address. _______________________________________________________ __ 
RelatioMhlpto you. ______________________________________________________ __ 
Date debt was incurred _____________________________________________________ __ 
Amountdue. ___________________________________________________________ _ 
Doyoua~~ththisamount.--~----------------------------------------------
Does the creditor owe you money? ___ no --yes 
Ifyes,~l~n~--------------------------------------------------
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
~ __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
SECURED CREDITORS: 
Please provide the following information about all creditors that have a lien on any of your property. Use a 
separate sheet of paper for additional secured creditors, if necessaty. 
a) Name & Address of secured creditor ______________________________________________ _ 
Aanuntnumber~~--~~------------------------------------------------Are you related to this creditor many way __ --:--:--__________________________________ _ 
Person incurred debt --you ___ spouse ---'pint 
Is anyone else respoMible for debt --Ye5 ___ no 
If yes, provide: Name & Address ________________________________________________________ __ 
Relationship to you 
Does the debt involve=-a=-=n=-u:-:-:n=-ex=p';"ired-:-;--co-n-:-tr-a-ct=-o-r"";lea--se-------------------------------------
Date debt ~s incurred. _________________________ __ 
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~ountdue, __________________________________ _ 
Do you agree with this amount? ____________ _ 
Does the aeditor owe you money? __ no ---Ye5 
If~,~lmn,------------------------------
Has aeditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agenCY?---Jyes __ no 
If~, 
Name&Address~ ___________________________ __ 
Has aeditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
~ __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
Description of the collateral, __________________________ __ 
~r~v~ueofrollat~. ___________ _ 
Do you wish to keep this property ________ __ 
b) Name & Address of secured creditor __________________________ _ 
Accountnumber~~--~~~--------------------­
Are you related to this aeditor in any way __ --:-~--------­
Person incurred debt --you __ spouse ----Pint 
Is anyone else responsible for debt ---yes __ no 
If~, provide: Name & Address, __________________________________________________________ __ 
Relationship to you. _________________________________________________________ _ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease:....-__________________________________ _ 
Daredebtwasincurred ______________________________________________________ ___ 
Amountdue'---~~------~-----------------------
Do you agree with this amount?~---------------------
Does the creditor owe you money? __ no ---yes 
If yes, ~lain,--------------------------------
Has aeditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?~ __ no 
If yes, Name & Address ____________________________ __ 
Has aeditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
-Y8S __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
~riptionof~ecollateral ____________________________________________________ __ 
~~v~ueofrollat~l, __________________________ __ 
Doyouwishtokeepthispro~rty--------------------_______ _ 
c) Name & Address of secured aeditor ____________________________________________ _ 
Acrountnumber _______ --------------------------
Are you related to this aeditor in any way __ --:-__________ _ 
Person incurred debt --you __ spouse ----Pint 
Is anyone else responSible for debt ---yes __ no 
If yes, provide: 
A-27 
Name&Add~s, ________________________________________________________ __ 
Relationship to you. _______________________________________ ......, ___ _ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease, ________________________ _ 
Date debt was inc:urred ________________________ _ 
Amountdue._~~-----~------------------
Do you agree with this amount?~-----------------
Does the creditor owe you money? ___ no --yes 
If~,~~~--------------------------------------------------
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?--Y'S __ no 
If~, 
Name&Add~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
----Ye5 __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
Description ofthecollateral, ________________________________ _ 
Marl<etvalue of collateral. ______________ __ 
Do you wish to keep this property _____________ __ 
UNSECURED CREDrrORS: 
Please provide the following information about all unsecured creditors. This will include all credit cards, 
doctors bUls, personal notes, etc. Use a separate sheet of paper for additional unsecured creditors, if necessary. 
a) Name & Add~s of unsecured creditor ___________________________ _ 
Accountnum~ ________________________________ _ 
Are you related to this creditor in any way _____ _ 
Person incurred debt -you ___ spouse -Pint 
Is anyone else ~ponsible for debt --Ye5 ___ no 
If~, provide: 
Name&Add~s, _________________________________ __ 
Relationship to you __________________________________________________ ___ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease'--_________________ _ 
Datedebtwasincurred ___________________________ __ 
Amountdue, ______ ~------------Do you agree with this amount? ___________ __ 
Does the creditor owe you money? __ no --Ye5 
If~,~~n,------------------------------------------________ __ 
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?----Ye5 __ no 
If yes, Name & Address ______________________________ _ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
----Ye5 __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
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b) Name &r: Address of unsecured creditor _____________________ _ 
Accountnwnber ____________________________________________ _ 
Are you related to this creditor in any way ___________________________ __ 
Person incurred debt --you __ spouse ---pint 
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes __ no 
If yes, provide: 
Name&r:Address~ ____________________________ _ 
Relationship to you _____ --:--:--:_ .......... _--: __________________ _ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease, ____ _ 
Date debt was incurred _____________ _ 
Amountdue~ _________________________________ _ 
Do you agree with this amount? ____________________ _ 
Does the creditor owe you money? __ no -.--.:yes 
Ifyes,ppl~n~ ____________________________________ __ 
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency? ---Ye5 __ no 
If~ , Name&r:Address, ____________________________________________________________ _ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
---Ye5 __ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
c) Name &r: Address of unsecured creditor ___________________________________________ _ 
Accountnumber _______________________________________________ _ 
Are you related to this creditor in any way _____________________________ __ 
Person incurred debt --you __ spouse ---Pint 
Is anyone else responSible for debt --yes __ no 
If yes, provide: Name&r:Address. ___________________________________________ _ 
Relationship to you, ______________________________________________________ _ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease'--' ___ _ 
Datedebtwasincurred __________________________ _ 
Amountdue. ________ ~----------------Do you agree with this amount? _______________ _ 
Does the creditor owe you money? __ no --yes 
Ifyes,expl~n _____________________________________________________________ _ 
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency?---Ye5 __ no 
If yes, Name&r:Address, __________________________________________ _ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 
-------Ye5 ___ no 
If yes, include on question 5 on client questions 
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I 
d) Name & Address of unsecured creditor ________________________ 
Accountnurnber______________________________________________________________ 
Are you related to this creditor in any way __~--------------------------------­

Person incurred debt ---you __spouse -pint 

Is anyone else responsible for debt ---yes __no 

If yes, provide: 

N~e&Address._________________________________________ 
Relationship toyou __________________________________ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease._______ 
Date debt was incurred. __________________ 

Amountdue.____________________________________ 

Do you agree with this amount? ____________________ 

Does the creditor owe you money? ___no ---yes

Ifyes,explain.___________________________________________ 
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency? ------yes __no 
Ifyes,Name&Address___________________________________ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this d~bt? 

------yes __no 

Ifyes, include on question 5 on client questions 

e) Name & Address of unsecured creditor ______________________________________________ 
Accountnurnber________________________________________ 
Are you related to this creditor in any way __________________________ 
Person incurred debt ---you __spouse --pint 
Is anyone else responsible for debt --yes __no 
Ifyes, provide: 
Name &Address _________________________________________________ 
Rruationshiptoyou___________________________________ 
Does the debt involve an unexpired contract or lease_______ 
Date debt was incurred. _________________ 

Amountdue______________________________ 

Do you agree with this amount? ____________________ 

Does the creditor owe you money? __no --yes
Ifyes,explain,_______________________________________ 
Has creditor turned this account over to an attorney or collection agency? -----Jfes __no 
Ifyes,
Name &Address __________________________________________________ 
Has creditor brought a lawsuit against you for this debt? 

------yes __no 

Ifyes, include on question 5 on client questions 
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I 
• PROPERlY QUESI'IONS 
Please answer the following questions about your property. Ifyou do not own any property of the type 
requested, simply write "NONEH • 
What real estate do you own an interest in. Please provide the address of the property, and the market value. 
How much cash do youhave?_____________________________ 
Please list all checking and savings accounts. Bankname&address ________________________________________________ 
TYPeofa~ount __________________________________________________________ 
Balance~____________________________________________ 
On a separate sheet of paper, list all ofyour household goods with the market value of each item. 

What is the value of your wearing apparel, _________________________ 

What is the value of your jewelry____________________________ 

Do you own any firearms? Ifyes, please list with values. __-.,.._________________ 

Does your life insurance have a cash surrender value? Ifyes, how much and what insurance company ____ 

Value ofanyannuities. _______________________________ 

Value and location ofany interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh or other pension pIans. ____________ 

Valueofanystocks~_________________________________ 
Value of any interests in partnerships.____________________________ 
Value of any bonds.__________________________________ 
Does anyone owe you money? If yes~ who and how much ________________________ 
Are you owed a tax refund. _________________________________ 

Please list all automobiles, trucks and trailers and their values _______________________ 

Value of any boats___________________________________ 

List and value of office equipment _____________________________________ 

Attach list and values ofequipment used in business, if any. 

Valueofinventory_________________________~_________ 

A- 31 

List and value of any crops, stored or growingo-_____________________ _ 
.. 
Attach list and value of any farm equipment'--_____________________ _ 
.. 
List and value any livestock ____________________________ _ 
.. 
List and value any other property not listed above. ____________________ _ 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
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c. Fee Agreement 
BANI<RUPI'CY FEE AGREEMENr 
The undersigned, whether one or more persons, hereby retain the law firm of , for 
representation in a bankruptcy proceeding in the bankruptcy division of the U. S. District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky. The undersigned agree to pay~law firm the sum of DOLLARS AND no/lOO 
($~ as a retainer in this proceeding. The undersigned' also agree to pay the filing fee and all other costs of this 
action. The undersigned further understand that a record of the attorneys' time spent in worlcing on this bankruptcy 
is being kept and that said attorneys will bill for the same at the rate of DOLLARS ($.-J per hour. In the 
event said attorneys' time, at such hourly rates, exceed the retainelj the undersigned further agree to pay and be 
responsible for that additional time. The retainer does not apply to any adversary proceedings which may be 
brought as a result of this bankruptcy. Nor does it apply to negotiations with creditors (other than meetings with 
creditors which occur at the first meeting of creditors). Additional retainers may be required from the debtors in 
the event of an adversary proceeding or extensive aeditor negotiations. Unless attorney fees are paid promptly 
, reserves the right to withdraw from this proceeding with court approval at any time. 
The undersigned further authorize and direct that any telephone expense may be charged to 
the number of __ • 
This the __ day of _____ -I, 19_. 
Debtor 
Debtor 
STATE OF KENTUCKY 
COUNTY OF •• .scr. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by_--" on this the __ day of ____ .-I 
19_. 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public 
(Notarial Seal) 
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D. Disclosure of Compensation of Attomeyfor Debtor 
Phone: 
Attorney for the Petitioners 
Inre 
Debtor 
UNITED SfATES BANKRUPfCY COURI' FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRlcr OF KEN11JCKY 
___ DMSION 
Case No.: 
Social Security No.: _~~ __ _ 
and Debtor's Employer's Tax 
Rule 2016(b) - Statement of 
Attomey Compensation 
Chapter ______ _ 
Identification No.:, ______ _ 
Debtor 
Social Security No.:, ___________ _ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
DISCLOSURE OF COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b), I certify that I am the attorney for the 
above-named debtor(s) and that compensation paid to me within one year before the filing of the 
petition in bankruptcy, or agreed to be paid to me, for services rendered or to be rendered on behalf of 
the debtor(s) in contemplation or in connection with the bankruptcy case is as follows: 
For legal services in connection with this case I have agreed to 
accept ................................................................................................................ $ or 
See Below 
Prior to the filing of this statement, I have 
received ....•..........•.•.•.............•..........................•............•.•......•••••••.........••..•...•. $, ____ _ 
Balance Due ..........................................•••.................•.....•........•........•.•............ See below 
(This is only used if there are special arrangements made for payment other than payment in full at 
flling) 
The debtor agrees to pay the firm of $ at Elling and an additional 
$ __ at the (first meeting of creditors or other designation) plus any amounts 
over and above the retainer at their normal hourly rate. 
The source of the compensation paid to me was: 
I I Debtor I I Other (specify) 
The source of compensation to be paid to me is: 
I I Debtor I I Other (speciCy) 
A-35 
4. I I I have not agreed to share the above-disclosed compensation with any other person unless they are 
members and associates of my law firm. 
I I I have agreed to share the above-disclosed compensation with a person or persons who are not 
members or assodates of my law firm. A copy of the agreement, together with a list of the names 
of the people sharing in the compensation, is attached. 
5. In return for the above-disclosed fee, I have agreed to render legal services including: 
6. 
a. Preparation and filing of any petition, schedules, statement of affairs and plan which may be 
required; 
b. Representation of the debtor at the initial meeting of aeditors; 
c. Other provisions: 
The debtor agrees to pay the firm of ____ at their normal hourly rate, any amounts over 
and above the retainer. 
By agreement with the debtor(s), the above-disclosed fee does not include the following services: 
The standard fee agreement is for the basic bankruptcy proceedings listed above and does not 
include representation in advenaty proceeding or tax counseling. If any other services are required 
the fee will be discussed at that time. 
In re __________ _ 
Case No. (if known) 
Debtors 
CERI1FICATION 
I certify that the foregoing is a complete statement of any agreement or arrangement for payment to me 
for representation of the debtor(s) in this bankruptcy proceeding. 
Date Signature of Attorney 
Name of law firm 
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E. 
YS. 
Notice of Stay 
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 
CIRCUIT /DISTRICf COURI' 
CASE NO. _____ _ 
NOIlCEOF STAY 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANTS 
All interested persons will please take notice that ____ -'. have/has filed, on ___ ..I 
199-, in the United States Banlcruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky, a petition under the provisions of 
Chapter _ of the United States Bankruptcy Code where said action is pending as Case No. _____ '
You will further take notice that 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1) provides for an automatic stay of all 
proceedings of this action. 
______ --', are/is represented in the above-mentioned Chapter ____ by the 
undersigned counsel. 
Respectively submitted, 
DEITZ &t FREEBURGER, P.S.C. 
536 Chestnut Street 
P. O. Box 21 
Henderson, KY 42420 
(502) 830-0830 
By: 
Attorney for Debtor 
CERIlFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Stay was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to ; this the _ day of , 199_. 
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F. 
INRE: 
Amendment to Schedules 
DEBTOR(S) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPfCY COURl' 
FOR THE WESTERN DlSTRIcr OF KENTUCKY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO., ________ _ 
AMENDMENTlP SCHEDULES 
Comes the debtor(s) and states that through error and Inadvertence, ___ failed to list in schedule the 
following: 
INSTRUcrIONS FOR COMPLETING AMENDMENTS 
oN~E~DEOF~SFORM 
If amendment lists you as a Creditor, you have 90 days from the date of certification of mailing of 
amendment within which to file a proof of claim. (ONLY IF CASE IS A CHAPl'ER 13 OR ASScr 
CHAPTER 7). 
The undersigned certifies under penalties of perjury, that I have read the foregoing amendment, and certify that 
the statements therein contained are true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
Executed on: _________ _ 
_________ --', Debtor 
Executed on: _________ _ 
_________ --', Debtor 
A-39 
INRE: 
DEBTOR(S) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPI'CY COURr 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICf OF KENTUCKY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASENQ, ________________ _ 
CERTlBCATE OF SERVICE AND 
NanCE OF AMENDMENT TO SCHEDULES 
I hereby certify that a copy of the attached Amendment to Schedules was this the ____ day of 
_____ --J' 199_forwarded to: 
(List any creditor who has not been previously listed 
and the trustee. Provide complete addresses.) 
____________ ,TNstee 
along with a copy of the Order for Meetins of Creditors by depositing a copy of same in the United States man, 
properly addressed and postage prepaid. 
Attorney for Debtor(s) 
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G. Motion and Order to Redeem Property 
INRE: 
UNITED S1'ATES BANKRUPfCY COURI' 
FOR THE 
WESTERN Dl5l'Rlcr OF KENTUCKY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER 
____ ~~~~~n~sL) _________________ ) 
MOTION TO REDEEM PROPERlY 
Debtor(s) hereby move(s) the Court pursuant to Section 722 of litle 11, United States Code, for an Order 
permitting the Debtor(s) to redeem an item of tangible personal property from a lien securing a dischargeable 
consumer debt. 
1) The item of personal property involved is ____ --', which is intended primarily for personal, family 
or household use. 
2) The debtor originally purchased the property on _____ and the original purchase price was $~ __ , 
3) The debtor has/has not obtained an appraisal and believes the fair market value of the property to be 
$~----, 
4) The debtor represents that the debtor will have cash available to redeem the property within ten (10) days 
of the entry of the requested Order. 
S) The security interest of in said property, except to the extent of the amount of the allowed 
secured claim of said creditor, is a dischargeable consumer debt. 
6) The amount of the allowed secured claim of said creditor has been or should be fixed by Court as the sum 
ofS, _____ , 
WHEREFORE, the Debtor moves the Court for an Order permitting the Debtor to redeem said property by paying 
said creditor the aforesaid sum, and finding that the remainder of the claim of said creditor is a dischargeable 
consumer debt. 
Attorney for Debtor(s) 
CERI1FICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing motion to redeem was served by regular mail upon ______ -' 
this the __ day of ,199_. 
Attorney for Debtor(s) 
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INRE: 
UNITEO STATES BANKRUPI'CY COURI' 
FOR THE 
WESTERN DlSTRIcr OF KENTUCKY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASENUMBBR 
__ -"oe~b~towrC~s)r.-________ ) 
ORDER TO REDEEM PROPERTY 
No objections having been filed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to redeem the __ .... be SUSTAINED. 
IT IS FURl'HER ORDERED that the debtor shall tender to __ the sum of$. ___ which is 
the amount of the allowed secured claim fixed by this Court within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order. 
ENTERED BY ORDER OFCOURr 
Date:. ____ _ 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
Prepared by: 
Phone: _________ _ 
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H. 
INRE: 
Motion to Avoid Lien with Order 
DEBTOR(S) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICf OF KENTUCKY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO., ____ _ 
---------------------------) 
MOUONTO AVOID LIEN 
Debtor, by counsel, hereby moves the Court pursuant to Section 522(0 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid 
the lien on the following described property: 
In support of said Motion, Debtor states: 
1. _______ --I, a creditor, filed a lien in the Office of the Clerk of _____ and a copy of the 
lien is attached. 
2. The amount of the claim which the lien secures is $:...-____ --' 
3. The above mentioned lien is a ________ lien. 
4. Debtor submits the following information on the value of the property: 
A). Fair Market Value: $, _____ , 
B). Value listed in Schedules: $'--___ __ 
o. Value according to records of County Property Valuation Administration: 
$~-----------
D). Purchase Price: $, ________ -' 
E). Date of Purchase: _______ '
Fl. Appraised Value (if recently appraised): $. ______ ... 
5. The trustee haslhas not abandoned the property. 
6. The debtor does/does not claim an exemption of $~ ______ in said property. 
7. The lien held by the creditor impairs the exemption of the debtor in the property described in the 
motion. 
A-43 
WHEREFORE, the debtor moves the Court to order the lien void and for such other relief as may be 
entitled. Any objection to this Motion must be filed within lS days of the certificate of service date below. If no 
objections are received, an order approving this motion to avoid lien may be entered. 
CERTIBCATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of this motion was served by first class mail upon, ________ : this the_day 
of ___ ..... l99_. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
Attorney for Debtor 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
. WESTERN DISTRICI' OF KENTUCKY 
INRE: 
DEBTOR(S) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------) 
No objections having been filed, 
CASE NO., _____ _ 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Avoid Lien of ____ in the following property be, and 
is, SUSTAINED. 
Property Description: 
A copy of this Order shaD be mailed to the attorney for debtor(s), trustee, and the above-named creditor. 
Louisville, Kentucky 
Dated: ____ _ 
~=~~=~~==~==-..J.JUDGE UNITED STATES BANKRUPfCY eOURI' 
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HANDLING CASES WITH THE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The "Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Act of 1986" enacted 
on October 27, 1986, paved the way for the creation of United States Trustee's office which began 
operating in Kentucky on September 7, 1988. While two states-North Carolina and Alabama-are 
currently not a part of the United States Trustee system, all other states are. The offices are grouped 
according to geographical considerations into regions which total twenty-one. Kentucky and 
Tennessee make up Region 8. The headquarters for Region 8 is located in Memphis, Tennessee, the 
largest city in the region. 
The United States Trustee supervises and maintains chapter 11, 12, and 13 trustees, and a 
panel of chapter 7 trustees. This section will focus only on the chapter 7 aspects of the United States 
Trustee's duties as they relate to consumer bankruptcy matters. 
A. Statutory Authority 
Those laws involving the establishment of the United States Trustee program are not to be 
found in Title 11, The Bankruptcy Code, but are located in Title 28, Part II, Department of Justice. 
The duties of the United States Trustee are set forth at 28 U.S.C. §586. The duties of the United 
States Trustee most salient to chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases are set forth below: 
1. 
2. 
The duty to establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of private 
trustees that are eligible and available to serve as trustees in cases 
under chapter 7 of Title 11 (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(I)); 
The duty to supervise the administration of cases and trustees in 
cases under Title 11, whenever the United States Trustee deems it 
appropriate by: 
a. Reviewing applications filed for compensation and 
reimbursement under section 330 of Title 11 and filing 
comments or objections (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(A)(i)); 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Taking such action to ensure that all reports, schedules, 
and fees are properly and timely filed (28 U.S.C. 
§586(a)(3)(D)); 
Notifying the United States Attorney of matters that may 
constitute crimes under the laws of the United States and 
assisting the United States Attorney in carrying out 
prosecutions based on such actions (28 U.S.C. 
§586(a)(3)(F)); 
Monitoring the progress of cases and taking such actions 
as are deemed to be appropriate to prevent undue delay in 
such progress (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(G)); 
Monitoring employment applications filed under section 
327 of Title 11 (28 U.S.C. §586(a)(3)(H); and 
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f. Performing the duties prescribed for the United States 
Trustee under Title 11 and such duties consistent with 
Title 11. 
The last of these duties (found at 28 U.S.C. §586(a)(5)) incorporates the many duties found 
in Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) which the United States Trustee may be either required to perform 
or may be required to see that other parties perform. The United States Trustee is not a judicial 
officer, but is an officer under the Executive Branch of government. However, many of the duties 
now required of the United States Trustee were previously performed by the. Judicial Branch of 
government. For example, appointments of trustees were previously made by judges. 
Some major rights and responsibilities of the United States Trustee as they relate to 
consumer bankruptcy cases that are mentioned in Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) follow: 
1. Pointing out abuses to the court with respect to bankruptcy petition 
preparers (11 U.S.C. s§ 11 O(h)(3); 
2. 
3. 
Raising and being heard on any issue in any case or proceeding 
under Title 11 (11 U.S.C. §307); 
Serving as the chapter 7 trustee in a case when necessary (11 
U.S.C. §321); 
4. Determining the amount of a trustee's bond and the sufficiency of 
the trustee's surety (11 U.S.C. §322); 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Convening the creditors' meetings and presiding over such 
meetings (11 U.S.C. §341); 
Questioning the debtor and administering the oath (11 U.S.C. 
§343); 
Appointing an interim trustee to serve in the case who becomes the 
trustee ifno election is held (11 U.S.C. §701); 
8. Examiningthereportsandaccountsoftrustees(11 U.S.C. §704(8), 
(9)); 
9. 
10. 
Seeking the dismissal of cases by reason of debtors' substantial 
abuse (11 U.S.C. §707(b)); and 
Objecting to or seeking the revocation of debtors' discharges (11 
U.S.C. §727). 
As can be seen, Congress intended the United States Trustee to be an important party in the 
consumer bankruptcy process. 
B. Mission Statement 
The United States Trustee's Mission Statement is set forth below: 
"The United States Trustee Program acts in the public interest to promote 
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the efficiency and to protect and preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy 
system. It works to secure the just, speedy, and economical resolution of 
bankruptcy cases; monitors the conduct of parties and takes action to 
ensure compliance with applicable laws and procedures; identifies and 
investigates bankruptcy fraud and abuse; and oversees administrative 
functions in bankruptcy cases." 
The Mission Statement incorporates the concept set forth in Rule 1 00 1 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure as promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, which states: 
"These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every case and proceeding." 
Many of the day-to-day goals of the United States Trustee are aimed at speedy and fair case 
treatment, reasonable fees for those professionals involved in cases, and increased distribution of 
dividends to creditors. 
n. CASE ADMINISTRATION 
The United States Trustee has the responsibility for monitoring the progress of cases in 
bankruptcy and taking appropriate actions to prevent undue delay. Accompanying the duty to 
prevent undue delay is the United States Trustee's duty to know (or be in a position to learn) about 
each case. 
A. Review Of Schedules 
The 12 month period ending March 2000, 908,802 Chapter 7 cases were filed in the U.S. 
It is estimated that as many as eighteen thousand Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases will be filed 
in Kentucky in the year 2000. In an ideal environment, the United States Trustee would make a 
cursory examination of each case and review the schedules, statements and lists of each debtor. 
Currently, spot checks are randomly conducted. If a case requires special attention, a file is 
assembled and a monitoring process begins. 
One area of United States Trustee concern is the amount of attorney fees charged consumer 
debtors. Since most consumer cases involve credit card debt and medical expense debt and involve 
virtually no unencumbered or non exemptible assets, the skill level of the debtors' attorneys are not 
particularly taxed. In this regard, when the United States Trustee identifies cases in which fees 
appear excessive, the normal course is to call or write the debtors' attorney and request an 
explanation. Recourse to the court is permitted by 11 U.S.C. §329. This section governs the 
debtor's transactions with the debtor's attorney and permits an exploration of the fee issue. Section 
329 also codifies the court's authority to govern the reasonableness ofthe fees charged by attorneys 
for debtors, and if fees are found excessive, the court has the power to cancel the fee agreement or 
make other determinations. 
Another area of concern in dealing with the debtors' schedules, is whether or not the 
schedules provide creditors with a sufficiently clear picture of the debtors' financial condition in 
order to explain the debtors' inability to satisfy debts or determine the cause of bankruptcy. On 
occasion, when debtors' schedules are unclear, the United States Trustee has moved the court to 
require amendments. Therefore, a reading of the schedules by the United States Trustee staff is an 
important function of the office. 
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As part of monitoring the schedules and statement of affairs, the United States Trustee 
routinely checks for multiple filers: Multiple filings are one indication of bad faith. The United 
States Trustee also monitors whether the debtor( s) has filed a Chapter 7 within the full 6 year period. 
If the debtor(s) have received a discharge within 6 years, the office will file a motion to dismiss 
under 707(a). This is usually done if the attorney for the debtor does not voluntarily do so after 
contact with this office. 
The Office of the United States Trustee may use llUSC 707(a) in a motion to dismiss the 
petition in Bankruptcy for "cause". 707(a) states: 
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only 
for cause, including-
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time 
as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information 
required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the United States Trustee. 
In In Re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, (6 Circuit 1991), that court determined that bad faith can be 
determined to be "cause" for the court to dismiss the case. Specifically "fact driven", egregious 
actions by the debtor(s), such as spending a state court settlement within 30 days of filing, along 
with other factors, could warrant the United States Trustee to file an action to dismiss. 
Occasionally, signatures on petitions are checked to verify authenticity. There have been 
occasions where one debtor has signed the name of the other to the petition. 
B. Substantial Abuse 
"Substantial abuse" is a concept intended by Congress to deny a debtor the use of the 
bankruptcy system in order to discharge debts and achieve a "fresh start". Section 707(b) is set forth 
as follows: 
"(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United 
States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed 
by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that 
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions ofthis chapter. There shall be 
a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor." 
11 U.S.C. §707(b). 
In essence and stripped to the barest essentials, if a debtor records sufficient disposable 
income, as reflected in debtors' Schedules I and J, to make a meaningful payback to creditors over 
a period of time, the United States Trustee is placed in the posture of considering moving for 
dismissal of a case. Numerous factors play into the scenario. It may be that the debtor has lost a 
goodjob, been involved in a divorce proceeding, suffered serious illness, and the income stream will 
be interrupted with a corresponding increase in expenses. Efforts are made to communicate with 
debtors prior to making a motion to dismiss. 
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This statute is geared strictly to consumer debts. In interpreting the statute, the Sixth Circuit 
in In Re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (1989), ruled that the honest debtor and/or the needy debtor could 
make use ofthe bankruptcy system, but denied the "fresh start" to those debtors who weren't needy 
or who weren't honest. 
The United States Trustee examines each situation in light of the facts of the case in 
determining whether to move forward or not. It is suggested that debtors' counsel carefully pre:pare 
Schedule I and point out anticipated changes in income ofmore than ten percent (10%) on the face 
of the schedule. 
C. 	 Criminal Referrals 
Section 586(a)(3)(F) of Title 28 requires the United States Trustee to notify the United 
States Attorney of the occurrence ofany action which may constitute a crime under the laws ofthe 
United States. This corresponds to the duties ofother parties in the bankruptcy process-judges and 
trustees-to report potential criminal matters to the United States Attorney as is required by Title 18 
Section 3057, which states: 
"§ 3057. Bankruptcy investigations 
(a) 	 Any judge, receiver, or trustee having reasonable grounds for 
believing that any violation under chapter 9 of this title or other 
laws of the United States relating to insolvent debtors, 
receiverships or reorganization plans has been committed, or that 
an investigation should be had in connection therewith, shall report 
to the appropriate United States attorney all the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the 
offense or offenses believed to have been committed. Where one 
of such officers has made such report, the others need not do so. 
(b) 	 The United States attorney thereupon shall inquire into the facts 
and report thereon to the judge, and if it appears probable that any 
such offense has been committed, shall without delay, present the 
matter to the grand jury, unless upon inquiry and examination he 
decides that the ends of public justice do no require investigation 
or prosecution, in which case he shall report the facts to the 
Attorney General for his direction." 
The United States Trustee has taken a very aggressive role in seeking to uncover situations 
involving fraudulent schemes, concealed assets, perjury, false proofs of claims, and such other 
activities which destroy the integrity of the bankruptcy system. United States Trustee personnel 
have conducted extensive investigations and reconstructions of records, appeared as both fact and 
expert witnesses in federal trials, lectured other governmental agencies, including the Federal 
Bureau oflnvestigation-all with the purpose ofadvancing integrity within the Bankruptcy system. 
Consumer bankruptcy cases normally do not generate the sophisticated schemes seen in 
business bankruptcies. However, there is no statistical information on the amount of fraud tb.at 
occurs in consumer bankruptcy cases. Information about consumer bankruptcy fraud matters is most 
frequently generated in the form of tips from ex-spouses, relatives, and friends who are either 
co-makers or guarantors of debts. 
The policy of the United States Trustee, prior to making a criminal referral, is to request a 
written statement from the person with information about the debtors' alleged fraud. Personnel from 
the United States Trustee's office will conduct an investigation, and if satisfied, will then make the 
B-5 

referral. Referrals are made without publicity and United States Trustee personnel will rarely 
discuss referrals with anyone other than federal law enforcement officials. The lack of public 
knowledge on this subject belies the weight and emphasis the United States Trustee places on this 
function. 
D. Employment Of Professionals 
Consumer debtors choose their own counsel. Counsel is required to set forth in a Rule 
2016(b) statement the terms of counsel's employment. This disclosure is attached to the petition, 
filed with the Court, and also transmitted to the United States Trustee. Usually, this is the last and 
only matter in which consumer debtors are involved with respect to professionals. 
However, about three per cent (3%) ofthe anticipated eighteen thousand chapter 7 consumer 
cases for 2000-or perhaps five to six hundred cases-will be denominated as asset cases. Asset 
cases involve considerably more work than the no-asset cases. Assets for distribution to unsecured 
creditors need to be collected, liquidated, and disposed of. The panel trustee may hire auctioneers, 
attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other types ofprofessionals in order to assist in the handling 
of the case. 
Section 327 of the Code and Rule 2014 govern the procedures involved in the hiring of 
professionals. The United States Trustee plays a major role in pointing out conflicts to the court 
with respect to the employment of professionals. 
The "disinterestedness" of the professional in the case (defined at section 101) is a 
determining factor in whether or not a professional may be permitted by the court to be involved in 
the bankruptcy process. This process places high regard on fiduciary concepts and fiduciary 
relationships. 
E. Petition Prepares 
The United States Trustee has been instrumental in the enforcement of 11USC 11 0 and the 
unauthorized practice of law. 11USC 11 0 deals with penalties for persons who negligently or 
fraudulently prepare Bankruptcy petitions. In addition to section 110, United States Trustee have 
grounded their complaints on state law prosecuting the unauthorized practice oflaw, section 105 and 
329, and contempt power set forth in Rule 9020. The courts have generally proscribed all activity 
except the mere typing of a Bankruptcy petition and schedules from the unauthorized practice of 
law, although some courts have concluded that prosecution ofthe unauthorized practice oflaw rests 
with the states. United States Trustees have also referred a number ofcases for criminal prosecution 
under 18USC §156. Injunctive relief is routinely obtained. There have been instances where an 
attorney is involved with a petition preparer or non lawyer. Also a petition preparer may be engaged 
under the umbrella of an attorney or an attorney over charging for services if all the work is done 
by a paralegal. There are other ethical considerations such as fee splitting, trust fund or escrow 
account violations. The United States Trustee office has used 11 USC329 motions, injunctions, show 
cause motions, Bar referrals, and referrals to court disciplinary panels. 
F. Complaints 
There are instance where a debtor has become dissatisfied with the services oftheir attorney. 
The United States Trustee is sometimes contacted by the debtor who has formal complaints about 
their attorney. The United States Trustee in most instances, directs the debtor to the local Bar 
Association and recommends that a formal complaint be filed with that entity. There are times 
though that the United States Trustee becomes actively involved with the local Bar association 
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directly. This can occur if an attorney has repeated complaints logged against himlher and the 
United States Trustee becomes aware ofthese complaints. Also, there are times when a panel trus'tee 
files a complaint with our office concerning conduct by a debtors attorney in filling out lhe 
schedules and statement ofaffairs. Depending on the nature and number ofoccurrences, the United 
States Trustee may take some action, from calling the attorney to filing a formal complaint. 
III. PANEL TRUSTEE 
Panel trustees are the backbone ofthe consumer chapter 7 process. The consumer debtors' 
contact with a bankruptcy system "authority figure" is almost exclusively only the panel trustee, not 
United States Trustee personnel, the bankruptcy court clerk personnel, or judicial officers. It is the 
panel trustee who is responsible to the creditor body for making sure their positions are protected 
when necessary and for determining whether or not the case should be denominated as an "asset" 
case or a "no asset" case. Since about ninety-seven percent (97%) ofthe cases will be declared "no 
asset" cases in 2000, the panel trustee is the consumer debtors' only brush with the bankruptcy 
system. 
A. Appointment To The Case 
Section 701 requires the United States Trustee to promptly, after a case filing, appoint one 
ofthe panel trustees to serve as interim trustee until the first meeting of creditors about thirty (30) 
days later. Ifno trustee is elected, then the interim trustee becomes the permanent trustee. Secti on 
702( d). Rarely, ifever, is there an election for a trustee in a consumer bankruptcy case. Therefore, 
as a practical matter, once the United States Trustee appoints an interim trustee, that trustee knows 
he or she will serve continuously in the case. 
The panel trustee qualifies by filing a bond in favor of the United States in an amount 
determined by the United States Trustee and conditioned upon the faithful performance of the 
trustee's official duties. The United States Trustee also determines the sufficiency ofthe surety on 
such a bond. The trustee's bond is a broad instrument and not one that merely guarantees paymt~nt 
if the trustee should abscond with money. The acceptance ofthe appointment by the panel trustee 
is an assumption ofa number of fiduciary duties owed by the trustee to the estate. A determination 
by a bankruptcy court that the trustee has breached a duty owed to the estate calls into question l:he 
trustee's lack of faithful performance and liability under the surety bond. 
In accepting the appointment, the trustee must carefully determine whether or not conflicts 
are evident from the schedules as between the trustee and the consumer debtor. Likewise, the trustee 
should decline accepting a case in which one ofthe trustee's clients has a claim against the debtor. 
If a trustee declines or rejects a case at or near the time of appointment, the United States 
Trustee must appoint another interim trustee. 
B. Meeting OfCreditors 
The meeting of creditors calls for the debtor to be placed under oath and examined by the 
United States Trustee and other interested parties. §§341,343. By statute, the United States Trustee 
presides over this meeting. The Court may neither preside over the meeting nor attend. The United 
States Trustee has delegated the authority to preside over meetings ofcreditors to the panel trustee. 
At the meeting, the debtor is examined by the panel trustee and other interested parties. The 
proceedings are tape recorded and the tapes are turned over to the United States Trustee which 
maintains custody ofthem for two (2) years. Anyone can obtain a copy by writing the United States 
Trustee and providing the United States Trustee with blank tapes. 
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Meeting places in the Eastern District of Kentucky are held in Lexington, Covington, 
Ashland, Pikeville, Corbin and Frankfort. In the Western District they are held in Louisville, 
Bowling Green, Paducah and Owensboro. Louisville and Lexington meeting places are located in 
spaces provided by the United States Trustee. All other places in Kentucky make use of facilities 
where bankruptcy courts are located. 
The meeting of creditors not only provides for debtors' examinations, but also operates as 
a clearinghouse for debtors and creditors to work out reaffirmation agreements, arrange to surrender 
property, as well as working out other matters. In almost every case the meeting venue provides the 
only face-to-face contact among the parties to the process-debtors, creditors, their representatives, 
and panel trustees. 
Congress has stepped up its desire to make consumer debtors aware ofalternatives to fIling 
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. For example, Section 342 requires the clerk to notify the debtors of 
the availability ofother chapters. As seen on the face ofthe petition, debtors must acknowledge that 
they are aware of the availability ofother chapters. In addition, attorneys for debtors must declare 
that they have informed debtors of the availability ofother chapters. 
Recently, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. section 341(d) requiring the trustee to ensure the 
Chapter 7 debtor is aware of the availability of relief under other chapters as well as the effects of 
discharge and reaffirmation. This new law requires the panel trustee to question the debtor about 
the debtors' knowledge ofthe impact ofbankruptcy and its effects on future actions of the debtors. 
C. Trustee Oversight 
By statute (28 U.S.C. §586), the United States Trustee is required to establish, maintain, and 
supervise the panel ofprivate trustees. Private trustees are regarded as independent contractors, not 
employees. "Establishment of the panel" requires the United States Trustee to be involved in 
recruitment, background investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, hiring practic,es, 
including equal opportunity and diversity issues. "Maintaining the panel" requires the United States 
Trustee to engage in periodic training, one-on-one training, review of reports, review of bank 
deposits, other reviews, and to provide trustees with a handbook on policy and procedure. 
"Supervision" requires the United States Trustee to discuss issues in cases, visit the trustees 
regularly, and sample the trustee's legal and accounting practices to ensure that these practices 
comport with sound fiscal and fiduciary practices. The United States Trustee makes policy, and also 
litigates with and against panel trustees, creditors, and debtors. Because ofthese numerous contacts 
and relationships, the United States Trustee attempts to be forthright in the positions taken, both in 
policy-making and litigation, and attempts to deal with panel trustees in an even-handed fashion with 
respect to the United States Trustee's oversight powers. 
D. Duties Of Trustee 
In the consumer bankruptcy setting the primary function ofthe United States Trustee is to 
see that the panel trustee presides at the meeting of creditors, tapes the proceedings, fIles a 
memorandum of the proceedings, and submits a final report, referred to as an "NDR" (No 
Distribution Report) as required by Rule 5009. This permits the case closing process to begin. 
Additionally, the panel trustee must ensure that the debtor performs those intentions as 
specified in section 521(2)(B). For example, surrendering assets to creditors who hold security 
interests. 
The trustee must investigate the financial affairs ofthe debtor. As a practical matter, panel 
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trustees satisfy this from an examination of the schedules, statements, and lists as well as :the 
interrogation of the debtor at the meeting of creditors. 
E. Asset Collection And Liquidation 
In the event the case is an asset case, the panel trustee must collect and reduce to money 
property of the estate. Section 704(1). One of the primary goals of the United States Trustee is: to 
check the conduct of the panel trustee to ensure that all assets have been identified, that they are 
physically collected or taken into custody, and timely liquidated. 
The practice in Kentucky, as is the case in other jurisdictions, has been for debtors to 
maintain control of estate assets until the panel trustee requests them. A reading of section 521 (4) 
is clearly contrary to the practice. However, in today' s setting, with consumer bankruptcies at a nl~ar 
all-time high, practicalities seem to take precedence. 
The United States Trustee gauges the panel trustee's efforts at taking possession of estate 
assets and encourages trustees to quickly liquidate assets. Statistical information is collected from 
cases in order to determine how much of the assets' values go toward fees and expenses and how 
much is distributed to creditors. Since panel trustees represent the interests of unsecured creditors 
primarily, the United States Trustee encourages diligence and aggressiveness from the panel trustees 
in order to maximize dividends to creditors. 
F. Investment OfFunds 
The result ofasset liquidation is cash proceeds. The United States Trustee requires the panel 
trustee to carefully safeguard funds by placing funds in a federally insured depository as set forth 
in 11 U .S.C. §345. The money is kept in accounts clearly identified as trust accounts. Panel trustl;!es 
are required to invest funds in interest-bearing accounts when doing so 'Would promote meaningful 
distributions to creditors. 
Since the limit ofa federally insured depository is $100,000, the United States Trustee has 
agreements with authorized banks and the appropriate Federal Reserve branches, that when funds 
on hand exceed $100,000 the depository bank will pledge its own assets as collateral to guarantee 
the funds of creditors in the event of a bank failure. 
Various documents relative to this collateralization are maintained by the United States 
Trustee for each panel trustee and each case. 
G. Submission Of Reports 
Trustees as fiduciaries are required to make periodic reports to the United States Trustee. 
The United States Trustee examines these reports and makes use of them as a management tool. 
A key report is the 180 Day Report. In this report, which the panel trustee is required to 
submit to the United States Trustee each six (6) months, the trustee records the number of cases to 
which he or she was appointed during that time period. Also, the trustee reports the num ber ofcases 
closed. Total funds on hand and total funds for each case are reported. This assists the United States 
Trustee in determining changes in the trustee's bond amounts. It also provides a mechanism for the 
panel trustee to control his or her inventory ofcases because the United States Trustee maintains its 
own data base and can also request the court clerk to provide a listing of cases. All these lists are 
used by the United States Trustee to ensure cases do not "fall through the cracks" but move along 
steadily. 
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For each case the panel trustee must submit a report listing each asset whether the debtor 
listed it or not. 
A form that reflects a checkbook entry process must be filed with the United States Trustee 
in each case in which the trustee holds cash funds. This permits cross-checking between other 
reports such as auctioneer reports or bank reports, in order to determine the movement of assds 
through the liquidation process. 
H. Case Closings 
The United States Trustee must examine the case closing documents prepared by the panel 
trustee prior to their submission to court for approval in cases where assets are to be distributed to 
creditors. These documents include a request by the trustee for his statutory compensation as well 
as his out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the administration ofthe estate. Before an asset case 
can be closed, all professional fee applications must be submitted to the Court for approval and all 
creditors' proofs of claim examined for objections by the panel trustee. 
While asset collection and distribution occur in only a small percentage ofbankruptcy cases, 
debtors are anxious to see if priority creditors will be satisfied. Generally, priority creditors ~Lre 
federal, state, and sometimes local taxing agencies whose debts are not normally extinguished by 
bankruptcy. Since these debts will survive bankruptcy, the more the trustee is able to pay to satisfy 
them, the less the debtor will have to pay post petition. Unsecured creditors take the balance of 
funds held by the trustee. In some unusual situations there will be sufficient funds to pay all 
administrative, priority and unsecured creditors in full with interest. On occasion, the debtors will 
receive a refund of sums left remaining after all claims have been satisfied in full. 
The distribution scheme in bankruptcy is complex. Trustees are required to strictly follow 
that scheme in making lawful distributions of dividends to creditors. The United States Trustee's 
function is to double-check the trustee's distribution proposals and assist the trustee in ensuring that 
the statutory scheme of payments to creditors is carried out. 
The panel trustee disburses estate funds in accordance with the court approved order of 
distribution. As soon as all checks have cleared the account, the trustee submits a final account 
along with all canceled checks and bank statements to the United States Trustee for review. If the 
United States Trustee determines that the funds have been properly disbursed by the panel trustl~e, 
the final account is sent to the court for approval and the case is administratively closed. 
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** ** ** 
Having successfully litigated or sought recovery on a claim against a debtor the word 
"bankruptcy" (in particular Chapter 7, commonly referred to as a "straight" or "liquidation" 
bankruptcy) can strike fear in the hearts of creditors. "What happens to my claim now?", "Will I get 
paid?", and for the secured creditors, "What happens to my collateral?" are all common and 
legitimate questions and concerns raised by creditors when a bankruptcy ensues. The ability of a 
creditor to obtain recovery in a bankruptcy is directly related to the creditor's knowledge of the 
proceeding, and its experience (and that of its counsel) in dealing with bankruptcy issues. This 
outline is designed to provide a general overview of the most important Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
concepts. 
Copyright Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C. and Hal D. Friedman, 2000. All rights reserved. No part of this outline 
may be reproduced without pennission. This outline is designed to provide general infonnation on the subject 
matters covered. It is intended to provide neither a complete survey of all possible developments or a 
comprehensive analysis of those developments or issues discussed. Readers should consult the original source 
materials referenced. This outline is submitted and published with the understanding that the author is not 
rendering legal advice. Portions of this outline were adapted and updated, by pennission, from materials 
prepared by Hal D. Friedman and Kathy S. Pike, Esq. for the 1998 Consumer Bankruptcy in Kentucky Practice 
Series. . 
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1. THE AUTOMATIC STAY ANn ITS IMPORTANCE. 
In the typical Chapter 7 case, a consumer debtor is seeking relief from creditor attempts to obtain 
recovery on an outstanding debt, either through non-litigation methods such as collection letters and 
telephone calls, or through legal process, a judgment, garnishment, execution and similar collection 
measures. It is critical for the creditor and practitioner to remember that the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition (under any chapter, including 7) creates an automatic stay, stopping virtually all attempts 
by the creditor to enforce a pre-petition obligation of the debtor. 
The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. §362 is one of the most fundamental protections 
afforded the consumer debtor by the Bankruptcy Code. The stay arises immediately and becomes 
effective automatically without court order upon the filing of the bankruptcy case. No stay arises, 
however, until the petition is in-fact filed with the clerk. 
The stay stops all collection efforts against a debtor. All collection proceedings (both pre and 
post jUdgment) are stayed, including actions against the debtor or any property comprising the 
debtor's estate. 
In the typical consumer Chapter 7 case, the stay only prevents action by creditors against the 
debtor and the debtor's property which is part of the bankruptcy estate. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. 
New Jersey Dept. ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S.Ct. 755, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986). This 
is different from the protection afforded under Chapter 13, where the stay is made applicable to 
both the debtor and to "co-debtors" in Chapter 13 by virtue of 11 U.S.C. §1301. Thus, in a 
consumer bankruptcy filed under Chapter 13, a creditor may not act to collect any part of a consumer 
debt owed by a debtor in bankruptcy from any individual that is also liable for the debt in 
conjunction with the debtor (typically friends or relatives that may have co-signed an obligation for 
the debtor). 11 U.S.C. §1301. In Chapter 7, the co-debtor stay is not applicable and co-debtors and 
their property are "fair game" through normal state law remedies. 
1.1 Scope of the Automatic Stay. 
The stay provided by §362 is extremely broad in its scope, and with certain limited 
exceptions enumerated by statute or carved out by judicial decisions applies to almost any action a 
creditor might take against the debtor or property of the debtor's estate. Although there are 
exceptions, these are narrowly construed and a creditor contemplating action against a debtor or the 
debtor's property post-filing should consult an attorney to discuss the effect of the stay on the 
proposed course of conduct. In determining what constitutes "property of the estate" subject to 
protection from the stay, the practitioner is advised to refer to 11 U.S.C. 541, which provides a 
comprehensive list of the types of property and property interests that make up the estate, as well as 
those interests not included as property of the estate. As a rule of thumb, a creditor should consider 
any action it is contemplating against the debtor or their property post-bankruptcy "off-limits'" unless 
a well recognized exception is granted by the bankruptcy court or agreed to by the debtor. 
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§362 lists those actions which are stayed upon the commencement of a bankruptcy as 
follows: 
(a) Litigation. §362(a)(1) provides for a broad stay of litigation against the debtor and 
prohibits the commencement or continuation of any judicial, administrative or similar ''proceedings'' 
against the debtor based upon any claim which arose prior to the filing of the debtor's petition. 
(b) Enforcementof Judgments. §362(a)(2) stays enforcement of any judgment obtained 
pre-petition against the debtor or against property of the estate. For example, the stay would prohibit 
actions to commence or continue with wage or non-wage garnishment or attachment, post-judgment 
replevin of property, pursuing execution against a debtor's real or personal property, and all similar 
attempts of a creditor to recover on a judgment obtained prior to commencement of the case. 
(c) Acts to Obtain Possession of Property of the Estate. §302(a)(3) prohibits a creditor 
from taking any action to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of the debtor's 
estate. For example, a creditor's post-petition use of self-help repossession remedies authorized 
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 9-503 is prohibited by the stay, absent an 
order annulling, modifying or terminating the stay (discussed below). 
(d) Acts to Create, Perfect or Enforce any Lien Against Property of the Debtor or the 
Estate of the Debtor. §362(a)(4) and (a)(5) prevent a creditor from, for example, filing a notice of 
judgment lien against real property, which would otherwise be authorized under KRS 426.720, filing 
or recording a mortgage lien or perfecting a lien on a motor vehicle owned by the debtor under 
Kentucky's title lien statutes. 
(e) Acts to Collect, Assess or Recover Claims Againstt/,e Debtor. §362(a)(6), although 
similar to paragraph (a)( 1), prohibits any "act" (as opposed to a "proceeding") by a creditor to collect 
a pre-petition debt. Under this provision, informal "acts" (such as demand or acceleration of a 
promissory note) are stayed, in the same manner as formal litigation is prohibited. The practitioner 
should further refer to the broad definition of the term "claim" set forth at 11 U.S.C. §101. 
(f) Setoff. §362(a)(7) prohibits a creditor's "setoff of any debt owing to a debtor that 
arose before commencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the debtor.""This 
section clearly prohibits actions such as the "pure" setoff of a debtor's bank account to payor satisfy 
a concurrent obligation of the debtor to the bank. See,~, In re Nelson, 6 B.R. 248 (Bankr. D. An. 
1980). 
Prior to 1995, it had also been held by several courts that the placing of an administrative 
"freeze" or hold on a debtor's bank or similar account by a creditor was also a violation of this 
section. See, ~, In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992). However, in Citizens Bank of 
Maryland v. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. 286, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.ED.2d 258 (1995) the Supreme Court 
settled this debate by unanimously ruling that the so called "freeze" or administrative hold was not 
a setoff in violation of the Bankruptcy Code, because the bank's refusal to pay was not permanent 
and absolute, and was merely a temporary measure to preserve the status quo while it sought relief 
from the sty in the bankruptcy court to pursue its common law right to setoff against the account. 
According to the Court in Strumpf, setoff in violation of the automatic stay does not occur until (i) 
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a decision to effectuate it has been made; (ii) some action accomplishing it has been taken; and (iii) 
a recording of it has been entered. An important caveat to note here, however, is that the creditor 
which has placed an administrative hold on an account should be careful to promptly bring the matter 
to the bankruptcy court's attention through a form motion for relief from or modification of the stay 
to all the setoff under 11 U.S.C. §506 and 553. The language of the Strumpf opinion sanctions only 
a "temporary", not indefinite, hold on the debtor's funds to allow the creditor to determine how to 
proceed. 
1.2 Violation oft/Ie Stay; Penalties. 
A majority of Circuits have held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void 
ab initio and without effect, regardless of whether the creditor has notice of the stay. See Raymark 
Industries. Inc. v. Lai, 973 F.2d 1125, 1132 (3n! Cir. 1992); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569,574 (9th 
Cir. 1992); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953,956 (lOth Cir. 1990); Mathews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249,251 
(7th Cir. 1984); Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306 (lIth Cir. 1982). It has been 
held that a creditor which initiates collection activity post-petition, even without knowledge of the 
bankruptcy, has an affirmative duty to restore the status quo without the debtor having to seek relief 
from the bankruptcy court. In re Dungey, 99 B.R. 814, 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). Failure ofa 
creditor to restore the debtor to the status quo voluntarily could lead to a finding that the Creditor 
has acted in willful violation of the stay. In re Dungey, 99 B.R. at 816. 
In 1993, the Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier position and concluded that actions in violation 
of the stay are merely voidable, rather than void. Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp., 990 F.2d 905 
(6th Cir. 1993). Thus, under some limited circumstances, such as where a debtor unreasonably 
withholds notice of the stay and the creditor would be prejudiced as a result, or where the debtor is 
attempting to use the stay unfairly as a shield to avoid an unfavorable result, the protection afforded 
by §362 may be unavailable to the debtor. Easley, Id.at 911. 
The distinction between whether actions in violation of the stay are void or voidable can be 
important in a practical sense for the creditor. For example, suppose in a Chapter 7 case a creditor 
acts in good faith post-petition to repossess a vehicle in which it holds a security interest, without 
notice that the bankruptcy has been filed or that the stay is in effect. Such an action would clearly 
constitute a technical violation of the stay. However, because the action may now be considered 
voidable, rather than void, the creditor may be able to request that the court authorize this conduct 
post-petition, where the debtor has not been harmed or prejudiced in order to expedite disposition 
of the collateral where voluntary reaffirmation will not occur. 
1.3 Penalties and Damages. 
Section 362 provides forrecovery of actual damages (including out of pocket losses, damages 
for embarrassment and humiliation), costs and attorneys fees incurred by an individual injured by 
a willful violation of the stay. 11 U.S.C. 362(h). In certain cases, punitive damages may also be 
awarded against a creditor. Of course, where the violation of the stay is inadvertent or unintended, 
a creditor should not be held in contempt. However, it is important for the creditor to remember that 
a violation of the stay is considered "willful" where the action violating the stay is undertaken with 
knowledge that the stay is in effect; willfulness in this context does not require a showing of malice 
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or specific intent to violate the stay. In re Garofalo's Finer Foods. Inc., 164 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1994). 
1.4 Grounds for Relief From The Automatic Stay. 
Relief from the automatic stay is controlled by §362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rule 4001. After notice and a hearing, stay relief, modification or annulment may be 
granted by the Court to a "party in interest" upon request for the following reasons: 
(a) cause, which includes but is not limited to a showing of lack of adequate protection 
of an interest in property of such party in interest (typically collateral held by a secured creditor), 11 
U.S.C. §362(d)(1); or, 
(b) where the party in interest (usually the creditor) can demonstrate that (i) the debtor 
has no equity in the property in which it has an interest and which it seeks to recover; and (ii) that 
said property is not necessary for the debtor's "effective reorganization." 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(2). The 
party seeking stay relief need not establish both. In re London Tiles. Inc., 35 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1983); In re Cabe. Inc., 41 B.R. 222 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). 
In the vast majority of consumer bankruptcy cases, the "effective reorganization" prong of 
the test outlined in §362(d)(2) would be an applicable consideration only in Chapter 13. In Chapter 
7, the debtor is not seeking to reorganize and establish a payment plan to creditors. Rather, the 
debtor's non-exempt assets, if any, will be liquidated and a discharge of the debtor's obligations 
entered in court. 
Note that the pendency of the state court litigation related to the claim may also be grounds 
to modify or obtain relief from stay. See,~, In re Marvin Johnson's Auto Service. Inc., 192 B.R. 
1008 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re Revco D.S .. Inc., 99 B.R. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (relief from 
stay would be granted to allow state court litigation to proceed, in order to liquidate the claim of the 
creditor, where the creditor's claims and the debtor's counterclaims had been previously filed in state 
court, discovery was in progress and all issues were based entirely on state law). 
Technically, it is not proper for a creditor to request the bankruptcy court to authorize a ·'lift" 
of the automatic stay. Many practitioners improperly use this term when seeking relief from stay. 
However, the terms is not found in the Code, and is not generally accepted as an appropriate request 
by the Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky. 
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, and will consider the balance of hurt in fashioning 
relief. In re Phelia Associates. Inc., 26 B.R. 235 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). Ultimately, therefore,the 
grant or denial of stay relief by the bankruptcy court will be based on an evaluation and weighing 
of various factors, depending upon the relative position of the parties. The following cases are 
illustrative. 
The automatic stay would be terminated to permit a creditor to exercise rights in the 
debtor's automobile following the debtor's default, where the debtor continued to use the 
automobile without adequately protecting the .creditor and while failing to execute a 
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reaffirmation agreement on the vehicle. In re Smith, 167 B.R. 850 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1994). 
A debtor is not entitled to a continuance of the automatic stay to prevent a creditor from 
enforcing its security interest or mortgage where no equity exists in the property and no 
offer of adequate protection was forthcoming at the hearing. In re Tinsley & Groom, 38 
B.R. 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984). 
A Chapter 7 debtor's auto payment, made seven days late, is not cause for stay relief in 
order to repossess, In re Nikokyrakis, 109 B.R. 260 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1989). 
The most common example of "cause" for stay relief under §362, set out by the statute itself, 
is a lack of "adequate protection" for the creditor in its secured collateral. The concept of adequate 
protection is discussed in more detail below. It has been repeatedly held that whether cause exists 
for stay relief must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, there are other examples of 
cause which might justify relief from stay. 
For example, bad faith on the part of the debtor, as found by examining the totality of the 
circumstances, may be cause for stay relief. In re Grand Traverse Development Co. Ltd. 
Partnership, 151 B.R. 792 (W.D. Mich 1993). The requirement that the Debtor come into court with 
"clean hands" and in "good faith" has been established in Chapter 7 cases On re Khan. 35 B.R. 718 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984), remanded, 751 F.2d. 162 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124 (6th 
Cir. 1991)), as well as in Chapter 13 (In re Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 
(6th Cir. 1982)). Although Khan, Zick, and Whitman dealt with the concept of the debtor's bad faith 
in the context of the creditors' request for dismissal of the bankruptcy case, the elements of bad faith 
constituting the necessary prerequisite for "cause" justifying dismissal would likewise appear 
applicable in the context of a request for stay relief. 
1.5 Adequate Protection Defined. 
Adequate protection is an important but illusive concept in the retail consumer bankruptcy 
context. The term is not defined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code, and yet the "lack" of adequate 
protection is generally considered to be the foremost reason for the grant of stay relief whete the 
debtor has equity in a creditor's collateral and asserts a need for the collateral in order to accomplish 
a reorganization plan. 
Adequate protection has been defmed judicially as: (1) the debtor having equity in the 
property, or (2) the property is necessary to the debtor's performance under the plan and the creditor's 
security interest will not be impaired by the stay. In re Milo Ridge Resort & Executive Conference 
Center, 26 B.R. 277 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). 
Because exactly what constitutes adequate protection cannot be defined with exactitude, the 
following case examples are provided to assist the practitioner in determining the existence of 
adequate protection, or the corresponding lack thereof: 
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(a) Where the value of the collateral is equal to or greater than the debt owed by the 
creditor, the creditor is adequately protected. In re W.L. Mead .. Inc., 42 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1984). 
(b) An equity cushion in and of itself suffices as adequate protection from the stay. In 
re Epstein, 26 B.R. 354 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); 
(c) Regular payments to a creditor may serve as adequate protection, where the debtor's 
equity cushion is inconsequential. In re Shriver, 33 B.R. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); 
(d) A debtor is not required to provide adequate protection to an under-secured creditor 
seeking relief from the stay where the value of the creditor's interest in the property has increased. 
In re Cablehouse. Ltd., 68 B.R. 309 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); and, 
(e) An under-secured creditor is not entitled to compensation in the form of adequate 
protection payments for money that it could earn by foreclosing upon its interest and having 
investing the proceeds. In re Pullins, 65 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). 
Note that although the courts have generally held that the existence of equity in a creditor's 
collateral constitutes adequate protection, there may be instances where adequate protection is 
lacking, even where there is an equity cushion. For example, the failure of a debtor to maintain 
insurance covering property damage to the collateral might be inadequate protection,justifying relief 
from the stay. 
1.6 Obtaining Stay Relief: Distinctions Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. 
In the retail or consumer Chapter 7 case, the secured creditor is generally faced with the 
dilemma either of obtaining a reaffirmation agreement from the debtor to avoid discharge of the 
debtor's obligation to the creditor, or surrender of its collateral from the debtor to allow the creditor 
to liquidate the collateral and minimize its loss. In Chapter 13, on the other hand, the debtor is 
interested in retaining the majority of its property, rather than surrendering it to creditors. Therefore, 
in Chapter 13 the creditor must ensure adequate protection of its claim and the collateral securing 
its claim during the pendency of the debtor's reorganization plan, while it obtains payment from the 
debtor in the plan. 
It becomes readily apparent that the grounds asserted by a creditor for stay relief in the retail 
bankruptcy case will vary considerably depending upon the type of bankruptcy commenced by the 
debtor. For example as discussed above, in a Chapter 7 proceeding, §362(d)(2) is not applicable to 
the inquiry, because the debtor does not seek "reorganization", but rather liquidation of assets and 
discharge of all indebtedness in a Chapter 7. Because reaffirmation is a wholly voluntary process, 
and the creditor is not obligated to allow reaffirmation, the debtor has little practical choice but to 
surrender its property secured by a creditor's lien to the creditor when reaffirmation is not agreeable 
to both parties. A motion or relief indicating that the creditor will not allow reaffirmation, and that 
there is no equity in the property for the benefit of unsecured creditors, should result in stay relief 
as a matter of course, as a debtor has few, if any, objections available. 
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It should be much easier, therefore, for a creditor to obtain quick relief from the stay in a 
Chapter 7 proceeding, as opposed to Chapter 13 where the debtor has proposed a repayment plan and 
has the intention of retaining the majority of its property. For example, a motion for relief from stay 
in Chapter 7 is granted automatically within 15 days following the filing of the motion, unless an 
objection is filed by the debtor establishing "good cause" for a hearing on the motion. This is why 
under the Local Rules of both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky, a party seeking relief 
from stay has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the property and the party 
opposing relief has the burden on all other issues. §362(g); See also In re Williams A. Smith Const. 
Co. Inc., 86 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). A debtor must prove that the creditor's interests are 
adequately protected. In re Milo Ridge Resort & Executive Conference Center, 26 B.R. 277 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1982). A creditor bears the burden of proving the validity and perfection of its security 
interest. In re Vanyas, 50 B.R. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). 
1.7 Procedure for Stay Relief 
The procedure for obtaining relief from the automatic stay is governed by Bankruptcy Rule 
4001, and the rules applicable in the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. Under Rule 4001 
a request for relief from the automatic stay is brought by written motion, which must state with 
particularity the grounds for the motion and the relief sought. In a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, the 
motion should be served by regular mail service and must be served upon the case trustee and on the 
debtor. See Bankruptcy Rules 9013, 9014 and 7004. 
A Motion for relief from stay may be made ex parte, but only where it is shown by sworn 
testimony that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the movant before the 
adverse party or the attorney for the adverse party can be heard in opposition. The movant's attorney 
must further certify to the court in writing hislher efforts to give notice and the reasons why notice 
should not be required. Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(2). 
In both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky, a motion for stay relief may not be 
filed without an accompanying proof of claim with supporting documents establishing the security 
interest of the movant in the property of the estate that is subject to the motion. See LBR 401. 
Eastern District of Kentucky; LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky . Notice to all parties in interest 
is required in both Districts. Note that in the Western District of Kentucky, a request for relieffrom 
stay shall not be combined in the same pleading with any other request for relief, and all motions 
filed must include a proposed order. LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky. 
In the Eastern District of Kentucky, all parties to a motion for relief from stay must be given 
at least ten (10) days notice of the hearing on the motion. LBR 401, Eastern District of Kentucky. 
In the Western District in a Chapter 7 case, a hearing on a motion for relief from stay will only be 
set if the party in opposition to the motion so objects within 15 days from the date of service of the 
motion; otherwise, if no objection is filed, stay relief will be granted within 15 days following the 
date of service of the motion, without hearing. LBR 10, Western District of Kentucky. 
In the Western District of Kentucky, LBR 15 serves as a useful tool for the creditor in a 
consumer Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case. The Rule also serves to free up the court's crowded docket 
from routine stay relief motions involving disputes over claims secured by motor vehicles. Under 
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the rule, whenever a debtor elects to retain possession of a "motor vehicle" which secures an 
outstanding obligation, either by paying for the vehicle through a Chapter 13 plan, or through 
reaffirmation or otherwise, the debtor is required to maintain proof of insurance against physical 
damage on the creditor's collateral. If the debtor fails to furnish proof of insurance on the vehicle at 
the Section 341 meeting, the stay shall be deemed terminated. Further, if during the pendency of a 
case, either before or after the 341 meeting, insurance lapses on any motor vehicle subject to the 
provisions of the rule, (1) the creditor may notify the debtor and hislher counsel in writing (with a 
copy to the court) regarding the lapse of insurance; (2) the debtor shall be enjoined from using the 
motor vehicle for so long as it remains uninsured; and, (3) if the debtor fails to provide proof of 
re-insurance for a minimum of 90 days to the creditor within five business days following the 
mailing of the notice, the stay shall be deemed terminated. LBR (WD)15. 
Although not required by the rule, it is recommended that a creditor that has complied with 
Rule IS's requirements, but has not received proof of insurance within the time specified, notify the 
Court of the debtor's failure to comply with the Rule to insure that the procedure has been carried 
out properly. This is ususally done by local practice or custom through a document filed of record 
which certifies non-compliance with the Rule. 
This rule is currently the subject of focus by the Joint Local Bankruptcy Rules Committee 
for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. It is possible that a joint rule for both districts 
related to insurance on collateral may soon be in place. 
2. GENERAL BANKRUPTCY TERMINOLOGY AND OVERVIEW. 
2.1 Relief Available. The United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §1011 et seq., sets out 
the basic avenues of relief available to debtors, these include: 
(a) C/,apter 7. The purpose is to achieve a fair distribution to creditors of the non-
exempt, non-mortgaged property of the debtor and to give the debtor a fresh start through a discharge 
in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§701-766. 
(b) Chapter 13. A rehabilitation program for an "individual with regular income" where 
the debts do not exceed a specified amount and the debtor's future earnings are used to pay creditors 
in full or in part. The fresh start comes from the discharge granted at the end of the case. 11 U.S.c. 
§§1301-1330. 
(c) Non-Consumer Related Bankruptcies: C/,apters 11 and otllers. A reorganization 
proceeding for use by any debtor generally engaged in business, with the goal of rehabilitating tile 
debtor as a going concern rather than liquidating it. 11 U.S.C. §1101-1174. 
2.2 The Parties. 
(a) Debtor. The person, corporation, partnership, or legal entity which is the "principal" 
of the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §101(13). 
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(b) Creditor. An individual, corporation, partnership or other legal entity that has a 
claim against the debtor which arose at the time of or before the beginning of the bankruptcy process. 
11 U.S.C. §10I(lO). 
(c) Trustee. The "person" who is charged with the responsibility of supervising the 
bankruptcy case and estate property. All Bankruptcy Courts now have a United States Trustee. The 
U. S. Trustee is independent of the Court system and is appointed by the Justice Department. The 
function of the U. S. Trustee varies by type of case. In a Chapter 7, the U. S. Trustee appoints a case 
Trustee whose primary function is to take possession of the debtor's property which is neither 
exempt nor subject to a valid security interest, tum these items into money, and fairly distribute it 
among the creditors. 
2.3 The Debtor's Property - TIle Estate. 
(a) Property of the Estate. Tthe debtor's assets which are to be administered during the 
proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §541(a). 
(b) Property Subject to a Security Interest. The debtor's property on which he or she 
has granted a consensual lien or security interest prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. 
(c) Exempt Property. Under 11 U.S.C. §541, upon the commencement of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, all property of the debtor becomes "property of the estate". In order to provide the 
debtor with a "fresh start", debtors are allowed to claim enumerated exemptions to prevent certain 
property from being liquidated by the trustee, and to protect it from claims of creditors whose claims 
arose before the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. §522; KRS 427. 
The date for determining exemptions is the date the order for relief is entered. In the 
event of a conversion from one chapter to another, the date for determining exemptions in the 
converted case is the date of conversion. In re Butcher, 75 B.R. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1987), affd. without 
opinion in 848 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Dyess, 65 B.R. 143, 14 BCD l379 (Bankr. W.O. La. 
1986). 
(1) Basic Categories of Exemptions. 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d) lists the federal 
exemptions to which each debtor is entitled, and also provides that an individual debtor may 
elect to use either federal or state exemptions, unless the state of which it is a resident has "opted 
out" of the federal exemption scheme. 11 U.S.C. Section 522[b]. Kentucky has "opted out" of 
the federal exemptions (KRS 427.170). Thus, Kentucky law provides that the following property 
of an individual debtor resident in this state is exempt: 
(A) All household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing and ornaments not to 
exceed $3,000 in value; The terms "household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing, and 
ornaments" mean clothing, furniture, appliances, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and 
personal effects ofan individual and the individual's dependents, but do not include: 
(i) Works of art; 
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(ii) Electronic entertainment equipment (except to the extent of one television 
and one radio; 
(iii) Antiques; and 
(iv) Jewelry other than wedding rings. 
(B) Tools, equipment and livestock, including poultry, of a person engaged in 
farming, not exceeding $3,000 in value; 
(C) One motor vehicle and its necessary accessories, including one spare tire, not 
exceeding in the aggregate $2,500 in value; 
(D) Professionally-prescribed health aids for the debtor, or a dependent of the 
debtor; 
(E) Tools, not exceeding $300 in value, of any individual debtor necessary in its 
trade, and one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,500 in value and its necessary accessories, 
including one spare tire, of a mechanic or other skilled artisan primarily engaged in the 
replacement, repair, or emergency servicing of essential, mechanical, electrical or other 
equipment in general use; 
(F) The professional library, office equipment, instruments and furnishings of 
a minister, attorney, physician, surgeon, chiropractor, veterinarian, or dentist, necessary in the 
practice of such profession, and not exceeding $1,000 in value, and one motor vehicle not 
exceeding $2,500 in value with necessary accessories, including one spare tire; 
(G) An individual debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $5,000 in value, in 
real or personal property that such debtor or a dependent of such debtor uses as a permanent 
residence in this state, or in a burial plot for such debtor or a dependent of such debtor. 
However, this exemption does not apply if the debt or liability existed prior to the purchase of 
the property or the erection of the improvements thereon; see,~, In re Connors, 1999 W.L. 
1090829, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (federal tax lien paid before 
homestead); 
(H) Any money or other benefit to be paid or rendered by any assessment or 
cooperative life or casualty insurance company, and any money or other benefit to be paid or 
rendered by any fraternal benefit society; 
(/) An award under a crime victim's reparation law; 
(J) To the extent reasonably necessary for the support of an individual and his 
dependents, in addition to the foregoing property which is totally exempt, money or property 
received and rights to receive money or property for alimony, support or separate maintenance; 
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(K) A payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the 
debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any 
dependent of the debtor; 
(L) A payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal bodily injury, not 
including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an 
individual of whom the debtor is a dependent; 
(M) A payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an 
individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor or any dependent of the debtor; and 
(N) Assets held, payments made and amounts payable under pensions exempt 
pursuant to KRS 61.690, 161.700,427.120 and 427.125, or the right or interest ofaperson in 
an individual retirement account or annuity, deferred compensation account, tax sheltered 
annuity, simplified employee pension, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other retirement 
plan described in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, which qualifies for deferral 
of income tax until the date benefits are distributed. However, this exemption does NOT apply 
to any amounts contributed to an individual retirement account or annuity, deferred 
compensation account, a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other qualified retirement plan 
or annuity if the contribution occurs within 120 days before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
In addition to the foregoing, every debtor shall have a general exemption not to 
exceed $1,000 in value to be applied toward any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, 
in its estate on the filing date. 
(2) Claiming Exemptions. The debtor is required to list the property claimed as 
exempt on the schedules which are required to be filed either with the petition or within fifteen 
(15) days thereafter. In light of the fact that exemptions are claimed in the bankruptcy schedules, 
the rule for amendment of exemptions is identical to the rule for amendment of the schedules, 
which is that amendments may be filed any time before the case is closed. Bankruptcy Rules 
4003(a), 1007 and 1009. 
In the event the debtor fails to claim exemptions to which he is entitled, for example 
when the debtor has died or is incapacitated, a dependent of the debtor may file the list within 
thirty (30) days after the schedules are filed. In the event the debtor fails to file its schedules, the 
deadline begins to run on the date when the schedules were due to be filed. Bankruptcy Rule 
4003(a). 
The exemptions are listed in Schedule C of Official Form 6 of the debtor's petition. 
Schedule C requires that the debtor estimate the value of the items claimed as exempt, and 
indicate the statute under which the exemption is claimed. Typically, a debtor lists the maximum 
statutory amount allowed for exemption of each category of property, regardless of the amount 
of equity which the debtor has in the property. The exempted property must be listed with 
sufficient specificity so as to enable the trustee and creditors to determine its nature and value. 
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(3) Trustee's and Creditors' Rig/,t to Object to Exemptions. The trustee or any 
creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt. Bankruptcy Rule 4003 (b). 
Some of the more common grounds for objections to exemptions include: 
(A) Sloppiness in claiming exemptions; 
(B) Lack of statutory basis; 
(C) Exemption of several items of property whose aggregate value exceeds the 
statutory exemption; 
(D) Conversion of non-exempt assets into exempt assets, which conversion 
appears to be fraudulent, Abbott Bank-Hemingford v. Armstrong, 931 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 
1991); see also Inre Simms, 243 B.R. 156,2000 Bankr. Lexis 7 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (trustee failed 
to prove conversion was done with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors); and 
(E) Assets which are concealed and later discovered cannot be exempted. 
In the event that no objections are timely filed to claimed exemptions, ''the 
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt". 11 U.S.C. §522(l). See In re Rosenzweig, 
245 B.R. 836,2000 Bankr. Lexis 185 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.) (a tax refund scheduled as exempt, but 
not listed as asset was allowed because of trustee's failure to timely object). 
(4) Burden of Proof and Objection Time Lines. Either the trustee or creditors can 
file objections to exemptions. In any hearing on objections to exemptions, the objecting party 
has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed. Thereafter, the burden 
shifts to the debtor to show that the claim to exemption has been properly claimed. In re Catli, 
999 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Lester, 141 B.R. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
After hearing on notice, the court will determine the issues presented by the 
Objection. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c). 
All objections to exemptions must be in writing and must be served on the trustee, 
the person filing the list of exemptions claimed, and the attorney for such person. Bankruptcy 
Rule 4003 (b). Because an objection to exemptions is a contested matter, no answer to the 
objection must be filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Bankruptcy Rule 9014. 
The deadline for filing objections to exemptions is normally thirty days after the 
date on which the first meeting of creditors is actually concluded. In the event an amendment 
to exemptions is filed after the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, the deadline for 
objecting to exemptions claimed by the amendment is extended for an additional thirty days. 
The time period for objecting to exemptions may be extended by the court only ifthe extension 
is granted within the original time period. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b). Ifthe time period for filing 
objections to exemptions expires, due to excusable neglect, it may not be later extended by the 
court. Bankruptcy Rule 9006{b){3). 
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In the event no objections to exemptions are timely filed, the exemption claimed 
by the debtor is finalized, and the valuation of the debtor's interest in the property is approved. 
The importance of timely objecting to exemptions was emphasized by the United States Supreme 
Court in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280, (1992), 
wherein the Court held that there is no "bad faith" exception to the deadline for timely filing 
objections to exemptions, even where there is no colorable statutory basis for the exemptions 
claimed. Therefore, although it was apparent that the debtor's claimed exemption was not 
permitted under the exemption statute, the failure of any party to timely file an objection waived 
the trustee's right to later challenge the exemption. However, the Court observed that the 
Bankruptcy Code contains sufficient safeguards against debtors filing groundless claims, such 
as the denial of a discharge under 11 U.S.C. Section 727(a), or civil or criminal sanctions under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or 18 U.S.C. §152, to prevent meritless exemption claims from being 
routinely filed. 
(d) Trustee's Avoidance Powers. The right of the debtor or a Trustee to avoid or 
"nullify"certain liens on property which would otherwise have been exempt, except for the debtor's 
own actions or actions of the debtor's creditors prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. Harvey v. 
Fellner, 245 B.R. 834,2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21454 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (reopening case to avoid 
unknown judicial lien discretionary, not per se disallowed); see also In re Pressley, 242 B.R. 193, 
1999 Bankr. Lexis 1556 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (same). 
(e) Abandonment. Action taken, primarily by the Trustee to surrender or give up any 
right which the debtor may have in specific property of the estate. 
(f) Preferential Transfers. A transfer of the debtor's property usually on the "eve of 
bankruptcy" which the Court can set aside to restore the parties to their original status. Discussed in 
detail. 
(g) Claims Against tile Estate. 
(1) Claim. Generally, a right which a creditor has against the debtor or against his 
property. This right may be unliquidated or liquidated, and may be established by contract 
(prejudgment) or by order or judgment of a court (post-judgment). 
(2) Secured Claim. The claim of a creditor which is secured by some right in the 
debtor's property usually created by an act of the debtor prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, such 
as signing a mortgage or security agreement. A claim is generally secured only to the extent of 
the value of the collateral. The pre-eminent case on valuation is the United State Supreme 
Court's recent ruling in Associates Commercial Com. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953,117 S.Ct 1879, 138 
L.Ed.2d 148 (1997). In Rash, which dealt with a filing under Chapter 13, the Supreme court held 
that the value of a creditor's collateral (and thus, the amount of its secured claim), is the 
"replacement value" of the collateral, i.e., the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business 
or situation would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller. While the case dealt only 
with valuation in a Chapter 13, valuation for purposes of a creditor's secured claim in Chapter 
7, or for redemption purposes, should follow the same standard. 
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(A) Unsecured Claim. A claim of a creditor which is not secured, i.e., is backed 
only by the debtor's promise to pay and the creditor's previous reliance on the debtor's general 
assets. 
(3) Terminating tlte Bankruptcy Case. 
(A) Disc/large. A formal act of the court and entry of a final order which in 
effect relieves the debtor from any responsibility for payment of his debts. 
(B) Dismissal. An involuntary dismissal of the case (Debtor has failed to comply 
with rules of court, or for other cause), see Dionne v. Simmons, 200 F.3d 738, 2000 U.S. App. 
Lexis 294 (11 th Cir;) (court improperly dismissed case because cause was not shown by moving 
party; the moving party was the debtor; In re Tumen, 244 B.R. 431, 2000 Bankr.' Lexis 96 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir.) (debtor's solvency did not justify dismissal). 
(C) Closure oftlte Case. Typically, a case is administratively closed by the 
Court upon discharge or dismissal. 
3. BASIC CONCEPTS IN CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY. 
3.1 Notices in Cltapter 7. Notice of Debtor's Bankruptcy filing is sent to all creditors listed 
on the petition schedules. The notice includes the following useful information: 
(a) Name of the debtor and any alias' used in the last six (6) years; 
(b) Name and address of the debtor's attorney; and 
(c) The time frame in which certain actions may be taken: 
(1) Date Petition Filed. Automatic stay goes into effect. 
(2) Meeting of Creditors. The date first set for an examination of the debtor by 
his/her creditors, required by the Code. . 
(3) Last date to file objection to discharge or complaint of non discharge ability. 
(4) Date of Discharge. Generally the last date to file reaffirmation and stay lifted. 
3.2 Tlte Automatic Stay. Arises automatically upon the filing of the petition. Discussed in 
detail above. 
3.3 Proofs of Claim (filing procedure). 
(a) Generally. Unsecured creditors are informed by the Court's notice not to file a proof 
of claim unless they are notified that is is likely assets will be realized for their benefit. The vast 
majority of consumer Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases, with no distribution to be made to the 
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unsecured claimants, and a proofof claim should generally not be filed in a Chapter 7, no-asset case 
unless the creditor is advised by the Court or the Trustee to file. 
(b) Notice to File. Should notice be provided that a proof of claim should be filed, it 
should contain the following information: 
(1) Unsecured Proof of Claim. Statement by the creditor of the balance owed by 
the debtor. Some evidence showing how the balance was derived should be attached to the proof 
of claim along with a copy of the original obligation. 
(2) Secured Proof of Claim. Statement by the creditor of the balance owed by the 
debtor and evidence that the creditor has a valid and perfected security interest in specified 
propertY of the estate. 
All proofs of claim should be filed using the official bankruptcy form and all 
information requested should be included. Note: Do not include any "pre-computed" interest 
charges in your claim balance. 
3.4 Role of the Trustee. The Trustee represents the interests of the unsecured creditors. His 
or her job is to collect assets and to distribute them to the unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. The 
Trustee conducts the meeting of creditors. The Trustee will review the petition and proofs of claim 
filed and question the debtor at the meeting of creditors to determine if there are any assets for the 
benefit of the unsecured creditors. To the extent that the Trustee is a "friend" to the unsecured 
creditors, he is the "enemy" of the secured creditors. The Trustee possesses certain powers which 
may be used to adversely affect the secured creditor's position. He or she can set aside unperfected 
security interests, fraudulent transfers, some statutory liens, and preferences. 
3.5 Preferences in Chapter 7. 
(a) Elements of a Preference. The power to avoid a preference allows the Trustee to 
set aside any transaction between a creditor and the debtor which improves the position of that 
creditor to the detriment of the other creditors. The burden is on the Trustee to prove all of the five 
(5) elements of a preference action: 
(1) Transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) Transfer must be for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor 
before the transfer was made; 
(3) Transfer must have been made when the debtor was insolvent (the Code provides 
the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition). 
(4) Transfer must have been made during the 90 days before the date of the filing of 
the petition or between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition if the 
creditor was an insider at the time of the transfer; and 
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(5) Transfer enables the creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive 
if the case were a case under Chapter 7 and the transfers had not been made. 11 U.S.C. §547. 
(b) Exceptions to Preferellces. The Code sets out specific exceptions. These include, 
as a general rule, a creditor's ability to retain up to $599.99 on consumer debt received within 90 
days from the filing of the petition (note that transfers less than $600.00 within the 90 day period 
may be aggregated, resulting in a preference); 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(8) when the transfer in question 
was a contemporaneous one for new value; 11 U.S.C. §547( c) (1); where the payment of a debt was 
within the ordinary course of business by the debtor; 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(2) and when the creditor 
gave new value after the transfer in question. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(4) 
(c) Preferences Ullder State Law. Under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee 
may also seek to assert a preference claim under state law. In Kentucky, the applicable preference 
period is extended from 90 days under federal law, to 6 months from the date of transfer by virtue 
ofKRS 378.060. However, unlike under the federal statute, in order to succeed on a preference 
claim under state law a trustee must prove that the debtor intended to prefer the creditor which 
received the transfer. In the typical case of a garnishment or other involuntary payment by a debtor 
to a creditor, this will be a difficult burden. See In re Rexplore Drilling, 971 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 
1992); Omniflight Helicopters. Inc. v. Kennedy, 567 S. W.2d 123 (Ky. App. 1978). Practitioners are 
also directed to In re Battery One-Stop Ltd., 36 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 1994), which holds that a 
garnishing creditor rises to the level of a lien creditor on the date of the service of the garnishment 
order upon the garnishee. Thus, where a creditor obtains a lien prior to the beginning of the 
preference period, no preferential transfer can occur with respect to payments received subsequent 
to the date of the creation of the lien via service of the garnishment order. See also In re Edwards, 
219 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998). 
3.6 Fraudulent Conveyance. In Kentucky, the trustee has two bodies oflaw at his disposal 
in pursuing fraudulent conveyances-state law (11 U.S. C Section 544, incorporating KRS 378.010 
et seq) and federal bankruptcy law (11 U.S.C. Section 548). Some common examples of fraudulent 
conveyances are the transfer of property or the grant of a security interest for less than fair 
consideration and the sale of property by the debtor for less than fair consideration. In such event, 
the lien may be avoided under either 11 U.S.C. §548 orKRS 378.010 etseq, discussed infra, and any 
equity which is otherwise exemptible by the debtor may be claimed as exempt, free and clear of the 
creditor's claim, provided the debtor has not concealed such property. or voluntarily transferred it. 
In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Roberts, 81 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1987). 
3.7 Lien Defects. Under 11 U.S.C. Section 544, the trustee has the power to avoid any 
transfer of property of the debtor, including defective liens, that would be voidable by ajudiciallien 
creditor or a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. Section 544. This 
power permits the trustee to strike down invalid or "secret" liens (liens which have not been 
recorded, as required by KRS 382.010): 
No deed or deed of trust or mortgage conveying a legal or equitable title to 
real property shall be valid against a purchaser for valuable consideration, 
without notice thereof, or against creditors, until such deed or mortgage is 
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acknowledged or proved according to law and lodged for record. As used in 
this section, "creditors" includes all creditors irrespective of whether or not 
they have acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings or by voluntary 
conveyance. KRS 382.270. 
Kentucky law also specifies the place of recordation of mortgages, by requiring that: 
All deeds, mortgages and other instruments required by law to be recorded 
to be effectual against purchasers without notice, or creditors, shall be 
recorded in the county clerk's office of the county in which the property was 
conveyed or the greater part thereofis located. KRS 382.110. 
In addition, Kentucky law (KRS 355.9-302) requires that certain liens on personal property must 
be recorded to be effectual. 
In the event that a mortgage or lien on real or certain personal property is unrecorded or 
improperly filed, it may be avoided by the trustee. Any equity which exists after avoidance of such 
liens and/or mortgages may be claimed exempt by the debtor, to the extent such exemption is 
allowed by Kentucky statutes. 
Lien avoidance on certain exempt property under Section 522(f) is done by motion of the debtor, 
and is a contested matter under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Bankruptcy Rule 4003( d). The prerequisites 
for lien avoidance are: 
(a) Existence of property in which the debtor has a valid exemption; 
(b) Existence of a lien on such property; 
(c) The lien is either a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security 
interest in household furnishings or goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, 
musical instruments or jewelry, which are held primarily for personal, family or household use of 
the debtor or his dependents; implements, professional books or tools of the trade of the debtor or 
his dependents, or professionally-prescribed health aids; and 
(d) The lien impairs the debtor's exemption interest. 
No deadline for seeking lien avoidance is imposed by either the Bankruptcy Code or the 
Bankruptcy Rules. Notice of the motion seeking lien avoidance must be given to the creditor whose 
lien is sought to be avoided. A minimum of five (5) days' notice must be given of any hearing on 
the motion for lien avoidance, which time may be reduced by the court. Bankruptcy Rule 9006. 
The debtor bears the initial burden or proof, and the creditor has the burden of rebuttal. In re 
Streeper, 158 B.R. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993); In re Maylin, 155 B.R. 605 (D. Me. 1993); In re 
Mohring, 142 B.R. 389 (E.D. Ca. 1992). 
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The standard of proof in a lien avoidance action is presumably a preponderance of the evidence. 
4. TREATMENT OF THE SECURED CREDITOR - THE THREE "R's" OF CHAPTER 7 
BANKRUPTCY. There are three possible ways to resolve a secured claim in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy: 
reaffirmation, redemption or recovery. 
4.1 Reaffirmation. 
(a) Generally. Reaffirmation of a debt by the debtor is a method for insuring that the 
creditor will be paid post-bankruptcy, despite the discharge entered in the case. The basic question 
is, does the creditor want to allow the debtor to reaffirm the debt (or does the creditor wish to realize 
on its collateral), and if so, on what terms. Remember that reaffirmation is a voluntary agreement 
between the debtor and the creditor, and may not be required unilaterally by either party. 
(b) Terms All Reaffirmations Must Include: 
(1) Name of parties. 
(2) Balance as of a certain date, including interest rate, the installment payment, and 
date of the next payment due; 
(3) Identify the security in the reaffIrmation and attach a copy of the original 
obligation and security agreement; 
(4) "Subject to the original terms of the contract"; 
(5) Require proof of insurance; 
(6) Provide for fair rental value: this protects the creditor if the debtor later rescinds 
the reaffirmation; 
(7) The debtor's attorney's declaration; 
(8) Conspicuous statement that the reaffIrmation agreement may be rescinded and 
that the agreement is not required by the b~ptcy code or other non-bankruptcy law; and, 
(9) Signature of both the debtor and the debtor's attorney. 
Under the Code, the agreement must be made before the granting of the debtor's 
discharge. See Chase Automotive Finance. Inc. v. Kinion, 204 F.3d 751,2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5025 
(5th Cir.); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 98 (Bankr. D. Conn.). The debtor also 
must not have rescinded the agreement at any time prior to the discharge or within sixty (60) days 
after the agreement was fIled with the Court, whichever occurred later, by giving written notice of 
the rescission to the creditor. Generally, Bankruptcy Courts will set a fIling deadline for reaffIrmation 
agreements to be fIled with the court. That date is usually the same date as the date for discharge of 
the debtor. The Code requires simply that the agreement must be "made" prior to discharge, and fIled 
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with the Court. Failure to file your agreement with the Court could result in the agreement 
being invalidated and could subject the creditor to penalties from the Court. 
(c) Debtor's Right to Rescind. Anytime prior to discharge or within sixty (60) days after 
such agreement is filed with the Court, whichever occurs later, the debtor may rescind by giving 
notice to the creditor. The notice to the debtor that he may rescind the agreement must be set out in 
the agreement conspicuously. This means that the required language must be underlined, or placed 
in capital letters so as to be conspicuous within the body of the reaffmnation agreement. 
(d) The Effect of the Reaffirmation. If the rescission period is past, the debt is not 
discharged and the debtor remains liable on the indebtedness as if the bankruptcy was never filed. 
4.2 Redemption. A debtor may redeem property by paying the lienholder the amount of its 
allowed secured claim, as either agreed to by the debtor and creditor, or as established by a valuation 
hearing. 11 U.S.C. §§722 and 506(a). If the creditor is over secured, the allowed secured claim 
is equal to the outstanding balance owing at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Ifthe creditor is under 
secured, the allowed secured claim is the value of the collateral. In re Breckinridge, 140 B.R. 642 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1992); In re Polk, 76 B.R. 148 (9th Cir. 1987). Such payment must be made as 
a one-time lump-sum payment, unless the creditor consents to an installment payment schedule. In 
re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). Redemption is initiated by the debtor filing a motion to 
redeem, and is a contested matter. Bankruptcy Rule 6008. 
Redemption is a very limited right, and only applies where the creditor's security is: 
(a) Tangible personal property; 
(b) Intended primarily for personal, family, or household use; 
(c) Is a dischargeable consumer debt; and 
(d) Is exempted or has been abandoned. 
All of the above conditions must exist or there is no right to redeem. 
The Code provides that the debtor may redeem qualified property by paying the secured creditor 
the amount of the allowed secured claim. However, in cases where the lien exceeds the value of the 
property, the creditor would only be entitled to the fair market value of the collateral at the time the 
bankruptcy petition was filed. Note that if all of the conditions for redemption are met, the debtor 
has an unqualified right to redeem and the creditor cannot keep a debtor from redeeming merely 
because it would prefer reaffirmation (of course, the creditor always has the right to contest valuation 
of the collaternl for redemption). 
4.3 Recovery. If the debtor and creditor have been unable to agree on terms of reaffirmation 
or the creditor does not choose to allow the debtor to reaffirm, and no motion to redeem has been 
made by the debtor, then the creditor must begin to think in terms of recovering its security. This 
a two-fold process. First, the creditor must position itselfto take possession by "freeing" its property 
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from the restrictions imposed by the bankruptcy. Second, the creditor must obtain actual physical 
possession of the security. 
(a) Positioning to Take Possession. There are three (3) interested parties: the debtor 
who owns the property, the Trustee who is entitled to any equity over and above the properly 
perfected liens and allowed exemptions, and the secured creditor. 
In order to take the property free and clear of claims by the other two (2) interested 
parties, the secured creditor must obtain stay relief (see above), removing bankruptcy protection 
provided to the debtor, and obtain the Trustee's abandonment of the property (extinguishing the 
unsecured creditor's interest). In the best of worlds, the creditor can get the debtor and his counsel, 
as well as the Trustee, to sign an Agreed Order Terminating Stay and Abandoning the Property. 
If one or both will not cooperate for one reason or another, then the creditor will have to file motions 
to have the stay lifted and to have the Trustee abandon the property. 
(1) Notification. Motion to Terminate, Annul or Modify the Stay (see above). 
(2) Abandonment. Even though the Stay has been terminated and creditor is 
permitted to obtain possession of its collateral, the creditor must still obtain an abandonment 
from the Trustee in order to dispose of the collateral free of the Trustee's lien. One of the most 
common methods of abandonment is obtaining an abandonment from the Trustee at the meeting 
of creditors, by way of an agreed order. Both abandonment and lifting of the Stay can be 
achieved by no action on the part of the creditor. In all cases, once discharge has been entered 
the Stay is lifted as a matter of law. Note that termination of the stay does not equal 
abandonment, and separate tests are required to be met by the Court for each. 
(3) Obtaining Possession of Security. Even though the creditor is free from the 
bankruptcy proceedings, he still must act in accordance with state law and take peaceable 
possession of the property, and otherwise comply with Article 9 of the UCC. 
4.4 Lien Avoidance. 
(a) Introduction. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f), a debtor may avoid the fixing 
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such nonconsensuallien impairs 
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled, if such lien is a: 
(1) judicial lien, other than a judicial lien that secures a debt to a spouse, former 
spouse or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, 
in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record; and 
to the extent that such debt is not assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law or 
otherwise; and includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such 
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support; or 
(2) nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any household 
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical 
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instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the 
debtor or the trade of a dependent of a debtor; or professionally-prescribed health aids for the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 
Only a nonconsensuallien can be avoided. In re Fagan, 26 B.R. 212 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1982); InreDriver, 133 B.R. 476 (Bankr. S.D. In. 1991). 11 U.S.C. §101(36) defines a "judicial 
lien" as a lien "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or 
proceeding." 11 U .S.C. §522(f) permits a debtor to avoid certain liens, to the extent that such liens 
impair an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled. For purposes of 11 U.S.C. 
§522(f), a lien is considered to impair an exemption to the extent the sum of (i) the lien, (ii) all other 
liens on the property and (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were 
no liens on the property exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the 
absence of any liens. See In re Lehman, 205 F.3d 1255,2000 U.S. App. Lexis 3418 (11th Cir.) 
(calculate lien avoidance using entire value of property, ignoring non-debtor spouse's interest); In 
re Cannon, 243 B.R. 153,2000 Bankr. Lexis 6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (lien upon dissolution of marriage 
split between prope~ settlement - avoidable - and support obligation). 
For example, if a debtor has household goods worth $3,000 and claims the household 
goods exemption provided by statute, and a creditor has a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money 
security interest in the household goods, the creditor's lien may be avoided. The result of such a lien 
avoidance would convert the creditor's claim from a secured claim to a general unsecured claim. 
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, the rule adopted by the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Dixon, 885 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1989) was that a homestead 
exemption applied only in execution sale situations. Thus, the Court ruled that the debtor's 
exemption was never impaired in a bankruptcy situation, and consequently a debtor could never 
avoid liens. As a result of this ruling, Sixth Circuit debtors were confronted with the problem of 
selling their home after bankruptcy, and being required to pay the lienholder out of the equity which 
should have been protected as exempt property to provide for their "fresh start". 
However, Kentucky courts found that the holdings ofln re Dixon and In re Moreland, 
21 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994), a case which reaffirmed Dixon, did not apply in Kentucky due to 
differences in Kentucky and Ohio law. In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1995); In re 
Powell, 173 B.R. 338 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1994). These decisions, which have been adopted in the 
Western District of Kentucky, hold that Dixon was based on an interpretation of Ohio law which was 
contrary to Kentucky case law. 
In re Dixon, supra, was probably overruled by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 
which provides that a debtor may avoid a judicial lien, even when the debtor has no equity in the 
property over and above a lien which is superior to the junior lien which the debtor is seeking to 
avoid. Thus, a debtor's residual interests in property, such as a possessory interest, are protected 
from ajudiciallien. Section-by-Section Description ofH.R. 5116, 140 Congo Rec. HI0, 764 [daily 
ed. October 4, 1994]; H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103d Congo 2d Sess. 35-37 [1994]. 
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However, Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky have held that judgement liens are void 
and need not be released by the Bankruptcy Court. 
For example, in Stidham v. Ford Motor Credit, Case No. 91-50019, Adversary 
Proceeding No. 94-5091 (January 11, 1995), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky was presented with a fact situation wherein Ford Motor Credit held a judgement lien 
encumbering all real estate of the debtors, including the two pieces of real property which the debtors 
owned at the time they filed bankruptcy. One piece of property was sold by the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy trustee and Ford Motor Credit's lien attached to the sales proceeds. A second tract of 
property was abandoned by the trustee and later sold at a state court foreclosure sale. After they filed 
bankruptcy but before receiving their discharge, the debtors purchased real estate (the "new 
property") in the same county where the judgement lien was filed. When the debtors later attempted 
to refinance the new property, they discovered that Ford Motor Credit's judgment lien was still of 
record. Ford Motor Credit refused to release its judgment lien, and the debtors sought an order of 
the Bankruptcy Court removing such lien. The Hon. Joe Lee first determined that the discharge of 
indebtedness was retroactive to the date of the bankruptcy filing, and that the underlying judgment 
lien was discharged prior to the debtor's purchase of the new property. The Court then addressed the 
status of the judgment lien and determined that it was extinguished by the sale of the two pieces of 
real property. Thus, because there was no longer any indebtedness owed by the debtors secured by 
the judgment lien, the underlying judgment is void and did not survive bankruptcy. 
Similarly, in In re William Norvell. III, Case No. 95-34212(1)7 (July 31, 1996), the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky agreed with Judge Lee's analy~is and held 
that because the underlying obligation was discharged and no property to which the lien could attach 
was owned by the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the judgment lien itself was also void. 
Consequently, the Court determined that a KRS 426.720 judgment lien will survive bankruptcy 
ONL Y as an in rem claim against real estate which the debtor owned at the time the bankruptcy case 
was filed, and will not attach to any real estate acquired by the debtor after the bankruptcy filing. 
It is clear that 11 U.S.C. Section 522(t) applies even in a jurisdiction that has opted 
out of the federal exemption scheme. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d, 
350 (1991). 
5. EXCEPTIONS To DISCHARGE IN CHAPTER 7. 
5.1 Generally. When the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code were developing the "fresh start" 
approach to bankruptcy, they recognized that there should be certain instances where the debtor was 
not entitled to the benefits of the discharge provisions of the Code. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code 
allows creditors and other interested parties the right to object to allowing the debtor the benefit of 
a discharge of all ofhislher debts, or having a specific debt(s) held to be non-dischargeable in the 
bankruptcy action. This outline provides a general overview of Section 523 claims (exceptions to 
discharge) and provides a detailed discussion regarding the most common forms of these claims, 
which are designed to except from discharge isolated debts incurred by fraud, false pretenses, false 
representations or for willful and malicious injury to property under Sections 523(a)(2)(A), (B), (C) 
and Section 523(a)(6). 
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Claims for exception to discharge are filed within the bankruptcy proceeding, and are referred 
to as "Adversary Proceedings". 
Practice Note: What is an "Adversary Proceeding" and how do you file one? Generally, these 
cases are brought ''within'' the main bankruptcy case and are styled in accord with the sample 
Complaint form to these materials. With the complaint, the Plaintiff must complete and file 
an Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet (which can be obtained form the Court clerk), along 
with the filing fee, which is currently $150.00. 
5.2 Exceptions To Discharge Generally-ll U.S.C.§523. The Code provides for exceptions 
to the discharge of certain debts. These "non-dischargeable" debts or "exceptions to discharge" 
relate only to the specific debt involved. This section of the Bankruptcy Code will not operate to 
deny the debtor a discharge ofhislher other debts. 
Practice Note: You should be careful to distinguish complaints under Section 523 
from those under Section 727 and Motions to Dismiss under Section 701. Complaints 
under Section 523 relate to individual, isolated debts. Complaints under Section 727 
are an attempt to prohibit a debtor's discharge entirely, and different factors are 
considered by the Court in such a proceeding. Both are brought by adversary 
proceeding, however. To the contrary, actions under Section 701 of the Code are an 
attempt by a creditor or other party with standing to dismiss a Chapter 7 case, thus 
denying the debtor a discharge, for reasons related to the debtor's bad faith in filing 
the proceeding in the first place. See. ~, In re Spangolia, 199 B.R. 362 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1995). Unlike Adversary proceedings, Section 701 actions are brought by 
motion filed in the main bankruptcy case. 
The types of debts which are generally non-dischargeable in a Chapter 7 petition under 
Section 523 are as follows: 
(a) Taxes. Many taxes are non-dischargeable. See, Meyersv. IRS, 196F.3d622, 1999 
U.S. App. Lexis 29962 (6th Cir.) (tax obligation not discharged per 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(I)(c) because 
of wilful failure to file returns and abuse of exemptions); Ward v. Board of Egualization, 204 F.3d 
888, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis §2597 (9th Cir.) (post-petition interest non-dischargeable if tax non-
dischargeable). 
(b) Fraud. Debts incurred by fraud or under false pretenses or representations, including 
through false statements made in a written financial statement or other writing submitted to a creditor 
for the purpose of obtaining credit. See, In re Wiggins, 245 B.R. 726, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 183 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga.). The code protects creditors who extend credit based on fraudulent information 
communicated by a dishonest debtor (see detailed discussion below). But see, In re Bryant, 241 B.R. 
756, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1497 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.) (creditor failed to prove justifiable reliance). 
(c) Unscheduled Debts. A debtor has a duty to file a list of creditors and ifhe fails to list 
a creditor, that creditor will not receive notice of the bankruptcy and will be deprived of the right to 
participate in the case. Thus, the Code provides that unlisted debts are excepted from discharge. But 
see In re Madaj, 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the bankruptcy code does not except an 
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unscheduled debt from discharge if the creditor had notice or actual notice of the bankruptcy case 
in time for timely filing of a proof of claim"). The Madaj court also held that the unscheduled debt 
was discharged even though the creditor did not learn ofthe case until after the discharge order was 
entered, in light of the fact that the court could find no prejudice to the creditor that could have been 
avoided if the creditor had received timely information. 
(d) Theft. Debts which result from embezzlement, larceny and fiduciary fraud. See,~, 
In re Jacks, 243 B.R. 385, 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1729 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.) (fiduciary duty had to exist 
before misconduct). 
(e) Alimony, Maintenance and Support. This section is self-explanatory, but it should 
be mentioned that if the right to receive the alimony, maintenance or support is assigned to a third 
party, the debt will lose its nondischargeable status. Details will be discussed by other presenters at 
this CLE. See, In re Ackerman, 247 B.R. 336, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 384 (Bankr. M.D. Fla) (spouse's 
professional fees are nondischargeable support obligations). 
(f) Willful and Malicious Injury. When a person or entity is injured or property is 
damaged as a result of the "willful or malicious" conduct of the debtor, the debtor's liability arising 
therefrom may not be dischargeable. This might include the deliberate sale of collateral and 
conversion of the proceeds by a debtor without payment to the secured creditor. Generally, however, 
under recent case law, the injury must be intentional and the damage caused by the injury must have 
been intended. See, infra; see also, In re Baldwin, 245 B.R. 131,2000 Bankr. Lexis 138 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir.) (state battery conviction proved intent to injure); In re Sarff, 242 B.R. 620, 2000 Bankr. Lexis, 
(B.A.P. 6th Cir.) (breach of duty of loyalty was based on willful breach of service contract, so 
nondischargeable ). 
(g) Fines and Penalties. Fines, penalties or forfeitures owed to a governmental unit, 
including traffic fines, are generally not dischargeable. 
(II) Student Loans. The Bankruptcy Code provides that some types of student loans may 
not be discharged. Recent amendments have changed the rules related to student loans. Soverign 
immunity will limit a debtor's ability to sue state educational institutions. See, University of 
Virginia v. Robertson, 243 B.R. 657,2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis k766 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
(i) Intoxication. Judgments and consent decrees resulting from driving while 
intoxicated. See, In re Longhevv, 246 B.R. 234, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 178 (Bankr. D. Md.) (loss of 
consortium award nondischargeable). 
0) Prior Denials. Debts from a previous bankruptcy in which discharge was denied. 
5.3 Elements of a §523(a) Claim. As listed above, there are several different types of Section 
523 claims. The most common claims brought by creditors are found at Section 523 (a)(2) and (a)(6). 
Subsections (a)(2)(A) and (B) deal with debts incurred for money, property or services to the extent 
they are obtained by false pretenses, false representation, fraud, or the use of a fraudulent statement 
concerning the debtor's financial condition. Subsection (a)(6) relates to debts incurred as the result 
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of a willful or malicious injury by the debtor to another or to the property of another. The remainder 
of this outline will examine these specific code provisions in greater detail. 
(a) 523(a)(2)(A) 
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides: 
(A) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this 
title does not discharge an individual from any debt; 
(B) For money, property, services or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of 
credit, to the extent obtained by; 
(C) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement 
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that although the burden of proof rests on the 
plaintiff/creditor to establish the elements of 11 U. S.C. §523( a) in such a claim, the burden of proof 
required is a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than that of clear and convincing 
evidence. Grogan v. Gamer. 498 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). 
(2) To succeed in a non-dischargeability claim under §523 (a)(2)(A), a creditor must 
prove by preponderance of the evidence that: 
(A) The Defendant made certain false statements to the creditor; and, 
(B) The Defendant made these representations with the intent to deceive the 
creditor; and, 
(C) The Creditor reasonably relied on the false representation; and 
(D) The Creditor sustained the loss resulting from the Defendant's 
misrepresentation (causation). 
See Grogan v. Gamer, supra; Inre Ward, 857F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988); InrePhillips, 
804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ritzer, 105 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). 
In a case under §523(a)(2)(A), the first 2 elements of the analysis essentially focus 
on the conduct of the Debtor. In determining whether a debt arising from credit card charging 
spree is non-dischargeable for fraud under §523 (a)(2)(A), the question is whether at the time of 
making the charges, the debtor did not intend to pay the debt or did not have a reasonable 
prospect of being able to the pay debt. See,~, In re Chech. 96 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1988); In re Pozucek, 73 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Daugherty, 57 B.R. 99 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn 1985). 
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(3) With respect to the element of intent, a number of factors are considered in 
determining the Debtor's actual intentconceming repayment ofa credit card debt or other cash 
advances, including but not limited to: 
(A) length of time between the charges or obtaining the credit and filing 
bankruptcy; 
(BJ financial condition of the debtor when he or she obtained the credit; and, 
(e) whether the purchases made or credit incurred were for luxuries or 
necessities. 
In re Lemaster, 142 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Id. 1992): In re Marlar, 142 B.R. 304 
(Bankr. E. D. Ark. 1992). 
(4) Gambling debts present a special "subset" of potential, non-dischargeable debts 
under this section. Many courts have held that debts incurred for gambling purposes are 
non-dischargeable. Forinstance, in Citibank v. Hansbury, 128 B.R. 320 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), 
the credit card issuer sought a determination that the debt owed to it by the card holder was 
excepted from discharge under §523(a)(2)(A). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant, by using 
credit cards issued by the Plaintiff, incurred a debt in the amount of $47,654.28 at a time when 
he had no ability to repay and he knew or should have known that he had no ability to repay the 
debt. Id. The Defendant denied that he had incurred the debt without intending to repay it. The 
Court in Hansbury stated: 
"The defendant does not dispute that he incurred the amount of debt that he 
is alleged to have incurred. He admits that he incurred most of the debts by 
taking cash advances to be used to pay gambling debts, and that he hoped to 
repay this debt and all the debt as issue here by gambling and winning big ... 
He knew at all times relevant to this proceeding that he lacked the means to 
honor the credit card obligations that he was incurring. 
"The defendant does not dispute that he incurred the amount of debt that he 
is alleged to have incurred. He admits that he incurred most of the debts by 
taking cash advances to be used to pay gambling debts, and that he hoped to 
repay this debt and all the debt as issue here by gambling and winning big ... 
He knew at all times relevant to this proceeding that he lacked the means to 
honor the credit card obligations that he was incurring. 
Id. at 321. 
See also In re Karelin, 109 B.R. 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Vermillion. 136 B.R. 225, 226 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (where debtor used card only for cash advances and used money to pay 
off other debt or to gamble, the debtor knew that she did not have the ability to repay the debts, 
and thus intended to deceive the creditor); In re Bartlett, 128 B.R. 775, 779 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1991) (where credit card advances were taken for gambling purposes and debtor did not have 
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reasonable basis for believing she could repay her debt through the gambling winnings, but 
merely "hoped" that she would win enough to pay of the debts, the debtor made implied 
representation to credit card company when she obtained cash advances and made 
misrepresentations and knowing them to be false and with the intention and purposes of 
deceiving her creditors). 
**NOTE: The above rules may be partially abrogated by the 6th Circuit's ruling in 
Rembert and its holding related to subjective intent to deceive (see discussion 
below). It is not completely clear what the impact of this new case will be to the body· 
of law related to debts incurred for gambling purposes. 
Practice Note: Non-Dischargeability May be Presumed: 11 U.S.C. Section 
S23(a)(2)(C) states: 
"For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a 
single creditor and aggregating more than $1000 [to be adjusted] for "luxury goods 
and services", incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order 
for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1000. [to be 
adjusted] that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan 
obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order of relief under 
this title, are presumed to be non-dischargeable; 'luxury goods or services' do not 
include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the 
debtor or a dependant of the debtor ... " 
Thus, in some cases, where a debtor has "loaded up" hislher credit card within 60 days prior 
to filing, purchasing non-essential items that qualify as "luxury goods" (hot tubs, mink coats, lavish 
vacations, gambling, and other similar items or services), or obtaining large cash advances, the 
creditor's burden of proof may be considered satisfied, and the burden of proving an innocent intent 
or motive shifts back to the defendant debtor. Watch this carefully, however! The fact that non-
dischargeability is presumed does not relieve the creditor of its burden of filing an adversary 
proceeding to obtain an official ruling on non-dischargeability from the court. 
The third and fourth elements necessary for a finding of fraud essentially focus on the 
creditors' conduct. In the vast majority of cases, there is no dispute that the creditor has suffered a 
loss (the fourth element), and in any event, this fact may be easily proven. Of course, the issue of 
"causation" (whether the loss was caused by the debtor's fraudulent conduct or the creditor's own 
negligence) is always in issue. 
The third element necessary for a creditor to succeed under the statute is reliance, and this 
can be a very difficult element to prove. In fact, before filing a complaint under Section 
S23(a)(2)(A), a prudent practitioner will conduct a sufficient due-diligence review, particularly 
related to this element. Recent court opinions have greatly limited the availability of the claim. For 
example, in In re Chincilla, 202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996), the bankruptcy court sternly 
admonished the creditor for filing what it considered to be a frivolous complaint: 
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"AT&T's case is analogous to a gunslinger in the wild west without 
ammunition. It does not survive. This court is closing the 523(a)(2)(a) "town 
gates" to credit card issuers. Just don't ride into town firing blanks and 
kicking up dust in the hope of rustling up a settlement. Come in armed with 
facts to prove fraud or you may be driven out of town with a 523(d) bullet in 
your tail." 
The "523( d) bullet" that the court is referring to is the power of the Bankruptcy Court, under 
such section, to award a debtor the "court costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding 
if the Court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially justified ... 
In the Sixth Circuit, our courts have determined that in a complaint under §523(a)(2)(A), the 
Plaintiff/Creditor must demonstrate that it reasonably relied on the representations and conduct of 
the Debtor. In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 932 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 
1988); Inre Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992); Inre Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556 (6th Cir. 1992). In 
Ledford, the Court stated that "whether a creditor's reliance is reasonable is a factual determination 
to be made in light of the totality of the circumstances." In re Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1560. According 
to the Sixth Circuit, the circumstances which may effect the reasonableness of the Creditors' reliance 
are: 
(A) whether the creditor had a close personal relationship or friendship with the 
debtor; 
(B) whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave 
rise to a relationship trust: 
(C) whether the debt was incurred for personal or business reasons; 
(D) whether there were any "red flags" that would have alerted the ordinary 
prudent lender to the possibility that the representations relied upon were not accurate; and, 
(E) whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of 
the debtor's representation. In re Ledford, 970 F.2d. at 1560. 
In both Ward and Ledford, the Sixth Circuit held that a credit card issuer has a duty to 
investigate and verify a card holder's ability to pay before it issues the card and the Court further 
inferred that the credit card issuer may not merely rely on the debtor's signature, but rather should 
conduct some form of independent credit report in approving the debtor's credit. However, see In 
re Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992) (in the context ofa §523(a)(2)(B) case, the requirement of 
"reasonable reliance" is not rigorous and is only directed at creditors acting in bad faith; courts 
should not undertake subjective evaluation and judgment of creditors' lending practices). In re 
Bridges, 51 B.R. 85,90 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1985) (under 523(a)(2)(A), creditor only required to make 
"some efforts" to verify information contained in debtors' financial statements and an "exhaustive 
credit check" is not necessary). 
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In November, 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Field v. Mans, 116 S.Ct. 
437, 133 L.Ed.2d 35 1 (1995). In deciding the case, which was brought by the creditor under §523( a), 
the Court concluded, contrary to the authority cited above, that the proper standard for determining 
a creditor's reliance was the less rigorous standard of "justifiable reliance". The proper inquiry was 
whether the creditor "justifiably" relied on the debtor's conduct in extending the credit. It therefore 
appears that the burden on the creditor in establishing reliance in the adversary proceeding context 
has been lessened, although, as a practical matter, it is unknown by how much. 
However, just when it appeared that the Supreme Court, under Field v. Mans, might be 
relaxing the stringent standards courts have imposed on credit card issuers in bringing 523(a)(2)(A) 
complaints, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision that severely limits credit 
card lenders' ability to recover nondischargeability judgments in adversary proceedings under 
§523(a)(2)(A). The decision, Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Services. Inc., 141 F.3d 277 (6th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 438 (1998) is significant for several reasons: 
(i) First, it holds that the proper inquiry to determine a debtor's fraudulent 
intent is the debtor's subjective intent to repay; and, 
(ii) Second, it holds that each time the credit card is used the debtor makes 
an implied representation that he intends to repay but not that he has the current ability to repay. 
In examining the debtor's representations and intent, the Court wrote: 
"[T]he focus should not be on whether the debtor was hopelessly insolvent at the 
time he made the credit card charges ... ; rather, the express focus must be solely 
on whether the debtor maliciously and in bad faith incurred credit card debt with 
the intention of petitioning for bankruptcy and avoiding the debt. A finding that 
a debt is nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(A) requires a showing of actual or 
positive fraud, not merely fraud implied by law . . . [T]he hopeless state of a 
debtor's financial condition should never become a substitute for an actual 
finding of bad faith." 
This case appears to adopt Ninth Circuit law, follows the reasoning of an increasing number 
of courts, and alters current law in the Sixth Circuit. As a result, it now appears that credit card 
issuers in this Circuit will not be successful in nondischargeability actions unless they can prove that 
the debtor actually intended to defraud them at the time the card was used. Given the obvious 
difficulties in proving a debtor's subjective intent, Rembert appears to significantly limit a credit card 
creditor's remedies under §523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
(b) 523(a)(2)(B): Use of a False Statement in Writing. 
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(B) states: 
(A) A discharge under [this title] does not discharge ... any debt for money, 
property, services or an extension, renewal or refmancing of credit, to the extend obtained by: 
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(i) Use of a statement in writing that is materially false; 
(ii) respecting the debtor's ... financial condition; 
(iii) on which the creditor ... reasonably relied; 
(iv) and, that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to 
deceive. 
Be careful to consider the difference in the reliance standard. Under the decision Field v. 
Mans, the standard for reliance under 523(a)(2)(A) is that of "justifiable reliance." Under (a)(2)(B), 
the statute requires "reasonable reliance", which appears to be a slightly higher standard. 
Further, remember that the statement at issue must be "materially" false. A slight or 
insignificant error on the document will not suffice to render the debt nondischargeable. The 
question the practitioner should ask is "would my client have made the loan or extension of credit 
had it known that this statement was false?" 
Finally, "intent" is always the hardest element to prove in these cases. Guidance might be 
found in the cases cited above related to (a)(2)(A), and in Knoxville Teachers, infra. 
The burden of proof, like that under (A)(2)(A), is a "preponderance of the evidence." See 
Grogan, supra. 
An exhaustive discussion of the elements of this claim is beyond the scope of this summary. 
The following cases should be consulted by a prudent Kentucky practitioner considering filing an 
(a)(2)(B) complaint: Coman v. Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986); Knoxville Teachers Credit 
Union v. Parkey, 790 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Woolum, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1992); In re 
Duncan, 35 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Rosel, 63 B.R. 603 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986). 
debt-
(c) Section 523(a)(6): Willful and Malicious Injury. 
(1) 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(6) states: 
(A) (a) A discharge under [this title] does not discharge ... a debtor from any 
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of 
another entity. 
In truth, most of the prior case law in Kentucky on this section was abrogated by the ruling 
of the United States Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 
L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). A detailed overview of the case is instructive on this point: 
Margaret Kawaauhau and her husband recovered a state court judgment on a medical 
malpractice claim against the debtor-physician, Paul W. Geiger. Dr. Geiger prescribed oral 
C-31 
antibiotics to Ms. Kawaauhau, although he knew that intravenous antibiotics would be more 
effective. Ms. Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated, resulting in the amputation of her leg. Dr. Geiger 
later filed for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Kawaauhaus brought an adversary 
proceeding under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) to have the debt determined nondischargeable. Ms. 
Kawaauhau argued .that Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered inadequate medical care to her that 
necessarily led to her injury. The Bankruptcy Court held that Dr. Geiger's treatment "fell far below 
the appropriate standard of care and therefore ranked as willful and malicious." Dr. Geiger lost on 
appeal to the U.S: District Court for the Eastem District of Missouri and appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit, which reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court's decision focused on the plain language of §523( a)( 6), reading it to mean 
that "only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury fall within the exception's scope." 
According to the Court, the word "willful" in subsection (a) ( 6) modifies the word "injury," indicating 
that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional 
act that leads to injury. For these reasons, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision and 
declared that the debt was, in fact, dischargeable as the plaintiff could not prove that the debtor 
actually intended to cause her injury. . 
The ruling is a departure from the standard used in most bankruptcy courts around the 
country and will overrule a considerable body of case law which requires a much less rigid showing 
of improper conduct. The decision will make it far more difficult for creditors to succeed in a 
complaint to deny discharge under the "willful and malicious injury" exception set out in §523( a)( 6). 
See In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that unless an actor desires to cause the 
consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it, 
he/she has not committed a ''willful and malicious" injury under the terms of this section). A lack 
of excuse or justification will not alone make a debt non-dischargeable. 
These cases do not, however, make it impossible for a creditor to succeed in the right case 
and given proper facts. For example, many causes of action under this section entail a debtor's 
conversion of property given as collateral on a creditor's loan. If a debtor sells a creditor's collateral, 
without tendering payment from the proceeds of the sale to the creditor, the creditor has a cause of 
action under this section. See,~, In re Cline, 52 B.R. 301 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). 
Likewise, if the debtor were to assault or batter the complaining creditor, this would clearly 
constitute sufficient "intent to harm" rendering the debt nondischargeable. See,~, In re Bishop, 
55 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (where debtor struck plaintiff in the head with a hammer, the 
debt for such damage was nondischargeable). 
If a debtor fails to keep or secure insurance on a vehicle subject to a lien, is this non-
dischargeable? Generally the answer is no. See ~ In re Diver, 121 B.R. 509 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1990) (while the court found that the knowing failure to keep and maintain insurance on a vehicle 
was in fact wilful, it was not "malicious" so the debt was dischargeable). 
The measure of damages under this section is somewhat unclear. Generally, in the sale of 
collateral subject to a security agreement, damages are tied to the value of the property sold or 
converted. In re Thomas, 36 B.R. 851 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984). In other actions under this section 
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(for example, personal injury), damages might be awarded in a state court tort action and sustained 
in a bankruptcy court under principals of collateral estoppel. 
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Unpublished Opinions by Honorable David T. Stosberg 
In re: Robert L. Ray, Case No. 99-31519(3), AP No. 99-3098, decided September 3, 1999. Criminal restitution 
obligation ofthe debtor owed to the plaintiff in the amount of$1800.00 entered by the State Court for driving 
under the influence charge was not dischargeable by virtue of Section 523(a)(7). The Court ruled that "any 
financial obligation imposed as part ofa criminal sentence is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(7). 
" Relates to Section 5.1 of Outline. 
In re: Donald Ray Kennedy and Shirley Jean Kennedy, Case No. 98-40655(3) 7, AP No. 99-4038, decided 
January 28, 2000: An adversary proceeding brought by the holder of covenant not to compete, requesting an 
order from the court declaring that the covenant was not a "claim" under Section 101(5) which could be 
discharged in bankruptcy. The Court determined that the debtors obligation to comply with the covenant did not 
constitute a "claim" under the statute. The Court terminated the stay to allow the parties to pursue additional 
claims related to the agreements between them. Relates to Section 2.3 of Outline. 
In re: Kenneth Wayne Oglesby and Rachel Michelle Olgelsby, Case No. 99-41539(3)(7), AP No. 00-4014, 
decided April 5, 2000. Debtor signed a note and mortgage on November 10, 1999 and filed bankruptcy on 
November 23, 1999. In an adversary proceeding brought by the Creditor seeking a determination that the 
$22,608.00 mortgage indebtedness was non dischargeable under Section 523(a)(2), Court ruled, without 
deciding the case on the merits and acknowledging the need for additional evidence, that "the proximity between 
the date ofthe execution ofthe note and mortgage and the date ofthe bankruptcy filing supports the Plaintiffs 
allegation offraud...." Relates to Section 5.3 of Outline. 
In re: Michael W. Payne, Case No. 99-41583(7), AP No. 00-4015, decided May 19,2000. Where the debtors 
pledged certain collateral to a creditor under the terms ofa security agreement and later sold the items to private 
purchasers and pawn shops, Court refused to declare the obligations non dischargable under Section 523( c) 
because, while the Debtor confessed·to the sale of the items, the testimony and evidence at trial presented by 
the plaintiff creditor did not establish the debtor's malicious intent to harm the creditor. The Court cited to 
Maryfield Grain Co. v. Crump, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2000), a decision by Judge Wendell Roberts, which 
held that in order to prevail in an action 523(a)6), the Creditor must prove the debtor had the intent to harm 
either the creditor or the collateral. Relates to Section 5.3 of outline. 
Unpublished Opinions by Honorable J. Wendell Roberts 
In re: Clayton & Stacey Crump, Case No. 99-50595. AP No. 99-5029, decided March 20,2000. Court overruled 
Creditor's Motion to Reconsider Judgment entered on Debtor's behalfon creditor's Section 523(a)(6) claim. 
Court ruled that the Debtor's failure to remit proceeds from the sale of collateral (in this case crops) did not 
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constitute a willful and malicious injury where it appeared the Debtor was using the proceeds for his farming 
business with the motive ofkeeping the business afloat Relates to Section 5.3 of outline. 
In re: Charles Lewis Roberts. Jr.. Case No. 00-30788(2)7, APNo. 00-3067, decided September 14,2000. A final 
judgment had been entered for interest on a child support arrearage. The Court held that it was non­
dischargeable under Section 523(aX5), citing In re: Coleman, 56 B.R 179. Relates to Section 5.3 of outline • 
• 
In re: Selma Ann Slaughter. Case No. 99-34948(7), AP No. 00-3004, decided November 6,2000. Court refused 
to allow the debtor to amend her complaint to state a claim for preferential conveyance under Section 544(b) 
and the Kentucky Preference Statute KRS 378.060, ruling that the statute of limitations for avoidance actions 
under Section 544 under Section 546(a)(2) barred the amendment where the case was closed on March 14,2000 
and the Plaintiff raised the issue on May 8, 2000, after passage of the bar date. Relates to Section 3.5 of 
Outline. 
Unpublished decisions by Honorable Joan L. Cooper 
In re: Nickie Howard Vandagriff, Case No. 99-11171(3)7, decided April 12,2000. Trustee sought an order 
declaring that the debtor's IRA Funds were not exempt from estate property. The issue for determination was 
whether these funds, which were rolled over from a retirement plan qualified under ERISA into an individual 
IRA within 120 days before the bankruptcy petition was filed, were entitled to the exemption under KRS 
427.150. The Court ruled that the funds were in fact exempt, holding that the exemption statutes are to be 
liberally construed in favor of a debtor and further that, under the IRS Code sections applicable, which are 
incorporated by reference into the Kentucky statute, the roller was not a "contribution" to the IRA as used in the 
Kentucky Statute. Relates to Section 2.3 of Outline. 
In re: Curtis Wayne Rippy, Case No. 98-11756(1), APNo. 99-1012, decided June 7, 2000. Creditor bank filed 
adverSary proceeding for exception to discharge related to its loan secured by a Harley Davidson Motorcycle. 
The Trustee counterclaimed alleging that the Bank did not hold a perfected security interest in the motorcycle 
and other collateral, and that the Bank's sale of said collateral after the bankruptcy violated the stay and 
constituted a preferential transfer under Section 547. The Court ruled that the Bank did not properly perfect its 
security interest in the collateral under KRS 186A.190, which requires that the Bank's lien be notated on the 
Certificate ofTitle. The Court therefore concluded that the motorcycle was property ofthe bankruptcy estate and 
that the Bank's lien was unperfected and therefore subordinate to the interest ofthe Trustee. Relates to Section 
3.7 of Outline. 
In re: Timothy W. Alexander, Case No. 00-10025, decided June 12,2000. Debtor soughtto hold his ex-wife and 
her divorce attorney liable for an intentional violation ofthe stay when, following filing of the petition by the 
debtor, they requested the state divorce court to issue an order holding the Debtor in contempt for failure to 
make payments on certain debt obligations assigned to the Debtor in the divorce decree. The Court held that 
while the ex-wife and her attorney alleged their actions were in good faith, their actions were clearly intended 
to enforce a portion of the parties separation agreement which fell into the prohibitions set forth in Section 
362(bXl). The Court awarded the Debtor damages in the amount of $1344.20. Relates to Section 1.3 of 
Outline. 
In re: Martha A. Brumbaugh, Case No. 99-41200 (3) 7, decided July 5, 2000. Debtor sought to avoid judicial 
lien against home owned jointly with her husband. The Debtor claimed a homestead exemption against the 
property in the amount of $4,500.00. The Creditor objected arguing that the lien did not impair the debtor's 
exemption under Section 522(f)(2)(A). The Debtor argued that because, under Kentucky law, a creditor can 
attach and sell under execution a debtor-spouse's interest in property, the lien impaired her exemption and was 
avoidable. The Court ruled that under the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress provided a 
federal definition of"imp.airment" and provided an arithmetic test to determine ifa lien impairs an exemption. 
Under the Code, a lien does not impair an exemption unless the sum ofthe lien, the other liens and the amount 
ofthe exemption the debtor could claim exceed the value ofthe debtor's interest in the property in the absence 
ofany liens. Utilizing the test, the. Court overruled the Debtor's motion. Relates to Section 4.4 of Outline. 
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TRANSITION RULES FOR REVISED ARTICLE 9 
9-702 - 9-709 
Richard H. Nowka 
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law 
1. Applicability of revised 9 over pre-effective-date (PED) transactions 
• Applicability of revised article 9-9-702 
• On July 1, 2001, revised 9 immediately applies to PED . 
transactions and liens within scope of revised 9 regardless of 
whether the transaction was covered by old article 9 ' 
• Effect is that secured party must comply with revised 9 
requirements to insure continued validity of PED transaction 
SAVING CLAUSE-9-702(2) except as otherwise provided by 
the transition rules (these "otherwise provided" rules include 
length of perfection, and continuation of perfection, discussed 
infra), transactions and liens not governed by old 9 remain valid 
without the necessity of action; they can be terminated, , 
completed, consummated and enforced under either revised 9 
. or law applicable otherwise, 'at option of secured party 
EXAMPLE-agriculture liens are not covered by old 9 but are 
within scope of revised 9; on July 1, 2001, a PED agriculture 
lien is governed by the requirements of revised 9, thus 
necessitating the lienholder's compliance with revised 9; 
saving clause effect is that the lien remains valid under revised 
9 without any action by the lienholder, and lienholder can 
choose to enforce lien under either revised 9 or PED applicable 
law 
D-ll 
EXCEPTION TO APPLICABILITY OF REVISED 9-9-702(3) 
revised 9 does not affect an action, case, or proceeding, i.e., 
litigation, con:tmenced before revised 9 takes effect, July 1, 
2001; if litigation involving a security interest is commenced 
before July 1, 2001, the requirements of old 9 for enforceability, 
perfection, priority, enforcement, etc., apply in the proceeding 
regardless of whether revised 9 changes those requirements 
• Priority of security interest-9-709 
• Revised 9 priority rules determine the priority of conflicting 
claims regardless of whether the claim arises before or after the 
effective date of revised 9 
EXAMPLE-SP 1 takes a security interest in debtor's 
equipment that attaches on May 1, 2000, but never perfects it; 
revised 9 takes effect; SP 2 takes a security interest in the 
same equipment on August 1, 2001, and perfects it on August 
5, 2001; the priority rules of revised 9 determine the priority of 
the competing claims; SP 2 has priority 
EXCEPTION-9-709(1) if the relative priorities of the claims 
are established before the effective date of revised 9, then old 9 
determines the priorities; revised 9 does not define when . 
. "relative priorities" are "established," but the official comments 
to 9-709 indicate that relative priorities are established 
whenever two or more entities have an interest in the same 
collateral; priorities are established regardless of whether or 
when an actual conflict over the collateral arises 
EXAMPLE-SP1 takes a security interest in debtor's 
equipment on May 1, 2000, and perfects it on May 7, 2000; 
SP 2 takes a security interest in the same equipment on August 
1, 2000, and perfects it on August 5, 2000; these priorities are 
established before the effective date of revised 9 and are 
determined by the priority rules of old 9; SP 1 has priority 
• Claimant's action taken after the effective date of revised 9 can 
change relative priorities established under old 9 resulting in 
revised 9 determining the relative priorities 
D-12 
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EXAMPLE-SP 1 and SP 2 have unperfected security interests 
in debtor's equipment prior to effective date of revised 9; old 9 
determines the priorities because the relative priorities are 
established prior to revised 9; SP 1 has priority; after effective 
date of revised 9, SP 2 perfects its security interest by filing a 
financing statement; the post-effective-date action of SP 2 
changes the relative priorities which are now determined by the 
priority rules of revised 9; SP 2 has priority 
• The mere taking effect of revised 9 cannot change relative 
priorities established under old 9; in a situation where PED 
action of the claimant is not effective to perfect a security 
interest under old 9, but is effective to perfect a security interest 
under revised 9, the relative priorities are not reestablished 
upon the effective date of revised 9; priority is determined 
under old 9 
EXAMPLE-in March 2000, SP 1 takes a security interest in 
debtor's right to payment for lottery winnings, a general 
intangible under old 9, but files a financing statement describing 
the collateral as "accounts" and is not perfected under old 9; in 
August 2000, SP 2 takes a security interest in the same 
collateral and files a financing statement describing the 
collateral as "accounts and general intangibles" and is 
perfected under old 9; the relative priorities are established and 
SP 2 has priority; under the accounts definition of revised 9 (9-
102(2», a right to payment for lottery winnings is an account; 
when revised 9 becomes effective, SP 1 's financing statement 
is effective to perfect its security interest under revised 9 
(assuming all other revised 9 perfection requirements are 
satisfied); if revised 9 were to govern priority, the first to file or 
perfect rule would award priority to SP 1 since it was the first to 
file, and SP 1 is now perfected; however, the relative priorities 
are not reestablished and SP 2 has priority 
• Priority of security interest dates from effective date of revised 9 
for security interest in after acquired collateral acquired after 
revised 9 effective date-9-709(2); this provision has a narrow 
application; it is applicable only for after acquired collateral 
" D -13 
acquired by the debtor after revised 9's effective date, and 
when secured party's perfection action was not effective to 
perfect the security interest under old 9, but is effective to 
perfect the security interest under revised 9; priority of such 
after acquired property security interest dates from the effective 
date of revised 9 
EXAMPLE- in March 2000, SP 1 takes a security interest in 
debtor's current and after acquired rights to payment for lottery 
winnings, a general intangible under old 9, but files a financing 
statement describing the collateral as "accounts" and is not 
perfected under old 9; when revised 9 becomes effective, SP 
1 's financing statement.is effective to perfecfits security interest 
under revised 9 (assuming all other revised 9 perfection 
requirements are satisfied); after revised 9 becomes effective, 
the debtor acquires additional rights to payment for lottery 
winnings; the priority date for the rights to payment acquired 
after revised 9's effective date is July 1, 2001 
2. Security interest enforceable and perfected under both revised 9 and 
old 9-9-703(1) 
• A security interest that was enforceable and perfected under old 9 
or other applicable law 9 (when PED transaction was outside the 
scope of old 9) is a perfected security interest under revised 9 if, 
when revised 9 becomes effective, the applicable requirements for 
enforceability and perfection under revised 9 are satisfied without. 
further action 
EXAMPLES-purchase money security interest in debtor's 
consumer goods automatically perfected upon attachment under 
both old 9 and revised 9; security interest in debtor's instruments 
. perfected by possession under both old 9 and revised 9; security 
interest in debtor's securities account perfected by control under 
both old 9 and revised 9 
3. Security interest enforceable and perfected under old 9 but not under 
revised 9-9-703(2) 
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• Security interest that is enforceable and perfected under old 9 but 
does not satisfy the revised 9 requirements for perfection remains 
perfected for one year after revised 9 takes effect 
• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if security interest 
becomes enforceable under revised 9.requirements before the 
year expires 
• Security interest remains perfected thereafter if security interest 
becomes perfected under revised 9 requirements before the year 
expires 
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's right to 
proceeds of a written letter of credit; SP perfects by possession of 
the letter of credit (effective under old 9-305); revised 9 becomes 
effective; possession of letter of credit does not perfect such 
security interest under revised 9 requirements; security interest 
remains perfected until June 30, 2002; perfection lapses on June 
30, 2002, unless effective perfection action taken between July 1, 
2001, and June 30, 2002 
EXCEPTION-this rule-security interest remains perfected for 
one year--is subject to 9-705, discussed infra at 6, which allows 
security interests perfected by filing to remain perfected beyond 
June 30, 2002 
4 .. Security interest enforceable but not perfected "before effective date of 
revised 9-9-704 
• Security interest is enforceabl~ under old 9 but is not perfected 
under old 9 when revised 9 becomes effective; security interest 
remains enforceable for one year after revised 9 becomes 
effective regardless of whether security interest satisfies 
enforcement requirements of revised 9 
• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if revised 9 
enforceability requirements are satisfied during the year; if 
requirements not satisfied during the year, security interest lapses 
D -15 
• Security interest becomes perfected under revised 9 when revised 
9 perfection requirements are satisfied, with or without action by 
the secured party 
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's instruments 
under a security agreement signed by debtor describing the 
collateral as "debtor's instruments"; SP fails to take possession of 
the instruments and is not perfected under old 9; when revised 9 
takes effect the security remains enforceable for one year and 
thereafter since the authenticated security agreement satisfies the 
enforceability requirements under both old 9 and revised 9; SP 
can perfect under revised 9 either by taking possession of the 
instruments or by filing a financing statement covering instruments;' 
if, prior to revised 9 effective date, SP takes action that is 
ineffective to perfect the security interest under old 9, but effective 
under revised 9, e.g., files a financing statement that satisfies 
revised 9's requirements, the security interest becomes perfected 
immediately upon revised 9 becoming effective; this possibility is 
less likely in Kentucky since Kentucky filing office will change from 
local filing under old 9 to central filing under revised 9 
5. After-acquired property under security interest perfected under old 9 
other than by filing where perfection action not effective under revised 
9-9-705(1) 
• Rule has narrow application; affects only security interest in 
property acquired after revised 9 effective date, and security 
interest is perfected other than by filing under old 9, such action 
not being effective to perfect the security interest under revised 9; 
in such case the security interest in property acquired after revised 
9 effective date is perfected for one year after revised 9 effective 
date; after lapse of one year, security interest becomes 
unperfected unless secured party takes action effective under 
revised 9 within one year of effective date; under 9-703(2) the 
security interest in the PED collateral is perfected also for only one 
year after revised 9 becomes effective 
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EXAMPLE-SP has security interest in debtor's existing and after 
acquired instruments; the instruments are held by a bailee who is 
not an agent of or under the control of SP or debtor; SP perfects 
under old 9-305 by notifying bailee of SP's security interest; 
revised 9 takes effect and thereunder SP's perfection action is not 
effective; after revised 9 takes effect the debtor acquires 
instruments which it delivers to bailee;. the security interest in the 
instruments acquired after revised 9 becomes effective remain 
perfected for one year from revised 9's effective date; thereafter, 
perfection lapses unless SP takes action effective under revised 9, 
e.g., bailee acknowledges it holds instruments for SP, or SP files a 
financing statement 
6. PED filing-9-705(2) & (3) 
• Filing effective under revised 9, but ineffective under old 9-9-
705(2) 
• Where PED filing satisfies the perfection requirements of 
revised 9, but not the requirements of old 9, the security 
interest is perfected when revised 9 takes effect 
EXAMPLES-financing statement could be ineffective under 
the requirements of old 9 because, for example, the financing 
statement description is overly broad, or it is filed in the wrong 
jurisdiction under the choice of law rules of old 9-103; if revised 
9 validates the financing statement's broad description, or the 
jurisdiction is proper under revised 9's choice of law rules, the 
security interest is perfected without further action when revised 
9 becomes effective 
EXAMPLE-SP anticipates the effective ~ate of revised 9 and 
files a financing statement under the requirements of revised 9, 
although the financing statement is not effective under old 9; 
the security interest is effective without further action when 
revised 9 becomes effective; SP typically also would make an 
effective filing under old 9 
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• Filing effective under old 9, but ineffective under revised 9-9-
705(3) 
• Security interest is perfected by a PEO filing which is effective 
to perfect the security interest under old 9; PEO filing is not 
effective to perfect the security interest under revised 9; 
nevertheless security interest remains effective until earlier of 
remaining period of perfection under old 9, or June 30, 2006; 
this is an exception to the one year of perfection rule of 9-
703(2) .. . . 
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's equipment 
in August 2000; SP perfects by filing financing statement in the 
Kentucky county clerk's office of the county of debtor's 
residence; revised 9 takes effect on July 1, 2001; under 
revised 9, financing statement in equipment is filed in secretary 
of state's office, thus filing is not effective under revised 9; 
security interest remains perfected regardless of lack of 
effective post-effective-date filing until earlier of normal lapse 
date under old 9 or June 30, 2006 
PRACTICAL EFFECT -SP can do nothing and security interest 
perfected by PEO filing remains perfected for both PEO 
collateral and post-effective-date collateral 
7. Continuation of perfection by filing-9-706 & 9-705(4) 
• Security interest perfected by PEO filing cannot be continued 
beyond lapse date by filing revised 9 continuation statement-9-
705(4) 
EXCEPTION-PEO filing can be continued by timely filing a 
revised 9 continuation statement if PEO filing was in the filing 
office designated by revised 9; the continuation statement and the 
PEO financing statement must satisfy revised 9 requirements for 
an initial financing statement-9-705(4) & (6) 
PRACTICAL EFFECT -exception is of little value to security 
interests perfected by filing in Kentucky because PEO filing 
D -18 
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typically is a county clerk's office filing and effective revised 9 filing 
is a secretary of state's office filing, thus effective filings would not 
be made in the same office; exception applicable to multi-state 
secured transactions where choice of law rules of both old 9 and 
revised 9 specify same jurisdiction and same office 
• Continuing effectiveness of PED filing is accomplished by filing an 
initial financing statement "in lieu" of filing a continuation 
statement-9-706 
• The "in lieu" statement is filed in the filing office designated by 
revised 9 
• The "in lieu" statement can be filed any time prior to lapse of 
effectiveness of PED financing statement; this filing is not 
restricted to the normal six month window for filing continuation 
statements 
• The "in lieu" statement continues the effectiveness of the PED 
financing statement for five years from the date of filing the "in 
lieu" statement, not five years from the normal lapse date of the 
PED filing· . 
• The "in lieu" statement can continue the effectiveness of more 
than one PED filing against the same debtor provided the "in 
lieu" statement properly identifies all the affected filings 
• The "in lieu" statement must: 1) satisfy the revised 9 
requirements for an initial financing statement (part 5 of revised 
9); 2) identify the PED filing by filing office, date of filing, and 
file numbers of the PED filing and most recent continuation 
statement (if any); and 3) indicate that the PED filing remains 
effective 
EXAMPLE-SP perfects a security interest in Kentucky 
debtor's equipment by filing a PED financing statement in 
county of debtor's residence on August 5, 2000; revised 9 
takes effect on July 1, 2001, and revised 9 specifies the proper 
filing office as the Kentucky secretary of state's office; on 
November 11, 2004, SP files, in the Kentucky secretary of 
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state's office, an initial financing statement (an "in lieu" 
statement) that also satisfies the requirements of 9-706(3) to 
continue the PED filing; SP's PED filing is continued for five 
years from November 11, 2004, and SP's priority date relates 
back to the original priority date 
8. Amendment of PED filing-9-707 
• Amendment, under the revised 9 definition, includes any filings 
made to a financing statement after filing the initial financing 
statement, e.g., add or delete collateral, continue or terminate the 
financing statement, add or delete debtors/secured parties 
• Place of filing amendment-must file amendment in office and 
jurisdiction specified by revised 9 regardless of place of PED 
filing 
EXAMPLES-PED financing statement filed locally in 
Kentucky, post-revised 9-effective-date amendment can be filed 
only in Kentucky secretary of state's office; in multi-state 
secured transaction-PED filing made, for example,· in Indiana 
under old 9's choice of law rules; revised 9's choice of law 
rules designate Kentucky as the proper jurisdiction; post-
effective-date amendment can be filed only in Kentucky 
secretary of state's office 
EXCEPTION-can terminate effectiveness, i.e., a termination 
statement, of PED filing in accordance with law of jurisdiction 
where PED filing is made-9-707(2) & (5); termination 
"exception" i·s not available if SP has filed a post-effective-date 
initial financing statement in office designated by revised 9; 
exception may not be available in Kentucky because revised 9 
changes filing office from local to central 
• Method of amending-9-707(3) 
• If the PED financing statement and the amendment are filed 
in the same office specified by revised 9, then amendment is 
only filing required; this method is not generally applicable in 
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Kentucky since PED filing is local, and the post-effective-date 
amendment filing is central; possible in multi-state secured 
transactions where PED filing office is same as revised 9 
filing office 
• If the pre and post filing offices are not the same, file post-
effective-date initial financing statement in office specified by 
revised 9, and therewith or thereafter, file amendment; two 
documents filed; the initial financing statement must also 
satisfy 9-706(3)-the information required to continue the 
effectiveness of the PED filing 
• If the pre and post filing offices are not the $ame, can file 
post-effective-date initial financing statement which provides 
the amended information in office specified by revised 9; one 
document filed; the initial financing statement must also 
satisfy 9-706(3)--the information required to continue the 
effectiveness of the PED filing 
0-21 
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I. 	 Introduction 
A. 	 Transition. As of July 1,2001, all transactions will become subject to new default 
rules. 
B. 	 Major Changes and Clarifications 
1. Default Rules contained in Part 6 
2. Statutory Distinction between Consumer and Commercial Transactions 
3. Definitional Clarifications of Good Faith and Commercial Reasonableness 
4. Definitional Clarification Regarding Parties 
5. Notice Safe Harbor 
6. Explanation ofDeficiency 
II. 	 Commercial v. Consumer Transactions 
A. 	 Definition ofConsumer Transactions. 
9-102(24) defines "consumer transaction" as a "consumer transaction in which: 
(1) 	 an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes; and 
(2) a security interest in consumer goods secures the transaction." 
9-102(23) defines "consumer goods" as "goods that are used or bought for use 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." 
D- 23 

B. 	 Importance 
1. 	 10 day notice safe harbor does not apply to consumer transactions. 
R9-612 provides: 
(1) 	 Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, 
whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question 
of fact. 
(2) 	 In a transaction other than a consumer transaction, a notification of 
disposition sent after default and ten (10) days or more before the 
earliest time ofdisposition set forth in the notification is sent 
within a reasonable time before the disposition. 
2. 	 Separate Notice Requirements and Form. See Section V below. 
3. 	 Requirement ofExplanation of Calculation of Surplus ofDeficiency. See 
Section VI below. 
4. 	 Limitations on Strict Foreclosure. R 9-620(5)-(7) provide: 
(5) 	 A secured party that has taken possession of collateral shall 
dispose ofthe collateral pursuant to KRS 355.9-610 within the 
time specified in subsection (6) ofthis section if: . 
(a) 	 Sixty percent (60%) ofthe cash price has been paid in the 
case ofa purchase-money security interest in consumer 
goods; or 
(b) 	 Sixty percent (60%) of the principal amount of the 
obligation secured has been paid in the case ofa non­
purchase-money security interest in consumer goods. 
(6) 	 To comply with subsection (5) of this section, the secured party 
shall dispose of the collateral: 
(a) 	 Within ninety (90) days after taking possession; or 
(b) 	 Within any longer period to which the debtor and all 
secondary obligors have agreed in an agreement to that 
effect entered into and authenticated after default. 
(7) In a consumer transaction, a secured party may not accept 
D - 24 
r 
r , 
collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures. 
r 5. Minimum Damage Provisions. R9-625(3), (5) and (6) provide: 
r (3) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 355.9-628: 
(a) A person that, at the time of the failure, was a debtor, was 
r an obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral may recover damages under subsection (2) of this 
section for its loss; and 
r (b) If the collateral is consumer goods, a person that was a 
r 
debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured party 
failed to comply with this part of this article may recover 
for that failure in any event an amount not less than the 
r credit service charge plus ten percent (l 0%) of the principal amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus 
ten percent (10%) of the cash price. 
r (5) In addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (2) of this 
section, the debtor, consumer obligor, or person named as a debtor 
r in a filed record,.as applicable, may recover five hundred dollars ($500) in each case from a person that: 
r (a) Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-208; 
r 
(b) Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-209; 
(c) Files a record that the person is not entitled to file under 
r" KRS 355.9-509(1); (d) Fails to cause the secured'party of record to file or send a 
r termination statement as required by KRS 355.9-513(1) or (3) of this Act; 
r . (e) Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-616(2)(a) and whose failure is part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice, of 
noncompliance; or 
r· (f) Fails to comply with KRS 355.9-616(2)(b). 
r (6) A debtor or consumer obligor may recover damages under subsection (2) of this section and, in addition, five hundred dollars 
r 
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III. 
($500) in each case from a person that, without reasonable cause, 
J 
J 
fails to comply with a request under KRS 355.9-210. A recipient of J 
a request under KRS 355.9-210 which never claimed an interest in 
the collateral or obligations that are the subiect of a request under 
that section has a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the J 
request within the meaning of this subsection. 
6. Rebuttable Presumption Rule not Statutorily Adopted in Consumer 
transactions. Revised Article 9 adopts the rebuttable presumption rule for 
violations of Part 6. Under this rule, the value of the collateral is 
rebuttably presumed to be the amount of the debt. If the presumption is 
not rebutted the effect is that the secured party loses its deficiency claim. 
While Revised Article 9 adopts the rule only for non-consumer 
transactions, the Kentucky Supreme Court has adopted the rule for all 
types of transactions. See Holt v. Peoples Bank of Mt. Washington., 814 
S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1991). Where the secured party has failed to provide the 
required notice, however, the absolute bar rule applies. Id at 570-71. 
j 
J 
J 
Definitions of Good Faith and Commercial Reasonableness 
J 
j 
A. 
B. 
Good Faith 
Current Article 9 uses the general VCC definition of good faith contained in 1-
201(19). Thatsection defines "good faith" as ''honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned." 
R9-102(43) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observence of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. " [emphasis added] 
Commercial Reasonableness. 
R9-627 provides some clarity to the defInition of commercial reasonableness. 
That section provides: 
355.9-627 Determination of whether conduct was commercially reasonable. 
(1) The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection, 
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different 
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 
preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection, 
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
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(2) 	 A disposition ofcollateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner if 
the disposition is made: 
(a) In the usual manner on any recognized market; 
(b) At the price current in any recognized market at the time of the 
disposition; or 
(c) Otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among 
dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition. 
(3) 	 A collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially 
reasonable if it has been approved: 
(a) In ajudicial proceeding; 
(b) By a bona fide creditors' committee; 
(c) By a representative ofcreditors; or 
(d) By an assignee for the benefit of creditors. 
(4) 	 Approval under subsection (3) of this section need not be obtained, and 
lack of approval does not mean that the collection, enforcement, 
disposition, or acceptance is not commercially reasonable. 
IV. 	 Definitions ofDebtor, Obligor, and Secondary Obligor 
A. 	 Current Article 9 has created some uncertainty because the definition of"debtor" 
includes both the owner of the collateral and the person who owes the obligation, 
as the "context" requires. 
B. 	 R9-102 provides separate definitions for; 
"debtor" - the person who owns the collateral; 
"obligor" - the person who owes the debt; and 
"secondary obligor" - a guarantor. 
C. 	 These definitions are most important when considering the parties entitled to 
notice and a commercially reasonable sale. 
V. 	 Notice Requirement. R9-614 provides clarity regarding the form that notice must take. 
Under R9-614 completing the following form provides sufficient information: 
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<Name and address of secured party> 
<Date> 
NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY 
<Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor> 
Subject: <Identification ofTransaction> 
We have your ..... <describe collateral>, because you broke promises in our 
agreement. 
<For a public disposition:> 
We will sell ..... <describe collateral> at public sale. A sale could include a lease 
or license. The sale will be held as follows: 
Date: .............. . 
Time: .............. . 
Place: .............. . 
You may attend the sale and bring bidders ifyou want. 
<For a private disposition:> 
We will sell ..... <describe collateral> at private sale sometime after 
..... <date>. A sale could include a lease or license. 
The money that we'get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce the amount 
you owe. Ifwe get less money than you owe, you ..... <will or will not, as applicable> 
still owe us the difference. Ifwe get more money than you owe, you will get the extra 
money, unless we must pay it to someone else. You can get the property back at any time before 
we sell it by paying us the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our 
expenses. To learn the exact amount you must pay, call us at ..... <telephone number>. 
If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount that you 
owe us, you may call us at ..... <telephone number> <or write us at ..... <secured 
party's address» and request a written explanation. <We will charge you $...•. for the 
explanation ifwe sent you another written explanation of the amount you owe us within 
the last six (6) months.> 
Ifyou need more infonnation about the sale call us at ..... <telephone number> 
<or write us at ..... <secured party's address». 
We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an interest in 
..... <describe collateral> or who owe money under your agreement: 
..... <Names ofall other deb~ors and obligors, ifany>" 
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VI 
R9-614 also provides: 
(4) 	 A notification in the form of subsection (3) of this section is sufficient, 
even if additional information appears at the end of the form. 
(5) 	 A notification in the form of subsection (3) of this section is sufficient, 
even if it includes errors in information not required by subsection (1) of 
this section, unless the error is misleading with respect to rights arising 
under this article. 
(6) 	 If a notification under this section is not in the fonn of subsection (3) of 
this section, law other than this article dc~tennines the effect of including 
information not required by subsection (1) of this section. 
Explanation of Calculation of Surplus or Deficiency. 
A. 	 When a consumer requests an explanation after a disposition of collateral, R9-616 
requires the secured creditor to respond within 14 days with an explanation of the 
method of calculation. The secured party must provide one explanation free of 
charge in any 6 month period. For additional explanations, the secured party may 
charge a fee of up to $25.00. 
B. 	 The explanation must include the following information: 
(a) 	 The aggregate amount ofobligations secured by the security interest under 
which the disposition was made, and, if the amount reflects a rebate of 
unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication ofthat fact, 
calculated as of a specified date: 
1. 	 If the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral 
after default, not more than thirty-five (35) days before the secured 
party takes or receives possession; or 
2. 	 If the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral 
before default or does not take possession of the collateral, not 
more than thirty-five (35) days before the disposition; 
(b) 	 The amount of proceeds of the disposition; 
(c) 	 The aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting the amount of 
proceeds; 
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(d) 	 The amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types ofexpenses, including 
expenses ofretaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and 
disposing ofthe collateral, and attorney's fees secured by the collateral 
which are known to the secured party and relate to the current disposition; 
(e) 	 The amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types ofcredits, including 
rebates ofinterest or credit service charges, to which the obligor is known 
to be entitled and which are not reflected in the amount in paragraph (a) of 
this subsection; and . 
(t) 	 The amount of the surplus or deficiency. 
c. 	 R9-616( 4) provides: 
A particular phrasing of the explanation is not required. An explanation 
complying substantially with the requirements ofsubsection (1) ofthis 
section is sufficient, even if it includes minor errors that are not seriously 
misleading. 
D - 30 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
HANDLING CASES WITH THE CHAPTER 7 
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
Copyright 1998-2000, Bachert, Baker, Lyon 
Updated 2000, Cathy S. Pike 
Scott A. Baclrert 
Hamed, Baclrert & Denton 
Bowlillg Green, Kelltllcky 
and 
Miclzael L. Baker 
Ziegler & Sclmeider, P.S.C 
Covillgtoll, Kelltucky 
and 
James D. Lyoll 
Attorlley at Law 
Lexillgton, Kentllcky 
and 
Catlry S. Pike 
Weber & Rose, P.S.C. 
Louisville, Kelltucky 
SECTION E (a) 
~t 
.J 
i 
.J 
j 
.1 
J 
I 
.J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
HANDLING CASES WITH THE CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Property' Of The Estate ............................................. E(a)-l 
II. 
III. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Estate Property Defmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-l 
Property of Estate and the Chapter 7 Trustee, Generally ............... E(a)-l 
Reference to State Law ........................................ E(a)-2 
Preference Litigation ............................................... E(a)-2 
A. Introduction .................... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-2 
B. Preferences-Purpose ........................................... E(a)-5 
C. Definitions .................................................. E(a)-5 
D. Defenses of Creditors .......................................... E(a)-9 
E. Security Interests ............................................ E(a)-10 
F. Accounts Receivable and Inventory .............................. E(a)-l0 
G. Statutory Liens .............................................. E(a)-ll 
H. Domestic Relations ..................... ; .................... E(a)-ll 
I. Consumer Minimum ......................................... E(a)-ll 
J. Sureties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-ll 
K. Real Property Rules .......................................... E(a)-12 
L. Presumption ofInsolvency ..................................... E(a)-12 
M. Burdens of Proof ............................................ E(a)-12 
N. Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-12 
O. Venue .................................................... , E(a)-13 
P. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-13 
Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation ••••••••••.••••••••••••.••••••.•••• 
A. Definitions Under § 548 ...................................... . 
B. Partnership Transfers ........................................ . 
C. Rights of Transferees ........................................ . 
D. Transfer .................................................. . 
E. Value Defined ............................................. . 
F. Parties - Plaintiffs ........................................... . 
G. Venue .................................................... . 
H. Statute of Limitations ........................................ . 
I. State Law ................................................. . 
SECTION E(a) 
E(a)-13 
E(a)-15 
E(a)-16 
E(a)-17 
E(a)-17 
E(a)-17 
E(a)-18 
E(a)-18 
E(a)-18 
E(a)-18 
IV. "Strong-Arm" Powers Of A Chapter 7 Trustee ••••••.....•.•....•.•••. E(a)-19 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
General Analysis ofa Trustee's Powers .......................... E(a)-19 
Trustee's Status as a Lien Creditor ....... ~ ...................... E(a)-19 
Trustee's Power to Avoid Statutory Liens ......................... E(a)-21 
Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. E(a)-22 
V. Other Issues Relating To Trustee's Administration Of The 
Bankruptcy Estate ............................................... . 
A. Post-Petition Transfers ....................................... . 
B. Trustee's Power to Compel Turnover of Property .................. . 
C~ Trustee's Standing to Object to or Revoke Discharge ............... . 
D. Operation of the Debtor's Business ............................. . 
E. General Duties and Responsibilities of a Trustee .................. . 
Endnotes ................................. ~ ........................... . 
SECTION E(a) 
E(a)-23 
E(a)-23 
E(a)-23 
E(a)-25 
E(a)-25 
E(a)-25 
E(a)-29 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
.J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
·r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
HANDLING CASES WITH THE CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
I. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
A. Estate Property Defined 
James D. Lyon 
Michael L. Baker 
Scott A. Bachert 
Cathy S. Pike 
The commencement of a bankruptcy creates an estate, comprised of all property rights the 
debtor has in property of every kind and description, legal and equitable, wherever located and by 
whomever held, as of the date of filing. 11 USC §541. The definition of estate property is extremely 
broad, but the estate generally can have no greater interest in property than did the debtor at the time 
of filing. Property of the estate does however include property preserved, recovered or transferred 
back to the estate. 11 USC § 541(a)(4) and (5). Property of the estate may include consigned 
property, ifno notice of the consignor's interest is given. In re: Andaco. Inc., 226 BR 578 (Bankr. 
W.O. Ky. 1998). 
1. Property Received Within Six Months of Petition 
In addition to property rights held at the commencement of the case, property received by 
bequest or inheritance, property settlement or divorce decree, or through life insurance benefits 
within six (6) months of the petition is property of the estate. 11 USC § 541 (a)(5). 
2. Proceeds of Estate Property 
Proceeds, product, offspring, rent or profits of estate property is estate property. This does 
not include earning from the debtor's services after the commencement of the case. Note that 
post-petition earnings are property of a Chapter 13 and Chapter 12 bankruptcy estate. 
3. Property Not Part ofthe Estate 
Some property is not held to be part of the bankruptcy estate. These specific, rarely seen 
exceptions involve property held in trust, expired leases of non-residential property, accreditation 
as an educational institution, certain interest in hydrocarbons and cash from the sale of certain 
money orders. Reference should be made to 11 USC § 541 (b) (1-5). 
4. Effect of Restrictions on Transfer of Property Interest 
The property of the debtor becomes property of the estate despite any agreed restriction on 
transfer, except for trust restrictions enforceable under state law. 11 USC §541 (c)( 1 )(2). 
B. Property Of Estate And The Chapter 7 Trustee, Generally 
The Chapter 7 trustee has the duty of collecting and reducing to money the property of the 
. estate, and is accountable for the property received. 11 USC § 704 (1 )(2). 
1. Property Exemptions 
An individual may exempt property from the estate. 11 USC § 522. Kentucky has opted 
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for a state, rather than Federal exemption scheme. Exemptions are found in Chapter 427, and 
throughout the Kentucky Revised Statues, as well as in applicable Federal Statutes. 
2. Objections to Exemptions 
The trustee has thirty (30) days from the date ofthe first scheduled first meeting to object 
to a claim of exemption. Failure of the trustee to object within the time period will prevent the 
property from being administered, even ifthe claim of exemption is groundless. Talyor v. Freeland 
& Kronz. 503 US 638 (1992). 
3. Abandonment of Property 
A trustee may abandon property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate, or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit. 11 USC § 554. Abandoned property reverts back to the debtor. 
C. Reference To State Law 
Property rights are determined by reference to the relevant state's law. But once that 
determination is made, the federal bankruptcy law determines to what extent the debtor's interest 
is property of the estate. In re Omegas Group. Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994); Bavely v. IRS. 
911 F2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990); Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis, 772 
F2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985). State law must be applied in a manner consistent with federal bankruptcy 
law. Torres v. Eastlick, 767 F. 2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985). 
II. PREFERENCE LITIGATION 
A. Introduction 
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §547, is one of the longer statues in the 
Bankruptcy Code. No statute so long is simple in either application or interpretation. Yet the 
premise of the preference statute is very simple. Preferences are transactions that benefit one 
creditor at the expense of others. 
11 U.S.C. §S47 
(a) In this section-
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished, held for 
sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw 
materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a 
business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held 
for sale or lease; 
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services, or 
new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously 
transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void 
nor voidable by the debtor or the Trustee under any applicable law, 
including proceeds of such property, but does not include an 
obligation substituted for an existing obligation; 
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not sllch right has 
been earned by performance; and 
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable 
without penalty, including any extension. 
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(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Trustee may 
avoid any transfer of an interest ofthe debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before 
such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition; or 
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of 
the petition, if such creditor at the time as such transfer was an 
insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would 
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 ofthis title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
provided by the provisions of this title. 
(c) The Trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose 
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous 
exchange for new value given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; 
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary 
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the 
transferee; 
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of 
the debtor and the transferee; and 
(C) made according to ordinary business terms; 
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that 
was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that 
contains a description of such property as collateral; 
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such 
agreement; 
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; 
and 
iv) in fact by the debtor to acquire such property; and 
. (B) that is perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives 
possession of such property; 
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such 
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; 
and 
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an 
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otherwise avoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such 
creditor; 
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a 
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the 
aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, 
as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of 
other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which 
the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all 
security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection 
(b)( 4)(A) ofthis section applies, 90 days before the date of 
the filing of the petition; or 
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)( 4)(B) of 
this section applies, one year before the date ofthe filing 
of the petition; or 
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security 
agreement creating such security interest; 
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under 
section 545 of this title; 
(7) to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, 
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection 
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a 
Court of record, determination made in accordance with State or 
territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement 
agreement, but not to the extent that such debt-
(A) is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of 
law, or otherwise; or 
(B) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance or 
support; or 
(8) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily 
consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes 
or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.00. 
(d) The Trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the 
debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure 
reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other 
obligation to dissolve ajudiciallien that would have been avoidable by 
the Trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such 
surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent 
of the value of such property recovered by the Trustee or the amount 
paid to the Trustee. 
(e) (1) For the purpose of this section-
. (A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including 
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale 
of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of 
such property from the debtor against whom applicable law 
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and 
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is 
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perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire 
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph 
(3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) atthe time such transfer takes effect between the transferor 
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 
days after, such time, except as provided. in subsection 
(c)(3)(B); 
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is 
perfected after such 10 days; or 
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such 
transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; or 
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the 
transferor and the transferee. 
(3) For the purpose of this section, a transfer is not made until the 
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. 
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been 
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of 
the filing of the petition. 
(g) For the purposes of this section, the Trustee has the burden of proving 
the avoidability ofa transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and 
the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is 
sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer 
under subsection (c) of this section. 
Preferences - Purpose 
The purpose of the preference statute allows a Trustee (or debtor in possession) to preserve 
the quality of distribution among unsecured creditors by preventing one creditor from enhancing his 
position at the expense of all other creditors on the eve of bankruptcy . In re IRFM. Inc., 52 F .3d 228 
(9th Cir. 1995). Most importantly, the preference section facilitates an equal distribution of the 
debtor's assets among creditors. In re Antweil. 931 F.2d 689, (9th Cir.) affd sub. nOI11., Barnhill V. 
Johnson. 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.ED 2d 39, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992). 
C. Definitions 
I. §547(a) 
11 U.S.C. §547(a) defines the following terms: 
a. Inventory 
Inventory is defined as that personal property that is either leased or furnished, sold or 
delivered, including raw materials, crops or live stock and materials that are used or consumed in 
a business. Inventory is essentially the product that the debtor offers for sale leases or uses in the 
course of his business. 
b. New Value 
New value is defined as additional money, or new value of goods or services rendered, new 
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credit or release of property previously transferred to the debtor including proceeds of property that 
is used by the debtor, but does not include an obligation that is substituted for an already existing 
obligation. This definition, which creditors use as a defense under §547(c), requires a creditor to 
extend additional credit or material to a debtor rather than simply take the existing property of the . 
debtor. The purpose of the new value exception encourages a creditor to continue to do business 
with a financially troubled debtor who might otherwise avoid bankruptcy. In re IRFM. Inc., 52F .3d 
228 (9th Cir. 1995). 
c. Receivable 
The term receivable means the right to payment whether or not that right has been earned 
by performance. 
d. Taxes 
Taxes are defined in terms oftime under §54 7(a)( 4). The parties must use the day that the 
tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension, rather than the day the tax is actually 
paid. Therefore, an income tax payment is due on April 15, unless an extension is granted. The tax 
is due on April 15, even ifpaid on March 15. 
2. §547(b) - Elements of Preference 
The elements constituting a preferential transfer are found at 11 U.S.C. §547(b). This 
straight-forward section defines what a Trustee must assert and prove in order to avoid a preferential 
transfer. No transfer is void; it is simply voidable. If a Trustee fails to challenge a transaction, it 
remains valid. Clark v. Pure. 151 B.R. 75 (E.D. Pa.1993). 
In order to avoid a transfer of an interest of the debtor, not necessarily title, the Trustee must 
assert and prove that the transfer: 
1) benefits the creditor; 
2) 
3) 
4) 
is payment on an antecedent debt; 
made while the debtor is insolvent; 
within 90 days of the filing of the bankruptcy, unless the transfer 
is to an insider, which calls for a one year reach back period, and 
5) the result ofthe transfer allows the creditor to receive more than it 
would receive in a Chapter 7 distribution. 
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 116 L.Ed.2d 514, 112 S.Ct. 527 (1991), on remand. In re 
ZZZZ Best Inc., 40 F.3d 317 (9th Cir .. 1994). The state of mind or intent of the parties is not an 
element. In re Penna Pacific Properties, 983 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1992). 
a. Transfer oflnterest of Debtor 
The first element of a preference requires that a transfer of an interest of the debtor must 
benefit the preferred creditor. What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete, is a matter of 
Federal Law. Barnhill V. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.ED 2d 39, 112 S.CT 1386 (1991). 
However, in the absence of Federal Law, transfer is defined by State law. Barnhill v. Johnson Slpra. 
The transfer of an interest of the debtor must benefit a creditor. In the absence of benefit, no 
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preference occurs. 
b. Antecedent Debt 
The debt must already have existed at the time that a transfer of property of the debtor 
occurs. What constitutes an antecedent debt has been the su.bject of some interesting cases. For 
example, a check returned for insufficient funds is a credit transaction. A subsequent payment by 
the debtor for a dishonored check is a payment on an antecedent debt. A check honored in the 
ordinary course is a cash transaction and not a payment on an antecedent debt. In re Car Renovators, 
946 F.2d 780 (lIth Cir. 1991), cert.denied sub. nom., Heart of Dixie Nissan v. Reynolds, 504 U.S. 
913, 118 L.Ed. 2d 553, 112 S.Ct. 1949 (1992). Reducing future obligations to a present value and 
then obtaining cancellation of the debt for payment meets the statutory definition of an antecedent 
debt. In the case of In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1996), a husband reduced his future 
maintenance obligations to a lump sum and paid that to his wife in exchange for cancellation of the 
debt. The Court characterized the transaction as payment of an antecedent debt. 
c. Insolvency 
Insolvency is defined in § 101 of Title 11, the general definitions section. The presumption 
of insolvency generally favors the Trustee; in other words the debtor is presumed insolvent for a 
period of time. However, insolvency is rebuttable. 11 U.S.C. §101(32), defines insolvency as a 
balance sheet test. The Court will find the debtor insolvent if it determines the debtor's liabilities 
exceed his assets. In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercurv. Inc .• 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1991). Insolvency is 
presumed for the ninety (90) days immediately prior to bankruptcy. The Trustee need put no proof 
into evidence on the issue of insolvency unless a creditor rebuts the presumption with evidence; or 
if the transfer of the interest of the debtor occurred outside the ninety (90) day period immediately 
prior to bankruptcy. The Trustee always bears the burden of persuasion to prove each element of 
a preferential transfer. 
d. 90-DayRule 
Except with regard to transfers to insiders, the reach back period is ninety (90) days. The 
Trustee will review the period of the ninety (90) days immediately proceeding the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition and determine whether transfers that have occurred in that time frame are 
preferential, with the knowledge that the debtor is presumed insolvent during those ninety (90) days. 
11 U.S.C. §547(f). An affected creditor may challenge the presumption by competent evidence. 
Weekends and holidays do not extend the preference period beyond ninety (90) calendar 
days. Unlike the holding onn re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987), which held that the statute 
of I im itation for filing a preference action was jurisdictional, the ninety (90)-day reach back period 
for preferences are deemed substantive rather than procedural. See In re Bergel, 185 B.R. 338 (9th 
Cir. B.A.P. 1995). 
e. One Year Rule 
With regard to transfers to insiders, as defined in § 1 0 1 (31) of the Bankruptcy Code, a 
Trustee may challenge transfers for one (1) year. The ninety (90)-day insolvency presumption still 
applies. The Trustee must prove insolvency in cases where the transfer occurs more than ninety (90) 
days prior to filing the bankruptcy. See In re PerrY, 158 B.R. 694 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1993). Even 
though the definition of "insiders" in § 101(31) does not include the debtor's girlfriend, in certain 
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circumstances when a long term close relationship has been established, a girlfriend of a Chapter 
7 debtor can be deemed an insider. See In re Levy. 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy.S.D. FLA. 1995). 
f. Liquidation Test 
The last element that a Trustee must prove to establish a preferential transfer is called the 
liquidation analysis. Section 547(b)(5) sets forth a tri-partite test.· The Trustee must show that the 
preferred creditor (1) received more than he would have received if the case were liquidated under 
Chapter 7; (2) if the transfer had not been made to the preferred creditor; and (3) that such creditor 
received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of Title II. The Trustee will 
generally prevail and carry his burden of persuasion if he proves that the transfer of an interest of 
the debtor that occurred prepetition would have been property of the bankruptcy estate upon filing 
of the bankruptcy petition if the transfer had not occurred. Therefore, the issue in these cases 
concerns whether the asset transferred would have been property ofthe bankruptcy estate. 
A debtor's payment prepetition of trust fund taxes does not constitute a transfer of property 
ofthe estate. Hence, the Internal Revenue Service did not receive more than it would receive in a 
Chapter 7 distribution. Biegerv. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53, 110 L.Ed.2d 46, 110 S.Ct. 
2258 (1991). Transfers of trust assets do not constitute preferential transfers. See In re Unicorn 
Computer Corporation, 13 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Funds "ear marked" or clearly designated for the benefit of a party other than the debtor 
constitutes a transfer outside the scope of the preference section. Yet, a debtor who kites checks 
does not create an "earmarking" situation for the affected bank or creditor to utilize as a defense. 
See In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Funds of the debtor held for safekeeping purposes only in an escrow account does constitute 
property of the estate. A payment of said funds prepetition can result in a voidable preferential 
transfer. In re Winters, 182 B.R. 26 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Ky. 1995). 
However, when a general building contractor filed bankruptcy, and the owner paid the 
subcontractor directly to avoid the timely filing of a mechanics lien, a Court held that said transfer 
did not constitute a transfer of property of the estate, even though the payment reduced the general 
contractor's interest. The payment to the subcontractor by the owner was held "ear marked". In re 
Steele Vest. Inc., 112 B.R. 852 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Ky. 1990). 
Prepetition payments to fully secured creditors are not avoidable preferential transfers 
because a Trustee must pay in full a secured creditor if the Trustee sells the collateral. Thus, the 
liquidation test fails since that creditor received the same it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
In re C-L Cartage.Jnc., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990). 
Normally, a Trustee need only offer as proof a mathematical analysis that reveals the 
preferred creditor benefited to a greater degree than its pro rata share of distribution of the claims 
actually filed in a Chapter 7 case. When a creditor receives a beneficial transfer prepetition, 
however received, he betters his position over other unsecured creditors. Often, the only asset 
recovered in a case will be the preferred transfer. 
The exceptions to the rule include two fact patterns. The first leaves the preferred creditor 
as the only creditor. The second pattern is the rare case in which the Trustee recovers other assets 
that allow the Trustee to pay other creditors more than the preferred creditor received. 
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The preferred creditor receives no distribution from the estate until it repays to the Trustee 
the value of the avoided transfer. 11 U.S.C. §502 (d). 
D. Defenses Of Creditors 
11 U .S.C. §547( c) enumerates the defenses of a creditor to preference claims raised by the 
Trustee. These defenses supplement any claim that the Trustee has not met its burden in proving 
one of the elements of §547(b). Section 547 (c) assumes thatthe transfers soughtto be avoided have 
met the required elements of §547 (b). In addition, section 547 (c) allows for certain transfers and 
prohibits recovery by the Trustee for the benefit of all creditors. The enumerated defenses are as 
follows: 
1. Contemporaneous Exchange for New Value 
TIle Trustee may not avoid a transfer to a creditor that was (1) meant to be a transfer 
contemporaneous for new value; and (2) was in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. 
Many cases have discussed what constitutes a contemporaneous exchange. 
A check given to a creditor at the time that services or goods are provided is in fact a 
contemporaneous exchange, so long as the drawer's bank honors the check. In re Transport 
Associates. Inc., 171 B.R. 232 (Bkrtcy. W.O. Ky 1994). Contrast the use of the phrase "date of 
transfer" between §547(b) and §547(c) as it applies to checks. The date of transfer of checks under 
§547(b) relates to the date the drawer's bank honors the check. Barnhill V. Johnson, supra. 
However, the date a creditor receives the check establishes the date of transfer pursuant to §547(c), 
so long as the drawer's bank subsequently honors the check. In re Transport. Associates. Inc., supra. 
New value requires the creditor to provide the debtor with some benefit after payment by 
the debtor. In re Lee, 179 B.R. 149 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). The purpose of the new value exception 
protects transfers that do not diminish the bankruptcy estate. In re Cocolat. Inc., 176 B.R. 540 
(Bkrtcy N.D. CA. 1995). One test requires the Court to determine to what extent the debtor's estate 
was replenished by the creditor when it provided new services or products. In re Riggs, 129 B.R. 
494 (Bkrtcy. S.D. OH. 1991). 
New value is not the exclusive defense. A creditor can raise other defenses, particularly the 
defense of payment in the ordinary course. In re Transport Associates. Inc., 171 B.R. 232 (Bkrtcy. 
W.O. Ky. 1994). 
2. Ordinary Course 
A Trustee cannot avoid transfers made by a debtor to a creditor in the ordinary course of 
business. 11 U.S.C. §547(c). To meet this exception, a creditor must show three elements. First, 
the debt must be incurred in the ordinary course of business as between the creditor and the debtor. 
Second, the payment of the debt must be made in the ordinary course as between the debtor and 
creditor. Third, the payment of the debt, in addition to being in the ordinary course between the 
parties, must also be in the ordinary course of the industry involved. The issue of which industry 
standard applies is an issue off actual proof. A tri-partite test has been adopted by several circuits. 
In re Midway Airlines. Inc., 69 F.3d. 792 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Rublin Industries. Inc., 78 F.3d 30 
(2nd Cir. 1996); In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992). 
The purpose of the exception allows parties who have enjoyed a steady business relationship 
to continue that relationship, even to the verge of the filing of the bankruptcy. The exception is not 
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available to a creditor who has engaged in only one transaction with the debtor. In re Winters, 182 
B.R. 26 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1995). 
The creditor asserting that a transfer occurred in the ordinary course of business carries the 
burden of proof on that issue. In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., supra. Payments on both long 
and short term debt may qualify for the ordinary course exception. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 
151 116 L.Ed.2d. 514, 112 S.Ct. 527 (1991). See also In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990). 
Even late payments can qualify for the exception. In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., supra. 
Often times creditors couple the defense of ordinary course with the new value exception 
discussed supra. 
E. Security Interests 
The mere filing of a security interest can be an avoidable preference. This occurs 
particularly in cases in which the filing does not encompass an extension of credit for new value 
or a transfer in the ordinary course. To the extent that a security interest is filed outside the scope 
ofthe timely perfection scheme established by the Uniform Commercial Code, or within the time 
frame specified in §S47(c)(3)B twenty (20) days after the debtor receives possession), the interest 
can be avoided by the Trustee even if the underlying debt is not preferential. Section 547(c) 
specifies that a creditor has twenty (20) days from the date of transfer of the debtor's interest to 
perfect its lien on personalty. The perfection then relates back to the date of transfer. When the 
transfers involve real estate, in the absence of any particular state statute on perfection, §547(e) 
applies. This section requires that perfection occur within ten (10) days after the transfer. A transfer 
is perfected when a good faith purchaser for value is put on notice that the interest ofthe transferee 
is superior to all others. This requires a filing. See In re Levv, 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 
1995). The transfer must include an interest of the debtor, but may be less than full title. In re 
Hed!!ed Investments Associates. Inc., 163 B.R. 841 (Bkrtcy. D. Co. 1994). In cases ofa garnishment 
in Kentucky, a transfer occurs on the day the garnishment lien was created, on the day of the filing 
ofthe garnishment, and not on the day the garnishment was paid. In re Clark, 171 B.R. 563 (Bkrtcy. 
W.D. Ky. 1994). 
The essential rule on security interests provides that in the absence of any state statute, a 
creditor must perfect its lien on personalty within twenty (20) days. Perfection then relates back. 
However, ifreal estate is involved, a recording must be made within ten (10) days ofthe date ofthe 
transfer. The waiver ofa mechanic's lien right in exchange for a voluntary lien is still preferential 
under Kentucky law. A Court avoided as a preferential transfer the filing ofa lien voluntarily given 
by the debtor in exchange for a waiver by the affected creditor of its mechanic's lien right. In re 
Rexplore Drilling, Inc., 971 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1992). 
The primary tenant of this portion of §S47(c) provides that a creditor will prevail so long 
as the creditor files timely. The Trustee will prevail if a creditor files late, even if the creditor has 
no specific knowledge of the financial plight of the debtor. 
F. Accounts Receivable And Inventory 
Accounts receivable and inventory are discussed in §S47(c)(S). Liens on this type of 
property, the so-called floating liens, are not avoidable to the extent that the debtor's inventory or 
accounts receivable have been replenished. A recorded financing statement and proof of supply of 
additional inventory to a debtor is sufficient to defeat a Trustee's claim. A creditor does not receive 
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credit for financing a previous loan. In re Blueerass Ford-Mercul)'. Inc., 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 
1991). Courts employ a net improvement and position test for floating inventory. Bankruptcy Courts 
look at the value ofthe inventory ninety (90) days before the filing ofthe bankruptcy and the value 
ofthe inventory on the date ofthe petition. To the extent that a Trustee proves more debt was paid 
by the debtor than inventory supplied by the creditor, the Trustee may recover the net improvement 
in the creditor's position in the ninety (90) days before the filing ofthe bankruptcy petition. In re 
Parker Steel Company, 149 B.R. 834 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1992). 
G. Statutory Liens 
A Trustee may not be able to avoid statutory liens under §547. Hence, tax liens are 
nonavoidable. A Trustee cannot set aside a mechanic's lien timely filed in accordance with KRS 476, 
even if the mechanic's lien was filed within ninety (90) days before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. 
H. Domestic Relations 
To the extent that a debtor makes a transfer in good faith to a former spouse for alimony, 
child support, maintenance or pursuant to a valid separation agreement or divorce decree, the 
payments made by the debtor are not avoidable as a preference. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(7). The 
exception does not apply to assignments of payments to another entity, voluntarily or by operation 
of law, nor does it apply to payments designated as alimony, child support or maintenance unless 
the payments are actually alimony, maintenance, or child support. However, a separation agreement 
that called for periodic payments, reduced to a lump some by agreement of parties and paid prior 
to the filing ofthe bankruptcy, was deemed a preferential transfer even though the payment offuture 
maintenance was canceled. In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1996). 
1. Consumer Minimum 
In cases involving consumer debts, §547(c)(8) allows a creditor to defeat what would 
otherwise be a preferential transfer if the aggregate value of all of the property of the debtor that is 
affected by the transfer is less than $600.00. The purpose of this exception was to remove de 
minimis amounts collected by garnishments that occurred immediately preceding the filing of the 
bankruptcy. Some conflict exists regarding the term "aggregate value" and the amount of$600.00. 
One case in Kentucky in particular asserts that §547 will apply so long as the garnishment collected 
totals $600.00 or more in the aggregate that occurred within the ninety (90) days before the filing 
ofthe bankruptcy. In re Clark, 217 B.R. 89 (U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. Ky. 1995). 
J. Sureties 
In the event that a debtor transfers property to a surety in order to secure reimbursement of 
a bond or makes other application in order to dissolve ajudiciallien, such as a mechanic's lien, the 
transfer ofproperty to secure that bond can be set aside as a preferential transfer. To the extent that 
the Trustee recovers property, the amount ofthe obligation insured by the surety can be reduced by 
the recovery made by the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §547(d). 
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K. Real Property Rules 
A transfer of an interest in real estate occurs when the instrument is recorded. In re Leyy, 
185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 1995). If a creditor records a mortgage outside the ten (10) day lim it 
of §S47(e), the transfer of the interest of the debtor occurs when the mortgage is perfected, i.e. the 
date of the filing. The creditor also loses the new value and ordinary course exceptions as defenses. 
In re Moran, 188 B.R. 492 (Bkrtcy. E.D. NY. 1995). The same rules apply with regard to the filing 
of security interest on fixtures. Kentucky law requires that to perfect an interest in a fixture, a 
creditor must file a fixture filing in the County Clerk's office. The transfer is not perfected until the 
filing occurs. Hence, Kentucky law applies the same rule with reference to fixture filings as it does 
to the filing of other interests in the real estate of the debtor, including mortgages. If an instrument 
is filed within ten (10) days, the transfer relates back and the defenses of §S47(c) may apply. 
L. Presumption Of Insolvency 
11 U.S.C. §S47(f) states that the debtor is presumed to be insolvent for the ninety (90) days 
immediately proceeding the filing of the petition. TIle presumption is rebuttable. The test for 
determining insolvency is called a balance sheet test. The balance sheet test requires a Court to find 
that the liabilities of the debtor exceed the assets ofthe debtor to hold that the debtor is insolvent. 
In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, Inc., 942 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1991). Outside of the ninety (90) day 
period, for insider transactions, the Trustee must prove insolvency as a necessary element under 
§S47(b). See In re Perry, 158 B.R. 694 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Oh. 1993). 
M. Burdens Of Proof 
The Trustee bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence to establish each and 
every element under §S47(b). See In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs. Arkansas. Inc., 9 F.3d 680 
(8th Cir. 1993). TIle burden of proof falls on a creditor to establish one of the exceptions under 
§547(c). See In re Fred Hawes Organization. Inc., 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992). 
N. Parties 
Normally the Trustee brings any action under §S47. The Trustee alone holds the avoiding 
power. The Trustee is specifically so authorized under the wording of the statute of §S4 7(b) which 
states that "the Trustee may avoid any transfer and interest of the debtor in property". The debtor 
assumes the role of the Trustee in cases un~er Chapter 11. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1107(a) the 
debtor-in-possession has all of the powers and standing ofa Trustee to bring a preference action. 
A debtor may bring a preference action to the extent that it preserves an exemption which 
it holds specific in property. See 11 U.S.C. §S22(g) and (h). 
Additionally, in certain circumstances, an individual creditor may bring a preference action. 
A creditor has standing to do so if certain conditions are met. First, the creditor must show that a 
colorable claim exists which will benefit the estate. Second, the creditor must have demanded that 
the Trustee or the debtor-in-possession bring the action. Third, the fiduciary involved must have 
refused to bring the action. Fourth, the Court must find that the refusal to bring the action is 
unjustifiable in light of the statutory and fiduciary responsibilities placed upon the Trustee or debtor 
in possession. After a creditor satisfies the Bankruptcy Court by meeting these conditions, the 
burden of proof shifts to the Trustee or debtor in possession to rebut why the preference action 
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should not be brought. This type of issue arises more often in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7 cases. 
See In re The Gibson Group. Inc., 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995). 
O. Venue 
Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1409. Subsection (a) allows a Trustee to file a preference 
action in the Bankruptcy Court in which the case arose. The action can be brought regardless of 
where the defendant resides. The only limitation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b), which limits 
the Trustee to bring an action for an amount less than $1,000.00 or a consumer debt of less than 
$5,000.00 only in the District Court in the district where the defendant resides. Controversies which 
do not exceed these amounts often place the defendant at a decided disadvantage where the 
defendant resides a substantial distance from the Court in which the bankruptcy case if filed. Venue 
often provides an effective weapon to the Trustee in obtaining a preference judgment equal to the 
merits of the action itself. 
P. Statute Of Limitations 
The statute of limitations applicable to actions under §547 of the Bankruptcy Code is 
governed by 11 U.S.C. §546(a). This Code section allows the Trustee the later of either two (2) 
years from the day the bankruptcy was filed or one (1) year after the appointment or election of the 
first Trustee under either Chapter 7 or 11 U.S.C. §1104, Chapter 12 or Chapter 13, if the 
appointment or election occurs before the expiration of two (2) years from the filing of the 
bankruptcy. 
A preference action may not be commenced after the case is closed or dismissed. Hence, 
the period begins to run the day the bankruptcy case is filed. Be aware that the 6th Circuit has ruled 
in an often criticized case that the two (2) year statute of limitations is ajurisdictional prerequisite. 
In other words, the clerk's office is always open. Thus, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays do not 
extend the statute of limitations until the next working day. In re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
III. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LITIGATION 
The Trustee can avoid fraudulent conveyances which occur within one (1) year ofthe filing 
ofthe bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. §548 sets forth the terms and conditions under which a Trustee 
may avoid a transfer on the grounds of fraudulent conveyance. The purpose of the fraudulent 
conveyance statute is to enhance the pool offunds from which creditors can recover by setting aside 
gratuitous transfers made on the eve of the filing ofthe bankruptcy. 
11 U.S.C. §548 
§548 Fraudulent transfers and obligations. 
(a) The Trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or 
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, indebted; or 
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
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(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a 
result of such transfer or obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to 
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property 
remaining with the debtor was· an unreasonably small 
capital; or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would 
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to 
pay as such debts matured. 
(b) The Trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date 
of the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the 
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such 
transfer or obligation. 
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this 
section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a 
transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation thattakes for value 
and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or 
may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent 
that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation. 
(d) (1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when stich 
transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor 
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected 
cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is 
superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if 
such transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the 
case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of the 
filing of the petition. 
(2) In this section-
(A) "value" means property, or satisfaction or securing of a 
present antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an 
unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a 
relative of the debtor; 
(B) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, 
financial institution, or securities clearing agency that receives 
a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of 
this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 
741 of this title, takes for value to the extent of such payment; 
(C) a repo participant that receives a margin payment, as defined 
in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as 
defined in section 741 of this title, in connection with a 
repurchase agreement, takes for value to the extent of such 
payment; and 
(D) a swap participant that receives a transfer in connection 
with a swap agreement takes for value to the extent of such 
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transfer. 
A. Definitions Under §548 
1. Transfer 
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest 
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is incurred either voluntarily 
or involuntarily within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy. In determining what constitutes 
a transfer, the Trustee must first look to Federal law. Barnhill V. Johnson. 503 U.S. 393, 118 L.E 
D 2d 39, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992). However, frequently federal law is silent on what constitutes a 
transfer. In that instance, the Trustee must look to the interest in property as defined by State law. 
In re FBN Food Services. Inc., 185 B.R. 265 (N.D. III. 1995). Courts will examine transfers of 
interests in real estate according to the date of recording of the controlling instrument. See In re 
Levy, 185 B.R. 378 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Florida 1995). The transfer must necessarily involve an interest 
of the debtor, but the debtor may hold less than full title. In re Hedged-Investments Associates. Inc., 
163 B.R. 841 (Bkrtcy. D. Co. 1994). A foreclosure sale is an involuntary severance of the title ofthe 
debtor. Prior to 1994, the validity of a foreclosure sale of real estate for less than seventy percent of 
its value was open to question. See Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Company. 621 F.2d 
201 (5th Cir. 1980). The so called Durrect Rule was abrogated at least with reference to real estate 
foreclosure sales in B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, __ U.S. __ 128 L.ED2d 556, 114 
S.Ct 1757 (1994). The Supreme Court in B.F.P. held that, in the absence of evidence of collusion, 
the sale price derived from a foreclosure sale properly advertised and conducted pursuant to state 
law is reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law. As such, a valid foreclosure sale is sufficient 
to defeat a fraudulent conveyance action regardless of the price brought at the forced sale. 
2. Incur Obligation 
The transfer of an interest of the debtor encompasses more than simply the debtor 
transferring title. For example, a debtor,who subjects property to a mortgage in favor ofa relative 
within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy has made a fraudulent conveyance. The issue of 
tithing, which is incurring an obligation in furtherance of worship in one's religion, has created 
much concern. A Chapter 7 Trustee recently attacked tithing and brought an action against the 
religious institution that received the contributions. In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bkrtcy. D.Mont. 
1995). However, while finding that tithing was a fraudulent conveyance as defined in §548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Eighth Circuit recently held that recovery of religious contributions otherwise 
recoverable under §548 violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000b-b. In 
re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). 
3. Intent to Defraud 
For purposes of 11 U.S.C. §548, the Trustee must prove either actual intent to defraud or 
constructive fraud. Actual fraud is found if the Trustee proves that the transfer of the interest ofthe 
debtor was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was 
already obligated to or became obligated by the debtor within one (1) year of the filing of the 
bankruptcy. Actual harm is not an element necessary to prove a fraudulent conveyance. The 
Trustee only must show that the debtor acted with intent to hinder or delay creditors. In re Sherman, 
67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir. 1995). Even if the transfer was actually fraudulent as to creditors, if the 
requisite intend to defraud is not proven, the transfer will not be avoided under I I U .S.C. §54 7( a)( I). 
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In re Vaughn, 244 B.R. 631 (Bankr. w.o. Ky. 2000). 
a. Actual Fraud 
Actual intent to defraud on the part of the debtor may be inferred from the badges of fraud 
in a subjective evaluation of the debtor's intent. Badges of fraud that a Court may evaluate include 
threatened or actual litigation existing at the time of the transfer, the degree of the transfer of the 
interest of the debtor of the property, the state of the debtor's finances atthe time of the transfer, the 
special relationship held by the debtor with regard to the transferee and the retention of property by 
the debtor despite the transfer. 
b. Constructive Fraud 
The Trustee may also set aside transfers of interest of the debtor if the debtor received less 
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and was either insolvent 
on that date or was rendered insolvent by such transfer or obligation. The phrase reasonably 
equivalent value does not require a finding that the debtor possessed actual intent to defraud. In re 
Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). The Trustee can avoid a transfer simply if the debtor received 
less than reasonably equivalent value. In re McDonnell, 934 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991). The issue 
in reasonably equivalent value cases is normally whether a creditor paid sufficient consideration. 
For purposes of real estate foreclosure sales, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of 
collusion, and so long as the State statutes which prescribe the procedure for selling real estate and 
foreclosure were followed, the sales price was as a matter oflaw reasonably equivalent value. B.F.P. 
v. Resolution TrustCorporation,_U.S._128 L.ED2d 556,114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994). The current 
trend of cases avoids a specific numerical percentage or formula. Rather the Court must factor fair 
market value and the extent of the lack of interest between the parties and transaction. The closer 
or more special the relationship is between the parties, the less of an arms length transaction, the 
more scrutiny the Court renders the transfer to ensure that the creditor paid fair market value. See 
In re Morris Communications. NC, Inc., 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990). 
4. Insolvency 
Insolvency is determined as of the time of the transfer using a so-called balance sheet test. 
In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Oh. 1993). The Trustee bears the burden of proof on the 
issue of insolvency. In re McConnell, 934 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991). The Trustee also prevails in 
a fraudulent conveyance case ifhe shows that the result of the transaction or transfer of the debtor 
reveals that the debtor was unreasonably undercapitalized or that the debtor would be unable to pay 
his debts as they matured. 
B. Partnership Transfers 
If a partnership files bankruptcy, a Trustee is required to liquidate the assets of the 
partnership and then pursue the individual partners for the unpaid bills of the partnership. 11 U .S.C. 
§723. If the partnership files bankruptcy, the Trustee of the partnership may avoid transfers that 
have occurred with individual partners within one (1) year of the filing of the bankruptcy if the 
debtor partnership was either insolvent on the date ofthe transfer or became insolvent as a result of 
the transfer. The Trustee of the partnership debtor is not required to show any intent or that the 
transfer was for less than an reasonably equivalent value. 
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C. Rights OfTransferees 
Initial transferees are those parties who receive property transferred in the fraudulent 
conveyance. The initial transferee, if the Trustee succeeds, loses the avoided conveyance, and the 
subject property is restored to its status prior to the transfer, subject to the Bankruptcy. A 
subsequent transferee who qualifies as a bonafide purchaser will b~ able to defeat a Trustee's claim 
under 11 U.S.C. §548, to the extent that the B.F.P. actually gave value in exchange for the transfer. 
See In re Coutee, 984 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1993). The transferee bears the burden of proof on the 
element of good faith, a basic prerequisite to being a B.F.P. U.S. v. Nordic Village. Inc., 503 U.S. 
30, 117 L.Ed.2d 181, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992). To the extentthat new value was paid by the transferee 
in an avoided transfer, the Trustee must reimburse the transferee. 11 U.S.C. §548(c). 
D. Transfer 
Section 548(d)(1) ofthe Bankruptcy Code defines the term "transfer" and its application in 
cases of fraudulent conveyance. Contrast the definition with section 547, the preference section, 
which fails to define the term "transfer". 11 U.S.C. 548(d)(I) defines "transfer" in terms of 
perfection of the conveyance by the creditor and notice to other parties of the change in character 
of the subject property. 
The date of recording the instrument places all parties on notice of the transfer of the 
debtor's interest. That filing perfects the interest of the transferee. At that point in time, a B.F.P., 
a role the Trustee can assume pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(3), cannot defeat the interest of the 
transferee. 
If the transferee fails to perfect its interest until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 
section 548(d)(1) deems the perfection to have occurred on the day before the filing of the 
bankruptcy. 
The date of transfer is the key date relating to the date of the bankruptcy petition, because 
the transfer must occur within one (I) year offiling of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, a Court held 
that the transfer of realty occurred on the day the girlfriend ofthe debtor recorded her deed, which 
occurred within one (I) year of the filing of her boyfriend's bankruptcy, not withstanding the fact 
that the debtor executed the deed several years prior to the filing ofthe bankruptcy. In re Levy, 185 
B.R. 371 (S.D. Fla. 1995). 
A creditor perfects his lien on personalty normally by filing a UCC-I although no filing is 
required for most consumer purchases. 
E. Value Defined 
11 U.S.C. §548(d)(2) defines value as property, or the securing of a present or antecedent 
debt ofthe debtor. Value does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor 
or a relative of the debtor. The definition of value differs slightly for fraudulent conveyance 
purposes than for preferences or other Bankruptcy Code sections. Commodity brokers, stock 
brokers, and financial institutions, or other parties who deal with securities have special rules for 
dealing with margin payments or swap agreements. The securities party is entitled to the bonafide 
purchaser defense to the extent that he has taken payment or value to the extent ofa margin or swap 
agreement. 
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F. Parties - Plaintiffs 
As in preference actions, normally the Trustee or debtor in possession alone has standing 
to bring a fraudulent conveyance action. The statute plainly states that the Trustee is the party 
authorized to bring the action. The debtor is also authorized to bring a fraudulent conveyance action 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §522(g) or (h) to the extent that the debtor protects an exemption he claimed 
in his property. However, the debtor is not allowed to take advantage of the transfer of either a 
preference or a fraudulent conveyance action to the extent that a lien avoided is preserved for the 
benefit of the bankruptcy estate against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §551. The debtor cannot take 
advantage through his exemptions when he previously agreed to subordinate his exempt interest in 
property to a creditor. The effect oflien preservation is that the Trustee replaces the avoided party 
as a secured creditor. The exemption of the debtor remains subordinate to the lien interest of the 
bankruptcy estate. The lien against the interest of the debtor remains. 
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed whether an individual creditor has standing to bring 
a fraudulent conveyance action. In the case onn re The Gibson Group. Inc., 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 
1995), the Court allowed a creditor to bring a §548 action since the creditor alleged a colorable 
claim that benefited the estate. The Court agreed with the analysis ofthe creditor that the fraudulent 
conveyance action benefited the estate. The Court must find that the creditor demanded that either 
the Trustee or the debtor in possession bring the fraudulent conveyance action and that the Trustee 
or debtor in possession refused to bring the action. The Court must find that the refusal of the 
Trustee or debtor in possession to bring the fraudulent conveyance action was unjustifiable in light 
of its statutory and fiduciary responsibilities. While the initial burden is on the individual creditor 
to show that it has met these elements, once established, the burden ofproof shifts to the Trustee or 
debtor in possession to show why the fraudulent conveyance action should not be brought. 
G. Venue 
Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. §I409. Venue normally lies in the Court in which the 
bankruptcy case is filed. In the event that the fraudulent conveyance action seeks to recover a 
money judgment ofless than $1,000.00 or a consumer debt ofless than $5,000.00, the action must 
be brought only in the District where the defendant resides. 
H. Statute Of Limitations 
Statute of limitations applicable to fraudulent conveyance actions are defined in 11 U .S.C. 
§546(a). This section allows an action to be brought either the later of two (2) years from the date 
the bankruptcy petition is filed. or one (1) year after the appointment of the first Trustee if such 
appointment occurs before the expiration of two (2) years after the case is originally filed. If the 
case is closed or dismissed, there is no standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance action. 
I. State Law 
11 U.S.C. §544(b) empowers a Trustee to utilize the state law fraudulent conveyance 
scheme. Kentucky Revised Statutes 378.010 allows for a reach back of five (5) years rather than 
the one (1) year of 11 U.S.C. §548. The Trustee under state law must establish that a debt existed 
on the date oftransfer and that the transfer was made with intent to defraud creditors. KRS 378.010. 
A Trustee may also employ KRS 378.020 to set aside a transfer made by the debtor when he 
received no consideration rather than the standard of reasonably equivalentvalue pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §548. 
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A Trustee may utilize the state statutes because he possesses a five (5) year statute of 
limitations under KRS 413.120 rather than two (2) under 11 U.S.C. §546. Arguably, a Trustee can 
extend the five (5) year statute of limitations to seven (7) years. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) extends a statute 
oflimitations if it otherwise expires before the end of two (2) years after the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. 
IV. "STRONG-ARM" POWERS OF A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE 
A. General Analysis Of A Trustee's Powers 
Section -544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, often referred to as the "strong-arm clause," 
provides the Trustee with the power and status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, a hypothetical 
bona fide purchaser, a creditor that extends credit at the time the bankruptcy case was commenced 
and an actual unsecured creditor. Although bankruptcy law confers upon the Trustee the rights of 
hypothetical creditors, the Trustee must look to relevant state law to determine what rights and 
remedies a creditor would have to avoid transfers of property. Section 544 of the Code confers no 
greater rights or powers on the Trustee than the applicable state law affords a creditor occupying the 
position assumed by the Trustee. 
Since state law governs the powers of the Trustee under § 544, one necessary question is 
which state's laws control. If the property of the estate is located in more than one jurisdiction or 
affected by contracts of more than one jurisdiction, the tendency of the courts is to utilize the law 
of the situs of the property at the commencement of the case. I However, courts are not in consistent 
agreement regarding the manner in which the choice of law rules are applied.2 
B. Trustee's Status As A Lien Creditor 
I. § 544(a) 
Section 544 confers upon the Trustee the rights of certain hypothetical creditors, 
specifically: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the 
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with 
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a 
creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such ajlidicial 
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists; 
a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the 
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with 
respect to such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or 
a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the 
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be 
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser at the 
time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a 
purchaser exists [and has perfected such transfer]. 
The rights of these hypothetical creditors, and thus the Trustee, is dependent upon state law. 
While, obviously, there is a variety of state statutory laws to apply, many of the actions 
brought by the Trustee will be based upon the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-301 specifies 
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that "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien 
creditor before the security interest is perfected ... " TIlerefore, in his/her position as a hypothetical 
lien creditor, the Trustee has rights superior to any creditor that is unperfected as of the date offiling 
for any of the number of reasons. For goods, the security interest must be perfected by the filing of 
a financing statement, pursuant U.C.C. § 9-302. The Trustee gains priority over any creditor that 
did not file a perfected security interest, whose filing has lapsed,3 who filed in the wrong location 
or in an inappropriate manner,4 who did not identify the security interest properly,S or who failed to 
amend the filing to reflect subsequent changes.6 
Since the Trustee does not obtain rights greater than a lien creditor under § S44(a), creditors 
with a purchase money security interest perfected after the filing but in the time allowed by statute 
(twenty (20) days in Kentucky) are not subordinate to the interest of the Trustee. It is not a violation 
of the automatic stay for a creditor to file to perfect such a lien within twenty (20) days from the date 
the debtor received possession of the goods. 
In addition to the filing requirements for holders of security interests in goods, the Uniform 
Commercial Code also sets forth certain notice provisions for a consignment seller under § 2-326(3). 
To the extent these notice requirements are not met, the Trustee may avoid the transfer and recover 
goods held on consignment. 
Although the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth specific rights of the Trustee as to 
holders of security interests in goods of a hypothetical lien creditor, this status also provides the 
Trustee with power over creditors holding non-Code interests such as unrecorded real estate 
mortgages or conveyances.7 
As a hypothetical bona fide purchaser for real estate pursuant to § S44(a)(3), the Trustee 
holds rights greater than those of a hypothetical lien creditor. As well as the unrecorded interest that 
the Trustee could set aside as a hypothetical lien creditor, a hypothetical bona fide purchaser may 
avoid an unrecorded equitable interest, equitable claims under constructive or implied trust, or 
interest of a transferee claiming under recorded instruments with minor defects in form or content. 
TIle status of a bona fide purchaser gives the Trustee some specific power of actions against 
the state government in Kentucky. Kentucky law provides thatthe state, county, city or other taxing 
districts shall have a lien on property assessed for taxes for five (5) years following the date when 
the taxes became delinquent. The lien may not be defeated by gift, devise, sale, alienation or other 
means except by sale to a bona fide purchaser.s 
Where the Commonwealth has seized property related to the trafficking in controlled 
substances, the seizure of said property may be set aside only by a subsequent bona fide purchaser.9 
2. § S44(b) 
While the trustee is given the status of a hypothetical creditor under §S44(a), regardless of 
the existence of any such creditor, §S44(b) somewhat broadens the trustee's standing further by 
providing, 
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property 
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable 
law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under 
section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section S02(e) 
of this title. 
For the trustee to avoid a transfer pursuant to this subsection there must exist an actual 
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creditor with an appropriate claim. This creditor must hold an allowed claim or one that is not 
allowable only because of§502(e), which disallows certain claims by co-debtors or sureties. Once 
it is established that there is such a creditor, the trustee acts not for the benefit of that creditor but 
as trustee for the estate. 
Under section 544(b), the Trustee is able to set aside fraudulent transfers or other voidable 
transfers under state law. In a case out of the Eastern District ofl(entucky, for example, the trustee 
was able to utilize the Kentucky preferential transfer law, KRS §378.060, to set aside a transfer 
between the debtor and a third party where the trustee may not have been able to show that the 
transfer was a preference under 11 U.S.C. §547(b)}O 
Since the trustee's rights to pursue a cause of action is derivative of a specific creditor, it 
is generally accepted that any defenses, including estoppel or statute oflimitations, good against the 
creditor are good against the trustee. II Therefore, where the creditor has taken some action prior to 
the filing of the bankruptcy that would deem the transfer valid, the trustee will be foreclosed from 
avoiding the transfer. When the statute of limitations has run before the filing of the bankruptcy, 
the trustee is likewise prevented from avoiding the transfer. 
When the statute of limitations has not run on the date offiling ofthe petition, there is some 
disagreement among the courts regarding whether to apply the state law statute or the limitation set 
forth in §546(a) which provides a two (2) year limitation period for actions under §544. The view 
that has been adopted by the Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky is that if the statute of limitations had 
not run on the date of filing, the trustee must bring the action to avoid the transfer within the two (2) 
year period set forth in §546(a)}2 
C. Trustee's Power to Avoid Statutory Liens 
Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Trustee may avoid certain statutory 
liens. Section 545 states as follows: 
The Trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the 
debtor to the extent that such lien -
(1) First becomes effective against the debtor -
(A) when a case under this title concerning the debtor is 
commenced; 
(B) when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title 
concerning the debtor is commenced; 
(C) when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take 
possession; 
(D) when the debtor becomes insolvent; 
(E) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a 
specified standard; or 
(F) at the time of an execution against property of the debtor 
levied at the instance of an entity other than the holder of 
such statutory lien; 
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement 
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(3) 
(4) 
of the case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such 
property at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or 
not such a purchaser exists; 
is for rent; or 
is a lien of distress for rent. 
Section 545 can be generally divided into three categories of statutory liens. First, those 
triggered by the insolvency of the debtor; second, those not valid against a bona fide purchaser; and 
third, a lien for rent. 
The statutory liens referenced in § 545( 1 )(A)-(F), allows the Trustee to avoid any lien which 
arises solely because the debtor has become insolvent. "Insolvent" is a defined term under § 101 of 
the Code, which utilizes the traditional balance sheet definition of insolvency where the debtor is 
considered insolvent when his liabilities exceed his assets. This traditional definition of insolvency 
is modified by the Code by adding a provision that the debtor's non-exempt assets are excluded from 
calculation. J3 However, since the applicable lien is a creature of state law, the state law definition 
of insolvency that applies will generally prevail in determining whether such a lien exists. It is 
possible, therefore, for the debtor to be insolvent for purposes ofthe Code but not insolvent under 
state law.14 
Section 545(2) provides the Trustee with the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser 
similar to § 544(a)(3). However, § 545(2) does not limit the Trustee to the position of a bona fide 
purchaser of real property. 
The avoidability of a statutory lien under § 545(2) will typically turn on whether the creditor 
has taken the sufficient steps to perfect its interest under state law. Although most interests must 
be perfected at the time the case is filed, some interests may be perfected at a later date. Section 
546(b) provides that the Trustee's rights under § 545 are subject to any state law that permits 
perfection, post-filing, to relate back to a pre-filing date. For instance, in Kentucky, notice of a 
mechanic's and materialman's lien must be filed within a certain time of the work being performed. 
If the notice is filed within this time, the lien will relate back to the date that the service was 
performed. IS Therefore, under § 545, the Trustee cannot avoid a mechanic's and materialman's lien 
where the work was performed prior to filing but the creditor perfected its interest within the 
statutory time period although post-filing. 
Much litigation under § 545(2) involves federal tax liens. 16 The Internal Revenue Code 
creates a lien in favor of the United States on all property by a person liable to pay taxes upon the 
assessment that that tax is made." However, that same statute provides that the lien imposed upon 
assessment is not valid against "any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lien or 
judgment lien creditor, until notice thereof which meets the requirements of sub-section (f) has been 
filed by the secretary or his delegate."ls Therefore, to the extent the Internal Revenue Service has 
not filed the requisite notice, the Trustee in his position as hypothetical bona fide purchaser may 
avoid the lien in favor of the Internal Revenue Service. 
D. Statute Of Limitations 
Section 546(a) sets forth the statute of limitations applicable to the Trustee when taking an 
action to avoid a transfer or lien under §§ 544, 545, 547, 548, and 553. Under § 546, the Trustee 
may not commence an action after the earlier of: 
E(a) - 22 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
j 
.j 
J 
J 
J 
J 
1 J 
• 
• 
• 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
(1) the later of -
(A) 
(B) 
Two years after the entry of the order for the relief; or 
One year after the appointment or election of the first 
Trustee under §§ 702,1104,1163, 1202, or 1302, ifsuch 
appointment of election occurs before the expiration of the 
period specified in sub-paragraph (A); or 
(2) the case is closed or dismissed. 
Section 546(a) as described above, is as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. 
Prior to the amendment, avoidance actions were barred after the earlier of two dates: two (2) years 
after the Trustee's appointment, or the time the case was closed or dismissed.19 By amending the 
statute, the limitation period has generally been reduced to two (2) years from the entry of order for 
relief as opposed to two (2) years from the appointment of the Trustee. While an action may be 
brought one (1) year from the appointment or election ofthe Trustee, this provision does not take 
effect if the two (2) year time limit from the order of relief has expired. Ifno Trustee is appointed 
during the first two (2) years, the statute is not revived upon the appointment of a Trustee. 
v. 
A. 
OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO TRUSTEE'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
Post-Petition Transfers 
In general, post-petition transfers are avoidable by the Trustee under § 549 if they are not 
authorized by the Court or by some provision of the Bankruptcy Code.20 Upon the filing of a 
Chapter 7 petition, the debtor is not authorized to sell or transfer property, or operate its business. 
Any entity taking title from a Chapter 7 debtor does so at his or her own peril. A Chapter 11, 12, 
or 13 debtor is authorized to continue operating its own business; therefore, in those cases a 
post-petition transfer will not be avoidable. 
Two kinds of unauthorized post-petition transfers are, saved from avoidance under §549. 
First, until constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy is given by recordation of a copy of notice of 
the petition in the appropriate land records office, a good faith transferee of real estate who had no 
knowledge of the pending bankruptcy is protected to the extent he gave fair, equivalent value.21 
Second, in the interim between the filing of ail involuntary petition and the Order of Rei ief, referred 
to as the "gap period", a transferee is protected in any dealings with the debtor to the extent he gave 
value for the transfer~22 Finally, under §542( c), one who owes money to the debtor or holds property 
of the estate is not liable to the Trustee if, after bankruptcy, that person in good faith and without 
knowledge of the filing of the case pays the debtor or transfers the property to someone other than 
the transferee. The transferee will bear the burden of proof to establish a valid post-petition 
transferP The Trustee must commence the adversary proceeding to avoid these transfers within two 
(2) years of the transfer or the time the case is closed or dismissed, whichever is earlier.24 
B. Trustee's Power To Compel Turnover Of Property 
Section 704 charges the Trustee with the responsibility to collect and liquidate property of 
the estate. The Bankruptcy Code, in two separate sections, gives the Trustee the power to compel 
turnover of property which is in the possession of third parties, including court-appointed custodians. 
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1. §542 Turnover of Property of the Estate 
Section 542 requires any entity, other than a custodian, who comes into possession of 
property of the estate which "the Trustee may use, sell or lease under § 363" to surrender such 
property to the Trustee upon demand. If the third party refuses to surrender possession, the Trustee· 
should commence an adversary proceeding to obtain an appropriate court order. 
TIle property for which the Trustee can compel turnover is limited to property which the 
Trustee can "use, sell or lease under § 363." As a result, if the property is subject to a valid claim 
of set-off such as a bank account, the Trustee cannot compel the bank to surrender the proceeds of 
the account and defeat the bank's right of set-off. If a creditor has a valid security interest in 
property and if the creditor has received relief from the automatic stay, the Trustee will not be 
entitled to turnover. In addition, property which is of "inconsequential value or benefit to the estate" 
cannot be compelled through turnover.25 
Ifa Trustee commences an adversary proceeding, it will be the Trustee's burden to prove: 
(a) possession and control of property by the .entity; (b) that the property can be uti Iized by the estate 
under § 363; and (c) that the property's value is more than inconsequential.26 
This section will also authorize the Trustee to compel turnover of records and documents 
regarding the debtor's property and financial affairs from the debtor's attorney, accountants, or other 
third parties. This turnover is subject to any applicable privilege.2' The attorney/client privilege of 
a corporate debtor is held, however, by the Trustee who has the power to waive as to pre-petition 
communications.28 
2. §543 Turnover of Property by Custodian 
In addition to the powers of turnover set forth in § 542, the Trustee has the power to compel 
turnover of property from a "custodian." A "custodian" is defined by the Bankruptcy Code to mean: 
(A) receiver or Trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a 
case or proceeding not under this title; (B) assignee under a general 
assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors, or (C) Trustee receiver 
or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is appointed or 
authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of 
enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general 
administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. 
Once a custodian has knowledge of the bankruptcy, the custodian is prohibited from making any 
disbursements of property of the estate or take any action in the administration of that property 
except as may be necessary for its preservation.29 This statute affirmatively directs the custodian 
to deliver to the Trustee all of the property ofthe debtor and its proceeds and to provide the Trustee 
with an accounting of all the property which came into the custodian's possession.JO 
The property which is to be turned over by the custodian is not limited, as in the case of 
§S42, to property which the Trustee could use, sell, or lease as no such limitation exists in §S43. 
In the appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Court can allow the custodian to remain in 
possession ofthe property of the estate if it would be in the best interest of the creditors. Special 
circumstances may exist if the custodian had been charged with liquidating the property of the 
debtor and it would be in the best interest of the creditor for the custodian to continue with the 
liquidation process. 
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If a custodian is directed to turn over property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Court, after 
notice and hearing, is empowered to provide for the payment of the custodian's expenses and fees. 
The Court can also provide for the payment of any third party or entity to which the custodian has 
become obligated. 
C. Trustee's Standing To Object To Or Revoke Discharge 
Although seldom used, the Trustee has standing under the Code to oppose the grant of a 
discharge or within the time limits seek a revocation of that discharge. Section 727 outlines specific 
circumstances in which a debtor can be denied a discharge. For example, a discharge can be denied 
ifthe debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified or failed to keep or preserve books or 
records concerning his or her financial condition or business transactions, knowingly 
and-fraudulently gave a false oath, failed to adequately explain loss of assets or deficiency of assets 
or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, has transferred or concealed property within 
one year before the filing of the petition. Under certain circumstances, a Trustee or creditor may 
seek to revoke a discharge previously granted ifthe discharge was obtained through fraud or if the 
debtor acquired property ofthe estate and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of the property 
or failed to surrender such property to the Trustee.31 The Trustee in that circumstance could file an 
adversary proceeding seekingthe revocation of the discharge in the case offraud within one (I) year 
after the discharge is granted, or in the circumstance in which property ofthe estate is acquired by 
the debtor which is not surrendered, one (I) year after the granting of the discharge or one (1) year 
after the date the case is closed whichever is later. 
D. Operation Of The Debtor's Business 
In most Chapter 7 proceedings, upon the filing of the petition for relief, any business 
operations ofthe debtor must immediately cease, and the Trustee is charged to take possession of 
the business assets and begin liquidating those assets for future distribution to the creditors. In some 
limited circumstances, it may be in the best interest of the creditors for the debtor's business to 
continue operating on at least a temporary basis. For example, it may be in the creditors' interest for 
the Trustee to sell the business as a going concern as opposed to liquidating its individual assets. 
Section 721 authorizes the Trustee, with Court approval, "to operate the business of the debtor for 
a limited period." Ifthe Court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, authorizes the temporary 
operation of the business, the Trustee may use, lease or sell property ofthe estate consistent with the 
requirements of §363, or obtain credit pursuant to the terms of §364. Like a debtor~in-possession 
in a reorganization proceeding, the Trustee is prohibited from using cash collateral without Court 
approval or creditor consent.32 Section 704(8) will require that the Trustee file periodic reports and 
summaries of the operation and provide those reports to the Court, the U.S. Trustee, and all 
governmental units responsible for the collection of taxes. 
E. General Duties And Responsibilities Of A Trustee 
Upon his or her appointment or election, the Trustee is charged with certain responsibilities 
to the creditors, the estate, and the Court. The Trustee will owe a fiduciary duty to the estate and 
the creditors in the performance of these duties. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the bankruptcy 
Trustee will have standing to bring certain causes of action and will have the power to avoid certain 
transfers. The Trustee is required to exercise due diligence and act in the best interest of the 
creditors.33 
This section will examine the general responsibilities of a Trustee as set forth by § 704 of 
the Code. 
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1. Control Property of the Estate 
The Bankruptcy Code vests exclusive control of the property ofthe estate in the Trustee. 
Section 704(a) requires that the Trustee collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and. 
to be accountable for the property received. The powers given the. Trustee to avoid transfers and 
compel turnover of property are to be exercised to fulfill this duty. In addition, the Trustee should 
give notice to all banks, utility companies, landlords, and insurance companies issuing a policy with 
cash surrender value payable to the debtor.34 
Once the property is collected, if it has value over and above the mortgages or security 
interests, and the debtors' exemptions, then the Trustee is to liquidate the property in a manner so 
as to produce the best dividend for the unsecured creditor. This sale typically will be conducted 
pursuant to §363 free and clear of all liens. If the property has no value to the unsecured creditors, 
the Trustee should abandon his interest. Upon abandonment, title to the property re-vests in the 
debtor.3s 
After his or her appointment, the Trustee is to file a physical inventory of the property of 
the debtor. This inventory is to be based upon the Trustee's review of the debtors' petition as well 
as the Trustee's own investigation.36 As the Trustee administers the estate, the Trustee is to maintain 
appropriate books and records showing all receipts and disbursements.37 
Since the Trustee is vested with exclusive control of the property during the administration 
of the estate, the Trustee is also accountable for all property.38 To satisfy the Trustee's fiduciary 
duties, the Trustee may need to obtain insurance protecting the property and the estate from any loss 
or damage. 
2. Insure Debtor's Performance of §521 Intentions 
In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to require that the debtor file within thirty (30) 
days ofthe date of filing the petition a statement of his or her intent with respect to the retention or 
surrender of property. The debtor is required to specify whether the property is exempt, whether the 
debtor intends to redeem the property, or reaffirm the debt secured by such property. Within 
forty-five (45) days after the filing ofthe notice of intent, the debtor is directed to perform his or her 
intentions.39 
Section 704(3) charges the Trustee with responsibility for insuring that the debtor performs 
his intentions concerning the retention or surrender of property. The Trustee can inquire of the 
debtor at the §341 meeting, but unfortunately in many cases the §341 meeting will be conducted 
prior to the expiration of the time period set forth in §521. It may be appropriate for the Trustee to 
continue the §341 first meeting of creditors in order to give the debtor the opportunity to complete 
his or her intentions, or for the Trustee to have follow-up contact with debtor's counsel. 
3. Duty to Examine Debtor Concerning Knowledge of the Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, §341 regarding the first meeting of the 
creditors was amended to require that the Trustee question the debtor to insure that the debtor 
understands: 
(1) The potential consequences of seeking a discharge in bankruptcy, 
including the effects on credit histories; 
(2) The debtors' ability to file a petition under a different chapter of 
this title; 
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(3) 
(4) 
The effect of receiving a discharge of debts under this title; 
The effect ofreaffirming a debt, including the debtors' knowledge 
of the provisions of §524(d) " 
Section 524 regarding reaffirmation agreements was also amended so that a court hearing 
approving the reaffirmation agreement is no longer necessary if the debtor was represented by 
counsel in the known negotiation of the agreement. Since no court hearing will be held to approve 
the reaffirmation agreement, the Bankruptcy Code has charged the Trustee with responsibility to 
insure that the debtors understand the legal effect and consequences of a reaffirmation agreement 
and a default under that agreement as well as to insure that the debtor understands that the 
reaffirmation agreement is a voluntary agreement. 
4. Duty to Investigate Financial Affairs of Debtor 
In order to fulfill his or her fiduciary duties and to collect all the property of the estate 
available, the Trustee cannot rely solely upon the debtors' bankruptcy petition and schedule of assets 
and liabilities. The Trustee must perform his or her own independent investigation. This 
investigation can be performed informally through a review of the debtors' books and records. The 
Trustee will have the opportunity to question the debtor at the §341 first meeting of creditors. If a 
more extensive questioning is required, the Trustee is authorized to conduct such examinations 
pursuant to Rule 2004 which allows for an examination in a manner substantially equivalent to a 
civil discovery deposition. Rule 2004 is not limited to debtors. Under this Rule, the Court can order 
an examination of "any entity". This rule would allow the Trustee to depose the debtor, any creditor, 
any transferee of property, the accountant of the debtor or any other person who has knowledge 
concerning the assets, liabilities, or financial affairs and transactions of the debtors. As part of this 
examination, the debtor, or any party in interest, has the right to compel production of documents. 
The debtor is charged with the duty to cooperate with the Trustee to enable the Trustee to 
perform his or her duties.40 Should the debtor fail to cooperate, such failure may be a basis to oppose 
the discharge ofthe debtor pursuant to §727. 
5. Examination of Proof of Claims 
In order to have an allowed claim for purposes of distribution of proceeds of the estate, a 
creditor, or some entity on behalf of the creditor, must file a proof of claim setting forth the nature 
of the claim, the amount of the debt, and appropriate documentation of the claim.41 Upon receipt 
of the proof of claims, and before making disbursements of the proceeds ofthe estate, the Trustee 
must examine each of the proof of claims and if appropriate, object to any improper claim. The 
objection should be in a form consistent with Bankruptcy Rule 3007. 
6. Duty to Furnish Information 
Section 704 imposes upon the Trustee the duty to "furnish such information concerning the 
estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest." Often the Trustee will 
receive requests for information from creditors or even the debtor concerning liquidation of assets, 
filing of claims, and more often, the likelihood of a distribution to the unsecured creditors. The 
Trustee should respond to these requests if the information is available to the Trustee. Certainly the 
Trustee is under no obligation to incur substantial expense on behalf of the estate in order to obtain 
information on behalf of a creditor. 
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The duty to provide information is limited to "a party in interest." The Trustee is therefore 
not obligated to provide information to the media. 
7. Duty to File a Final Account 
The Trustee is to either liquidate or abandon the property. Upon completion of the 
administration of all assets, §704(9) requires that the Trustee file ~ final report and an account of 
his or her administration of the assets. This report will set forth all property and monies received 
and disbursed by the Trustee. Upon approval by the Court of this final report, the Trustee will 
then disburse all final dividends to the unsecured creditors. Ninety (90) days after making the 
final disbursement, if any check is remaining unpaid, the Trustee will place a stop order on that 
check and pay over to the Bankruptcy Court clerk all unclaimed funds.41 At that time, the 
Trustee is required by Bankruptcy Rule 3011 to file a statement setting forth that he or she has 
complied with the provisions of§ 347. Upon filing such report, the Court should discharge the 
Trustee from further service and obligation and release the Trustee's bond. 
-
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Introduction 
The purpose of this discussion is to advise pra~itioners on methods and strategies 
regarding on issues to address with the Chapter 7 panel Trustee appointed by the United States 
Trustee. The general theme of this discussion is to advise practitioners how to satisfy the 
demands of the panel Trustee without drawing a Motion to Dismiss or other sanctions. A 
working knowledge of the powers of the Trustee, particularly the strong arm powers, is 
necessary. Practitioners should refer to the Consumer Bankruptcy Practice in Kentucky: Chapter 
7 Practice published by the University of Kentucky as a Monograph in 1996, Chapter 6, for a 
discussion of the powers of the Trustee. This author does not intend to restate all of those 
powers, although comments will be made when appropriate as to current practices and 
procedures. 
Commencement of the Case 
With the commencement of any Chapter 7 petition filed in the Eastern District of 
Kentucky, several matters arise at once that require the attention of Counsel. The first is the 
assignment of a case number. Contemporaneously with the assignment of the case number, the 
clerk appoints aTrustee on a random revolving basis from the list of panel Trustees, assigns a 
date for the meeting of creditors, and enters information onto the BANCAP system to issue what 
is called a "Order to Debtor". A copy of the Order to Debtor is attached for your review. 
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The Order to Debtor requires the Debtor to produce within ten (10) days various 
documents, which assists the Trustee is determination of whether an asset exists for liquidation 
or not. Please note that this Order is not issued in the Western District of Kentucky. No similar 
requirement exists in the Western District that compels Debtors to turnover documents. 
The Debtors must produce within ten (10) days the following: 
1. 	 copies of deeds, mortgages or other interests in real 
estate; 
2. 	 copies of bank statements and cancelled checks; 
3. 	 copies of titles to motor vehicles, mobile homes, trailers 
or boats (registrations are not acceptable); 
4. 	 certificates of stocks, bonds, and keys to safety deposit 
boxes; 
5. 	 copies of the Debtors' last filed state and federal income 
tax returns; 
6. 	 any other papers that pertain to ownership of property. 
Failure to produce these documents on a timely basis will result in a Motion to Dismiss. 
Pursuant to the Court's amended Standing Orders, which are available for review on the Court's 
website at www.kyeb.uscourts.govr a copy of which is attached hereto, the Trustee has no 
discretion but to move to dismiss for failure to produce these documents. 
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Counsel is reminded to contact the individual Trustee to determine his or her individual 
requirements regarding the fulfillment of this Order. Some Trustees are more strict than others. 
However, the general practice is to produce these documents as soon as the identity of the 
Trustee is known. 
Practice Tip 
Except for exigent circumstances, Counsel should obtain all of the required documents 
prior to filing the petition. The one document that cannot be obtained in advance is the bank 
statement that shows accounts balances through the date of filing. However, other than that, 
Counsel should require the production of all necessary documents before filing the petition. 
The Order to Debtor referenced herein also enjoins the Debtor from disposing of any 
property of the estate without the consent of the Trustee or Order of the Court. Frequently this 
author encounters situations where vehicles have been abandoned, turned over or allowed to 
be repossessed. Other collateral seems to disappear. The wiser approach is for Counsel to 
contact the Trustee to receive authorization for the intended course of action. The Debtor 
should not retain vehicles any longer than necessary, particularly if uninsured. However, to 
allow repossession of the vehicle without the Trustee's ability to inspect the title and verify that 
the lien is properly perfected, places the Debtor in the position of violating this order (as well as 
the relative creditor). In such cases, the property should not be turned over until a properly 
executed Order of Abandonment or Agreed Order Lifting Stay is executed. 
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Meeting of Creditors 
The meeting of creditors is contained in the initial notice issued by the Bankruptcy Court 
to all creditors, parties of interest, the Debtor, attorney for the Debtor and the Trustee for the 
Debtor. The clerk also includes this information on the print out of the receipt that is returned 
to Counsel. Attendance at the meeting of creditors by Counsel and by Counsel's client is 
mandatory. Ifeither should fail to attend the meeting of creditors, pursuant to the Court's latest 
standing Order, issued June 1, 2000, a copy of which is attached, the Trustee is directed to file 
a Motion to Dismiss. 
If Counsel becomes aware that a conflict exists, a Motion to Continue, coupled with an 
Affidavit and a proposed Order, must be filed immediately. Notice of the Motion must be served 
upon all creditors and parties of interest. In addition to filing the Motion, contact the affected 
Trustee and try to obtain an agreed upon rescheduled date. This date can be included in your 
proposed Order so that certification of the Order is limited to one distribution instead of two. 
Should a Motion to Continue not be necessary, Counsel and the Debtor should appear at 
the meeting of creditors at the time and place as scheduled. Ordinarily these hearings last only 
a few minutes. At the hearing, Counsel should be prepared to address each asset of the Debtor 
with the Trustee. While the meeting is conducted by the Trustee, who shall address questions 
to the Debtors, Counsel should be familiar with the assets of the Debtor and be prepared to 
discuss' these with the Trustee. 
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Of a particular interest to any Trustee is any pending litigation, any pending claim or any 
other matter that is contingent. Other matters of interest include any inheritance, lottery 
winnings, lien perfection issues, and equity available to the Debtor. 
To the extent that Counsel is informed that any potential asset may be subject to 
administration, the better practice is to inform the Trustee of the status of that asset prior to the 
meeting of creditors. This information will allow the Trustee to focus on the matters that need 
to be administered. In addition, Counsel should inform the Debtor that resolution of the 
personal injury or the contingent mater will rest with the Trustee and that the Debtor has no 
authority to adjudicate, settle or otherwise dispose of any contingent claim. The Debtors remedy 
is limited to objection to any proposed solution made by the Trustee and to properly schedule 
exemptions of said claims. 
An interesting development over the last several years has been the redemption of assets 
by Debtors in favor of either the estate or a perfected secured creditor. Companies have been 
formed whose primary purpose is to finance Debtors who have filed bankruptcy to allow those 
Debtors to either retain property that is listed in the bankruptcy or finance the acquisition of the 
new assets following the petition. To the extent that this issue may be appropriate, Counsel is 
urged to discuss this matter with the Debtor and with the Trustee prior to the meeting of 
creditors, if possible. For example, if the Debtor presents a title which Counsel knows lists an 
unperfected lien or lists a lien that is avoidable because it is preferential, an inquiry into the 
Debtor's desire to retain that item is necessary before the meeting of creditors. When the 
meeting of creditors occurs, the Trustee can be informed of the Debtor's intent to redeem. 
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It is this author's opinion that redemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722 includes property 
of the estate. The Debtor is required to pay the fair market value of the tangible personal 
property intended for personal family or household use by paying "the holder of such lien the 
amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien". Nothing in this 
section prohibits that the holder of such lien would be the Trustee in Bankruptcy. The Trustee 
stands in the shoes ofan unperfected secured creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 551, which allows 
the preservation of the lien avoided by the trustee in favor of the estate as against the Debtor. 
Thus, should redemption be desired, an inquiry into the ability of the Debtor to redeem must be 
made prior to the meeting of creditors. Otherwise, the Debtors stand an excellent chance of 
having the asset, particularly avehicle, removed from their possession and sold at auction or by 
other appropriate means by the Trustee. 
In sum, the meeting of creditors is the vehicle used by the Trustee to refine what assets 
of the estate need to be liquidated. Counsel for the Debtor should use the meeting of creditors 
as an opportunity to refine that process for the Trustee. By assisting the Trustee, Counsel can 
also facilitate the wishes of the Debtor by appropriately seeking alternatives. If the Debtor is 
aware that an asset is subject to liquidation before the meeting ofcreditors, the Debtor has been 
properly informed and is not surprised to learn that a valuable asset is to be turned over at the 
meeting of creditors. A surprised Debtor makes for an unhappy Counsel. Full disclosure of all 
possibilities to the Debtor prior to the meeting of creditors will confirm the confidence the Debtor 
has placed in Counsel. Disclosure of assets to be liquidated to the Trustee prior to the meeting 
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of creditors will engender good faith with the Trustee and allow for a better recovery for both 
the estate and the Debtor. 
The Difficult Debtor/Issues of Discharge 
In the Eastern District, the Court entertains Motions to Dismiss for the failure of Debtors 
to produce necessary documents or attend necessary hearings. Necessary hearings not only 
include the meeting of creditors but properly scheduled Rule 2004 examinations. Debtors can 
also be compelled to provide testimony in adversary proceedings. The Debtor has a continuing 
duty to cooperate with the Trustee. 11 U.s.c. § 521. 
On rare occasions, the Debtor does not' either fully cooperate with the Trustee. Instead 
of full disclosure, the Debtor attempts to conceal assets, delay production of documents or fail 
to provide full disclosure of transfers that apply prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. Both the 
Trustee and creditors have available as a sanction a complaint that objects to the discharge of 
the Debtor. Unlike nondischargeability issues under § 532 of the Code, dischargeability issues 
fall under 11 U.S.C. § 727. Once filed, a case cannot be settled without full disclosure to 
creditors and the Court. 
Trustees are increasingly becoming more litigious in the area of discharge. Trustees 
particularly rely on 11 U.S.C. § 727(d), which required the Court to revoke a discharge if a 
discharge was obtained through the fraud of the Debtor and the Trustee did not become aware 
of the fraud until after the discharge had been granted; the Debtor acquired property that was 
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property of the estate and failed knowingly and fraudulently to report the acquisition or 
entitlement of such property or refused to deliver said property to the Trustee or the Debtor has 
refused to obey a lawful order of the Court. The Debtor's discharge can also be revoked if one 
transferred, removed, mutilated or concealed property of the estate or what could have been 
property of the estate within one(1) year before the filing of the petition and failed to disclose 
it or if the Debtor lied, made false oath or attempted to bribe the Trustee. The conduct of the 
Debtor includes not only an examination of conduct after the filing of the petition, but also 
before the filing of the petition. 
Recently the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the "continuous concealment 
doctrine". This doctrine provides that should the Debtor conceal assets more than one (1) year 
prior to the filing of the petition, but exercises dominion over said asset into the one (1) year 
before the filing of the bankruptcy and the Debt~r fails to disclose either the transfer or the 
exercise of control, then the Debtor's discharge can be revoked for failure to disclose and for 
making a false oath by signing the petition. In Re: Keeney, 200 Fed. App. 0341P, (filed 
September 26, 2000). A copy of the opinion is attached for your review. 
Counsel does not normally partiCipate in such conduct with the Debtor. To do so invites 
potential criminal sanctions. In such situations, Counsel needs to walk a fine line between . 
properly advising one's client, maintaining confidences under the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and not participating in a fraud upon the Court and reporting such fraud to the 
appropriate authorities, including the Trustee and the United States Trustee. 
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Practice lips 
Advise one's client in writing to make full disclosure of all assets, transfers, or potential 
assets prior to the filing of the petition and prior to the meeting of creditors. At least advise your 
client that a fraudulent conveyance action should not be coupled with a discharge revocation 
action. Advise the Debtor of the powers of the Trustee's "strong arm" powers pursuant to § 544­
553 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Duties After Meeting of Creditors 
The Debtor's duty to cooperate with the Trustee extends until the close of the case. 
Therefore, Counsel needs to maintain contact with the Trustee in the event that any asset needs 
to be administered. Counsel particularly needs to be vigilant in the assertion of appropriate 
exemptions. If a Trustee undertakes the prosecution of a personal injury claim that belong to 
the Debtor and then seeks to settle the matter, Counsel needs to review the proposed 
settlement with the Debtor to ensure that the Debtor's interest are properly represented. The 
Debtors are allowed exemptions which are fully delineated in·KRS 427.150. Pain and suffering 
has been adjudicated to be excluded from the exemption as stated in KRS 427.150. The Trustee 
is required to furnish information concerning the estate to a party in interest. 11 U.S.c. § 
704(7). Thus, Counsel should maintain contact with the Trustee to determine the status of the 
pending litigation, should the Debtor believe that a viable exemption exists. Maintain with the 
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Trustee that an exemption by the Debtor is claimed and that any resolution of the case, short 
of jury findings, that settles the case strictly along the lines of pain and suffering will be opposed. 
The same admonition to creditors and creditor's Counsels exists with regard to Debtors and 
Debtors Counsel in these actions. Vigilance is essential. 
-
The same vigilance applies to activities that must be undertaken by the Debtor after the 
filing of the petition that cannot be produced by the meeting of creditors. Examples of these 
type of activities include preparing the filing tax returns, receiving and properly disbursing tax 
refunds or other activities that simply could not be performed by the meeting of creditors. 
Counsel should advise Debtors not to cash tax refund checks until cleared by the Trustee. 
Maintain contact by Counsel between the Debtors and the Trustee will ensure that no 
inappropriate actions will be filed, such as a complaint to revoke the discharge. 
Dealings With the Trustee in Representation of Creditors 
Creditors has one disadvantage in a bankruptcy in that, except for the rare instance of 
an involuntary petition, creditors do not select the place of filing. Counsel who represents 
creditors are not under the same statutory requirements to cooperate with the Trustee that the 
Debtor and Debtors Counsel have. However, even in adversary Situations, the more sensible 
approach by creditor's Counsel should be to communicate and to cooperate with the Trustee. 
Creditors Counsel normally have contact with the Trustee in the following situations: 
1. Relief matters; 
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2. lien avoidance matters; 
3. sale of secured assets; and 
4. representation of unsecured creditors. 
Regardless of the type of proceeding, Counsel will find that cooperation with the Trustee 
will produce a more effective administration of the case, result in a more efficient distribution 
of funds to creditors and enable Counsel to make speedier dispositions of assets that are secured 
in favor of their client's. 
Relief Matters 
In the Eastern District of Kentucky, relief from stay can be obtained by Motion in one of 
two ways. The first is by noticing the Motion on a fifteen (15) day opportunity notice. Ifanother 
party in interest wishes to object to the Motion for Relief, then the matter will be set for motion 
docket. The alternative is to notice it for a date certain. Motion dockets are conducted on a 
regular basis in the Eastern District of Kentucky and are set forth in Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014­
1. Counsel is urged to review any changes to the date and times on the Court's web page at 
www.kyeb.uscourts.gov. Recently, Judge Howard changed the motion hour for the Covington 
division from the first Tuesday of the month to the second Tuesday of the month to 
accommodate his new duties as a member of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. 
On relief matters, Counsel must attach a copy of the proof of claim to the Motion for 
Relief. The Motion must also set forth the basis by which relief should be granted, including the 
recording information that is pertinent to the asset that ought to be released from the 
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bankruptcy. Unlike some jurisdictions, a request for an abandonment of the property may be 
included in the Motion for Relief. 
An alternative to filing the Motion is to seek an Agreed Order with Counsel for the Debtor 
and the Trustee. The same information must be disclosed. Counsel must provide to the Trustee 
the documentation that shows the perfection of the lien on the asset in question. Often times, 
Counsel attaches a copy of a mortgage or other instrumentwhich does not contain the recording 
information. Trustee's review, proofs of claims, Motions for Relief and other documents for 
information that shows clearly that the lien of the punitive secured creditor is perfected in a 
timely manner and is not otherwise avoidable under the Trustee's strong arm powers. 
Absent such information, the Trustee shou!d object to the Motion for Relief or refuse to 
sign the proposed Agreed Order. Providing such information the first instance provides a 
smoother, more efficient administration of the estate and allows Counsel to seek liquidation of 
the asset on behalf of the secured creditor on a speedier and more efficient basis. An Order 
must accompany the Motion for Relief. 
Lien Avoidance Matters 
The most important aspect of representation of a creditor by Counsel when a Trustee 
seeks to avoid a lien is to accurately assess the merits of the Trustee's position. To litigate 
simply to stall for time frequently costs creditors substantial dividends. The cost of litigation Is 
borne by the estate and therefore decreases the amount of funds available for distribution, not 
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to mention the time spent litigating causes delays in which distribution can occur. If Counsel 
concludes that the Trustee's position is sound and no basis exists to defeat the proposed lien 
avoidance, the best representation is to concede and to facilitate a liquidation of the asset so 
that Counsel's client can receive a greater dividend. While the creditor will suffer a loss, for it 
is a rare case in which a lien avoidance matter results in a 100% dividend, the accurate 
assessment of a Trustee's case at the beginning of a case wJII allow the creditor to recover the 
maximum amount possible. Of course, if Counsel concludes that the Trustee's action is not 
warranted, defense of the litigation is proper, even if the result is adverse to Counsel's client in 
the end. Most Trustees are cognizant of the cost of litigation, the time expended in litigation and 
have already performed a cost benefit analysis before undertaking the proposed litigation. Most 
Trustees are normally considerate of settlement in these matters because the goal is to return 
funds to creditors as quickly as possible. 
If Counsel has determined that viable defenses exists to the Trustee's proposed action, 
the information that establishes the defense should be provided to the Trustee as soon as 
practicable. Most Trustee's are aware of the potential defenses to any action. Providing the 
documentation or offering testimony, that supports the defenses will quickly frame the issues. 
Counsel should be aware of the intent by the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of 
Kentucky to bring matters to trial in an expeditious manner. Therefore, no time exists by which 
to deray discovery. On the contrary, if discovery needs to be undertaken, do so at once. The 
burden of proof does rest with the Trustee. Normally, the key witness for the Trustee will be 
the Debtor. If not the Debtor, it is documentation provided to the Debtor that forms that basis 
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of the complaint. The Debtor is required to cooperate with the Trustee. Therefore, if his 
testimony is necessary, do not hesitate to take his deposition. The trial procedures in the 
Eastern District require all Counsel to enter into stipulations to refine the issues to be heard by 
the Court. Normally in lien avoidance actions, the litigation centers on one element. For 
example, frequently in preference litigation, the issue is an industry standard to determine 
whether the payment was made on an antecedent debt. Focus on the issues that benefit your 
client's the most. If the Trustee cannot prevail on all of the elements, the Trustee fails to meet 
the burden of proof. If Counsel can convince the Trustee that the elements cannot be met, the 
dismissal of the action should be obtained. 
Liquidation Analysis 
Whether Counsel represents a creditor who holds a lien or is simply unsecured, Counsel 
for creditors need to perform a liquidation analysis of the Debtor's assets. If the creditor 
represented is a lien creditor, the focus would be limited to the asset that is encumbered. 
Nonnally, the liquidation analysis for representing a secured creditor goes hand-in-hand with 
whether Counsel should prepare a Motion for Relief from Stay or seek and Agreed Order lifting 
the stay. Simply put, the Trustee undergoes amathematical analysis. The Trustee must deduct 
the administrative costs from any hypothetical sale. The administrative costs include the 
Trustee's commiSSion, which is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 326, any professional fee, such as 
auctioneer, real estate commission, attorney's fees, any tax costs as a result of the sale, 
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particularly any capital gains tax and any other costs that the Trustee must consider before 
performing the sale. In addition to the administrative costs, the Trustee must consider 
distribution to co-owners, if applicable, and, of course, the amount owed to the lien holders. 
Interest continues to accrue on the valid liens that encumber the asset. In addition to all of 
these factors, the Trustee must also consider applicable exemptions, particularly homestead 
exemptions in real estate sales. After all of these costs are deducted and a benefit remains to 
the estate to sell the property, it is in the interest of the secured creditor to facilitate a sale as 
well as the Trustee. After all, the secured creditor will be paid in full from the sale of the asset. 
If the creditor becomes convinced that a sale will not in fact pay all of these costs, then Counsel 
should employ the relief from stay mechanisms. 
If Counsel represents an unsecured creditor, Counsel should ask one's client to what 
extent that client may have knowledge of assets of the Debtor that can be liqUidated. It is in 
the unsecured creditors interest to find assets that can be liquidated. Unsecured creditors, of 
course,.only get paid a dividend from assets that are liquidated. Otherwise, the case becomes 
a no asset case and the client receives nothing. Counsel can determine quickly what assets of 
the Debtor hold potential value for the estate, and brings these matters to the attention of the 
Trustee. Counsel can assist the Trustee to make sure that creditors receive a substantial 
dividend. The services of Counsel in this area are limited to support for the trustee. However, 
aTrustee normally sells assets only after parties bring the value of those assets to the Trustee's 
attention. Many times Debtors understate or simply don't appreciate the value of property that 
they own. Thus, if Counselor Counsel's client holds knowledge of the value of certain assets, 
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even if the Debtor does not agree with that assessment, the Trustee may be able to realize a 
dividend to that creditor when otherwise the Trustee would be prepared to file a report of no 
distribution. The vigilant creditor is normally the creditor who gets paid. When representing an 
unsecured creditor, Counsel must file proofs of claims to preserve the right of the creditor to 
receive a dividend. 
Conclusion 
When Counsel must engage with a Chapter 7Trustee, two attributes most often work for 
the benefit of all concerned. Those attributes are cooperation and disclosure to the Trustee. 
In order for the bankruptcy system to work at its best, the system must be efficient. It is the 
duty of Counsel to facilitate and perform those necessary tasks to make the system work more 
efficiently. It is in the interest of all concerned, the Debtors, Trustee, and creditors, that the 
system work efficiently. The faster the system works, the faster Debtors leave the bankruptcy 
system and place this unpleasant chapter behind their lives. The faster the system works, the 
faster the creditors get paid and realize the full extent of their loss or recovery. Of course, the 
faster the system works, the faster the trustee gets paid as well. But more importantly, and 
efficient bankruptcy system brings credibility an respectability to what is now a meck maligned 
system. 
This author does not advocate that one should abandon a client when one disagrees with 
the Trustee. However, focusing on the area of disagreement, rather than litigating everything, 
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can only be in everybody's interest. The shorter the litigation, the lower the costs. The lower 
the costs represents a higher dividend to creditors. A lower ligation cost, also can result in more 
favorable, negotiated settlements for the Debtor or the creditor. Failure to communicate with 
the Trustee results in Motions to Dismiss with regard to the Debtors, more extensive litigation 
with regard to creditors, greater administration costs and lower dividends to everyone. The only 
person who makes more money when a lack of cooperation and the communication exists is the 
Trustee's Counsel. Practice in the Eastern District of Kentucky requires cooperation and 
disclosure of information. Debtor's must timely disclose assets and documentation supporting 
those assets. Creditors must disclose documents that prove perfection of liens. litigants are 
required to engage in meaningful stipulations and settlement discussions. Failure by one party 
to engage in a cooperative course can and probably will adversely impact that litigant. Cander 
before the Bankruptcy Court is a virtue and is normally not penalized. The required cooperation 
is perhaps the principal fundamental difference between litigating in the Bankruptcy Court and 
litigating in any other Court. 
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IO
N
 
A
LA
N
 E. N
O
RRIS, Circuit Judge. 
M
ilton W
. K
eeney, 
debtor in this bankruptcy action, appeals from
 the o
rder of the 
bankruptcy 
co
u
rt denying his petition for discharge in 
bankruptcy. The denial w
as based upon the c
o
u
rt's finding 
that he had co
n
cealed property interests and m
ade a false o
ath. 
W
e affirm
 the o
rder. 
I. 
I In 1971, A
ppellee, M
ary Jean Sm
ith, obtained a judgment 
against K
eeney for injuries she su
stained in a c
a
r accident. 
Sm
ith has been u
n
able to collect o
n
 this judgment. 
In 1982, a tract of real property w
as purchased in lhe n
am
es 
.
 
	of K
eeney's parents, Winfre~ 
and R
uth K
eeney.· They 
m
o
rtgaged this property to M
utual Federal Savings and Loan 
("M
utual Federal"). 
K
eeney 
and his then-w
ife, B
arbara 
K
eeney, lived o
n
 the property for about a year, and paid his 
parents n
o
 rent. K
eeney o
r his business entity, K
-B
ar Trailer 
M
anufacturing ("K-Bar"), m
ade all ofthe m
o
rtgage paym
ents 
for the property. In 1985 K
eeney ex
ecuted a n
ote for $89,960 
to M
utual Federal secu
red by a n
ew
 m
o
rtgage from
 K
eeney's 
parents o
n
 this property, as w
ell as all of K
-B
ar's inventory, 
fixtures 
and 
equipm
ent. 
K
eeney 
o
r K
-B
ar 
m
ade 
all the 
N
o. 99-5949 	
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paym
ents o
n
 this n
ote and 
m
o
rtgage. 
This property w
as 
ev
entually transferred by his parents for the su
m
 of$15,000, 
w
hich w
as paid to M
utual Federal. 
K
eeney placed the w
inning bid for a seco
nd piece of real 
estate in 1983, w
hich w
as purchased in his parents' n
am
es for 
the su
m
 of $61,700. 
O
f that su
m
, $52,000 w
as borrow
ed 
from
 M
utual Federal. K
eeney o
r K
-B
ar paid $9255 dow
n for 
this property from
 K
-B
ar's checking acco
u
nt, and thereafter 
K
eeney paid $52,455 from
 K
-B
ar's checking acco
u
nt for the 
balance due o
n
 the purchase price. 
K
eeney and his w
ife 
m
o
v
ed o
nto this property at about the tim
e it w
as co
n
v
eyed to 
his parents and lived there u
ntil the tim
e of their separation in 
1994 o
r 1995. K
eeney co
ntinues to live there. K
eeney o
r K
­
B
ar paid for im
provem
ents o
n
 this property and m
ade all 
mort~age paym
ents. K
eeney does n
ot pay rent to his parents 
for hiS u
se of the property. 
o
 
G
len G
adberry, A
ssistant V
ice President at A
lliance B
ank, 
N
 
form
erly M
utual Federal, testified that the o
nly rem
aining 
­ .c
reco
rds relating to the above property m
o
rtgages w
ere in 
'
-
'
 
K
eeney's n
am
e, rather than his parents', although m
any ofthe 
~
 
reco
rds had been destroyed. 
K
eeney filed for bankruptcy in 
1996. 
Sm
ith filed 
a 
co
m
plaint w
ith the bankruptcy co
u
rt seeking to bar K
eeney's 
discharge 
in 
bankruptcy, 
alleging 
that 
the 
real 
e
state 
co
n
v
eyances w
ere m
ade in 
an
 effort to 
co
n
ceal property 
actually belonging to K
eeney. 
The 
bankruptcy 
co
u
rt 
denied 
K
eeney 
discharge 
in 
bankruptcy u
nder 11 U
.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), finding that he 
had 
co
ntinuously co
n
cealed his beneficial interest in the 
above described property: 
The reco
rd in this case indicates that the debtor had 

propertf titled in his parents' n
am
es w
hile retaining a 

benefiCial interest in it, so
 as to invoke the co
ntinuous 

co
n
cealm
ent doctrine. W
hile his parents had legal title 

to tw
o different tracts of real estate, the defendant m
ade 

his hom
e o
n
 both at v
arious tim
es. H
e has stated that he 
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m
ade all the m
o
rtgage paym
ents o
n
 them
, and a dow
n 
paym
ent o
n
 o
n
e. In
ex
am
ining the defendant's intent,the 
Court 
n
otes that these transfers took place 
w
hile 
a 
judgment 
w
as pending 
against him
 in favor 
of the 
plaintiff. 
The defendant listed n
o
n
e of these property 
m
terests o
n
 his schedules w
hen he filed his bankruptcy 
case. 
.
 Smith v. Keeney (In re Keeney), 221 B
.R
. 401, 403 (Bankr. 
.
 B.D
. K
y. 1998). 
The co
u
rt further found that K
eeney had 
violated II U
.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) by m
aking a fals~ o
ath 
w
hen he o
m
itted the property from
 his bankruptcy schedules. 
ld. at 404. 
The district co
u
rt affirm
ed the decision of the bankruptcy 
co
u
rt. It also relied upon the co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent doctrine 
to co
n
clude that K
eeney had co
n
cealed property in violation 
of 11 U
.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). The co
u
rt n
oted that K
eeney 
produced o
nly self-serving affidavits from
 him
self and his 
parents stating that he had n
o
 interest in the property, and that 
n
o
 explanation w
as given for placing property that K
eeney 
purchased and u
sed into his parents' n
am
es. Thedistrictcourt 
~Iso co
n
cluded that K
eeney had m
ade a false o
ath in violation 
of 11 U
.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) by failing to disclose his interests 
in the property to the bankruptcy co
u
rt. 
n. 
K
eeney appeals the denial ofdischarge in bankruptcy to this 
co
u
rt, arguing that application ofthe co
ntinuous co
n
cealm
ent 
doctrine to bar his discharge 
w
as im
proper. 
This 
co
u
rt 
review
s the bankruptcy c
o
u
rt's findings offact for clear erro
r, 
and the district c
o
u
rt's co
n
clusions of law
 de 
"o
vo
. 
See 
W
esballco Bank Barnesville v. RafOl" (In re Baker & Gelty 
Fill. Servs.,illc.), 106 F.3d 1255, 1259 (6thCir.), cerl. dellied, 
522 U
.S. 816 (1997). 
The elem
ents of a violation of II 
U
.S.C. § 727 
m
u
st be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence to m
erit denial ofdischarge. See BarclayslAmerican 
Bus. Credit, lire. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389, 394 
(6th Cir. 1994), cerl. dellied, 513 U
.S. 1111 (1995). 
The 
B
ankruptcy Code should be co
n
strued liberally in favor ofthe 
N
o. 99-5949 
I" re Keeney 
debtor. 
See Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 
1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). A. 
K
eeney first argues that the bankruptcy a
nd district co
u
rts 
erred in applying the co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent doctrine to find 
that he had 
violated 
section 727(a)(2)(A). 
That section 
specifies that: 
(a) The co
u
rt shall grant the debtor a discharge, u
nless­
(2) the debtor, w
ith intent to hinder, delay, o
r defraud a 

creditor o
r an
 officer of the estate charged w
ith cu
stody 

of property u
nder this title, has 
.
•
•
 co
n
cealed, o
r has 

perm
itted to be 
.
•
.
 c
o
n
c
e
aled-
.
 


~
 
(A) property of the debtor, w
ithin o
n
e
 year before the 
M
 
date of the filing of the petition[.] 
-
-
.
 
.c
 
11 U
.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1993). This section en
co
m
passes 
~ 
tw
o 
elem
ents: 
1) 
a 
disposition 
of property, 
su
ch 
as 
co
n
cealm
ent, and 2) 
"a
 SUbjective intent o
n
 the debtor's part 
to hinder, delay o
r defraud a creditor through the a
ct disposing 
of the property." H
ughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 122 F.3d 
1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1997). 
The bankruptcy and district co
u
rts determ
ined that K
eeney 
had co
n
cealed his beneficial interest in the tw
o properties by 
placing them
 in his parents' n
am
es, w
ith the requisite intent 
to defraud. 
K
eeney argues o
n
 appeal that he had n
othing to 
co
n
ceal because he has 
n
o
 interest in the property. 
A
 
beneficial interest 
of o
w
n
ership in 
the property 
c
a
n
 be 
inferred, how
ever, from
 K
eeney's paym
ent for and u
se oCthe 
properties, including his 
rent-free 
residence o
n
 each 
and 
paym
ent of
all m
o
rtgage obligations. A
s n
oted by the district 
co
u
rt, no explanation w
as provided as to w
hy the properties 
w
ere titled in the parents' n
am
es. Courts have found that a 
debtor retained a beneficial interest in property u
nder sim
ilar 
circum
stances. See, e.g.,H
ughes,122F.3d 1237; Thibodeaux 
v. Olivier (In re Olivier), 819 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987). U
nder 
6 
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the facts of this case, the bankruptcy co
u
rt did n
ot co
m
m
it 
clear erro
r in its detennination that K
eeney held a beneficial 
interest in the properties. The requisite intent to hinder, delay, 
o
r defraud w
as also perm
issibly inferred by the bankruptcy 
co
u
rt in this case. See In re Snyder, 152 F.3d 596, 601 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (citation 
o
m
itted) (a debtor's intent 
'''m
ay be 
inferred from
 the circum
stances su
rro
u
nding his objectionable 
c
o
nduct"'). 
K
eeney 
n
ext 
argues that ev
en
 if he holds 
a beneficial 
interest in 
the 
subject properties, 
this 
co
u
rt 
should 
n
ot 
recognize the co
ntinuous co
n
cealm
ent doctrine to bring the 
violation w
ithin the requirem
ents of section 727(a)(2)(A). 
That 
statute 
specifies 
that 
both 
elem
ents (the 
act 
of 
co
n
cealm
ent and requisite intent) m
u
st o
ccu
r w
ithin a year 
before 
the 
bankruptcy 
petition 
is 
filed. 
11 
U
.S.C. 
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (1993). 
The bankruptcy and district co
u
rts 
relied upon a co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent to bring the transfers of 
property in this case, all perform
ed o
v
e
r o
n
e year before 
filing, 
w
ithin 
the 
statute. 
"U
nder 
the 
'co
ntinuing 
co
n
cealm
ent' doctrine,.a transfer m
ade and reco
rded m
o
re 
than o
n
e year prior to filing m
ay serv
e as evidence of the 
requisite act ofco
n
cealm
ent w
here the debtor retains a secret 
benefit of o
w
n
ership in the transferred property w
ithin the 
year prior to filing." 
H
ughes, 122 F.3d at 1240; see also 
Rosen 
v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1531 (3d Cir. 
1993) 
(describing the doctrine by stating that "a
 co
n
cealm
ent w
ill be 
found to exist during the year before bankruptcy ev
en
 if the 
initial act of co
n
cealm
ent took place before this o
n
e year 
period as long as the debtor allow
ed the property to rem
ain 
co
n
cealed into the critical ),ear"). 
In H
ughes, the Court of 
A
ppeals for the N
inth CirCUit found a co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent 
w
here 
a debtor 
retained 
an
 interest in her house 
after 
transferring it to her m
other, because the debtor had lived in 
the house and subordinated her m
other's deed oftm
st in o
rder 
to obtain a loan. [d. at 1241. In Friedell v. Kauffman (In re 
Kauffmatl), 675 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (per cu
riam), 
the co
ul1 co
n
cluded that a debtor held a beneficial interest in 
a house w
here the debtor lived in the house, m
ade m
o
rtgage, 
N
o. 99-5949 
III re Keeney 
tax, and escro
w
 paym
ents, and u
sed the house as collateral for 
loans. 
Thibodeaux, 819 F.2d 550, presents a situation sim
ilar to 
that here. O
livier w
as involved in a c
a
r accident that injured 
Thibodeaux. A
fter the accident, O
livier transferred title 10 his 
hom
e to his 
m
other for, in effect, n
o
 co
n
sideration. 
The 
O
liviers co
ntinued to live in the house and be responsible for 
all co
sts asso
ciated w
ith it. Thibodeaux obtained ajudgment 
against O
livier, but w
as u
n
able to collect. 
Six years later, 
O
livier filed for bankruptcy. The Court of A
ppeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirm
ed the denial of discharge u
nder section 
727(a)(2)(A). The co
u
rt n
oted that the intent elem
ent co
uld 
be inferred from
 O
livier's co
ntinued u
se of the transferred 
property. [d. at 553. The co
u
rt then affirm
ed the u
se of the 
doctrine of co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent in that case: 
N
 
N
 
[T]he O
liviers' m
otivation, their co
ntinuing o
ccupancy of 
.
.
-
.
.
the house 
rent-free, 
their prom
pt 
return 
of all 
the 
.
.c 
'
-
"
"purchase m
o
n
ey," and their acts of o
w
n
ership su
ch as 
~
 


insuring 
and 
m
aintaining the property taken together 

am
ply support the co
n
clusion that n
otw
ithstanding the 

purportedly co
m
plete transfer they retained a significant 

beneficial interest in the property and have "co
ntinue[d] 

to u
se the property as [their] o
w
n
 .
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
 


.
.
.
 H
ere the purported transfer by appellants o
ccu
rred 

m
o
re than 
a year before bankruptcy, but 
appellants 

co
ntinued the 
co
n
cealm
ent 
of their secretly 
retained 

interest in the propel1y. The co
u
rts below
 relied o
n
 the 

w
ell-settled doctrine that in this character ofsituation the 

co
n
cealm
ent ofan
 interest in an
 asset that co
ntinues, w
ith 

the 
requisite intent, into the year before bankruptcy 

co
n
stitutes a form
 of co
n
cealm
ent w
hich o
ccu
rs w
ithin 

the year before bankruptcy 
and, therefore, that 
su
ch 

co
n
cealm
ent is w
ithin the reach of section 727(a)(2)(A). 

/d. 
at 554-55; 
see 
also Friedell, 675 F.2d 
at 
128 ("A 
co
n
cealm
ent 
.
.
.
 need n
ot be literally co
n
cealed. The transfer 
of title 
w
ith 
au
endant 
circum
stances indicating that the 
8 
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bank1l1pt co
ntinues to use the property as his ow
n is sufficient 
to co
n
stitute a co
n
cealm
ent."). 
K
eeney points o
ut that this co
u
rt has never been presented 
w
ith a case co
n
cerning co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent, and u
rges us 
not to adopt the doctrine. 
A
lternatively, he cites Rosell, 
supra, to support his argum
ent that the doctrine's application 
is not proper in this case. In Rosen, how
ever, the Court of 
A
ppeals for the Third Circuit rev
ersed the bankruptcy co
u
rt's 
denial of discharge because there w
as a m
aterial Issue of fact 
on the intent clem
ent, so that the case w
as not proper for 
su
m
m
ary judgment disposition. 
Rosen, 996 F.2d at 1532. 
A
pplication of the co
ntinuing co
n
cealm
ent doctrine is proper 
u
nder the facts of this case, and w
e join those having adopted 
the doctrine. 
K
eeney also n
otes that u
nder K
entucky law, Sm
ith can
n
ot 
reco
v
er the subject property because the statute of lim
itations 
has ru
n
. 
See K
y. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 413.120, 413.130 
(Banks-Baldwin 1998). H
e argues that even ifa violation of 
section 727(a)(2)(A) can otherw
ise be show
n, that fact is 
irrelevant because Sm
ith is too late to reach the property. 
This 
argum
ent fails. 
"[C]oncealment 
o
r transfer 
u
nder 
§ 727(a)(2) m
ay o
ccu
r ev
en
 if no creditors are harm
ed by it. 
'Proof of harm
 is n
ot a required elem
ent of a cau
se of action 
u
nder Section 727 .
.
.
.
 Peterson v. Scoll (In re Scott), 172 F.3d 
959,968 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation o
m
itted). 
B. 
In 
addilion 
to 
relying 
upon 
a 
violation 
of 
section 
727(a)(2)(A), the bankruptcy and district courts also based the 
denial of discharge o
n
 K
eeney's m
aking of a false oath when 
he o
m
itted his beneficial interest in the properties from
 his 
benefit schedules filed w
ith the bankruptcy co
u
rt, in violation 
of section 727(a)(4)(A). 
(a) The co
u
rt shall grant the debtor a discharge, u
nless­
(4) lite debtor know
ingly 
and fraudulently. in 
o
r in 
co
n
n
ection w
ith the c
a
s
e
-
No. 99-5949 
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(A) m
ade a false o
ath o
r acco
u
nt[.] 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1993). 
In o
rder to deny a debtor discharge u
nder this section, a 
plaintiff m
ust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1) the debtor m
ade a statem
ent u
nder o
ath; 2) the statem
ent 
w
as false; 3) the debtor knew the statem
ent w
as false; 4) the 
debtor m
ade the statem
ent w
ith fraudulent intent; and 5) the 
statem
ent related 
m
aterially to the bankruptcy case. 
See 
Beaubouefv. Beaubouef(ln re Beaubouej), 966 F.2d 174, 178 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
W
hether a debtor has m
ade a false o
alh 
u
nder 
section 727(a)(4)(A) is 
a question 
of fact. 
See 
W
illiamson v. Firem
an's Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249,251 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
"
'Com
plete financial disclosure'" is a prerequisite to the 
~
privilege of discharge. Peterson, 172 F.3d at 967. The Court 
N
 
of A
ppeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that intent to 
.
.
-
.
.
defraud 
"involves a m
aterial representation that you know to 
.
.Q 
'
-
"
 
be false, o
r, what am
ounts to the sam
e thing, an o
m
ission that 
~
 
you know will create an erro
n
eo
u
s im
pression." In l'e Chav;Il, 
150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998). A
 reckless disregard as to 
w
hether a representation is true will also satisfy the intent 
requirem
ent. See ;d. 
"
'[C]ourts m
ay deduce fraudulent intent 
from
 all the facls and circum
stances of a case .
.
.
.
 W
illiam
soll, 
828 F.2d at 252 (citation o
m
itted). 
H
ow
ever, a debtor is 
entitled to discharge if false inform
ation is the 
result 
of 
m
istake o
r inadvertence. See G
ullickson, 108 F.3d at 1294. 
The 
subject 
of a false 
o
ath is 
m
aterial if it 
"
'bears 
a 
relationship to the bankrupt's business transactions o
r estate, 
o
r concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, o
r the 
existence and dispOSition of his property .
.
.
 ' Beaubouef, 966 
F.2d at 178 (citation o
m
itted). 
Keeney argues that because he has no interest in the subject 
property, he could not have m
ade a false oath co
n
cerning it. 
As explained in the previous section, there w
as no erro
r in the 
finding that Keeney held a beneficial interest in the property. 
By o
m
itting this interest from
 his filings he m
ade a false oath. 
10 Tn re Keeney No. 99-5949 
Keeney claims that even if he did make a false oath, it was 
not done knowingly. and that the bankruptcy court failed to 
find the intent element. Although the court was brief, it did 
find that Keeney had the requisite intent when not listing his 
interest in the property in his schedules. The bankruptcy court 
did not clearly err in mferring from the circumstances of this 
case that Keeney knowingly (or at least with reckless 
disregard) omitted his interest in the property with an intent 
to defraud. Keeney held a substantial beneficial interest in the 
properties, and the facts of this case make the bankruptcy 
court's inference ofintent entirely proper. Accordingly denial 
of discharge under section 727(a)(4)(A) was proper. 
m. 
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of discharge is 
affinned. 
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UN.ITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Eastern District ofKentucky

Covington Division 

. Mailing Address' po BOT] 11 ] Texington KY 40588-11 J 1 
In re: • Case No: 00 .' WSH 
aka/dba: Chapter: 7 
Trustee: Michael L. Baker 
541 Buttermilk Pike #500 
PO Box 175710 
Covington, KY 41017-5710 
Debtor(s) 859-426-1300 
CHAPTER 7 ORDER TO DEBTOR 
The above-named debtor shall within 10 days from the date of this order turn over to the trustee, 
whose name and address appear above, the following documents: 
1. All books, records of account, bank books, bank statements and cancelled checks for the 6 
months preceding bankruptcy (the last bank statement must show the amount on deposit on the date 
of bankiuptcy.); 
2. The original or a certified copy of the deed or contract under which the debtor holds title to or 
any interest In real estate, and certIfied copies of all recorded mortgages. liens, or encumbrances 
upon said real estate (these documents may'De obtained from the office of the county court clerk of 
tlie county in which the real estate is locateo.); 
3. Title papers to any motor vehicles mobile homes, trailers or boats (if original papers have been 
lostt duplicates must be obtained from the office of the county court clerk of tlie counly in which the 
vehicles are registered.); 
4. Certificates of stock, bonds and keys to any safety deposit boxes; 
5. Contracts of life or burial insurance; 
6. Copies of the debtor's last state and federal income tax returns; 
7. Contracts or title papers pertaining to any property of the debtor; and 
8. Copies of all notes, security a~ments, loan disclosure statements and other documents 
relating to loan transactions to whiCh tlie debtor is a party. 
Except for surrender of the aforementioned documents to the trustee, the debtor is restrained and 
enjoined fro~ transferring, abandoning, releasing to creditors. or in any way disposing of property of 
the estate until further order of the court. 
• F~ure to timely comply with this order will result in the filing of a motion to dismiss th 
Within case. 
Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the debtor complies with this order. 
Dated: 10123/00 
By the court­ ~ 
F 
I 
I 
I LED 
I 
10/23/00 ;i 
I 
Willian~ 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
j 
Clerk. I:.S. Baukruplcy Court 
Lexiugton. KY 
6-1 
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United States Bankruptcy Court 

Eastern District of Kentucky 

Notice*Notice*Notice 

e>- The Court has instructed the Trustees that 341 meetings are not to be continued unless 
they have an Order sustaining a Motion to Continue. If they do not have an Order sustaining a 
Motion to Continue, they are directed t~ file the attached .Motion to Dismiss. Any Motion to 
Continue the 341 meeting must be accompanied by an Affidavit of the person so requesting 
(debtor or counsel) and must be served upon the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee and all creditors 
listed on the matrix of the debtor(s). (See suggested form Motion and Order below.) Note the 
changes in the §341 Notice and Order to the Debtor for cases filed after June 1, 2000. 
e>-We are going to reduce the time it takes to enter a Chapter 7 discharge from 120 days to 60 
days. 'Ve have already reduced the time to 110 days and will be reducing the time by 10 days 
each month. In November 2000, discharges will be entered 60 days after the 341 meeting, 
absent a complaint being filed objecting to discharge. 
f;:> 'Ve will no longer sustain a Motion to Withhold a Chapter 7 Discharge for failure to file 
tax returns, failure to turn over tax refunds, failure to turn over other assets, etc. The Trustees 
are instructed to file a Motion to Dismiss. 
~ The Chapter 13 Trustee is instructed to file a Motion to Dismiss if the debtor is two (2) 
monthly or three (3) biweekly or five (5) weekly payments in arrears. All Motions to Dismiss 
will be heard by the court. 
~ From the FYI Department: 
a) The court will no longer accept Agreed Orders ofNon discharge ability. An 

adversary proceeding must be filed. 

b) Multiple, unrelated defendants in adversary proceedings will be dismissed. 
Separate causes of action require separate adversary proceedings even if conduct is 
similar and defendants are represented. 
c) The court will discourage extensions of time to file Complaints to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt and will be reluctant to approve Agreed Orders extending 
time. 
d) For Judge Howard's adversaries - the trial will be set approximately 60 days 
after the pre-trial. 
e) Beginning in October, 2000, trustee-held Chapter 13 confirmation hearings will 
be scheduled approximately 30 days after the 341 meeting. A confirmation hearing 
continued for any reason will be scheduled approximately 30 days after the 
trustee's confirmation hearing and will be conducted by the court. 
t) The Chapter 13 Trustee is drafting a standardized Chapter 13 Plan to be used in 
http://www.kyeb.uscourts.gov.lkyeblRules/rules-potice_OS2400.htm 11114/2000 
E(b) - 27 
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this District. It is expected to be distributed on or about June 1,2000, and will be 
required after July 1, 2000. A new local rule will be issued. A copy of the Plan will 
be added to the Court's website. 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

Division 
In re: 
Case No. _______ 
Debtor(s) 
MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 7 CASE 
The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because 
the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First :Meeting of Creditors. 
the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of 
Creditors. 
the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the Court's 
Order to Debtor. 
DATE: _____ 
Trustee 
NOTICE 
This motion to dismiss will be brought on for hearing at ____ on ____-' 20-, 
United States Bankruptcy Court _______________. 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the debtor(s), counsel for the debtor(s), 
the U.S. Trustee and all creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the __ day of 
11114/2000 
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___....:>,20_. 
Trustee 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

______ Division 

In re: 

Case No. ______ 
Debtor(s) 
MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 13 CASE 
The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because 
[ ] the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of Creditors. 
[ ] the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of 
Creditors. 
[ the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the Court's 
Order to Debtor. 
DATE: _____ 

Trustee 

11/14/2000 
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NOTICE 
This motion to dismiss will be brought on for hearing at ____ on ____---J 20-, 
United States Bankruptcy Court _____________---' 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that the above motion was served on the parties listed below on this the __ 
dayof ,20_, 
Trustee 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

Division 
In re: 
Case No. _______ 
Debtor(s) 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Comes now counsel for the above-captioned debtor(s) and moYes the Court for an order 
continuing the scheduled §341 First Meeting of Creditors. An affidavit in support of said 
11114/2000 
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motion is attached. 
DATE: _____ 
Counsel for Debtor(s) 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and all 
creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the date of , 20_. 
Counsel for Debtor(s) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

Division 
In re: 
Case No. _______ 
Debtor(s) 
ORDER 
Upon the timely-filed motion of the debtor(s) to continue the §341 First Meeting of Creditors 
and the Court having reviewed the record and being othenvise properly and sufficiently 
advised, 
11114/2000 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the §341 First Meeting of Creditors be and 
same is hereby continued to a date and time to be set by the trustee. 
DATED: __________ 
JUDGE 
Copy to: Trustee 
Attorney for Debtor(s) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

Division 
In re: 
Case No. _______ 
Debtor(s) 
ORDER 
The trustee having moved the Court to dismiss the within case and same having come on for 
hearing and the Court having reviewed the record and being othen"ise properly and 
sufficiently advised, 
IT IS ORDERED that the above-captioned case should be and hereby is 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: ________ 
11114/2000 
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I. • 
JUDGE 
Copy to: 
Debtor(s) 
Counsel for the Debtor(s) 
Trustee 
Notice to all creditors and parties in interest 
Return to main menu 
Please let us know any questions about these procedures. 
- ... 
11114/2000 
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LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS ON THE INTERNET BY 

TRUSTEES AND CREDITORS 

Alan C. Stout 

Stout Law Office 

Marion, Kentucky 

Copyright 2000, Alan C. Stout 
SECTION E(c) 

r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
; 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
'.CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY UPDATE 2000 
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, CLE 
DECEMBER 8, 2000 
WAVE OF THE FUTURE? 
UOUIDATION OF ASSETS ON THE INTERNET BY TRUSTEES AND CREDITORS 
BY: ALAN C. STOUT 
.s.to.P..tJ.3F.@ap.e.~Jl~t 
L OVERVIEW 
'Change, before you have to. "-Jack Welch, CEO, General Electric. 
Under the terms of Bankruptcy Code Section 363 (II U.S.C. 363), the trustee "after 
notice and a hearing" may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, 
property of the estate. 
Under Rule 6004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("FRBP"), notice to be 
provided in conformity with Rule 2002 of the FRBP. Rule 6004(t) recognizes that a sale not in 
the ordinary course of business can be by private sale or public auction. It also indicates that 
"unless it is impracticable, an itemized statement of the property sold, the name of each purchaser, 
and the price received for each item for a lot or for the property as a whole if sold in bulk shall be 
filed on completion of a sale." FRBP 6004(t). 
The Internet provides a unique opportunity for bankruptcy trustees to liquidate assets of 
bankruptcy estates. This is particularly true with assets which were previously difficult to market-
and eventually abandoned by the Trustee. Subjecting bankruptcy assets to sale before a world-
wide market also may increase the value of the assets to be sold. An awareness of the 
opportunities the internet brings to the liquidation arena can be beneficial to debtors' counse~ 
creditors' counsel and all members of the insolvency community. Any party having an interest in 
maximizing value to the estate should benefit. For example, thru maximizing value to the estate, 
the liquidation analysis in chapter 11 and chapter 13 venues may be impacted, thereby increasing 
the dividend to unsecured creditors. 
Advantages of internet liquidation of assets include: 
1. Market for hard to sell assets, specialty items or items not suited for locale; 
2. Market for highly specialized assets (i.e., target marketing or automatic notification 
service); 
3. Can assist in obtaining abandonment of assets (some courts have actually required 
proof of web exposure for abandonment of certain types of assets-ND NY & SDCA) ; 
4. Less expensive; 
5. Administrative ease; 
6. Maximize recovery. 
ll. CONSIDERATIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT TO USE INTERNET 
E(c) -1 
marketing of a specific asset is - what methodology to utilize? 
Generally, there are three options for utilization of the Internet for liquidation of assets by 
Trustees: 
• Asset Listing Service: Utilizes a traditional sale (i.e., public auction through 
auctioneer or private sale through listing of assets through broker). The Internet is 
used to market the asset only (i.e., through a listing service such as nabt.com or 
bankruptcysales.com); or 
• Online Auction Service: Use the Internet for the actual auction through an Internet 
auctioneer or asset disposition service (i.e., ebay.com, bid4assets.com or 
bankruptcymarket.com). 
• Simulcast Auctions: Hybrid auction where traditional auction on-site is combined 
with internet auction 
The methodology utilized will depend on the type of asset, location, and market appeal of 
a specific asset. 
See, generally LawYers Weekly USA, September 20, 1999, attached as Exhibit A. 
III. TYPES OF ASSETS SUCCESSFULLY MARKETED ON INTERNET 
Types of bankruptcy assets that have been successfully marketed on the Internet include: 
• "ehicles 
• Time shares 
• Inventory 
• Art 
• Jewelry 
• Real estate (particularly commercial leases-everything from shopping centers to 
office buildings to convenience stores) 
• Commercial paper (notes, judgments) 
• Restaurant equipment- In re: Mama's Oriiinal Foods, Inc., 234 BR 500 
(S.D.Calif., 1999), the Court held that where a chapter 7 trustee held restaurant 
equipment and there was no "recognized market" for such assets, the trustee was 
required to advertise the assets on the internet and by newspapers. 
• Partnerships or corporate ownership interests 
Note, the internet is actually becoming the "recognized market" for certain technology-based 
assets. However, disposition of these assets create a new range of issues. Some of these assets 
are: 
• Intellectual properties-An obvious market for intellectual property includes 
businesses whch might actually have a use for the property. However, in some 
cases businesses may have a use for the intellectual property for" offensive" or 
"defensive" purposes. In the offensive market, the purchaser would acquire the 
right to prosecute potential patent infringement litigation against companies which 
may have infringed on the rights of the patent. In the defensive setting, the 
E(c) - 2 
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acquiring company could maintain potential suits against new entrants into a 
particular industry. Many times new entrants into a particular manufacturing 
industry are wlnerable to infringement litigation. 
Customer lists, financial information, credit card numbers, etc. However, this may 
create public access v privacy concerns, see USTP-Privacy Study-Comments and 
Summary, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/ustlprivacy!comments-elements.htm 
for a summary of the public comments received by the U. S. Department of Justice 
"Study on FiIiancial Privacy and Bankruptcy" (Original deadline -Sept. 8, 2000 
extended to Sept. 22, 2000) 
Dot com companies and assets-What better way to sell? As the tech sector begins 
to falter, a whole new area of bankruptcy is developing with issues unique to the 
industry. See, "Sifting the Dot-Com Rubble", The Washington Post, August 10, 
2000. Exhibit B, and "Firms auction off assets on-line", The Washington post, July 
18,2000. Exhibit C. 
Domain names 
Preference & Fraud claims- The Ninth Circuit recently held that preference & 
fraud claims in a bankruptcy case can be sold. In re: Duckor,Spralding 8{. Metzger 
y. Baum Trust an re P.RT.C., Inc.), 177 F3d 774 (9th Cir., 1999). 
Bankruptcy claims - A market has developed over the internet for the sale of 
bankruptcy claims of all types. 
IV. A "SAMPLING" OF WEBSITES AVAILABLE FOR LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS 
BY TRUSTEES 
A. nabt.com - Created in 1997 by the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees 
(NABT) as a FREE service to Chapter 7 Trustee membership - The website includes NABT 
member listings; provides e-mail list service features to members and NABT Board; Library and 
links to other bankruptcy related sites; legislative updates and other information about 
organization in addition to asset sale po stings by NABT trustee members. There are 
approximately 1200 Chapter 7 trustees nationwide - of which, over 900 are members ofNABT. 
This site provides listing for: 
• Upcoming bankruptcy sales 
• Bankruptcy assets listed for sale 
Provides basic information on sales and contact information regarding the sales of assets by 
Chapter 7 Trustees. 
• Approximately 260 assets listed as of November 1, 2000 
• Approximately 100,000 hits per month 
R bankruptcysales.com-NABT and American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) have 
completed formation of a joint Internet Committee to form bankruptcysales.com. This a new site 
for noticing of Chapter 7, 11, and 13 bankruptcy sales of assets which will serve as a listing 
service and will have links to auction sites. This service will be available to the entire insolvency 
community for liquidation of assets. As these materials are prepared, bankruptcysales. com is 
scheduled to go on-line on November 20,2000. 
E(c) - 3 
• Heavy marketing 
• Launched on November 15, 1999 designed specifically for sale of government, 
bankruptcy, foreclosed assets, and financial instruments 
• Various bankruptcy pleadings available on line (application to employ, declaration, 
report of sale) 
C. bankruptcymarket.com - online auction service and posting service 
Approximately 41 assets listed as of September 4,2000 
D. liquidation. com - online marketplace for business surplus inventory 
E. ebay. com - The premier auction website. Over 2 million items and over 1 million 
users at any given time 
F. jairmarket.com - Specializes in sale of large volumes of retail related items 
G. tradeout. com - Surplus items and business to business items 
v. ISSUES WITH INTERNET LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS 
• Court approval of employment of auctioneers as professionals - 11 USC §327(a) 
and §328(a) FRBP 6004(a) 
• Bonding and insurance 
• Turnover of proceeds 
• Security concerns 
• Auctioneer's report 
• U S Trustee concerns 
• Auctioneer fee applications and commissions generally - guidelines contained in 
Trustee's handbook (See Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees, Chapter 8, section m-
6), effective January 1, 1998. No specific rules on internet auctions are in place at 
this time. However, it is contemplated that new rules will be included in handbook 
reVISIOns. 
• Shipping, packaging, and order processing 
VI. ACTUAL SALE RESULTS 
A. Atlantic Rancher Case 
B. nabt.com 
C. bid4assets.com 
E(c) - 4 
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EXHIBIT A 
LAWYERS WEEKLY USA 
THE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER FOR SMALL-FIRM LAWYERS 
REPIlINTED FROM SEPTEMBER 20, 1999 A BI-WEEI<LY NEWSPAPER FROM LAWYERS WEEKLY INC. 
B~ptcyTrustees Are Using the 
Internet to Sell Debtors' Property 
By Sylvia Hsieh 
Bankruptcy trustees have 
a new tool for selling 
debtors' property - Internet 
auctions.: 
It's already been used suc-
cessfully in at least one 
bankruptcy case, and 
trustees are predicting this 
could be the wave of the fu-
ture. It can net a wider au-
dience and better prices, as 
well as saving on adminis-
trative costs, many trustees 
say. '''; 
"This is the hottest, 
fastest-growing, most inno-
vative area in bankruptcy 
liquidation in 50 years," says 
'Lawrence Friedman of 
Southfield, Mich., vice presi-
dent of the National Associa-
tion of Bankruptcy Trustees. 
Instead of hiring an auc-
tioneer, taking out newspa-
per ads or holding a tradi-
tional sale, trustees can post 
property on the Web and let 
the bidding begin! 
However, most lawyers 
agree that a number of wrin-. 
Ides in the process have to be 
ironed out before on-line 
auctions fully catch on. 
opens it up to anybody to 
get into the bidding 
process," says Eugene Crane 
of Chicago, a Chapter 7 
trustee. 
Online bidding is ideal for 
office equipment, cars, com-
mercial real estate, jewelry, 
and other inventory, as well 
as intangibles such as notes, 
judgments or partnerShip in-
terests, experts say. 
In fact, debtors' lawyers 
may want to start advising 
their clients that some items 
that used to be routinely 
abandoned may suddenly 
be up for sale. 
"A time share or an inter-
est in a condo is a classic ex-
ample where it becomes 
cost-prohibitive to run ads in 
all the local newspapers. But 
if you put it on the Internet, 
it's easier to find a buyer," 
says Dan Goldberg of Hous-
ton, president of the Com-
mercial Law League of 
Going Once, Going Twice... America. 
Chapter 7 trustees say this Friedman, who has sold 
new tool will allow con- several time-shares over the 
sumers around the' world to Interne-t this year, agrees. 
bid for property and ulti- ''Trustees never used to sell 
mately put more money in time-shares. Now, we're 
creditors' pockets. . turning dollars out of noth-
"This will increase bank- ing." 
ruptcy sales because it en- Other items appropriate 
larges our market. Anybody for online auctioning include 
can click a button and see . out-of-sta'te property or 
what's being sold. This property that doesn't fit the 
E(c) - 5 
local market. 
"You won't get anything 
for a fur coat in Arizona in 
August, but put it on the 
Web and someone back East 
might be more interested," 
says Davi.d Birdsell, a Mesa, 
Ariz., Chapter 7 trustee. 
Some trustees expect this 
new tool to work in both 
consumer and business 
bankruptcies. 
But others say that con-
sumer debtors' property 
may be too personalized to 
sell over the Internet . 
"A sofa at the debtor'S 
house can be sold at a garage 
sale or flea market. And the 
shipping cost for smaller 
items like a refrigerator may 
weigh against buying from 
outside the locale," says 
Neal Batson of Atlanta, who 
represents creditors. 
Small and medium-size 
businesses ale better candi-
dates for Internet auctions, 
he says. 
How It Works 
The idea is so novel that 
trustees are still experiment-
ing with how online auc-
tions will work. 
A number of auction web-
sites catering specifically to 
bankruptcy estates are be-
ginning to pop up, notes 
Friedman. 
P.2 
And the National Associa-
tion of Bankruptcy Trustees 
(NABT) has been experi-
menting with posting items 
for sale on its website, hop-
ing to attract consumers as 
well as liquidation special-
ists. 
A recent sampling of those 
listings includes a jewelry 
store's inventory, vacant 
land in~kansas, an assisted 
living facility in Florida, a 
debtor's 1,100+ compact disc 
collection, and a $948 annu-
ity payment from an estate. 
The organization is now 
considering linking to an 
auction site that will handle 
online bidding, says Fried-
man. 
Trustees can try to sell di-
rectly to consumers by post-
ing items on auction web-
sites, such as eBay, Yahoo! or 
Amazon.com. 
But the problem with 
those sites is that the trustee 
would have to front the costs 
and the Internet provider 
would have. to sign court 
documents to be appointed 
as an auctioneer - something 
providers have so far shown 
little interest in doing, notes 
Birdsell. . 
In Massachusetts, a web-
site provider recently set up 
an auction directly on the 
debtor's home page, using 
pictures of the items and 
product desaiptions scanned 
directly from the debtor's 
catalogue. 
. The trustee is still respon-
sible for the sales, but in-
stead of taking out newspa'" 
per ads in the local paper, he 
or she scans diSital pictures 
and uploads' product de-
scriptions onto a server. 
The trustee may also have 
to "pick ~ choose" which 
items to put up for auction 
and set the reserve prices, 
says Boston attorney John 
Aquino, the ~pter 7 trustee 
REPRINTED FROM LAWYERS WEEKLY USA • SEmMBER 20. 1999 
in the Massachusetts case. 
. This is partict.iiarly true 
where there is a large inven-
tory of similar items that are 
being auctioned directly to 
retail consumers online, he 
adds. 
In addition, there are a va-
riety of different auctioning 
E(c) - 6 
method..s that can be used, 
depending 'on the type of 
. property being sold, .says 
Warren Agin of Boston, who 
represents creditors and 
trustees. 
The Upside. 
Trustees who have at-
FRONT PAGE NEWS 
tempted to sell property on-
line say they get higher bids 
because of the wider expo-
sure. 
Although the exact cost is 
unknown, most trustees pre-
dict that Internet auctions 
will be cheaper than tradi-
tional auctions. 
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II A lot of Internet auctions 
operate on a small listing fee 
and percentage compared to 
what you would pay an auc-
tioneer," says Agin. 
The provider in the Mass-
achusetts case, Fairmarket 
Inc., waived the set-up costs 
in exchange for 10 percent of 
the auction sales. 
Another company, 
Bid4Assets;com in Washing-
ton, will launch its website 
next month. It plans to 
charge 6-8 percent of sales, 
depending on the size of the 
assets, according to Tom 
Kohn, the company's CEO. 
Trustees who aren't NABT 
members will be charged a 
listing fee, and the company 
will also charge a fee for 
scanning photos, blueprints 
or other documents, he says. 
But Birdsell predicts that 
as more. companies begin 
prOviding this service, the 
cost will drop to 3-5% of 
sales, compared to the 10% 
that is paid to a traditional 
auctioneer. 
The result is that debtors 
may lose more property if 
trustees can put items on the 
auction block so cheaply, ex-
perts say. 
Because trustees can set 
the reserve price, they can 
post an item for sale and 
withdraw· it if nobody bids 
above that price, without 
risking major advertising or 
listing fees, says Agin. 
"If the asset is marginal, I 
might put it on the Internet 
with a reserve price and· see 
REPJUNTm FROM LAWYERS WEEKLY USA • S~\tBER 20. 1999 
if I get a bite," he says. 
The Wrinkles 
Since online auctioning of 
bankruptcy property is still 
so new, lawyers say there are 
a lot of kinks to work out be-
fore this type of sale be-
comes accepted. 
"The area is going to have 
to be monitored and fleshed 
out over time," says Chris 
. Marshall, the U.s. Trustee 
"in Boston, who adds that his 
office is watching the Massa-
chusetts case to "see the re-
sults and what issues it rais-
es." 
Trustees who are used to 
doing things a certain way 
may be slow to convert to 
such a novel and unpre-
dictable process. 
In addition, any type of 
sale must be approved by 
the court, and Internet auc-
tions are a totally new terri-
tory for judges. 
"I question whether a 
judge would approve an In-
ternet auction because of no-
tice to the creditors. Lots of 
people don't have c~J!lput­
ers and wouldn't search for 
it," says Alexander Knop£ler, 
a Chapter 7 trustee in Chica-
go. 
But most trustees predict 
they'll get little objection 
from creditors, who will 
benefit from the sales. 
Another issue is that the 
Internet auction provider 
will have to be familiar with 
the different procedural re-
quirements for each jurisdic-
tion, says Birdsell. 
"It's very complicated be-
cause there are so many dif-
ferent variations. The auc-
tion companies would have 
to jump through whatever 
hoops are required before 
they get paid their commis-
sion. They would have to 
understand that the trustee 
can't just write out a check," 
he says. 
In some jurisdictions, the 
auctioneer must post a bond, 
and it's unclear whether this 
will apply to Internet com-
panies. . 
A trustee would also have 
to ask the court to waive any 
local requirement that an 
auctioneer attend the sale 
since this would be "impos-
sible" over the Internet, says 
Marshall. 
Some jurisdictions require 
post-sale confirmation by 
the court. 
This could be "stifling" to 
online purchasers, says 
William Schorling of 
Philadelphia, who repre-
sents debtors and creditors. 
"Who wants to bid on some-
thing only to wait for the 
judge to approve it?" 
In jurisdictions that re-
quire auctions to take place 
in the courtroom, the trustee 
could arrange a real-time on-
line auction in front of the 
judge, Birdsell suggests. 
Another potential prob-
lem with selling property 
from a bankruptcy estate on-
line is that buyers can't re-
turn the property and have 
to be aware of the risks, such 
as liens or other encum-
brances. 
Some local rules require 
that auctions identify the es-
tate name and number, so 
that people know that 
they're buying out of a bank-
ruptcy estate, not from an es-
tablished merchant, Mar-
shall notes. 
Objections from debtors, 
creditors or disapPointed 
bidders "happen all the 
time," and require a hearing 
on whether the sale was con-
ducted properly and 
whether the buyer is a bona 
fide purchaser, says Schor-
ling. 
This could be a problem if 
the buyer has to travel to at-
tend a hearing, he notes. 
The potential for fraud in 
online bidding is another 
problem, given the recent 
tale of a 
13-year-old who bid up to 
$3 million on eBay for a 
Corvette, property in Florida 
and a Van Gogh painting. 
One solution would be to 
give passwords only to bid-
ders who put up a deposit. 
"That way if you get in-
volved in bidding, you're 
pretty sure you're bidding 
against other real bidders," 
says Schorling. 
But for large assets, many 
consumers may not have the 
available limit on their cred-
it cards for such a big de-
posit, he notes. I!!l!I!1 
Reprinted with permission from ~IS Weekly liSA. September 20. 1999.41 West Street. Boston. MA 02111·1233. 
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Sifting the Dot-Com Rubble 
Md. Auctioneer Set to Sell 
Assets Of Failed Firms 
By ROB GARRETSON 
IfIuIt/apll FDn SttIJIWriIIr 
Though she didn't gain the intemallonal 
headlines garnered by Internet failure Boo.com, 
the story of entrepreneur Andria Mc:CeIIan is 
well known throughout the Washington technology 
community. 
Her business, Qviczone.com, which ofered . 
Web IiDks between dtizeIls and loal gcwemments, 
fell info bankruptcy in May when funds ran short. 
But the final chapter of Qvlaone's story won't 
be written untillaler Ibis month, when its 
remaining assets will be auctioned 10 pay off the 
company's creditors. 
Out of the ashes of one local dotcom Dame-
out, another loal dotcom hopes 10 build a prof-
itable business. 
Blcl4Assets.com of SlIver Spring is the online 
auctioneer for the CMcmne bankruptcy sale, and 
the eigbt-month-old company is gearing up for 
what It ezpecIS to be a wave of Internet failures, 
res1rUcturings and consoIidaIIoDS. 
Founded by a pair of businessmen who grew 
up aaoss the street from each other in SlIver 
Spring, Bid4Assecs is a Web-based auction site 
designed to bring together sellers and buyers of 
assets such as real estate, &uandaI lDsIrumenlS, 
Iumry goods and other Items typically disposed of 
in baDkruptdes or seized by pemment qenc:ies. 
Among the assets feaIured on Bld4Assecs was 
the IOrmer presidential yacbl 1m SequoIa, which 
sold for an undisdosed amount in mess of $1 
million, according to Tom John, the company's 
chief execu1he. 
Among the happy customers is warren E. 
Agio, a bankmptcy lawyer at Swigart a: AgIo in 
Boston and author of a book on Internet bank-
ruptcy. Acdng as a IIquIdadon c:ouuseI, AgIo used 
Bid4Assets to get $28,000 for the domain name 
pJanetrock.com. 
"It's really a great business modeIlhey \me 
down there," AgIo said. 
Unlike olber popular generalpurpose auellon 
sites such as ~ or mass online merchants 
such as AmIzon.com, Bld4Asse!s' site handles 
property that requires more due diligence to buy 
or seD than used CDs, consumer eledronlcs or 
other household merc:bandise do. 
For. sellers, Bld4Assets provides services such 
as pre-qualiCying buyers, Including checking 
their credit, or accepIIng deposits required of 
bidders on high-priced assets. 1be company also 
actively promotes lis inventory with coDectol'S 
and other likely buyers, which a banlauptcy 
trustee or a government agency that has seized 
an asset is UDIikeJ.y to do. 
Bld4Assecs also helps bu)'el'S by olferlng, 
online Inspedion of auc:laI cIocumenlS, such as 
deeds, title records and lnspec:Iion c:ertific:ates. 
Bill Kead ...... chief operatlnc ofBcer 01 
BkMAaea.com, and CEO Tom Kohn with 
• bacIcMe. one of tha many thlnes their 
company auctions oft 
"It's a wln-win siIwdIon aD around, " 
Mc:aetIan said. 'Me bankrupt company wilJlikeIy 
gamer more doIIm for Its assets and be able to 
pay off more creditors, and folks that are In the 
market for disIressed assets wiD \me more em-
dent means of viewing many more' assets. And 
certainly the 1ruStees win, because it eases their 
pain slplftcandy." 
Though online aucllons offer eIBcIency for 
most types of bankruptdes, there are particular 
advmIIgeS for Internet businesses forced to Bq-
uidate assets, Mc:CeIJan said. 
"'l'he bankruptcy process and the court sys-
tem in general has been around for decades IIld 
isn't really geared IOWard the emdent sale of 
InteIIecIuaI property and assets from dot-com 
enterprises... [Online auctions) provide a l'I:~ .. 
emdent means [of) pining some wlue from 
those assets." 
E(c) - 9 
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Privacy advocaIes are concerned, however, 
about the auctioning of customer IisIs and other 
personal Infol'lllllion gathered by Web siles, par-
tlc:uIarly when those that buy Ibis infonnatlon 
\men't disclosed how they wiD handle It 
Though the privacr issues surrounding failed 
d01-C01DS are still cloudy, online banlauptcy auc-
tion sites such as Bld4Assets can help Mid 
problems, according to Richard 'DIton, a bank· 
ruptcy IaVI)'I!l' at Greenberg Traurig in New York. 
"Any buyer who wants to buy daI3bases has to 
be concerned about the cost of litigating the 
privacy issue, which can be incredibly high if 
you're 6ghtlng with 50 Slates and the rrc," he 
said. "Buyers undersIand dearly that they have 
to bend over backwards to comply with 
ezIstIng policy statements and maybe even go 
beyond them." 
By making those privacy statements available 
online for bu)'el'S to Inspect, Bid4Assets wiD help 
potential bu)'el'S judge the wlue of infonnatlon -
assets and sidestep privacy concerns before they 
bid on them, he added. 
Bld4Assets was launched in November of last 
year, after one of the founders, Norman 
Understein, had shivered through an outdoor 
auction of a $5 million property in Baltimore. 
There had to be a better ft); he and co-founder 
Rick ZIIeIman figured, 
The company has listed more than $1 billion 
of assets for sale in the past six monlhs, accord-
ing to Iohn, a ftIeran of America 0nBne Inc., 
Freeloader.com and most recently USA Today 
Online. 
Though CiYiczone.com wiD be the 6rst failed 
dot-com that Bid4Assets has liquidated, it won't 
be the last, Iohn predicted. 
"When we started this business, lntemet com-
panies could reaDy do no wrong. and we're just 
now beginning to feel the effects of the nwket 
c:orrec:tion In AprIl, " he said. "And it's taking 
this long because the banlauptcy process takes 
so tong." 
Qvlczone.com, &led for Chapter 7 liquida-
tion In AlexandrIa on May, 31,IistIng assets of 
between $100,001 and $500,000 and liabilities 
ofbetween $500,000 and $1 mlIIIon. Its assets 
headed for auction Include some custom-deveI-
oped Web software and about 100 dolll3ln 
names, plus computers, printers and ofIice 
equipment, The auction will close at 3:00 p.m. 
on Aug. 24, 2000. 
"Bid4Assets is the natural extentlon of the 
life cycle of a dot-com," CiYiczone's Mc:CeDan 
observed. "I can't iJUging doing Ibis any 
other way. • 
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Firms auction off assets on-line 
By William Glanz 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 
On-line businesses that sell the assets 
of bankrupt companies are springing up 
. to convert others' hard times into rev-
enuc. 'Ibcy have customer lists full of 
failed enterprises. 
Bid4Assets.com, a Silver Spring com-
pany, is selling everything from domain 
names of failed dotcom companies to 
DDpaid debt to tangible assets like build-
ings and art. 
"We don't get pcr50nal enjoyment out 
of others' fanures. We're just trying to 
run a business:' said Thomas Kohn, chief 
executivc of the privately held company. 
They aren't the only ones. 
Cambridge, Mass.-based Bankruptcy 
Exchange and Auction Marlcct Inc. 
debuted its Web site last week. 
'"Traditional auctions are very 
parochial, and wc're changing that," 
Bankruptcy Exchange and Auction 
Marlcct President lack Pascal said. 
New York-based EreoIg.com will 
begin Web auctions in August of dis-
tressed loaus. 
The assets of failed companies -
evcrything from furniture and computers 
to DDpaid debt - reached an estimated 
$250 billion last year alone, according to 
Bid4Asscts. 
1bc sale and purchase of most of 
those items is done at traditional auc-
tious, Mr. Pascal said. 
But auctious are inefficient because 
they atIract a regional audience and few 
people bid on the assets companies are 
forced to liquidate, the emerging Web 
auction companies argue. 
On the Web, the potential audience is 
1aIgcr. 'Ibc bigger the audience, the 
greater the chance an asset will be pur-
chased, on-line auctioneers say. More 
potential buyers also makes bidding 
more vigorous and can boost the pur-
chase price. 
That makes on-line auctions valuable 
to creditors, because Web deals can help 
creditors of failed companies recoup 
more money than they would recover at 
Thomas Kohn, Bid4Assets.com CEO, 
displays a toy with the auction site's 
logo at Its Silver Spring offices. 
traditional auctions, Boston-based bank-
ruptcy lawyer Warren Agio said. 
The sites that market assets of bank-
rupt companies aren't specializing in 
nickel-and-dime trinkets. On Ebay.com, 
the world's 1aIgcst on-line marketplace, 
the average transaction amounts to $40. 
On Bid4Asscts, it amoDDts to S2S,ooo. 
Last month, an auction on Bid4Assets 
resulted in the sale of the former presi-
dential yacht USS Sequoia, used from 
the Harding administration in the 1920s 
forward, until President Carter sold it 
in 1m. 
Even with a strong 
economy, 17-month 
old Bid4Assets already 
has listed $1 billion 
worth of assets. 
NorsbipCo, a Norfolk-based ship-
builder and dry-docking company, repos-
sessed the l04-foot yacht after its OWD-
ers, Presidential Yacht Sequoia 
FODDdation, based in Alexandria, failed 
to pay the $3 million it cost to' renovate 
the vcsscl. 
NorshipCo sold the ship for an undis-
closed price - but more than $1 million-
in a scaled bid auction to Sequoia LLC, a 
group ofTcxas investors. 
E(c) -11 
Bid4Assets, started With $5 million in 
capital, makes money by collecting a fcc 
of up to 8 percent for each item sold on 
its Web site. 
Even with a strong economy, 
17-month old Bid4Assets already has 
listed $1 billion worth of assets on its 
Web site already. 
If the economy slows and companies 
begin failing, business at Bid4Asscts, 
EreoIg.com and Bankruptcy Exchange 
and Auction Market could flourish. 
"We're definitely coDDtercyclical," 
Bid4Assets Vice President of 
Development David Marchick said. 
With more Intemet companies failing, 
Web auction sites selling assets of bank-
rupt companies expect more business. 
Dot-com companies used to simply 
close their doors, Mr. Agin said. 
Now they are taking advantage of 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to sen off assets, 
reorganize and reopen for business. 
. "We'vc not seen that before. 'Ibcy're 
doing it now because they realize they do 
have assets," Mr. Agin said. 
The intangible assets of dotcoms -
domain names, patents, copyrights and 
trademarks - are potentially their most 
valuable assets, Mr. Agio said. 
"When it comes to selling a domain 
name, the Internet is a natural. If you tty 
to think of another way other than the 
Internet to sell a domain name, your 
mind just goes blank," he said. 
Mr. Agio sold a domain name 
www.planctrock.com - owned by bank-
rupt Massachusetts-based Internet com-
pany WebSecure at, an on-line auction 
on Bid4Asscts for $28,000 to a 
London-based radio group. 
If the deep wc11 of venture capital 
aval1able to dot-coms dries up, the fail-
ure rate of the lntemct companies will 
surge, Mr. Marcbick predicts. 
So will business for the companies 
swooping in to sell their asset on-line. 
"We didn't think about [dot-com 
failures] wbcn we started, but we're 
starting to get calls and we've shifted 
resources to handle it," Mr. Marchick 
said •• 
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I. 
ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE 
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS AND TO 
CHALLENGE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE 
Thomas L. Canary, Jr. 
Updated by Ann E. Samani 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
TIle scope of this chapter is limited to the most common examples of cases filed to challenge 
the dischargeability of a specific debt or to challenge the debtor's discharge, generally. This subject 
is frequently addressed in multi-day seminars and this chapter is but a brief glimpse at the intricacies 
involved in the litigation of these type cases. For those interested in a more replete examination of 
this topic, the author recommends The Fraud Book by William R. Mapother, Creditors Law Center, 
1989 and 1993 Supplement. For information concerning that treatise, contact Creditor Law Center 
at (502) 587-5451. 
II. BANKRUPTCY TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS 
Before reviewing the specific cases and statutes involved in this area of the law, it is 
important for the reader to understand some of the basic terminology used by judges and 
practitioners. 
There is a vast difference between attempting to hold a debt nondischargeable and seeking 
a denial of the debtor's discharge. The first is specific and the second is general. 
A. Non-Dischargeable Debt 
A "non-dischargeable debt" is one where a creditor seeks to have an individual debt 
excepted from the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. This is done by filing an Adversary 
Proceeding pursuant to §523 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the following provisions of §523 will be examined: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
§523(a)(2)(A) - Debts incurred through false pretenses, false 
misrepresentations or actual fraud; 
§523(a)(2)(B) - Debts incurred through the use of false financial 
statements; 
§523(a)(5) and (15) - Obligations incident to a divorce; 
§523(a)(6) - Situations where a debtor's collateral is converted by 
the debtor; and 
• §523(a)(8) - Student loans. 
In each one of these situations, other than cases predicated upon §523(a)(5), an Adversary 
Proceeding must be filed. 
B. Denial Of Debtor's Discharge 
When a creditor seeks to have the debtor's discharge denied in its entirety, that Adversary 
Proceeding must be based upon 11 U.S.C. §727(a) and (c). Ifacreditoris successful, then he would 
deprive the debtor of the ultimate relief sought in a Chapter 7 proceeding, that is, relieffrom all of 
F-l 
his debts. Obviously, this is an extreme result, and this issue will be discussed at length later at IV 
below. 
C. Adversary Proceedings 
Adversary Proceedings are the Complaint filed by a creditor in the Bankruptcy Court 
seeking to hold a debt nondischargeable or seeking to deny generally the debtor's discharge. Such 
Adversary Complaints must be filed within sixty (60) days from the date originally set for the first 
meeting of creditors. This is mandated by Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007. 
Note that this is sixty (60) days from the date first set for the meeting of creditors. In other 
words, if the meeting of creditors is continued, the sixty (60) days is calculated from the original 
date,!!Q! the continued date. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), 228 B.R. 399 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
1999) 
This sixty (60) day deadline is absolute. If an individual files on the 61 st day, the Complaint 
will be dismissed. 
Note, however, the Courts are generally liberal about granting an extension of that time 
period. Such extensions are authorized under Bankruptcy Rules 9006(b), 4004(b) and 4007( c). The 
Motion for Extension must be filed prior to the expiration of the original sixty (60) day deadline. 
The Motion should be accompanied by some reason for the extension oftime. Generally accepted 
grounds for such a Motion are the need for additional time to conduct discovery to see whether a 
Complaint is warranted, availability of records from the debtor or from the creditor, and the 
unwillingness ofa debtor to submit himself to an examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004, 
etc. 
While Courts are generally liberal about granting a first extension, practitioners should have 
ample reason for requesting a second extension. One such example would be if a potential 
nondischargeability case is settled via the use ofa Reaffirmation Agreement. 
D. Reaffirmation Of Debts 
II U.S.C. §524(c) is the Bankruptcy Code section which allows for the reaffirmation of 
debts in Chapter 7 proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §524(c)(4) allows the debtor the later of the sixty (60) 
days from the filing ofthe Reaffirmation Agreement with the Bankruptcy Court, or the entry of the 
Discharge Order, to rescind the Reaffirmation Agreement. An unweary creditor's attorney could 
fall into the following trap. 
Remember, one has only sixty (60) days from the original date set for the first meeting of 
creditors to file an Adversary Complaint. Ifthe potential nondischargeability case is settled via a 
Reaffirmation Agreement, the debtor would have, at a minimum, sixty (60) days from the entry of 
the Reaffirmation Agreement with the Court to rescind that Reaffirmation Agreement. 
Say for example the Reaffirmation Agreement used to settle the potential 
nondischargeability case is filed with the Court on the 45th day after the first date originally set for 
the meeting of creditors. The creditor would have fifteen (15) days to file the Adversary Complaint. 
The debtor would have forty-five (45) days after the expiration of the creditor's time to file the 
nondischargeability suit to rescind the Reaffirmation Agreement. The debtor could agree to 
reaffirm, allow the nondischargeability deadline to run, and then rescind the Reaffirmation 
Agreement. If there is collateral involved, the lien survives the bankruptcy and the creditor could 
seek return of the collateral. However, if the potential nondischargeability suit were based upon 
F-2 
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credit card fraud or some other unsecured type of credit, then this author would suggest placing your 
malpractice carrier on notice. 
E. Procedure In Adversary Proceedings 
The initiation of an Adversary Proceeding is largely governed by Bankruptcy Rule 7001. 
It is very similar to civil actions filed in State or Federal Court. The filing fee for an Adversary 
Proceeding is currently $150.00. Bankruptcy Rule 7003, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, 
states that an Adversary Proceeding is commenced by the filing of the Complaint with the Court. 
Like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, Bankruptcy Rule 7004 dictates the rules on summonses and 
service of those summonses. This author would recommend that a practitioner new to this area 
review Official Form 160 on the proper caption for a Adversary Proceeding and Official Form B250, 
the summons form used by the Bankruptcy Court. 
For those practicing in the Western District of Kentucky, a reading ofLBR (W.O. Ky.) 8 
would be advisable. This is found in the Kentucky Rules of Court, Federal, published by West 
Publishing Company. 
Practitioners will also find that most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Rules many times without change. The author would commit to 
your reading the Advisory Committee notes to Bankruptcy Rule 7001 which gives a "conversion 
table" for many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Bankruptcy Rules. 
. After, the initial filing ofthe case, it proceeds forward like a regular civil action. The Judges 
in both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky have standard pretrial Orders that will issue 
soon after the initiation of the Adversary Complaint. Practitioners would be well-advised to adhere 
to the requirements and deadlines of those pretrial Orders to the "tee". While one would think this 
would go without saying, the author has seen many an Adversary Proceeding dismissed (recalcitrant 
creditors counsel) and Judgment entered (dilatory debtor's counsel) for failure to adhere to these 
deadlines. 
The burden of proof in an Adversary Proceeding is by a preponderance of the evidence. 
This is made clear in the case of Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991). This standard was also 
reiterated in the case ofIn re McLaren, 983 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1993). 
Likewise, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff. See Bankruptcy Rule 4005. 
ID. BANKRUPTCY CODE §523 - NON-DISCHARGEABILITY 
A. §523(a)(2)(A) - False Pretense, False Representation or Actual Fraud 
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides as follows: 
(a) 
(2) 
A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) 
ofthis title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or 
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained, by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, 
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an 
insider's financial condition. 
F-3 
Any practitioner preparing a Complaint to be filed under §523(a)(2)(A) must read the case 
ofIn re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988). The Ward court found that a creditor had to prove 
four elements to be successful in an action under this Code provision. 
1. The debtor knowingly made false statements to the creditor, and 
2. These representations (false statements) were made with the intent 
to deceive the creditor, and 
3. The financial institution reasonably relied upon these 
representations, and 
4. This reliance was the proximate cause of the creditor's loss. 
The creditor must prove all four of these factors in order to make its case. For guidance, the 
author would recommend as reading the cases ofIn re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1985), and 
In re Parkey, 790 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1986). 
The most difficult ofthese four factors to prove is element number 3, "reasonable reliance". 
Fortunately, a recent case from the United States Supreme Court appears to have lessened this 
standard. 
In the case ofField v. Mans, 116 S.Ct. 437 (1995) the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the creditor must show, only, that it "justifiably relied" on the false representations made 
by the debtor. 
Unfortunately, "justifiable reliance" was not succinctly defined by the Supreme Court in its 
opinion. The theory, and thus the definition, was extrapolated from the Restatement (2nd) of Torts 
(1976). The Court made it clear that the debtor's conduct need not conform to a "community 
standard" of a "reasonable man". In fact, at page 444 of the Field decision, the Supreme Court 
quoted from Prosser's Law of Torts (1978), §108 at 717. This is as close to a definition of 
"justifiable reliance" as can be found in the opinion: 
An individual standard ofthe plaintiWs own capacity and the knowledge 
which he has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts 
within his observation in the light of his individual case. 
In other words, these matters will be examined on a case-by-case basis. The debtor's 
conduct will not be measured against some hypothetical "reasonable man". The debtor's conduct 
will be adjudged by examining his background, education and life experiences to determine whether 
he knew or should have known that his statements were false and would be relied upon by the 
financial institution in order to make its credit decision. 
This Supreme Court decision will make litigation of these type cases very fact-intensive. 
Was it reasonable for a creditor to rely upon the statements made by an adult with an 8th-grade 
education as to whether he had pledged certain pieces of personal property on other loans? Is it 
reasonable for a creditor to expect an individual with a college degree in finance and 12 years' 
experience in his own business to be able to discern between collateral actually belonging to him 
versus to his corporation? Should a creditor be able to rely on statements made by a debtor as to his 
annual income without verification from his employer? It is this author's opinion that these are the 
issues that will have to be examined by the Court in light of the ruling in Field v. Mans, supra. 
1. Case Law: §523(a)(2)(A) 
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The Sixth Circuit has also provided some guidance in cases that fall under §523(a)(2)(A). 
A case can be made under this section by showing that the debtor was "grossly reckless" in 
providing the information to the creditor. In the case onn re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986), 
the debtor provided the creditor a very misleading deed. The Sixth Circuit found that this 
"statement" was so grossly reckless that it rose to the level of fraud that §523(a)(2)(A) was drafted 
to remedy. 
Likewise, the fraud of one partner can be imputed to another. See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 
1556 (6th Cir. 1992). 
. In re Rembert. 141 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1998) declared thatthe debtor who used a credit card 
is only representing at most an intent to repay, not the ability to repay. Thus the proper inquiry is 
what the debtor's subjective intent was after considering all of the circumstances surrounding the 
situation. Here a gambler (hourly wage factory inspector for 28 years) who had previously obtained 
a second mortgage on her home to pay her credit card debts and continued to gamble was found to 
lack the subjective intent to defraud. Note that two credit card issuers went to the 6th Circuit for two 
debts totaling $11,623.48. 
In re Shartz, 221 B.R. 397 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) followed Rembert and indicated that the 
court was not going to overturn the decision ofthe bankruptcy court when the debtor, who was laid 
off ran up $12,500 in debt while attempting to get a job, had not made any luxury purchases and 
had not attempted a "one last hurrah" at the creditors expense. The decision affirmed that the 
creditor had failed to meet the burden of proof. Pro se Debtor. 
In re Francis. 226 B.R. 385 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) states that a general release in prepetition 
settlement agreement does not release a §523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability claim. 
Many times, a creditor will initiate a civil action in state or federal court to redress damages 
incurred by it due to false representation or actual fraud on the defendant's part. The reaction to a 
judgment favorable to the creditor is the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Sixth Circuit case of 
In re Batie, 995 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1993) addresses this. If the issue of fraud is properly determined 
in the civil action, then the debtor could be collaterally estopped from relitigating this case in the 
bankruptcy arena. A creditor can plead its civil judgment as collateral estoppel against the debtor 
in the adversary proceeding filed under §523. 
Likewise, there are several cases decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky in this area. A debtor's sale of stock that he did not own led to an adverse decision for 
the debtor in the case onn re Pallo, 65 B.R. 101 (W.D. Ky. 1986). See also the cases ofIn re 
Sustarich, 73 B.R. 731 (W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Tabers, 28 B.R. 679 (W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Donald, 
26 B.R. 521 (W.D. Ky. 1983); and In re Fox, 13 B.R. 827 (W.D. Ky. 1982). 
Note also, that a future promise to tum over a tax return is not a "false representation" or 
"false pretense". In re Roeder, 61 B.R. 179 (W.D. Ky. 1986). Likewise, a promise to pay and give 
creditor a lien on a replacement vehicle in the future also does not arise to the level of a 
nondischargeable debt. In re Todd, 34 B.R. 633 (W.D. Ky. 1983). In both of these cases, note that 
it was a future promise that was determined not to give rise to a complaint under §523(a)(2)(A). 
Two cases from the Eastern District of Kentucky also shed some light on this area of the 
law. In the case onn re O'Bryan, 190 B.R. 290 (E.D.Ky. 1995), Judge Howard discusses the use 
of collateral estoppel from a judgment rendered in a state or federal civil action. This case also 
offers an excellent discussion of the dischargeability of punitive damages. Likewise, see In re 
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Parriman, 190 B.R. 88 (E.D.Ky. 1995), specifically discussing collateral estoppel from a state court 
judgment. 
B. §523(a)(2)(C) - Luxury Goods 
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(C) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b)or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
-(C) for purposes. of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, 
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more 
than $1075 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an 
individual debtor on or within sixty (60) days before the order for 
relief under this title (11 USCS Sections 101 et seq.), or cash 
advances aggregating more than $1,075 that are extensions of 
consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an 
individual debtor on or within sixty (60) days before the order for 
reliefunderthis title (11 USCS Sections 101 et seq.), are presumed 
to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include 
goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or 
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an 
extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be 
defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act. 
1. Presumption Periods 
Many people have a basic misunderstanding of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(C). Some creditors 
feel that if they have a debt that falls within the parameters set forth in this subsection of the 
Bankruptcy Code that the debt is ~ ~ nondischargeable. This is a fatal error. 
Specifically, this subsection of the Bankruptcy Code states that consumer debts to a single 
creditor aggregating more than $1,075 for a "luxury" goods or services obtained within sixty (60) 
days of the filing of the bankruptcy, or cash advances exceeding $1,075 taken on a consumer credit 
or open-end plan within sixty (60) days of the filing of the Bankruptcy are presumed to be 
nondischargeable. This does not absolve a creditor from having to file an Adversary Proceeding in 
order to determine the dischargeability of this debt. The presumption merely shifts the burden to 
the debtor to prove why the debt should not be discharged. 
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(C) also defines luxury goods and services. These are goods and 
services not reasonably required for the support or maintenance of the debtor or the debtor's 
dependents. Such examples would be lavish vacations, a gambling binge, mink 'Coats, travel trailers, 
etc. 
C. §523(a)(2)(B) - Use Of A False Statement In Writing 
11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228 (b), or 1328(b) 
of this title does not disc~arge an individual debtor from any debt 
F-6 
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(2) 
(B) 
for money, property, services or an extension, renewal or 
refinancing of credit, to the extent by -
use of a statement in writing -
(i) that is materially false; 
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial 
condition; 
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable 
for such money, property, services, or credit 
reasonably relied; and 
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published 
with intent to deceive. 
In order to maintain an action under this provision of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor must 
prove five (5) elements: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The statement must be in writing, 
It must be materially false, 
Respecting a debtor's or insider's financial condition, 
4. Upon which the creditor extending the credit reasonably rei ied, and 
5. Published by the debtor with the intent to deceive. 
Note the material difference now between the cases filed under §523(a)(2)(A) and 
§523(a)(2)(B). Under §523(a)(2)(A), a creditor can show "justifiable reliance". Cases filed under 
§S23(a)(2)(B) must show "reasonable reliance", which is, in the author's opinion, a higher standard. 
Note also that the statement in writing must be materially false. In other words, had the 
written statement been properly completed, would the creditor have still made the loan to the debtor? 
Proof ofthis element is often difficult. Hopefully, the financial institution has well-written 
lending policies. Many times, those lending policies dictate certain debt-to-income ratios which 
must be met before the loan is to be made. Ideally, a creditor could show that if debts omitted from 
a financial statement had been properly listed, then the ratios would have been exceeded and the loan 
not made. The author would submit that the creditor has gone a long way towards meeting this 
burden of proof. 
Additionally, was the reliance by the creditor "reasonable"? In other words, did the creditor 
have another means by which to secure the information omitted from the financial statement? 
It is common, almost to the point of being required, that a creditor show that it ran a credit 
bureau report or Dun & Bradstreet report prior to the extension of credit to an individual. Of course, 
the credit bureau report must be run at the time of the taking of the application, or soon thereafter, 
but before the decision to loan the money has been made. 
If the debts omitted from the application appear on the credit bureau report, then the 
creditor's case will not be persuasive. The Court could hold that creditor had another means to 
ascertain this information, and it is "reasonable" to expect creditor to do so. 
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However, creditors would be surprised at the number of financial institutions that do not 
report to the credit bureau. If the debts were not listed on the application and did not appear on the 
credit bureau report, then the creditor has gone a long way toward proving this necessary element. 
The most difficult of these elements to prove is "intent to deceive". Any requirement to 
prove such a "state of mind" makes these cases difficult to prosecute. Such intent must be shown 
by circumstantial evidence, as it is rare that a debtor will ever admit that he meant to deceive the 
creditor. 
Many times, the false statement comes in the nature of grossly understating living expenses 
or grossly overstating income. As concerns the living expenses, it is very important for a creditor 
to conduct the proper discovery to ascertain whether the debtor purposefully understated living 
expenses in order to meet minimum requirements of the creditor in order to make the loan. 
Remember, each debtor must file a Schedule I and J with their petition. Schedule I lists the 
debtors' income and Schedule J lists their expenditures. A creditor would be well-advised to review 
the Schedule J with the debtors to see if their living expenses have changed greatly from the time 
they made application for credit. 
Additionally, see if such a budget were taken at the time of the application for the loan . 
. Compare the two and-try to ascertain the nature of any significant differences. 
Also examine the Schedule I very closely. Has the debtor suddenly claimed a number of 
exemptions in order to artificially create a large tax refund atthe end of the year? Is there overtime 
or other income that appeared on the debtor's original application that do not appear on the Schedule 
J? Did the debtor's income depend largely upon commissions and that was not revealed in the 
application? Does the application reveal a second source of income not listed on the Schedule I? 
One point of inquiry from the Court will be whether a creditor attempted to verify a debtor's 
employment. In other words, did they ask for a pay stub or contact the debtor's payroll department 
upon application for credit? If a creditor simply took the word of a debtor, then the reasonable 
reliance requirement may not have been met. 
1. Case Law: §523(a)(2)(B) 
Like §523(a)(2)(A), the burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. See the 
Grogan and McLaren cases cited above. There are a number of cases from the Sixth Circuit which 
provide examples of what types of false writings have been determined actionable: Coman v. 
Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986) [false representation of acreage in deed held reasonable so 
debt discharged], But see, Knoxville Teachers Credit Union v. Parkey, 790 F .2d 490 (6th Cir. 1986) 
[misrepresentation of liabilities grossly reckless and debt determined to be nondischargeable]. 
"Extension of credit" includes a fraudulently obtained promise to forbear collection. As a 
result an otherwise dischargeable debt can become nondischargeable even though the creditor did 
not suffer any damage as a result of the forbearance. In re Campbell, 159 F .3d 963 (6th Cir. 1998). 
The case onn re Woollums, 979 F.2d 71 (6th Cir.1992) is also very instructive. There, an 
incomplete, unsigned and erroneous financial statement was submitted to a creditor. Later, when 
the debtor filed bankruptcy, the creditor moved to hold the debt nondischargeable pursuant to 
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§523(a)(2)(B). 
The bankruptcy court ruled against the debtor, but the district court reversed. The district 
court found that there was no way that any competent financial institution could reasonably rely 
upon such a poorly-completed financial statement. The standard to be applied is to safeguard against 
a creditor acting in bad faith. In other words, it would not be fair for a creditor, on one hand, to 
accept so deficient a financial statement and then use the same financial statement as grounds for 
holding the debt nondischargeable. Creditors have to play by the rules. The Sixth Circuit reinstated 
the bankruptcy court decision denying dischargeability to the two loans. It determined that 
reasonable reliance should not allow the court to undertake subjective evaluation and judgment of 
a lenders policies and practices. 
Another interesting case is that onn re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1985). Generally, 
11 U .S.C. §506(b) will allow a creditor to recover reasonable fees (attorney fees) and costs provided 
that the creditor is oversecured. The value of its collateral must exceed the debt. 
However, the Sixth Circuit found that the creditor was entitled to an award of attorney fees 
based on its contract only. Here, the contract called for the recovery of attorney fees in the 
collection of a debt. It was this clause that the Court focused on, not simply §506. The Court 
allowed for the recovery of the attorney fees despite creditor's undersecured status. Creditors should 
use this case when filing any case under §523 for the proposition that it should be allowed to collect 
its attorney fees. 
In the Eastern District of Kentucky there appears to be only one case on the court's web site 
which discusses §523(a)(2)(B). It is Judge Lee's 1990 decision in In re Snyder, Adv. No. 84-0151 
(Bankr. E. D. Ky. 1990). The debtor prevailed when the creditorwas unable to meet the burden of 
proof as to reliance and intent to deceive. 
There are a litany of cases decided under §523(a)(2)(B) from the Western District of 
Kentucky. Note that the holding in some ofthe cases from the Western District of Kentucky could 
now be different since the standard of proof has changed. Prior to the Grogan' case, the standard of 
proof was clear and convincing. It would be interesting to try to determine whether the holdings in 
any of these cases would have changed under the new preponderance of the evidence standard. 
In the case onn re Rosel, 63 B.R. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1986), a debtor understated his debts by 
$20,000 and overstated his income by $21,000. Additionally, his assets were overstated by $20,000 
for a total of $61 ,000. In reviewing the case, the Court found that the reliance on this statement by 
the creditor was so outrageous that the reliance was not deemed to be "reasonable". The debt was 
discharged. 
In the case onn re Bridges, 51 B.R. 85 (W.D. Ky. 1985), a creditor was denied the relief 
it sought in its Adversary Complaint because it failed to verify the information in the written 
statement (application). This is a lesson well taught and the author would refer the reader to the 
discussion ofthis subject above. 
Where a bank was actually aware ofthe debtor's financial condition, reliance on a financial 
statement was not reasonable. See In re Duncan, 35 B.R. 323 (W.D. Ky. 1983). Likewise, see In 
re Whitehouse, 26 B.R. 239 (W.D. Ky. 1982) to again show how a bank failed to show reasonable 
reliance. The author would also refer the reader to the case onn re Perez, 52 B.R. 824 (W.D. Ky. 
1985) and In re Peterson, 49 B.R. 1 (W.D. Ky. 1984). 
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While not a case out of the Western District or Sixth Circuit, recommended reading would 
be the case orIn re Rickey, 8 B.R. 860 (M.D. Fl. 1981). As stated above, "intent to deceive" is 
probably the most difficult element to prove when trying to make a case under §523(a)(2)(B). The 
Rickey Court held that intent can be shown by: 
1. False statement made by the debtor with actual knowledge it was false, 
2. Made with reckless indifference to the truth, 
3. Made by the debtor without checking sources readily available to him, 
4. Madewithout reasonable grounds to believe it was true. 
This sentiment is echoed in the Knoxville Teachers Credit Union v. Parkey case, supra. 
D. Unjustified 523(a)(2) Claims 
Creditors should not loosely file cases under §523(a)(2). §523(d) does allow a consumer 
debtor to petition the Court for costs and reasonable attorney fees from a creditor if that creditor files 
an action under §523(a)(2) and loses. To do so, the Court must show that the creditor's position was 
not substantially justified unless special circumstances exist that would make the award unjust. See 
In re Carmen, 723 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1983). 
This is why the author advocates taking a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 exam prior to the fi ling of 
a suit. The evidence adduced at that examination will determine whether your lawsuit is viable. As 
long as the creditor feels, after that examination, that its position would be substantially justified, 
an award under §523(d) should not be forthcoming. Unless such an examination is performed or 
deposition taken, a creditor may find the insult of defeat compounded by the injury of an award of 
attorney fees and costs against it. 
E. §523(a)(6) Willful And Malicious Injury [Conversion; Assault and Battery; Breach of 
Contract] 
11 USC Section 523(a)(6) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another 
entity or to the property of another entity. 
A cause of action under this Bankruptcy Code section usually entails the debtor's conversion 
of property given as collateral on a creditor's loan. A small primer on secured transactions (Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code) is appropriate at this juncture. 
Remember that perfection of a security interest is a notice provision only. In other words, 
the security interest is still valid as between the creditor and the debtor. Lack of perfection affects 
third parties only. A Trustee in bankruptcy, a bona fide purchaser for value or an intervening lien 
creditor may have rights superior to the unperfected lien creditor. However, the creditor's rights are 
still superior to the debtor's. This lack of perfection does not invalidate this separate contract (a 
security agreement) between the debtor and creditor that the property will stand as collateral for the 
loan. 
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If a debtor sells a creditor's collateral in derogation of a security agreement, what is the 
measure of damages? The answer in the Western District of Kentucky seems to be the value ofthe 
property so converted. See In re Thomas, 36 B.R. 851 (W.D. Ky. 1984) [value of automobile 
converted]; and In re Stevens, 26 B.R. 389 (W.O. Ky. 1983) [sum for which property was sold]. 
However, there is another case holding that the entire amount of the debt, not just the value 
ofthe collateral converted, is the measure of damages. See Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 
755 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1985). Since the Birmingham Trust case was decided after these two cases 
from the Western District, the issue of the measure of damages may need to be revisited. 
In order to sustain a case under §523(a)(6), a creditor must prove that the injury was both 
"willful" and "malicious". Willful has been defined as deliberate and intentional. See In re Thomas, 
supra at 853; Wheelerv. Laundani, 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1986); and In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (E.D. 
Ky. 1992). 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974,140 L. Ed 2d 90 (1998) has changed the 
landscape for "willful and malicious" because the proof must establish that the actor "desires to 
cause the consequences of his act, or ... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to 
result from it." In Geiger the court held that a medical malpractice judgment based upon negligent 
or reckless conduct could not be the basis for a §523(a)(6) nondischargeable debt. The Eighth 
Circuit held that the debtor cannot just intend to do the act but must also intend the consequences 
of the act and the Supreme Court affirmed .. 
1. Case Law: §523(a)(6) 
The ability to sustain a case under §523(a)(6) is very fact-intensive. For instance, in In re 
. Hawkins, supra, the Court found no malice since the· debtor gave the creditor $188 of the $300 
actually received for the sale of the car. The debt was allowed to be discharged. 
The most recent Sixth Circuit case is that of In re Markowitz, 190 Fjd 455 (6th Cir. 1999). 
Neither the jury verdict for legal malpractice nor the state court' refusal to submit a special 
interrogatory has collateral estoppel effect. Plaintiff obtained a prepetition legal malpractice 
jUdgment against the debtor for negligence. Collateral estoppel is applicable if "(1) the law of 
collateral estoppel in the state in which the issue was litigated would preclude relitigation of such 
issue, and (2) the issue was fully and fairly litigated in state court." Michigan law uses collateral 
estoppel when "the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was actually 
litigated and necessarily determined ... An issue is actually litigated if it is put into issue by the 
pleadings, submitted to the trier offact and determined by the trier offact.. .. The jury verdict did not 
actually decide the issue of willful and malicious injury; it was not actually litigated." (Emphasis 
added). The more important use of Markowitz is its new definition of "willful and malicious" taken 
from Geiger, supra, to require "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or ... believes that 
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it". The court declared that Perkins v. 
Scharffe, 817 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1987) was overruled by the Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 
523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed2d 90 (1998). The court sent back a judgment against an 
attorney as not establishing willful and malicious injury even though the attorney had admitted that 
he knew that failure to file an answer would result in a default judgment. 
However, in Abbo v. Rossi. McCreery & Assoc. (In re Abbo), 168 F.3d (6d' Cir. 1999) the 
court found that a malicious prosecution judgment established "willful and malicious" injury for 
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§523(a)(6). The jury verdict had required a finding that the defendant had acted "maliciously". 
Spring Works. Inc. v. Sarff (In re Sarff), 242 B.R. 620 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000) held that a 
state court judgment for breach of covenant not to compete, breach of contract, breach of duty of 
loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets and intentional interference with business relations is 
nondischargeable under 523(a)(6). The debtor was found guilty of intending to cause injury by 
taking customers from former employer. Reliance on advice of counsel can be a defense to 
523(a)(6) action but the reliance must be reasonable. Continuing to violate an injunction on advice 
of counsel, did not allow an escape for the debtor. . 
In re Crump, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 2000) granted debtor relief because his failure 
to remit proceeds generated from the sale of crop in which creditor had a security interest did not 
establish any intent to cause injury to the creditor. Instead, the court found that the debtor's use of 
the funds in the farming operation constituted his attempt to keep the business going so the debt 
could be repaid. 
In the case ofIn re Cline, 52 B.R. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1985), the creditor was found to have 
expressly or impliedly consented to the sale of the livestock. Since the creditor was charged with 
this knowledge, there could be no malice since the creditor could not show that the debtor intended 
to do harm. This debt was allowed to be discharged. For other cases involving cattle, see In re 
Brame, 23 B.R. 196 (W.O. Ky. 1982), and In re Vance, 43 B.R. 99 (W.O. Ky. 1984). 
In re Ouncan, 30 B.R. 754 (W.D. Ky. 1983) dealt with another livestock situation. There, 
a creditor's loan was .secured by a corn crop~ The debtor used this corn to feed hogs which stood as . 
security for another creditor's loan. The Court allowed this debt to be discharged because the debtor 
received no pecuniary gain from the "conversion". 
The author questions the holding that there was no "pecuniary gain" since the hogs had 
obviously been "improved" by the use ofthe feed and the eventual sale of the hogs. Perhaps that 
may lead to some suit between the respective secured creditors under a quantum meruit theory of 
law. Perhaps the creditor who had the security interest in the corn could sustain such a suit against 
the debtor. Reliance upon §523(a)(6) should not be blind. Common law theories such as quantum 
meruit are valid in these instances. 
An adjudication of such willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the 
property of another entity may have been litigated previously and decided in state court. The party 
prevailing in state court may be able to plead collateral estoppel to any adversary proceeding filed 
in the Bankruptcy Court. See In re Stillwell, 96 B.R. 102 (W.O. Ky. 1988), and In re Davis, 23 B.R. 
633 (W.D. Ky. 1982), both dealing with civil rights judgments. 
There is also a line of cases dealing with assault and battery. See In re Kirby, 167 B.R. 91 
(E.O. Ky. 1994) [no collateral estoppel effect given to default judgment entered in state court] See 
a/so, Spillman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1981); In re Bishop, 55 B.R. 687 (W.D. Ky. 1985) 
[damage sustained by a creditor after being struck in head with hammer by debtor held 
nondischargeable. See the cases cited at page 688 ofthat decision]; In re Beach, 39 B.R. 56 (W.O. 
Ky. 1984) [damages sustained by a waitress shot in bar fight held nondischargeable. See footnote 
1 at page 56 of that decision for other cases]; In re Thompson, 39 B.R. 270 (W.O. Ky. 1984) [since 
no punitive damages were awarded in state court, the Court did not allow collateral estoppel and 
allowed the debtto be discharged]. Conpare In re Cooney, 8 B.R. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1980) [where debt 
held nondischargeable with!!Q award of punitive damages]. 
The case onn re Daniels, 130 B.R. 239 (E.O. Ky. 1991) dealt with a reclamation obligation. 
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There, the Court held that obligations requiring an expenditure of money by the creditor were 
dischargeable. However, damages occasioned by illegal surface coal mining activities were 
nondischargeable. 
The case orIn re Oruen, 121 B.R. 509 (W.O. Ky. 1990) deals with the issue of lapsed 
automobile insurance. There, the Court held that while a knowing failure to secure automobile 
insurance could be determined willful, it was not malicious so the debt was allowed to be 
discharged. For those of you with under age drivers, you can rest easy knowing that if your 
insurance lapses or is not in effect and your child causes injury to a third party, you can file 
bankruptcy and the injured party cannot use §523(a)(6) to attempt to declare the debt 
nondischargeable as to you. In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 1992). 
However, the author would remind the reader that any damages resulting from death or 
personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated gives rise to 
a cause of action under §523(a)(9). Unlike causes of action under §523(a)(6), causes of action under 
(a)(9) are mll:~ nondischargeable. See also, In re Bex, 143 B.R. 835 (E.O. Ky. 1992) which again 
found that lack of insurance did not rise to the level of being willful so the debt was allowed to be 
discharged. 
For miscellaneous other causes of action under §523(a)(6), see In re Smith, 95 B.R. 473 
(W.O. Ky. 1988) [state court jury instruction focused on a "wanton and reckless", not "willful and 
malicious" standard]; In re Howard, 946 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1991) [since guarantor personally 
participated in conversion, debt held nondischargeable] and In re Stevens, 26 B.R. 389 (W.O. Ky. 
1983) [sale of musical instruments]. 
The key in any case filed under §523(a)(6) is to focus on the direction given in the cases 
cited above to establish that the injury is "willful and malicious". Bringing your cause of action 
within the ambit of these definitions is critical. 
F. 11 U.S.C.§523(a)(7): 
" ... for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit, ... not for compensation of actual pecuniary loss, other than tax penalty .... " 
In re Maxwell, 229 B.R. 400 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998) held costs incurred for debtor's 
incarceration are nondischargeable under §523(a)(7). 
In re Ray, 240 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1999) held restitution adjudged as condition for 
probation would be nondischargeable under §523 (a)(7) even though payable to the victim in amount 
of damages suffered by the victim ($1800 property damage on charge of wanton endangerment). 
Court said that Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) mandates that "any condition a state criminal 
court imposes as part of a criminal sentence" is nondischargeable under 523 (a)(7). 
G. §523(a)(8) - Student Loans 
11 USC Section 523(a)(8) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or made under any program 
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funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, 
or for an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, 
scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under 
this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor's dependents. 
Note: Effective for all cases filed after October 8, 1998, there is no longer a period of 
time after which the debt can be discharged. For cases filed before October 8, 1998, a student 
loan could be discharged if consolidated loan first became due more than seven years before filing 
of bankruptcy. Debtor argued 7 year period should run from date on which original loan matured. 
Rudnicki v. Southern College ofOptometrv (In re Rudnickil, 28 B.R. 179 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) 
Unlike the other causes of action discussed to this point, this is an Adversary Proceeding 
filed by the debtor seeking to discharge a student loan. Unless the debtor moves to have the student 
loan debt declared dischargeable, it is 3!: ~ nondischargeable. 
Since it is the debtor seeking the relief in the Adversary Proceeding, the burden of proof here 
is on the debtor. See B.R. 4005. The standard ofthe burden of proof is by the preponderance of the 
evidence. See Grogan v. Garner, supra. 
In order to sustain his burden of proof, the debtor must show that requiring the debtor 
to pay this obligation will impose an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's dependents .. 
Note also thatthe debtor must show that this is an educational loan (a) insured or guaranteed 
by a governmental unit, or (b) made under a program funded by a governmental unit or nonprofit 
institution. The definition of nonprofit institution is a subject of discussion when it comes to credit 
unions. 
There was an apparent split of authority over whether a credit union was a "nonprofit 
organization" and thus whether student loans made by it would enjoy the protection of §523(a)(8). 
The case of In re Roberts, 149 B.R. 547 (C.D. Ill. 1993) found credit unions to be nonprofit 
organizations. Two other cases that should be examined are the In re Sinclair-Ganos, 133 B.R. 382 
(Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1991) and In re Simmons, 1995 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994), which are 
both cited in the Roberts opinion. 
Coming to the same holding, i.e., student loans made by credit unions enjoy the protections 
under §523(a)(8), but by a different means, is the case ofT! Federal Credit Union v. Delbonis, 72 
F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1995). Here, the Court found not that the credit union was a nonprofit 
organization, but was a governmental unit. Note that this holding applies to federal credit unions, 
only. 
Given the apparent split in the Circuits on the issue of what constitutes a "nonprofit 
organization", the author surmises that this battle will rage on. 
1. Case Law: §S23(a)(8) 
The seminal case on student loans from the Western District of Kentucky is In re 
Berthiaume, 138 B.R. 516 (W.O. Ky. 1992). The Berthiaume Court examined the dischargeability 
of a student loan under a tripartite test: (1) the mechanical test, (2) the good faith test, and (3) the 
policy test. 
The mechanical test examines whether the debtor's financial resources in the foreseeable 
future are sufficient to allow the debtor to live at a subsistence level while repaying the student loan. 
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Pursuant to Berthiaume, the foreseeable future is 10 years. The debtor must show that his financial 
condition will not improve over the next 10 years in order to allow some small payment to the 
creditor. 
"Subsistence level" is usually equated with the poverty level. Poverty level statistics for a 
given year can be obtained in the Federal Register. For current figures, you may contact the Federal 
Information Center at (800) 688-9889 or try the Department of Health and Human Services at (202) 
690-6141. 
The "good faith test" examines whether the debtor has made a bona fide attempt to find a 
good-paying job, maximize financial resources and minimize expenses. This should be a point of 
inquiry by a student loan creditor at the discovery level, both in the form of a Request for Production 
of Documents and questions to be asked at a Rule 2004 exam or a deposition. The debtor should 
be examined concerning the Schedules I and J filed with the petition concerning income and 
expenses. Debtor should also produce copies of any resumes, letters, letters of rejection from 
potential employers, etc. to sustain the debtor's burden of proof under this test. 
Lastly, the "policy test" examines whether the debtor's motivation in filing the bankruptcy 
was the type of abuse that §523(a)(8)(B) was enacted to prevent. Some of the questions that will 
be asked by the Court are: 
(a) How much time expired between the date the loan was taken and 
the bankruptcy filed? 
(b) How much time expired between when the debtor graduated from 
school and the bankruptcy was filed? 
( c) What percentage of overall debt does the educational loan 
comprise? 
(d) What sort of degree did the debtor get? 
( e) What benefit did the debtor derive from the education? 
While not specifically made a part of the statute, there seems to be ajudicial sentiment that 
the debtor must have received some benefit from the education. That benefit would include not only 
the education that the debtor received, i.e., did it make the debtor more employable, but also what 
assistance the school rendered in helping the debtor find employment. 
The author has been involved in several Adversary Proceedings dealing with "trade 
schools". In those cases where the "trade school" did nothing to make the debtor more employable, 
nor provided any assistance in order to help the debtor secure employment, the author's "batting 
average" has been less than enviable. 
The "hardship" that must be endured by the debtor is not the "garden variety hardship" or 
"unpleasantness". Berthiaume at 521. In other words, the Court will require the debtors to "tighten 
up the purse strings" before they will be afforded the relief sought under §523(a)(8). An 
examination of the debtor's present financial condition and potential future employability is a 
requirement for litigation under this Code section. The Bertiaume court did find that while the 
husband failed to meet the test, his wife's health problems were sufficient to allow her student loans 
to be discharged. 
The case onn re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S 1081, 115 
S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed. 2d 634 (1995) allows the Court to be imaginative in crafting its relief. Here, 
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the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower Court's decision to defer final ruling on the dischargeability of 
the debt for 18 months. This was done to see if the debtor's circumstances would change and 
whether undue hardships still existed. It exercised the Court's equitable powers under §10S(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code in order to shape this relief. 
The latitude evinced by the Sixth Circuit allows the parties to be imaginative in any 
settlement negotiations. Deferment of payments, "stepped up payments" in recognition of potential 
increases in income,judicial reexamination of the debtor's financial condition, etc., are all tools to 
be used in crafting a settlement of cases filed under §S23(a)(8). Options allowed in the following 
cases: 
H. 
1. Wait 18 months or 2 years and require the debtor to advise of change 
of circumstances before the court will rule on the adversary. In re 
Cheesman, supra. 
2. Repayment and accrual of interest deferred for 2 years. In re 
Dennehy, 201 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996). 
3. Loan not dischargeable, but repayment deferred for 6 months while 
debtor gets settled in new job or obtains stable employment. In re 
O'Donnell, 198 B.R.l (Bankr. N.H. 1996). 
4. Each loan considered separately for S23(a)(8) purposes. Therefore, 
bankruptcy court can discharge two loans and declare one loan 
nondischargeable. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999). 
S. In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998) said debtors not entitled 
to discharge but § 1 OS would allow bankruptcy court to consider some 
amount less than full amount to be declared dischargeable. Debtors had not 
minimized expenses, were above poverty level, had $200 per month surplus 
income, and had never paid the first penny on the $30,000.00 student loans. 
§S23(a)(S) And (1S) - Obligations Incident To A Divorce 
11 USC Section S23(a)(S) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
(S) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for 
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or 
child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce 
decree or other order of a court of record, determination 
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but 
not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, 
voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise 
(other than debts assinged pursuant to section 
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408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or any such 
debt which has been assigned to the Federal 
Government or to a State or any political 
subdivision of such State); or 
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as 
alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such 
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance, or support. 
In addition, 11 USC Section 523(a)(IS) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
- (15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred 
by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in 
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other 
order of a court of record, a determination made in accordance 
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless -
(A) 
(B) 
the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from 
income or property ofthe debtor not reasonably necessary 
to be expended for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is 
engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures 
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation 
of such business; or 
discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the 
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 introduced 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15) into the Bankruptcy 
Code. The Bankruptcy Courts in Kentucky have not been spared from the furor that this section has 
caused. For an exhaustive examination of both §523(a)(5) and (a)(15), the author recommends the 
excellent article authored by C.R. (Chip) Bowles, former law clerk to the Honorable Judge Henry 
Dickinson, Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Kentucky. Mr. Bowles analyzes this 
situation in his usual replete style and would answer many of the questions merely raised by this 
article. It can be found in 34 U.L.J. Fam. L. 521 (1996). 
If an obligation incident to a divorce falls under the mantle of §523(a)(S), it is deemed 
automatically nondischargeable, that is, no Adversary Proceeding has to be filed. Included in that 
genre of obligations are debts to a spouse, former spouse or child of a debtor for: 
(a) Alimony to, 
(b) Maintenance for, 
(c) Support of such spouse or child, 
(d) In connection with a Separation Agreement, Divorce Decree or 
other Order of a Court of record, or 
(e) A Property Settlement Agreement. 
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Excepted from this group of automatically nondischargeable debts are any debts to the 
extent that: 
(a) The debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by the operation 
of law or otherwise [unless it is a debt assigned under the Social 
Security Act, §408(a)(3)] or any debt assigned to the federal 
government, state or any political subdivision of the state. 
In other words, the debt actually has to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. 
A practice tip to remember when the state comes to collect for medical expenses incurred for the 
mother and child. In re Lambdin, Adv. 97-6035 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1998) held that if the parent was 
not married to the mother, the state can only collect as a nondischargeable debt the amount of 
medical expenses incurred for the child and the DNA testing to determine paternity. The mother's 
medical expenses are dischargeable. The reader should examine the cases of Fitzgerald v. 
Fitzgerald, 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993) and Long v. Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) for the 
tests used to determine whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. 
The author would note that the Calhoun decision does represent the minority view by 
allowing a Bankruptcy Court to inquire into the party's changed financial conditions. Other courts, 
including the Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, have specifically rejected the Calhoun analysis. 
See Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801 (2nd Cir. 1987); In re Draper, 7790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986); 
and In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985) . 
. Calhoun was further explicated by the holdingofthe case onn re Fitzgerald, 9 F 3d 517 (6th 
Cir. 1993). At page 520 of its decision, the Court held that: 
The applicability of Calhoun, especially the second step's "present needs" 
inquiry, to support obligations other than assumptions of debt have been 
the source of some confusion in the lower courts of this circuit. 
This comment is especially pertinent since the author ofthe Fitzgerald decision was also the 
author of the Calhoun decision. Specifically, Judge Kennedy stated, again at page 520 of the 
decision, that: 
The writer regrets that it [Calhoun] has been applied more broadly than 
intended. Fortunately, a majority of courts in other circuits have rejected 
the "present needs" test when applied to alimony or child support. 
Indeed, this seems to overrule that portion of Calhoun that will go behind the divorce decree. 
Instead, the Court now seems to focus on the intent of the parties at the time of the divorce, and does 
not focus on the "present needs" at the time ofthe filing ofthe bankruptcy. The "present needs" test 
has been criticized on many grounds opining that it permits undue federal interference with a state 
Court's domestic authority. 
Additionally, it has been held that the "present needs" analysis punishes a non-debtor's 
spouse who has struggled to become self-supporting. It would result in the discharge of an 
overwhelming high number of support obligations simply because a non-bankrupt, ex-spouse has 
become self-reliant by the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. At page 521 of the decision, 
Judge Kennedy states: 
Calhoun was not intended to intrude into the state's traditional authority 
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over domestic relations and the risk of injustice to the non-debtor spouse 
or children. 
With that being said, the state of the law in the Sixth Circuit is, generally, that if the divorce 
decree specifically states that the award was for alimony, maintenance or support, the Court should 
not go behind that finding to challenge the intent of the parties at the time of the filing of the divorce 
decree. With all that being said, how does that impact §S23(a)(1S)? . 
Section S23(a)(IS) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor will not be allowed to 
discharge debts ofthe kind described in §S23(a)(S) incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce 
or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other Order of the 
Court of record unless the debtor can show one of the following: 
a. The debtor does not have the ability to pay the debt from income 
or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended 
for the maintenance or support of the debtor or dependent of the 
debtor. If the debtor is engaged in business, then the debtor must 
show that paying these debts would endanger the continuation, 
preservation or operation of such business; or 
b. discharging the debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that 
outweighs the detrimental consequences to the spouse, former 
spouse or child of the debtor. 
I. Case Law: §§S23(a)(S) and (15) 
In re Sorah. 163 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998) found that a "label such alimony, support or 
maintenance in the decree or agreement" is one of three "traditional state law indices" which 
produce a "conclusive presumption" of support and shift the burden of proof. 
In re Molino, 225 B.R. 904 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) "If debtor's standard of living will fall 
materially below the creditor's standard of living if the debt is not discharged, then the debt should 
be discharged". Eleven nonexclusive factors to consider.(They are same as in Smither, infra) Ability 
to pay considers debtor's prior, current and future prospects as well as debtor's voluntary removal 
of self from the job market or purposeful underemployment. Fact intensive and balance of factors 
required. Debtor had $48,000 annual income before divorce, now claiming income of $50 to $90 
per week. Former spouse paid $22,434 to creditors which was subject to hold harmless clause and 
debtor could repay over several years on manageable terms. Note the burden of proofthat the debt 
fits §S23(a)(IS) is on the creditor. But the burden of proof to establish the defenses to 
dischargeability are on the debtor. 
In the case ofIn re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996), Judge Dickinson held 
that a debtor's obligation to pay his ex-wife's attorney fees was nondischargeable under §S23(a)( 15) . 
as being in the nature of support. Additionally, the Court held that the equalization of the debtor's 
marital property obligation was also nondischargeable. Any decision under §S23(a)(l 5) is extremely 
fact-specific, and the author would refer the reader to this opinion for the details surrounding the 
Court's holding. Debtor has ability to pay ifhe can pay "all or a material part ... within a reasonable 
amount of time." The eleven non-exclusive factors he considered were: 
1. Amount of debt, including payment terms 
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2. Current income ofthe debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses 
3. Current expenses of debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses 
4. Current assets, including exempt assets of the debtor, objecting creditor, 
and their respective spouses 
5. Current liabilities, excluding those discharged by debtor's bankruptcy, 
of the debtor, objecting creditor and their respective spouses 
6. Health,job skills, training, age and education of the debtor, objecting creditor 
and their respective spouses 
7. Dependents of the debtor, objecting creditor, and their spouses, their ages and 
any special needs which they may have 
8. Any changes in the financial conditions of the debtor and the objecting creditor 
which may have occurred since the entry of the divorce decree 
9. Amount of debt which has been or will be discharged in the bankruptcy 
10. Whether creditor is eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code 
11. Whether the parties have acted in good faith in the filing of the bankruptcy and 
the litigation of the 11 U.S.C.§S23(a)(IS) issues. 
Judge Dickinson's analysis has been approved in an the unpublished decision of the Sixth 
Circuit, In re Patterson, 132 F.3d 33 (6th Cir. 1997) and in the BAP decision in Molino, supra. 
For those in the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Hon. Judge William S. Howard has 
rendered an opinion in In re Owens, 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky., 1996). Here, the Court held that 
the debtor was required to continue making payments on a loan for a motor vehicle driven by the 
former spouse as discharging the same would result in a benefit to the debtor that would outweigh 
the detrimental consequences to the spouse. 
Note however that the court held that a debtor's obligation under a property settlement 
agreement to pay debts on a note did not come within the discharge exception given the absence of 
hold-harmless language. This sentiment is common amongst other Courts in exam ining the situation 
of the hold-harmless language. See also, In re Richardson, 212 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997) 
where court found that debtto debtor's ex-spouse's mother was dischargeable because there was no 
hold harmless language. 
It is interesting to note that in determining whether the debtor had the ability to pay debts 
owed to his ex-spouse, the Court in Owens would not consider payments being made by the debtor 
on a note secured by the residence of the debtor's mother. The Court held that these payments were 
not reasonably necessary to be expended for maintenance or support of the debtor or debtor's 
dependent and therefore could not be considered in determining whether the debtor lacked the abil ity 
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to pay such debts from his own income or property. Attorneys filing §523(a)(15) cases in "the 
Eastern District of Kentucky are advised to read In re Owens as the Court's analysis under the case 
is very complete and well-written. 
In re Milburn, 218 B.R. 862 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998) provides an example of how not to 
litigate in state court and expect to come to bankruptcy court and re-litigate. If the ex-spouse 
attempts to litigate in state court over a debt that the debtor believes was discharged, the debtor must 
immediately remove the matter to the bankruptcy court. 
A very recent decision, In re Romer, 254 B.R. 207 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000), determined that 
the ability to pay would not include consideration of the funds the debtor was spending to support 
his live in girl friend nor the funds he was spending on his adult children. 
In a decision by a district court, In re Cameron, 243 B.R. 117 (M.D.Ala. 1999), the court 
determined that the bankruptcy judge should not consider the IRS guidelines for expenses in 
determining ability to pay, but instead should use the actual expenses, to the extent they were 
reasonably necessary and make that determination as of the time of trial. The court suggested the 
chapter 13 "disposable income" analysis would work well in this context. 
I. The Automatic Stay And §523 Judgment Collection 
One last aside. The Sixth Circuit held in the case ofln re Embry, 10 F 3d 401 (6th Cir. 
1993) that itis!lQ! necessary for a creditor to seek relief from the §362 Automatic Stay to pursue 
collection of a judgment entered in a nondischargeability suit pursuant to §523. A determination 
by the court that the debt is nondischargeable terminates the stay as to that particular debt. This 
allows a creditor to begin collection actions immediately. 
IV. 11 U.S.C. §727 - DENIAL OF DISCHARGE 
11 USC Section 727(a) provides as follows: 
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless -
(1) the debtor is not an individual; 
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a 
creditor or an officer ofthe estate charged with custody of 
property under this title [11 USCA Sections 101 et seq.], 
has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or 
concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, 
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-
(A) property ofthe debtor, within one year before the 
date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing 
of the petition; 
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, 
or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, 
F- 21 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
including books, documents, records, and papers, from 
which the debtor's financial condition or business 
transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or 
failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances 
of the case; 
the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in connection with 
the case-
(A) made a false oath or account; 
(B) presented or used a false claim; 
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain 
money, property, or advantage, or a promise of 
money, property, or advantage, for acting or 
forbearing to act; or 
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to 
possession under this title [11 USCS Sections 101 
et seq.], any recorded information, including 
books, documents, records, and papers, relating to 
the debtor's property or financial affairs; 
the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before 
determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, 
any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the 
debtor's liabilities; 
the debtor has refused, in the case -
(A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than 
an order to respond to a material question or to 
testify; 
(B) on the ground of privilege against 
self-incrimination, to respond to a material 
question approved by the court or to testify, after 
the debtor has been granted immunity with respect 
to the matter concerning which such privilege was 
invoked; or 
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked 
privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to 
a material question approved by the court or to 
testify; 
the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph 
(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within one 
year before the date of the filing of the petition, or during 
the case, in connection with another case, under this title 
[11 USCA Sections 101 et seq.] or under the Bankruptcy 
Act, concerning an insider; 
the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, 
under section 1141 of this title [11 USCS Section 1141], 
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or under section 14,371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in 
a case commenced within six years before the date of the 
filing of the petition; 
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1228 
or 1328 of this title or under 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy 
Act [11 USCS Sections 1060, 1061], in a case 
commenced within six years before the date of the filing 
of the petition, unless payments under the plan in such 
case totaled at least -
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in 
such case; or 
(B) (i) 70 percent of such claims; and 
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good 
faith, and was the debtor's best effort; or 
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed 
by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter. 
11 USCS Sections 701 et seq. 
An Adversary Proceeding seeking to deny the debtor's discharge must be distinguished from 
an attempt to dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy petition, in its entirety, under § 707. Dismissals under 
§707 cannot be at the request or suggestion ofa creditor. 11 U.S.C. §707(S). Additionally, the legal 
grounds for these two Code provisions are quite different. 
Dismissal of the case is like the petition was never filed at all. Denial of the debtor's 
discharge, while not dismissing the case, robs the debtor of the ultimate relief that he sought, that 
is, relief from his non-reaffirmed obligations. 
Likewise, an Adversary Proceeding filed under §727 of the Bankruptcy Code is different 
from an Adversary Proceeding filed under §S23. Remember, an Adversary Proceeding filed under 
§S23 seeks to except an individual debt from discharge. Cases filed under §727 seek to deny 
discharge of all debts, and therefore is a case to the benefit of all creditors. 
Also, unlike cases under §S23, cases under §727 cannot be settled easily. If the debtor is 
guilty of actions that give rise to a complaint under §727, then the discharge should be denied and 
no single creditor should be allowed to capitalize on that knowledge. Bankr. R. 7041 provides 
judicial oversight for the plaintiff's dismissal of a complaint to deny the discharge. There must be 
notice to the U.S. Trustee and the chapter 7 trustee and the court can condition a dismissal on such 
terms and conditions as it deems proper. Those terms do not deny the court the ability to allow 
compromises of claims made in an adversary proceeding to deny the debtor's discharge but they do . 
allow additional judicial oversight to prevent "sale of the discharge". In these circumstances, the 
courts have allowed other creditors to pursue the denial ofthe discharge ifthe creditor who brought 
the action is no longer interested in pursuing it. The lesson is do not file an Adversary 
Proceeding under §727 unless you are willing to take it all the way through trial and that you 
have a case that falls in one of the 10 enumerated grounds for denying discharge under 
§727(a). 
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To improperly use a discharge complaint to coerce a settlement on a §523 claim could be 
considered in violation of 18 U.S.C. §152. It is a bankruptcy crime to knowingly and fraudulently 
give, offer, receive, attempt to obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, 
advantage or promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any case under title 11. 
A. Case Law: §727 
Despite the rarity of §727 actions, there is some case law authority to give the practitioner 
guidance in the event that a creditor wishes to pursue this avenue of relief. In re Adams, 31 F.3d 389 
(6th Cir. 1994) involved a transfer of accounts receivable which served as collateral for a creditor's 
loan. The debtor transferred the accounts receivable into a corporation's operating account rather 
than into the creditor's dominion account. The monies were then used to pay other suppliers. 
The Court denied discharge since the debtor attempted to defraud a creditor by transferring 
property of the debtor within one year before the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If it had 
been done postpetition, it would also qualify for denial of discharge under §727(a)(2)(B). 
The Adams case also stands for the proposition that the standard of proof of §727 actions 
is by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In re Keeney, 227 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2000) is a case of Judge Howard's from the Eastern 
District in which the debtor purchased property over many years and titled it in his parents' names. 
He was attempting to avoid payment of a personal injury judgment. Although the debtor made the 
purchases outside the relevant statutes of limitation the court used the "continuing concealment" 
doctrine to find that the concealment continued into the one year limit set by 727(a)(2)(A). His 
discharge was denied under both 727(a)(2)(A) and 727(a)(4). Note that the creditor whose judgment 
was being hindered was no 10ngercollectibJe because the statute of limitations had expired. The 
Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the "continuing concealment" doctrine and noted that denial of 
discharge does not require proof of harm. Complete financial disclosure is required by the 
Bankruptcy Code to obtain the discharge. 
Interesting reading is the case onn re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, the Court 
actually dismissed a case where the Court found that the debtor had sufficient future income. The 
Sixth Circuit opined that the petitioner's seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code was an abuse of 
the "fresh start" theory that permeates the Bankruptcy Code. The lavish lifestyle and other excesses 
evidenced by the debtor postpetition further demonstrated the abuse that §727 was initiated to deter. 
Examples from the Western District of Kentucky under §727(a)(2) are In re Terrell, 114 
B.R. 907 (W.O. Ky. 1989) [ex-husband's transfer of vehicles to then-girlfriend {now wife} held 
insufficient to deny discharge. NOTE: that the Court used the clear and convincing standard. See 
In re Adams, supra; In re Yokley. 61 B.R. 198 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [four large withdrawals of money 
within three months of filing held to be transfer of property of the debtor with an intent to defraud 
the creditor]; In re Lineberry, 55 B.R. 510 (W.O. Ky. 1985) [debtor's failure to listQM investment' 
account insufficientto deny discharge when debtor's ex-wife admitted she was aware of the account. 
This case also examines §727(a)(3), (4) and (5)]; In re Hargis, 50 B.R. 698 (W.O. Ky. 1985) [debtor 
concealed that his wife was a partner in partnership and the wife held partnership assets. Discharge 
denied. See also, 44 B.R. 225 (W.O. Ky. 1984)]. 
Section 727(a)(3) requires the debtor to keep and preserve records from which his financial 
affairs can be understood. In re Scott, 172 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1999) involved a debtor with 435 boxes 
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of documents which "effectively concealed" the financial maze created by the debtor's interrelated 
entities. The Code places the burden on· the debtor to create books and records accurately 
documenting his business affairs. In re Strbac; 235 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999)denied debtor's 
discharge on summary judgment because debtor owned two unincorporated businesses whose 
records he "kept in his head". No tax returns were provided, and not one piece of paper relating to 
financial activities. Case by case analysis considering debtor's occupation, financial structure, 
education, experience, sophistication and any other factors which should be considered in the 
interest of justice. 
Section 727(a)( 4)(A) requires no knowing and fraudulent false oaths. In re Hamo, 233 B.R. 
718 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) Debtor discharge denied when he did not reveal that he was president of 
a company that bought and sold nine pieces of real estate including 1 just 2 days before bankruptcy; 
did not list $50,000 personal injury claim, and did not disclose $62,304.00 judgment against another 
company. Standard requires proof of: 
1. Debtor made a statement under oath 
2. Statement was false 
3. Statement related materially to the bankruptcy case (fact is material if 
it concerns discovery of assets, business dealings or existence or 
disposition of property) 
4. Debtor knew statement was false 
5. Debtor made statement with fraudulent intent. Intent determined from 
course of conduct of debtor. 
Another detailed case discussing the requirements of §727(a)(4)(A) is In re Schultz, 2000 
WL 575505 (Bankr. N.D. Oh.). See also In re Keeney, 227 F.3d 679(6th Cir. 2000). 
The other options for §727(a)(4) include the knowing and fraudulent withholding of 
recorded information from the trustee, presenting or using a false claim or giving offering, receiving, 
or attempting to obtain money, property or advantage or a promise of money, property or advantage, 
for acting or forbearing to act. 
Quite commonly, the debtor cannot explain a loss of assets. This falls under §727(a)(5) of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Example of cases litigated under that section are as follows: In re Dolin, 799 
F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1986) [debtor testified that the loss of assets were due to his expenditures for 
cocaine and gambling addictions. Held: insufficient to overcome presumption and discharge 
denied. This case also addresses §727(a)(3) concerning failure to keep records]; In re Yokley, 61 
B.R. 198 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [debtor was unable to document what two large withdrawals within three 
months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition were used for. Held: discharge denied]; In re 
Schermer, 59 B.R. 924 (W.O. Ky. 1986) [the debtor was unable to explain the disappearance of 
$26,000 in cash, inventories and receivables within two months of the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. Held: discharge denied]. 
The trustee is most likely to use §727(a)(6) "failure to comply with a lawful order of the 
court" to obtain assets which were to be turned over and then when the asset is not provided, the 
discharge is denied. 
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Section 727(a)(7) permits denial of the discharge when the debtor has committed any act 
specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within one year before the 
date of the filing of the petition, or during the case, in connection with another case, under this title 
[11 USCA Sections 10 1 et seq.] or under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider. TIl at is helpful 
when the debtor as a corporate officer has not complied with the standards in the corporate case and 
then files a personal bankruptcy. See In re Adams, 31 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1994). In re Dolin, 799 F.3d 
251 (6th Cir. 1986). In re Barman, 237 B.R. 342 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1999). 
Seeking a denial of the debtor's discharge under §727 is an all-or-nothing proposition. 
Given the severity of the relief requested, creditors should seek this as a last resort and only when 
they are willing to commit the resources necessary to take a case of this type all the way through 
litigation. 
V. PRACTICE TIPS 
Listed below are some practice tips used by the author's firm found to be very sllccessful 
in litigation under §523 and §727. The tips are in no particular order and are simply offered as an 
aid to the practitioner. 
A. Rule 2004 Exams 
Bankruptcy Code 2004 allows you to examine the debtor much like the taking of a 
deposition. As had been suggested in this chapter, this exam should be perfomed prior to the filing 
of an Adversary Proceeding or a complaint seeking to deny the debtor's discharge. Not only will 
this allow the creditor to evaluate the case, but may insulate a creditor from an attorney's fee 
demand under §523(d). 
Bankruptcy Rule 7030 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)( 4) allow for the taking of 
a deposition or Rule 2004 exam by non-stenographic means. This author takes the 2004 exams by 
video tape. TIlis can be done by agreement or Order of the Court. The only expense involved is the 
cost of the tape and an initial investment of portable video equipment. 
The author has found that this procedure provides the creditor's counsel with a 
psychological advantage. It is suggested that the television being used as the monitor be positioned 
so that the debtor can see himself. Many psychological studies have found that a person is much less 
likely to lie if they can see their own face. The debtor is then caught within the contlict of watching 
them self lie or tell the truth. This psychological pressure often results in more truthful testimony. 
Conduct a deposition or examination as if it will have to be transcribed. Many courts are 
not set up to play video. Even if they are, some judges may not be willing to use them. 
Additionally, opposing counsel may request a transcription ofthe testimony for use at trial. Using. 
tape to impeach a witness can be cumbersome. 
Make sure that all objections are properly preserved for the record. It is also suggested that 
the practitioner have a backup source in the form of an audio tape. That way, ifthe videotape were 
somehow destroyed prior to the transcription being made, there would be a record of the exam. 
Practitioners are advised to observe all of the usual strictures of a deposition such as the 
swearing-in of the witness, identification of the parties and the like. This is often explicated in the 
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Order to take the 2004 exam itself. 
B. The Subpoena Duces Tecum 
In taking a Rule 2004 exam or deposition, the use of a subpoena duces tecum is highly 
recommended. Items to request under the subpoena are discussed below. 
1. Checking and Savings Account Records 
First, ask for checking and savings account statements and canceled checks for the last 12 
to 24 months, looking for preferential or fraudulent transfers. These transfers could be to family, 
friends, business partners, relatives, creditors, or simply unexplained transfers of money. 
The practitioner should also check for extravagant expenditures, especially postpetition. 
This can be very valuable,in a case filed under §S23(a)(8) where the debtor is claiming an undue 
hardship. Ifthe debtor is able to afford luxuries postpetition, then it is unlikely that he or she will 
be able to convince the Court that the payment of the student loan obligation will work an undue 
hardship. 
Ifthe case was filed under §S23(a)(2)(A), the checking account could show that the debtor 
was using cash advances to support a luxurious lifestyle or simply to pay other creditors. It is 
amazing how often debtors will take multiple cash advances very shortly before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition and deposit that money into the checking account. Possession of these checks 
and bank statements could show the flow of those funds. 
A review of the checking and savings account records can also provide evidence of possible 
conversion. If collateral was sold, many times the proceeds from the sale will be placed into one 
of these accounts. Review of the records reveals where the money went, and what it was used for. 
Other proceeds, such as insurance proceeds not turned over to a creditor find their way into 
these accounts. If they were transferred to third parties for "safekeeping" or used for something 
other than car repairs, the checking account may prove to be the key in a case. 
Many times, such proceeds are used to purchase other exemptible assets. Equivalent to 
"bankruptcy planning for the indigent", such evidence can be used to show fraudulent intent and may 
convince the Court to impress an equitable lien on the property. A transcript of the deposition or 
copy of the tape given to the Trustee may give rise to a fraudulent transfer action under §S48 of the 
Bankruptcy Code or a preferential transfer under §S47. 
2. Policies of Property Insurance and Riders 
This practitioner often requests policies of property insurance and riders on homeowners' 
insurance policies. Quite often, this reveals valuable assets either not scheduled or undervalued on 
the debtor's schedule. 
Most homeowners' insurance policies do not cover items such as jewelry, antiques, furs, 
oriental rugs or the like. They are often covered by separate riders. Many times this will provide 
the "persuasion" needed to convince the debtors that they should settle the case. 
C. Use of Written Discovery 
If the practitioner has already filed an Adversary Proceeding and is preparing to take a 
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deposition in the matter, the use of written discovery should be considered. Responses to written 
discovery provides a background to the case and will aid in formulating questions to be asked at the 
upcoming deposition. Similarly, the use of Requests For Production will often provide materials 
to review in advance of the deposition. Finally, documents and written responses received in 
response to written discovery may lead to a request for additional and different documents at the 
deposition via the subpoena duces tecum. 
The use of written discovery will many times yield facts unknown to even the debtor's 
counsel. Providing evidence to the debtor's counsel that his or her client has not been forthcoming 
may provide an avenue for potential settlement of the matter. 
D. Settlement Document 
If an Adversary Proceeding has been filed, this author often enters into an Agreed Judgment. 
The Judgment should declare that the debt is not discharged. Be specific as to what 
Bankruptcy Code section led to the Judgment as this may have an impact if the debtor files for relief 
under the Bankruptcy Code at a future date. This could be considered res judicata or collateral 
estoppel in state court proceedings as well. 
The creditor should also seek a personal judgment against the debtor for the monies due and 
owing. If the debtor later defaults, the Agreed Judgment could be "localized" by filing suit on the 
judgment in state or federal court and initiating proceedings supplemental to collect the debt. 
If an Adversary Proceeding has not been filed, the creditor should use a combination of a 
Reaffirmation Agreement and Agreed Order extending timeto file a nondischargeability suit. 
Recall that the debtor has sixty (60) days from the filing of the Reaffirmation Agreement 
with the Court, or entry of the Discharge Order within which to rescind the Reaffirmation 
Agreement. The creditor should get an extension of time past that last day so that he does not fall 
into the "Catch-22" previously described in this chapter. 
There are certain disadvantages of not filing an Adversary Proceeding and getting an Agreed 
Judgment. The Reaffirmation Agreement does not carry the weight of a Judgment. If a debtor 
reaffirms and then defaults on the Reaffirmation Agreement, it will be necessary to file suit. The 
basis ofthe lawsuit will not be the original contract, but the Reaffirmation Agreement. Localizing 
and collecting on a Judgment is much different than on a Reaffirmation Agreement. 
Additionally, with the Reaffirmation Agreement, the creditor does not have a personal 
judgment. This is why the creditor would have to sue on the Reaffirmation Agreement. One cannot 
immediately move to execute on the Reaffirmation Agreement and it has no res judicata or collateral 
estoppel effect. 
Obviously, there are some advantages to entering into a Reaffirmation Agreement and 
extension of time over an Agreed Judgment. It is usually quicker. The Reaffirmation Agreement 
and Agreed Order can often be negotiated at the first meeting of creditors and the case can be over 
within a few short days. 
Secondly, there is less expense involved in negotiating the Reaffirmation Agreement. You 
do not have the initial outlay of $150 for the court costs, nor the associated attorney time in the 
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litigation of the case. 
The Reaffirmation Agreement does "revive" the creditor's debt. That is, the debt survives 
discharge and can be collected postpetition. Much like an Agreed Judgment, the terms of repayment 
can be spelled-out in the Reaffirmation Agreement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This has been only a brief examination of common Adversary Proceedings filed both for the 
discharge of an individual debt and Adversary Proceedings seeking to deny the debtor's discharge. 
Each case must tum on its own facts and a rereading ofthe Bankruptcy Code is always suggested 
prior to the filing of any Adversary Proceeding. 
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YL. CHAPTER 13 ISSUES - 2000 
BY 
W. THOMAS BUNCH 
BUNCH & BROCK 
LEXINGTON,KENTUCKY 
A. WHY CHAPTER 13? WHEN TO CONSIDER CHAPTER 13 AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO CHAPrER 7 
1. Definition. A Chapter 13 case is one of several remedies available to 
individual debtors who have a regular income and a limited amount of debt. 
2. Alternatives. An individual debtor may file a Chapter 7 liquidation, 
Chapter 11 reorganization, a Chapter 12 farmer's plan or a Chapter 13 wage earner's 
plan. 
3. Purpose of Chapter 13. The debtor is obligated to propose a wage 
earner plan that proposes payments out of the debtor's future earnings to a Chapter 13 
Trustee who will in turn pay those payments to the debtor's creditors in the order of 
priority fixed either by the plan, the Code or the Court, thus paying the creditors either 
in full or in part. 
4. Reason for Filine a Chapter 13. If the debtor has assets that would 
otherwise be lost in a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, he should file a Chapter 13 if 
he has future earnings sufficient to pay the creditors more than what they would receive 
in a Chapter 7 over a period not to exceed sixty months. 
s. Lower Cost. A Chapter 13 case is far simpler, less costly and less time 
consuming than a Chapter 11 case. Different from a Chapter 11 case, a Chapter 13 may 
G-l 
be filed only by the debtor and the plan is approved by the Court without a vote by the 
creditors if it meets the statutory criteria. Chapter 13 creditors neither may defeat a plan 
by voting, nor can they propose their own plan. See In the Matter of Workman, 108 
B.R. 826 (Bkrtcy. Ga. 1989) and Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 
(6th eire 1982). 
6. Broader Discharee Provisions. Chapter 13 cases also provide a 
discharge far broader than that available under either Chapter 7 or 11. Under Chapter 
13, all debts are discharged except for certain long-term debts; taxes; certain educational 
loans; debts for death or injury caused while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; 
and criminal restitution awards. Most importantly, the· remaining debts which are 
nondischargeable under Code §523(a) are dischargeable in a Chapter 13. See also, Code 
§1322(b)(2). 
7. Major Drawbacks to Chapter 13. The major "drawback" to a Chapter 
13 is that a debtor must commit all of his disposable income in plan payments for the 
plan to be confirmed. This requirement (along with certain other restrictions discussed 
hereinafter) is the principal limitation on this type of relief under the Code. 
B. REQUIREMENTS OF CHAPTER 13 PLAN - - ELIGmILITY, 
FEASmILITY AND GOOD FAITH. 
1. Debt EIiKibility. Only an individual who has secured debts at the time 
offiling of $250,000 or less and unsecured debts of $750,000 can ftle a Chapter 13. The 
debts must be non-contingent and liquidated to count. Code § 1 09( e) also requires a 
Chapter 13 debtor to be an individual, not a corporation or partnership. 
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2. Good Faith. Code §1325(a)(3) requires that the plan be filed in good 
faith with intent to payoff or pay down the debtor's creditors. Although "good faith" 
is not specifically defined in the Code, courts have interpreted it to mean the ability of 
the debtor to achieve a confirmed plan. 
3. Feasibility. Code §1325 authorizes the Court to confirm a plan only if 
(a) it complies with the provisions of the Code; (b) all fees required by the Code or by 
the plan to be paid before confirmation have been paid; (c) it is proposed in good faith 
and not by any means forbidden by law; (d) the value of property to be distributed under 
the plan on payments are not less than the amounts that would be paid on such claim if 
the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7; (e) as to each allowed secured claim 
provided for by the plan, either the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; the plan 
provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; the value of 
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the 
allowed amount of such claim; or the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim 
to such holder; and (t) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and 
to comply with the plan terms. 
4. Limitations on Confirmation. If the trustee or the holder of an 
allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not 
approve the plan unless the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not 
less than the amount of such claim; or the plan provides that all the debtor's projected 
"disposable income" to be received in the payback period beginning on the date that the 
first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan. 
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For purposes of Code §1325, "disposable income" means the debtor's income that is not 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor; and if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures 
necessary for the continuation, preservation and operation of such business. 
C. HOW TO COMPUTE AND PLAN - PAYING OFF THE CREDITORS. 
1. Mandato[), Provisions of the Plan. Code §1322(a) sets forth certain 
provisions of the plan that are mandatory and must be included in the plan. 
(a) Submission of the debtor's income to the Trustee. The plan must 
provide that all of the debtor's income or a portion of the debtor's income necessary to 
fund the plan must be paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee. 
(b) Pay all priority claims in full. The plan must provide for payment 
in full of all priority claims defined as such under Code §507, such as administrative 
expenses, taxes, attorneys' fees and other similar expenses as described therein. 
(c) Equal treatment for each particular class. If the plan contains 
provisions classifying the claims, all claims within each particular class must receive 
equal treatment. 
(d) Imposition of mandatory rules under local provisions. Each 
judicial district may have its own local rules which may contain other mandatory 
provisions within that district. 
2. Permissive Provisions of the Plan. Code § 1322(b) provides that there 
are certain provisions which may permissively be included in the plan. 
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(a) Designate classes of unsecured claims. The plan may designate 
classes of unsecured claims or other classes of claims so long as all the unsecured classes 
receive equal treatment under the plan and equal treatment within each class. Public Fin. 
Com. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983). 
(b) Modify the rights of secured claimants. The plan may modify 
the rights of the holders of secured claims from the original lending terms or by a write-
down under Code §506 to the fair market value of the collateral, except that a claim 
secured only by the debtor's principal residence may not be modified in any manner. 
Nobleman v. Amer. Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). 
(c) Cure or waive any default. The plan may cure or waive any 
default. The cure of any default, however, must be provided for in the plan and must 
be accomplished within a reasonable period of time. "Reasonable" is determined by the 
Court under the circumstances of the individual case. 
(d) Concurrently pay secured and unsecured creditors. This plan 
may provide payments to secured and unsecured debts concurrently, even though it 
would normally provide for payments in the order of the priorities set forth in either the 
plan or the Code. 
(e) Cure defaults on long-term debts. The plan may cure defaults 
on long-terms debts that would otherwise survive the plan term and reinstate provisions 
of the creditor's debt instruments if those defaults are cured within a "reasonable" time. 
(I) Provide for payment of post-petition claims. The plan may 
contain provisions for the payment of post-petition claims. 
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(g) Assume, reject or assign executory contracts or unexpired 
leases. The plan may make provisions for the assumption, rejection or assignment of 
executory contracts or unexpired leases, subject to the limitations contained in Code 
§365. In re Ford, 159 B.R. 90 (Bkrtcy. Wash. 1993). 
(h) Provide for payment of all or part of claims from property of 
the estate or property of the debtor. The plan may contain provisions for the payment 
of all or part of the various claims from either the property of the estate or property of 
the debtor and can also propose payments made by a third party entity. 
(i) Provide for the vesting of property of the estate. The plan may 
provide for the vesting of property of the estate, either at confirmation or a later time, 
either in the debtor or another entity. If there is no provision made for the vesting of 
the property, then the vesting would be controlled by Code §1327(b) which revests the 
debtor's assets in the debtor upon confirmation of the plan. 
(j) Other provisions not inconsistent with the title. The plan may 
include any other provision not inconsistent with the Code. Such authorization gives the 
debtor a wide latitude in formulating plan terms and tailoring those terms to suit the 
debtor's individual needs and requirements. 
3. Classification of Claims. A plan may contain classes of creditors, some 
of which or all of which may be paid concurrently pursuant to the terms of the plan, or 
they may be paid in the order of priority as fIXed either in the plan or as provided for 
in Code §503 and §507. 
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(a) Administrative claims. The plan may set up a separate class for 
administrative claims or administrative expenses. The Code describes an "administrative 
expense" in Code §503(b)(I)(A) as including "the actual common necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services 
rendered after the commencement of the case." One such administrative expense would 
be court costs and the Chapter 13 Trustee's commissions. 
(b) Professional fee claims. The plan may also contain a provision 
for the separate payment of attorneys' fees or other fees incurred by professionals, such 
as auctioneers, accountants, realtors or engineers as a Code §503(b)(2) expense. Under 
Code §503(b)(2), compensation and reimbursement may be awarded under Code 
§330(a)(I) which defines compensation for officers of the Court. Under Code 
§330(a)(1), the Court may "award to a trustee, an examiner or a professional person 
employed under §327... (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services 
rendered by the ... professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person 
employed by any such person; and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. " 
See In re Busy Beaver Building Centers. Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1993). At the time 
of the filing of the petition, the debtor's attorney of record becomes a "professional 
person" for purposes of allowance of compensation under the limitations set forth in 
Code §330. 
Many Bankruptcy Courts have placed limitations on Chapter 13 attorneys' 
fees, limiting them either to a routine case fee or an extraordinary case fee, the former 
of which is normally a flat fee and the latter of which is a fee allowed by the Court upon 
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the presentation of the attorney's affidavit containing his time charges and actual 
expenses incurred. In both cases, an order must be entered allowing the compensation 
and ordering that the compensation be paid pursuant to the treatment of that particular 
class set forth in the plan. 
Due to the advent of bankruptcy clinics, many courts including Kentucky's 
have limited attorneys' fees to $600~$750 for "run~of~the~mill garden variety" Chapter 
13 cases. If the attorney desires a higher fee allowance, then the attorney must file a fee 
application, with adequate notice, containing itemized time charges, and obtain court 
approval for the fee. 
(c) Tax claims. Code §503(b)(I)(B) requires the allowance of "any 
tax" (i) incurred by the estate or any "fine, penalty or reduction in credit relating to a 
tax, after application, a hearing and entry of an order." Even though taxes are normally 
non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under Code §523(a), Code §1328(a) provides that a tax 
claim is discharged at the end of the term of the plan, but Code §1322(a) requires 
provisions that the tax claims be paid in full as a condition precedent to confrrmation. 
If the debtor defaults later in the plan and obtains what is known as "hardship discharge" 
under Code §1328(b), then such a discharge would not discharge taxes. This means that 
the debtor must provide for payment in full of the taxes and successfully complete the 
plan to obtain the discharge of his taxes. 
(d) Cured claims. A cured claims class may be provided for in the 
plan if its treatment provisions are reasonable and such provisions cure the default within 
a reasonable time. The cure may be for either a real or personal property claim in 
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arrears, requiring payments to bring the claim into conformity with the original lending 
terms. Failure to cure would give the secured creditor a right to relief from the stay and 
the curing under the plan would preclude the Court from granting such relief. The usual 
method used by the debtors in their plans is to classify the cure claims and then provide 
that early distribution payments go to them from the Chapter 13 Trustee until such time 
as the claims have been brought current. The plan may also contain provisions that the 
current payments be made by the debtor outside of the Chapter 13 case directly to the 
creditor. 
(e) Secured claims. A Chapter 13 plan may make provisions for the 
payment of a secured claim either through the plan or outside of the plan. If there are 
mortgage, automobile, or other consumer property installment payments that are owed 
by the debtor, those payments may be scheduled to be paid outside of the plan and kept 
current by the debtor to preclude any default caused by delay of payments from the 
Chapter 13 Trustee to the secured creditor. The debtor's plan may otherwise provide 
that payments be made to the Chapter 13 Trustee who in tum would make the payments 
to the secured creditor. If a secured creditor's claim is written-down to the value of the 
collateral pursuant to Code §506(a), the payment normally would be made directly to the 
trustee who in tum would pay the secured claim to the extent of the fixed value of the 
collateral and the secured creditor's deficiency would become a part of the unsecured 
creditors' class and treated as such in that class. Memphis Bank v. Whitman, supra. 
Value is either fIXed by the plan or, if contested by the creditor, determined by the Court 
at a valuation. Many courts are hearing valuation on cross-affidavits, with only cross-
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examination of the appraisers at the scheduled hearings. 
(I') Unsecured claims. Unsecured claims are normally treated in one 
class and provisions are made for payment either (A) in full of that class, or (B) of a 
percentage of the total of the claims in that class, or (C) of a specific amount to be paid 
to the creditors in that class regardless of the total amount of the aggregate claims, i.~., 
a pool plan. Payment in full would be determined by taking the total amount of the 
unsecured creditors and dividing it by the length of the plan and the resulting sum would 
approximately equate to the monthly payment to be paid by the debtor either directly or 
by wage deductions payable by the debtor's employer to the Chapter 13 Trustee. A 
percentage payment would propose a certain percentage payback of the total allowed 
claims in the unsecured creditors class, which method can create problems in determining 
the exact amount of the monthly payment. A pool plan provides that a certain amount 
of money paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee over the life of the plan term would go to the 
unsecured creditors, regardless of what the total aggregate class debt amount would be. 
The debtor would not care what the total amount of the aggregate unsecured creditors' 
debts were because he would be paying only a specific sum for the plan duration. 
Trustee's fees would be added to all of these types of plans to obtain the exact payment. 
(g) Insider claims. An "insider" is defined by Code §101(31)(A) as 
a relative of the debtor but this definition is not inclusive because other persons, even if 
they are not relatives, may have such a close relationship to the debtor that they could 
be deemed insiders. Insider debt may be one of two kinds of debts: one that is payable 
as part of the unsecured creditors' class or one which is subject to grounds for objection 
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for inclusion in the unsecured creditors' class. Creditors will object to including an 
insider in an unsecured creditors' class if the insider has taken steps that would give the 
insider an advantage that other creditors would not have had, for example, the insider 
continued making loans to the debtor knowing that the debtor was insolvent and! or 
bankrupt for the purpose of the watering down the unsecured creditors' class. 
Notwithstanding the Code §1322(b)(1) prohibition that the classification of unsecured 
claims may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated, the plan may 
propose a different treatment for a co-obligor's consumer debt if that individual is liable 
on such consumer debt with the debtor. This means that a claim arising from a personal 
guarantee by a relative may be treated differently without violating the prohibition against 
unfair discrimination. The non-bankrupt co-debtor is protected by the debtor's automatic 
stay, but only to the extent of the amount of the debt being paid through the plan. 
Several courts require the debtor to treat all unsecured claims, insiders and 
others, in one class for the first 36-month term under the plan. Since the Code mandates 
all disposable income to be used to finance the plan for the fIrSt 36-month term, then the 
debtor would be free to pledge his disposable income in any way he pleases for the final 
24 months of the term. 
4. Modification of Secured Debt. Code § 1322(b )(2) authorizes the debtor 
to file a plan that will "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, .... " 
(a) Definition of secured claims. Code §506(a) provides that "an 
allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an 
interest, or that is subject to set off under §553 of this title, is a secured claim to the 
G-ll 
extent of the value of such creditor's interest the estate's interest in such property ... and 
is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount 
so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim." To allow a secured 
claim in a Chapter 13, the Court must determine the value of the asset secured by the 
lien thereon, which value amount becomes the secured claim, and subtract that value 
from the total claim; the resultant figure is the allowed amount of the unsecured claim. 
In re 680 Fifth Avenue Associates, 156 B.R. 10tO (Bkrtcy. N.Y. 1993). Often the 
allowance of secured claims is reached by negotiated agreement with the secured 
creditor, otherwise the Court must determine the amount of the allowed claim at a 
valuation hearing. See (e), supra. 
(b) Reduction of secured claim to value. The debtor may write down 
or reduce the secured creditor's claim to an allowed amount equal to the value of the 
collateral under Code §506(a). Once the valuation of the collateral is determined, the 
claim amount is written down to the fair value ofthe collateral and allowed as a secured 
claim in that amount, then the remaining· debt or the deficiency becomes an unsecured 
claim and may be treated in the unsecured creditors' class. If, however, the secured 
creditor's collateral is valued greater than the debt, then the secured creditor is entitled 
to payment in full pursuant to its debt instrument terms and the plan, otherwise such 
failure would justify the Court in granting relief from the automatic stay. If the debtor's 
plan reduces the secured creditor's claim to the value of the collateral, the debtor 
nevertheless must pay the creditor the present day value or interest on the debt to obtain 
confirmation. 
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(c) Exception to the real estate residence. Notwithstanding Code 
§1322(b)(2) that authorizes modification of secured claims, this section contains an 
exception, described as "other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real 
property that is the debtor's principal residence, ... ," which effectively prohibits the 
modification of the debtor's residence's mortgage. Code §1322(c) provides that, 
notwithstanding Code §1322(b)(2) and applicable non-bankruptcy law, any default with 
respect to or that gave rise to a lien on the debtor's residence may be cured at any time 
up to such time as when the residence is sold in a foreclosure sale and if the case is one 
where the last payment on the original payment schedule is due before the date in which 
the final payment under the plan term is due, the plan may provide for the payment of 
the claim as modified to a later date beyond the duration of the plan. This means the 
debtor can extend the final mortgage payments to the end of the term or beyond it. 
The prohibition against modification of the claim against the residence, 
however, is mandatory, but if the Court determines that the secured creditor's claim is 
not secured "only" by a security interest in real property, i.~., is also secured by other 
collateral, then such a partially secured claim can be treated and modified under the plan. 
Although the debtor may modify the rights of the secured creditor, such modifications 
must be confined to the limitations or parameters of Code §1325(a) which mandate that 
the holder of the allowed secured claim has either accepted the plan, or the plan provides 
that the holders such claim retain it's underlying lien and the value of the property to be 
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of the 
allowed claim, or the collateral must be surrendered to the secured creditor. 
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There is a split among the circuits as to whether the claim can be 
bifurcated into two separate classes. Some courts: prohibit bifurcation and some allow 
bifurcation. Compare Lomas Mtge USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992) with 
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). 
(d) Avoidance of lien on consumer property. The debtor either by 
motion or as part of his plan may use Code §522(f)(1) to avoid the fixing of a lien or 
interest on the debtor's property to such an extent that such a lien impairs an exemption 
which the debtor would have been entitled to if such lien were a judicial lien or a non-
possessory, non-purchase money security interest in household goods, furnishings, 
wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments or jewelry that 
are held primarily for personal, family or household use by the debtor or a dependant of 
the debtor, and implements, professional books or tools of the trade of the debtor or the 
trade of a dependent of the debtor, or professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor 
or a dependant of the debtor. A judicial lien that secures a debt to a spouse, former 
spouse or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for support of such spouse or 
child in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court 
of record, if such debt has not been assigned to another entity either voluntarily or by 
operation of law, cannot be set aside. For purposes of determining how the lien and the 
dollar values may be avoided, reference should be made to the formula set forth in Code 
§522(f)(2)(A). 
G-14 
j 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
-
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
!r 
r 
r 
s. Legtb of Plan. 
(a) Minimum and maximum terms. A Chapter 13 plan may be any 
length of time not to exceed 60 months calculated from the date the payments commence. 
Code §1322(d). Since filing a Chapter 13 is limited to an individual with regular 
income, this normally indicates that the debtor is a wage earner receiving a regular 
paycheck. Thus a Chapter 13 plan would normally propose the payment of a certain 
amount of money out of each paycheck, either paid voluntarily to the Chapter 13 Trustee 
or by a payroll deduction order from his paycheck. Nothing, however, precludes a plan 
from providing that the Chapter 13 payment be made irregularly or quarterly or even 
semi-annually or annually, depending on the type of income received by the debtor. The 
plan payment temi therefore may be tailored to fit the debtor's individual needs. The 
court cannot confirm a plan that will take longer than 60 months to be administered. 
(b) Calculation of payback amount. In formulating the plan, the 
debtor's counsel will normally require the debtor to prepare a precise monthly budget. 
He would deduct the total of living expenses from the net take-home pay and the 
remaining amount of money available would be the debtor's disposable income. The 
disposable income would then be the amount of the Chapter 13 payment. That amount 
then would be multiplied by 36 to 60 months to determine the maximum payment that 
the debtor is capable of making, and then the total would be compared to the floor or 
minimum payment required for purposes of confirmation. There is no requirement that 
the debtor pay all indebtedness in fulf; rather, the test is that the debtor must pay to the 
creditors an amount equal to what they would receive in case of a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
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That figure, derived from a Chapter 7 analysis of the debtor's assets and liabilities, 
would determine the floor. The maximum is determined by the debtor's disposable 
income, determined to be the best effort that the debtor can make in paying the most to 
his creditors. Add to the payables any allowable attorneys' fees, other professional fees, 
Court costs and the Chapter 13 Trustee's commissions and expenses, usually 8% - 91h % 
of the payable amount, and the payback sum is determined. 
6. Discbaraeability Considerations. At the end of every successful Chapter 
13. a discharge of any remaining unpaid indebtedness is ordered by the Court. 
Dischargeability of a Chapter 13 debtor is treated in Code §1328 at the end of a term. 
This discharge is different from the discharge that is normally entered in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case. 
(a) Discbargeability in Chapter 7. Under Code §523, certain debts 
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. These debts include 
taxes~ a debt incurred by fraud, a debt not listed in the petition; a debt incurred by fraud 
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny; a debt due 
a spouse~ former spouse or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for support 
of such spouse or child in connection with the separation agreement, divorce decree or 
other determination made under law by governmental unit; a debt for a fine, penalty or 
forfeiture payable to or for the benefit governmental unit; a debt incurred for an 
educational benefit or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit; a debt 
incurred for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle 
while being intoxicated from using alcohol, drug or another substance; a debt that was 
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or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior bankruptcy case under 
which he waived his discharge; a debt provided for any final judgment, reviewable order 
or consent order or decree entered in a United States or State Court issued by a Federal 
depository institution's regulatory agency rising from any act of fraud or defalcation 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed with respect to a depository institution or 
insured credit union; a debt incurred for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill a 
commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institution's regulatory agency to 
maintain capital of that institution; a debt incurred for the payment of an order of 
restitution issued under the criminal code; a debt incurred to pay a tax to the United 
States that would otherwise be non-dischargeable; and a debt incurred for a property 
settlement division or separation agreement or divorce decree relating to property unless 
the debtor does not have the ability to payor discharging such debt would result in a 
benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former 
spouse or child of the debtor. All other debts, except these, are dischargeable in a 
Chapter 7, but some would otherwise be dischargeable in a completed Chapter 13 plan. 
(b) Super-Dischargeability in Chapter 13. Code §1328 provides two 
types of discharges, both of which have some super-dischargeability consequences that 
are different from the discharge in a Chapter 7. At the successful completion of all 
payments under the plan, unless the Court approves a written waiver of discharge 
executed by the debtor after the bankruptcy has been filed, the Court grants a discharge 
of all debts provided for in the plan or disallowed under the plan, except for debts that 
are provided in the plan to survive the discharge where the last payment is due after the 
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date of which the final payment of the plan is due; for restitution or a criminal fine in 
a sentence on the debtor's conviction of the crime; and debts due a spouse, former 
spouse or child of the debtor for alimony, maintenance or support; debts due for an 
educational benefit or loan made by an insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit; 
and debts incurred by death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a 
motor vehicle when the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another 
substance. This means that debts incurred by fraud and debts due for taxes and the other 
exceptions listed in Code §S23(a) are otherwise dischargeable if the Court confirms and 
the debtor completes the plan. Note that taxes are required to be provided for in full. 
Code §1328(a) provides that "the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts 
provided for by the plan ... ," even though said debts are not paid in full. The 
conditioned limitation is that the debtor has to complete the payments under the plan. 
(c) Hardship Discharge of claims in Chapter 13. Code §1328(b) 
provides for a second kind of discharge in a Chapter 13, known as the hardship 
discharge. The Court may grant a discharge to the debtor under this section even though 
he has not completed the payments under the plan if the debtor's failure to complete such 
payments was due to circumstances for which the debtor should be justly held 
accountable and the debtor has paid to the creditors upon the date of the discharge or the 
application therefor a sum equal to what the creditors would have received if the debtor 
had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on the original filing date; and if a modification of the 
plan to provide for other payment terms is not practicable. This discharge will discharge 
this debtor from all unsecured debts provided in the plan, except debts that were 
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scheduled to be paid beyond the payment date last due under the plan and excepts all of 
the Code §523(a) debts from the discharge. This means that tax debts, fraud debts and 
all of the non-dischargeable debts specified in Code §523 would not be discharged under 
the Code §1328(b) discharge, but could be discharged under a Code §1328(a) discharge. 
(d) Mandatory payments in full. To obtain the right to the Code 
§1328(a) discharge, the plan payments must be paid in full in conformity with Code 
§1322(a) for the debtor to be entitled to the discharge. Since Code §1322(a) contains 
mandatory provisions for the payment of certain debts, i.e., all claims entitled to a 
priority under Code §507, then for the debtor to obtain the super-discharge under 
§1328(a), all payments proposed by the plan, must be paid in full. 
(e) Treatment of Domestic Relations Claims. A line of cases has 
developed that give to the debtor the right to create separate classes with separate 
provisions for debts due for alimony, maintenance, or child support. See In re Gianakas, 
917 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1990). There is a split of authority as to whether such 
classifications can properly be included in a plan, although the majority interpretation of 
most courts is that separate classification can be made. The limitation, however, is that 
the plan payments must not unfairly discriminate against another class of creditors, and 
if a former spouse, entitled to alimony, maintenance or support, is preferred over other 
creditors, then probably the plan itself is not confirmable under Code §1322(a). The 
October, 1995 amendments added Code §523(a)15, giving non-dischargeability status 
to debts incurred for property division arising out of divorce· decrees and property 
settlements. A debtor would therefore normally attempt to either include the former 
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spouse in a separate class for special treatment or alternatively include the spouse as an 
unsecured creditor in the unsecured creditors' pool and avail himself of the Code 
§1328(a) discharge. The hardship discharge under 1328(b), however, would not 
discharge any spousal debts remaining unpaid at the time of the termination of the plan. 
(I') Effect of Confirmation. Notwithstanding the discharge that is 
entered under Code §1328 after the completion of the plan, the confirmation of the plan 
itself has consequences that are beneficial to the debtor. First, the provisions of the 
confirmed plan bind not only the debtor but each creditor, whether or not the claim of 
such creditor is provided for by the plan and whether or not such creditor has objected 
to, has accepted or has rejected the plan. Secondly, except as otherwise provided in the 
plan or the order confirming the plan, once the plan is confirmed all of the property of 
the estate is vested in the debtor, and under Code §1327(c), the vesting of said property 
in the debtor is free and clear of any claim or interest of the debtor provided for by the 
plan. This means that once the plan is confirmed, any property that was property of the 
estate for purposes of determining the minimum payment due the unsecured creditors is 
thereafter free of any creditor's claims and may be disposed of by the debtor in any 
manner chosen by him. The disposal of the property, however, does not eliminate the 
debtor's obligation to make the plan payments, but any conversion of a Chapter 7 would 
revert back to the date of the bankruptcy action when the order of relief was entered and 
thereby bind the debtor to the Chapter 7 Trustee for the value of the property of the 
estate that existed at the time of the filing of the Chapter 13 since converted to a Chapter 
7. If the debtor has disposed of the property, the debtor may not be able to raise the 
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cash necessary to satisfy the Chapter 7 Trustee and thereby could forfeit his discharge. 
7. Leases and ExecutotY Contracts. Unexpired leases and executory 
contracts may either assumed, rejected or assumed and assigned either by motion during 
the pendency of a Chapter 13 or pursuant to the terms of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan 
as authorized by Code §365. 
(a) Assumption. Under Code §365(b)(l)(C), if there is an unexpired 
lease or an executory contract, the debtor has the option to assume such lease or contract 
if he either cures or provides adequate assurance that he will promptly cure any pre-
existing default; compensates or provides adequate assurance that he will compensate the 
party to the contract for any actual pecuniary loss resulting from such default and 
"provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease." An 
example would be that if the debtor is a party to an automobile lease, he may, either by 
motion or pursuant to the plan, assume that lease and provide for a separate classification 
for the curing of any arrearage due by providing for early payments to such creditor and 
continuing to make the monthly lease payments outside of the plan. Even though the 
creditor may oppose the assumption of such lease or unexpired contract, so long as the 
debtor meets the conditions set forth in Code §365(a), then the Court should approve the 
assumption. 
(b) Rejection. The debtor may, either by motion or as a part of the 
terms of the plan, reject any unexpired lease or executory contract. Any rejection again, 
like an assumption, must be approved by the Court and the rejection of a lease or 
contract will probably result in damage to the rejected party. That damage then becomes 
G-21 
an unsecured claim presumed to have been in existence as of the date of the filing of the 
bankruptcy. 
(c) Assignment. Code §365(t) also authorizes the assumption and the 
assignment of an unexpired lease or executory contract. If, for example, an automobile 
lease has value, the debtor may assume the contract, cure the default and comply with 
the provisions of Code §365(b)(1)(A),(B) and (C), and then under Code §365(t)(2), the 
debtor may assign the executory contract or unexpired lease, but only if he gives 
adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease. The 
latter requirement applies even if there has not been a default in such contract or lease. 
S. Mort&a&e on Debtor's Principal Residence. The plan may make various 
provisions relating to the debtor's residence. 
(a) Treatment in Plan. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy, if the 
debtor owns his real estate residence, whether with or without a mortgage thereon or 
with or without equity, various treatments may be made with respect to the residence 
debt. As discussed before, if the plan attempts to modify a secured creditor's claim, one 
of the Code limitations is that modification cannot be made as to the debtor's principal 
residence. This means that if there is a mortgage, the mortgage must be reaffirmed by 
the debtor as a part of the plan, any arrearages cured and paid according to the terms 
thereunder or the debtor will be subject to the lifting of the stay. 
(b) Use of state exemption statute. If the debtor's real estate 
residence is unencumbered, then the debtor may use the state exemption statute of $5,000 
per person or a total of $10,000 for a married couple (and may use the general 
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exemption of $1,000 for each debtor) against the residence for purposes of lowering the 
total amount of equity that would otherwise result in calculating the minimum or floor 
payments due under the Chapter 13 plan. Thus, if married debtors owned a residence 
valued at $25,000, the debtor could use their $10,000 real estate residence exemption to 
reduce the net equity to the creditors to $15,000 to establish the floor or minimum 
payments for purposes of the plan. As noted above, the disposable income test would 
determine the maximum amount but the floor would be the amount used for purposes of 
determining the Code §1328(b) confirmation or hardship discharge requirements later. 
(c) Abandonment of an asset. If the debtor's residence is fully 
encumbered and the debtor is unable to either make plan payments or to cure any 
arrearage for purposes of preventing the lifting of the stay, then the debtor may abandon 
the asset. The abandonment of the asset simply means that the Bankruptcy Court 
jurisdiction is ended upon the entry of the Court's order approving the abandonment and 
the stay, if thereafter lifted, would enable the secured creditor to file a foreclosure suit, 
force a sale and receive the proceeds from the sale for application on its mortgage debt. 
Any deficiency would become an unsecured claim and would be treated by the plan's 
unsecured creditors' pr,?visions. Abandonment is determined by a debtor when there is 
an inability to pay the mortgage payments through the terms of the plan and there is no 
significant equity that needs to be preserved by the debtors in retaining the asset. 
(d) Putting the Plan Together. A sample plan, usually fitting for most 
debtors, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. and references in this section shall be made to 
said Exhibit. 
G-23 
(1) Steps for Formulatig Plan. The debtor's attorney, using 
the information obtained from the debtor as set forth in the previous section, would 
perform the following: 
(2) 
(a) Calculate the debtor's budget 
(b) Determine the floor payments by doing a Chapter 7 
Liquidation Analysis 
(c) Calculate the debtor's "best effort" or "disposed 
income" , 
(d) Determine the length of the plan, 
(e) Create the creditor's classifications, 
(t) Obtain debtor's authorization to proceed, and 
(g) Obtain debtor's signature on plan. 
Service of Plan. The plan should be filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the Petition and Schedules, but can be filed within 
15 days thereafter, or even longer if approved by the Court. All creditors, the standing 
Chapter 13 Trustee and all known attorneys representing creditors must be served. The 
debtor's attorney is required to file in court his certificate of service of the plan. 
(3) Confirmation Bearin.:. The proposed plan is argued 
before the court at the Confirmation Hearing. The Chapter 13 Trustee will have filed 
his recommendations and comments and any creditor will have filed their objections to 
the plan. The court, after hearing arguments will either confirm, order amendments to 
the plan or refuse to confirm. If confirmation cannot be obtained, the debtor can either 
dismiss the Chapter 13 or convert to Chapter 7; the court cannot order involuntary 
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conversion. 
D. POST CONFIRMATION DEFAULT. 
1. Effect of Default. If a debtor fails to comply with the provisions of his 
plan, he may obtain a modification of the plan, convert to Chapter 7 or dismiss the 
Chapter 13. 
2. Modification of the Plan. Code §1329 allows the debtor to modify his 
plan by either increasing or reducing his plan payments, extending or reducing the time 
for such payments or by altering the terms of distribution to the creditors. Modifications 
have to be approved by the Court, but the limitations and conditions applicable to 
confirmation of the original plan still apply to the approval of the modified plan. Code 
§1329(b)(I). 
3. Dismissal or Conversion. Under Code § 1307 , the debtor may 
voluntarily elect to convert to a Chapter 7 (or to a Chapter 11 or 12), but only if the 
debtor so elects to be converted. The case can be dismissed by the Court for 
unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to the creditors, non-payment of fees, failure to file 
a timely plan, denial of confmnation of the proposed plan, material default of a plan 
term, revocation of the confirmation order, or failure to file timely such information 
required to be delivered to the trustee. The above list is merely illustrative; the reason 
for dismissal must be "for cause" as determined by the Court. 
E. POST-PETITION DEBT. 
1. No New Debt Intended. The purpose of the Chapter 13 pay-back is 
to payoff old debt, not to incur new debt. Any new debt that is incurred would be 
G-25 
legally binding on the debtor, but because his income has been submitted to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, a post-petition creditor cannot garnish or attach the 
debtor's income being used to fund the plan. The creditor must wait until the plan is 
either completed or the debtor's case is dismissed. If there is a conversion to Chapter 
7, however, the post-petition-incurred debt is includable in the debt pool and is 
dischargeable through the Chapter 7. 
2. Tax Debts. Code §1305(a)(l) provides that if post-petition tax debts are 
incurred, the taxing unit may file a proof of claim and seek payment through the Chapter 
13. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that if the taxing unit fails to file a proof of claim, 
the debtor can file one for the taxing unit so it will be paid under the plan. 
3. Consumer Debts. Code § 1305(a)(2) provides that if consumer debts are 
incurred after the Chapter 13 case if filed, the creditor may file a proof of claim and seek 
payment through the Chapter 13. If, however, the consumer creditor "knew or should 
have known" that prior approval by the trustee of the debtor's incurring the obligation 
was practicable but was not obtained, its proof of claim will be disallowed under Code 
§1305(c). 
4. Non-dischar&e of Post-petition Debt. If the debtor incurs post-petition 
debt without obtaining the trustee's permission and such permission time was practicable, 
then under Code §1328(d), that post-petition debt would not be included in the debtor's 
discharge at the completion of the Chapter 13, but would survive the bankruptcy as a 
non-dischargeable debt. 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
LEXINGTON DMSION 
Case No. In re: sample Chapter '::3:--------
CHAPTER 13 PLAN 
NOTICE 
THIS PLAN CONTAINS EVIDENTIARY MATTER WHICH, IF NOT CONTROVERTED, MAYBE ACCEPTED BY 
THE COURT AS TRUE. CREDITORS CANNOT VOTE ON THIS PLAN BUT MAY OBJECT TO ITS 
CONFIRMATION PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE § 1324, AND LOCAL RULES. ABSENT ANY SUCH 
OBJECTION, THE COURT MAY CONFIRM THIS PLAN AND ACCEPT THE VALUATION AND ALLEGATIONS 
CONTAINED HEREIN. 
The Debtor(s) above named hereby proposes the following plan. 
I. ~ All debts are provided for by this Plan. Only creditors holding claims duly proved and allowed shall be entitled to payments from 
the Trustee. (See Notice of Filing for Bar Date.) Trustee shall not file a claim on behalf of any creditor. 
2. Payments. As of the date of this Plan, the debtor has paid $0.00 to the Trustee. Debtor and/or any entity from whom the income shall 
pay to the Trustee the sum of $0.00 Monthly, commencing , for 60 months for total of $0.00 or until such 
amounts are paid that will afford payment of all allowed and proven claims in the amounts payable under this Plan. 
3. Plan Payments. The Trustee, from available funds, shall make payments to creditors in the following amounts and order. All dates for 
beginning of payments are estimates only and may be adjusted by the Trustee as necessary to carry out the terms of this plan. 
A. DEBTOR'S 
ATTORNEY 
NOIfE 
FEE PAID TO BALANCE 
REQUESTED DATE DUE 
--- PAYMENT SCHEDULE --- TOTAL 
PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH PAYMENTS 
B. Mortgage Arrears. (Regular monthly payments to be made by Debtor and to start on the first due date after date of filing petition.) 
--- PAYMENT SCHEDULE -- TOTAL 
CREDITOR RAtE ARREARS PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH PAYMENTS 
NONE 
C. Secured Claims. (A creditor's secured claim shall be the net amount due as of date of filing or the value of the collateral to which 
creditor's lien attaches, whichever is less. Interest shall be allowed at contract rate or 12.00% APR whichever is less. Creditor shall retain 
its lien until the allowed secured portion of the claim is fully paid.) 
CREDITOR & 
COLLATERAL 
i. Secured Claims - Paid in full 
NOIfE 
D. Secured Claims - Cure default only 
NOIfE 
RATE 
-- PAYMENT SCHEDULE --- TOTAL 
CLAIM PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH PAYMENTS 
D. Prioritv Claims. (Unsecured claims entitled to priority under II U.S.C. § 507 shall be paid in full as foIlows.) 
CREDITOR 
NONE 
PRIORITY 
CLAIM 
-- PAYMENT SCHEDULE ---
PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH 
TOTAL 
PAYMENTS 
E. Separate Class of Unsecured Claims. (May include co-signed debts as provided for by II U.S.C. § 1301, including interest at contract 
rate.) 
CREDITOR & 
CLASSIFICATION 
NOIfE 
Chapter 13 Plan - Page I of 3 
UNSECURED --- PAYMENT SCHEDULE --- TOTAL 
RATE CLAIM PAYMENT MONTH LENGTH PAYMENTS 
G-27 
In re: sample Case No. :::-______ _ 
Chapter 13 
F. Unsecured Creditors. (All other creditors not scheduled above are deemed unsecured without priority and shall be paid pro rata from 
funds remaining after payment of the above scheduled claims. Debtor estimates the unsecured claims to total $0.00, and proposes to 
provide at least $0.00, which will pay in full said creditors claims, or in no event, provide a composition percentage ofIess than 0%. 
(Funds ProvidedlUnsecured Claims) 
G. Lien Avoidance. (Debtor intends to file a motion, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4003(d) to avoid all nonpossessory, nonpurchase 
money security interests and judicial liens as provided by I I U .S.C. §522(f), and the plan herein provides for payment of such liens as 
general unsecured claims only. Any creditors claim or portion thereof not listed in paragraph C. above is to be treated as unsecured and, 
unless objected to, such unsecured status, for purposes of this plan, will be binding upon confirmation, but the lien shall survive unless 
avoided. 
H. Leases and Contracts. The Debtor hereby assumes the following unexpired leases and executory contracts, and rejects all others. 
NAME OF CREDITOR 
HOD 
L Miscellaneous Provisions. 
HOD 
DESCRIPTION 
4. Secured Claims - Paid directly by debtor!s>. The following creditors' claims are fully secured, shall be paid directly by the debtors; 
and shall receive no payments under paragraph 3 above: 
CREDITOR 
HOllE 
COLLATERAL ~TVALUE AMOUNTOFCLMM 
5. Future Income. Debtor(s} submits all future earnings or other future income to such supervision and control of the Trustee as is necessary for 
the execution of this Plan. 
J 
J 
J 
j 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
6. Standing Trustee Percentage Fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §586(e)(B), the Attorney General, after consultation with the United States Trustee, J 
sets a percentage fee not to exceed ten percent of payments made to creditors by the Trustee under the terms of this Plan. 
Chapter 13 Plan - Page 2 of 3 G-28 
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SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF PLAN PAYMENTS TO BE MADE BY TRUSTEE 
A. Total debt provided under the Plan and administrative expenses 
1. Attorney Fees 
2. Mortgage Arrears 
3. Secured Claims 
4. Priority Claims 
S. Separate Class of Unsecured Claims 
6. All other unsecured Creditors 
Total payments to above Creditors 
Trustee percentage 
* Total Debtor payments to the Plan 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
* Total payments must equal total of payments set forth in paragraph 2 on page I of this Plan. 
B. Reconciliation with Chapter 7 
I. Interest of unsecured creditors if Chapter 7 tiled 
a. Total property of debtor 
b. Property securing debt 
c. Exempt property 
d. Priority unsecured claims 
e. Funds for Chapter 7 distribution (est.) 
2. Percent of unsecured, nonpriority claims paid under Plan 
3. Percent of unsecured, nonpriority claims paid if Chapter 7 tiled (est.) 
Attorney for Debtor(s): 
Barno. 
BUNCH & BROCK 
271 WEST SHORT STREET, SUITE 80S 
P.O. BOX 2086 
LEXINGTON KY 40588-2086 (606)254-5522 
Signed: 
Chapter 13 Plan - Page 3 of 3 
Signed: 
sample, Debtor 
Dated: 
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WORKING WITH THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OFFICE 
Beverly M. Burden 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
Lexington, Kentucky 
and 
William W. Lawrence 
Attorney at Law 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
Western District of Kentucky 
Louisville, Kentucky 
Copyright 2000, Beverly M. Burden, William W. Lawrence 
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WORKING WITH THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OFFICE 
IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
BEVERLY M. BURDEN 
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE 
MAILING ADDRESS: 
PAYMENT ADDRESS: 
LOCATION: 
TELEPHONE: 
FAX: 
E-MAIL ADDRESS 
(FOR GENERAL INQUIRIES): 
WEBSITE: 
CASE INFO. AVAILABLE 
FOR AUTHORIZED USERS AT: 
PO Box 2204 
Lexington KY 40588 
Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
PO Box 1766 
Memphis TN 38101-1766 
100 East Vine Street 
Suite 500 
Lexington KY 40507 
859-233-1527 
859-255-3143 
questions@ch13edky.com 
www.ch13edky.com 
www.13network.com 
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
LOCAL RULES & FORMS SPECIFIC TO CHAPTER 13 CASES 
LOCAL RULES 
Below is tIre hypertext versioll of the Local Rules and Orders for the US Bankruptcy COllrt, Eastem District of 
Kenlllcky. If you 'd prefer, you can also clroose Adobe Acrobat (PDF) versions of our Local Rules and Standing Orders 
or tire 1999 amendments to tile Federal Rules QfBankruptq procedure. If you do not have tile free Acrobat Reader, 
you can also get it "ere. (l'lrese files are large-you may wislr to right-click on the lilrks and save tIre documelns to your 
local drive.) There are a number of onlille versions of the Federal Rilles of Ballkruptcy. YOll may find tIre L6gJzL 
I,,/Ormation Inuitute version at Cornell Law Sellool website helpfuL 
For Proofs of Claim and other official bankruptcy forms 
visit bttp:llwww.uSCQurts.govlbankform/ 
If you need these materials in an another format, please call us at (859) 233-2608, x. 134, or seud us e-lUaU. 
Local Rules and Forms of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky 
Effective May 1, 1997 
Note: These Rilles were amended by ~ r dated JanuaO' 1.199£ November 1, 1998. 
My 1.1999, December 29, 1999, an • IAII these are reproduced at the end of this 
page. Please refer to those amen menls as well as to the text of the Rules. 
Note also that a new lJl1J},{~fir11lation Agreemendrasbeenisslled by tire 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
Also, effective February 15, 1999, motions for relief in Jlldge Howard's cases must be noticed for 
hearing in the division to which the case is assigned. Except where an order allowing a hearing in a 
different division is obtained prior to tlte filing of a motion for relief, no relief motions sltall be 
noticed for Itearing on Lexington motion days otlter titan cases in tlte Lexington division. 
HONORABLE WILLIAM S. HOWARD, CHIEF JUDGE 
HONORABLE JOE LEE, JUDGE 
TABLE OF RULES 
1001-1. Citation and Author~ 
1001-2. Organization of Local Rules 
1002-1. Petition - General- Number of Copies of Petition and Schedules Required to be Filed 
With the Clerk 
1002-2. Petitjoll=.Ats.embJ.e~.le 
1002-3. Petition - Corporation 
1004-1. Petiilim - Partn.ership. 
1006-1. Fees - Installment payments 
1007-1. Lists, Schedules & Statements - Petition not Accompanied bUclwlyleS.J}J.!d..staleme.nts 
H-2 
1.1 
.I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
LOCAL RULES 
1007-2. Mailing - List or Matrix 
1071-1. Dhisions - Bankruptcy Court 
2002-1. Notice to Creditors & Other Interested Parties -- General 10 Day Notice Requirement 
2016-1. Compensation of Professionals - Requirements Supplemental Fee Applications 
1/3001-1. Claims and Equity Security Interests General 
lA002-1. Claim - Proof of by Creditor Holding a Secured Claim in Chapter 13 Case 
3003-1. Claims - Chapter 11 Case 
3009-1. Dividends - Chapter 7 Asset Cases - Deadline for Amending Claims 
\/3015-1. Chapter 13 - Plan - Service of Plan 
LAOI5-2. Chapter 13 Amendments to Plans Service of Plan . 
~015-3. Chapter 13 - Confirmation 
3017-1. Disclosure Statement - Approval 
3020-1. Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plan - Hearing on 
4001-1. Automatic Stay - Relief From 
4001-4. Hearings on Motions for Relief From Stay in the Lexington Division 
4001-5. Hearings on Motions for Relief From Stay in Divisions Other Than Lexington 
4003-1. Exemptions 
4003-2. Lien Avoidance 
4008-1. Reaffirmation 
5001-2. Clerk- Office LocationlHours 
5005-1. Filing Papers - Requirements 
5006-1. Court Papers - Uncertified Copies 
6004-1. Sale of Estate Property 
6008-1. Redemption 
7007-1. Motion Practice (in Adversary Proceedings) 
7026-t. Discovery - General 
7067-1. Registry Fund 
9014-1. Hearings on Motions 
9014-2. Contested Matters - Under Submission 
9022-1. Judgments & Orders - Notice of 
FORMS 
1. Special Reqyirements for Mailing List Matrix 
(see an importantNotitconcerning the Matrix) 
.v3• Certificate of Service of Plan. 1,\ I., ~ (. v I) &1'2. Chapter 13 Plan. J l1e"I(c'" ~'1 S1"",.Jl)'N~ Cou.qf O~Mc2. 
.v. 4. Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan. of Au, US1' I J 20 aO 
5. Motion for Relief From Stay. 
6. Objection to Exemptions. 
7(1). Motion for Order Avoiding Lien on Exempthap~. 
7M. Motion for Order Ayoiding Lien on Exempt.lr.o.p~. 
8...Motion for Approval of Reaffirmation Agreement. 
9. Motion to Redeem Prop~ 
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LOCAL RULES 
section 327 or 1103 of title 11 must have attached thereto a copy of the order of retention or 
authorization. 
Supplemental fee applications shall, in the same manner as original fee applications, contain all the 
infonnation required by Rule 2016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
/ RULE 3001-1. CLAIMS AND EQt1lTY SECURITY INTERESTS - GENERAL 
Each proof of claim, with supporting documents evidencing the claim and the perfection of a security 
interest, if any, shall be submitted in duplicate, one original copy, complete with supporting 
documents, for the court case file, and one conformed copy, complete with supporting documents, for 
the trustee's case file. The original copy, which must bear the original signature of the claimant, shall 
be retained by the clerk in the court case file. The conformed copy, which may bear a photocopy of the 
claimant's signature, but which otherwise shall be complete in all respects with supporting documents, 
shall be forwarded by the clerk to the trustee. 
The trustee shall examine and object to any defective or insufficiently documented claim, if any useful 
purpose would be served thereby. 
Upon request, the Clerk of Court shall provide claimants with instructions for filing proofs of claim. 
The requirements for filing in duplicate and documenting proofs of claim apply with equal force to any 
/ 
proof of an equity security interest in a debtor corporation. 
RULE 3002-1. CLAIM - PROOF OF BY CREDITOR HOLDING A SECURED CLAIM IN 
CHAPTER 13 CASE 
A proof of claim in conformity with Local Rule 3001-1 by or on behalf of a creditor, including a 
creditor holding a secured claim, other than a claim secured by an interest in real estate, must be filed in 
a chapter 13 case before the debtor or trustee may make payments to such creditor in accordance with 
the plan. Proof of a secured claim filed after the expiration of the time fixed by Rule 3002( c) of the 
Federal Rules of Banlcruptcy Procedure for filing claims shall be allowed only to the extent of the value 
of the collateral securing the claim. 
RULE 3003-1. CLAIMS - CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Unless the court for cause shown orders otherwise, the cutoff date for filing unscheduled claims or 
claims scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated in a chapter 11 case shall· be the date of the 
order approving the disclosure statement. 
RULE 3009-1. DMDENDS - CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES - DEADLINE FOR AMENDING 
CLAIMS 
When estate funds are available in a chapter 7 case for payment of a dividend to creditors holding 
allowed unsecured claims, the deadline for filing an amended claim for any deficiency remaining after 
the liquidation of collateral or for requesting an extension of time within which to file an amended 
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LOCAL RULES 
claim shall be the date of the final hearing on applications for compensation or, in divisions other than 
the Lexington division, if applications for compensation are filed on a notice and opportunity basis, 
such deadline shall be the last date for objecting to such applications for compensation in accordance 
with the notice. No dividend shall be paid on an amended claim filed after that date by a creditor who 
did not timely request an extension of time within which to amend the claim. 
RULE 3015-1. CRAPTER 13 - PLAN - SERVICE OF PLA N 
(a) Foun of plan. ~a. pter 13 plan shall conform substantially ~o Form No.2 with such alterations as 
may be approprif ~y-suit .the circumstances. . R.l" 'st ~ 6'1 srt1N ~ ''''6-Cott'li OJ( 6l~ n AT( I) 
(b) Service of plan. Concurrently with the filing ofthe plan the debtor or the debtor's attorney shall 
cause a copy of the plan to be served by first class mail upon all creditors of the debtor and other 
parties in interest. The debtor or the debtor's attorney shall file with the plan a certificate of service in 
the form prescribed by Form No.3 certifying that a copy of the plan has been served by first class mail 
upon all creditors of the debtor and parties in interest. 
RULE 3015-2. CHAPTER 13 - AMENDMENTS TO PLANS - SERVICE OF PLAN 
A modified chapter 13 plan shall be served upon all creditors and parties in interest and shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service in the same manner as the original plan. The modified plan and 
the order confirming a modified plan shall identify the plan as the First, Second, etc. Modified Plan 
Dated ____ , 
RULE 3015-3. CHAPTER 13 - CONFIRMATION 
uq~~o.sJ;oJ.~lfiDtDaJw· :m.. An objection to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is governed by 
deral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Such objection shall be filed with the court 
ays prior to the hearing on confirmation of the plan, shall be served upon the debtor, 
e debtor and the chapter 13 trustee, and shall be noticed for hearing at the hearing on 
confirmation f plan. An objection by a creditor to the reconunendation of the chapter 13 trustee as 
to the allow tl amo t of the secured claim of such creditor may be presented at thelhraring on 
confirmati of the Ian. ~l V\StD 0'1 srAN~IJ\lG- OR!)(wt O~ g , o'D 
(2) Hearing on Confinnation. The court shall rule on confirmation ofa chapter 13 plan after hearing on' 
notice to the debtor, the attorney for the debtor, and all creditors, including creditors holding secured 
claims, and any creditor who has timely filed an objection to confirmation of the plan. Notice of the 
hearing on confirmation of a chapter 13 plan may be combined with the notice of the meeting of 
creditors given pursuant to Rule 2002 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Ifno objection is 
timely filed, the court, without hearing evidence, may find that the plan has been proposed in good 
faith and not by any means forbidden by law. 
~""""""""'~""""'''''''l''~' I.U. The order of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan shall conform substantially 
copy of the order shall be served promptly upon the debtor or the attorney for the 
trustee, and any creditor who timely filed an objection to confirmation of the 
{(HIS( D 81./ STA.AI ~lN" ORM.e or g/" ro 
H-5 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
STANDING ORDER 
Effective August 1.2000. Local Rules 30IS-1(a}. 301S-3(a)(1) and 301S-3(b) [E.D. Ky. LBR 30 IS-I(a}. 
aD. Ky. LBR 30IS-3(a)(I) and E.D. Ky. LBR 301S-(b)] arc hereby amended to rcad as follows: 
RULE 3015-1. CHAPTER 13 - PLAN - SERVICE OF PLAN 
(a) Fonn of Plan. A chapter 13 plan shall conform to Form No.2 as revised 08/01/00. 
RULE 3015-3. CHAPTER 13 - CONFIRMATION 
(a)( 1) Objections to Confinnation. An objection to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is governed 
by Rule 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In cases pending in all divisions except 
Lexington. such objection to confirmation. for any reason. including valuation. shall b~ fjled with the court 
and served upon the debtor. the attorney for the debtor and the chapter 13 trustee at or p~or to the date first 
set for the meeting of creditors and in cases pending in the Lexington division within ten (10) days after the 
date first set for the meeting of creditors. The objection to confirmation shall be noticed for hearing at the 
hearing on confirmation of the plan. 
(b) Order of Confirmation. The order of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan shall conform 
substantially to Form No.4 as revised 08/01100 and a copy of the order shall be served promptly upon the 
debtor or the attorney for the debtor. the chapter 13 trustee. and any creditor who timely filed an objection 
to confirmation of the plan. 
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FORM NO.2 
(rev. 08101/00) 
INRE: 
DEBTOR(S) 
~~TEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
____ DIVISION 
CASE NO. ___ _ 
CHAPTER 13 PLAN 
Reference to "Debtor" herein shall include both Debtors in ajoint case. 
I. PROPOSED PLAN PAYMENTS AND DURATION OF THE PLAN. 
A. Plan Payments. The Debtor submits all or such portion of Debtor's future earnings or other income as is 
necessary for the execution of the plan to the control of the Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(I). 
1. The Debtor shall pay to the Trustee out of Debtor's future earnings or other income (check one): 
o the sum of $ __ each __ " 
OR 
o the monthly step plan payments set forth below: 
I through 
through 
2. The Debtor shall also pay to the Trustee periodic payments as follows: 
Frequency of Payment Payment Due Date Source of Periodic Payment 
B. Duration (pool Plan Only). The duration of the plan shall be __ months. (If blank. the duration of the 
plan shall be sixty (60) months). 
C. Total Amount to be Paid (pool Plan Only). The Debtor shall pay a ''pool'' amount of $ __ to the 
Trustee to complete payments under the plan (pool amount equals monthly payments times duration plus additional 
periodic payments). 
D. Method of Payment. Plan payments shall be made to the Trustee by (check one): 
o 
OR 
Payroll Deduction: (specify 0 H or 0 W in joint case) 
Employer Name: 
Address: 
and 
Phone Number: 
o Direct payments by the Debtor. However, Payroll Deductions will start if the Debtor does not 
make payments when due. 
H-7 
ll. TREATMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. 
A. Attorney's Fee. An attorney's fee for Debtor's counsel will be requested by separate application and shall 
be paid as allowed by the Court. It is estimated that the amount of the attorney's fee to be paid through the plan is 
$ __ . Unless otherwise ordered, the attorney's fee will be paid before creditors receive payments. 
B. Trustee's Fee. The percentage fee payable to the Trustee shall be paid before or at the time of each 
payment to creditors and other claimants. 
C. Other Administrative Expenses. All other expenses entitled to administrative priority under 11 U.S.C. § 
507(a)(I) shall be paid before creditors are paid. 
m. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS. 
A. Secured Claims To Be Paid Inside the Plan. 
1. Unless otherwise provided in the plan or ordered by the Court, each of the following secured 
claims, if allowed, shall be paid inside the plan, on a pro rata basis with all other allowed secured claims, to the 
extent of the proposed secured value or the amount of the claim, whichever is less. Any remaining portion of the 
claim shall be treated as a general unsecured claim. 
Estimated Proposed Proposed 
Secured Creditor Collateral Description AmountoC Secured Interest 
Claim Value Rate* 
* If blank, the mterest rate shall be the contract rate. 
2. The holder of any allowed secured claim provided for by the plan shall retain a lien until the 
allowed secured portion of the claim is fully paid. 
3. Secured claims shall be paid after administrative claims are paid and before all other priority 
claims are paid. 
B. Mortgages, Leases, and Other Debts To Be Paid Outside the Plan. 
1. Payments Outside the Plan by Debtor. The Debtor shall pay the following claims, except any 
prepetition arrearage, outside the plan by making payments directly to the creditors. The claims of such creditors 
shall be paid pursuant to the underlying contracts. 
Maturity Estimated Interest 
Secured Collateral DateoC AmountoC Rate on 
Creditor Description Note Arrearages Arrearage* 
* Ifblank, the mterest rate shall be the contract rate. 
2. Payments Outside the Plan by Third Party. The following claims shall be paid outside the plan 
by a non-filing third party making payments directly to the creditor. The claims of such creditors shall be paid 
pursuant to the underlying contracts. 
Secured Collateral Name oC Party to Relationship to 
Creditor Description Make Payments Debtor 
H-8 
J 
j 
I 
i 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I'· .. 
I 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
C. Prepetition Arrearages To Be Paid Inside the Plan. Unless Section VII of the Plan ("Special 
Provisions") specifically provides otherwise, any claim filed by a creditor for prepetition arrearages on a debt to be 
paid outside the plan shall be treated as a secured claim to be paid inside the plan concurrently with all other allowed 
secured claims. If no interest rate is specified, interest shall be paid at the contract rate. 
D. Surrender of Property. The Debtor surrenders the following property. Upon confmnation the automatic 
stay is terminated as to the collateral being surrendered. No distnbutions shall be made to the secured creditor until 
such time as an amended claim for the deficiency is filed by the creditor. Any allowed claim for a deficiency shall 
be treated as a general unsecured claim. 
Secured Creditor Collateral Description 
E. Avoidance ofUens under 11 U.s.C. § 522(1). The liens of the following creditors are avoided under 11 
U.S.C. § 522(1). The allowed claims of such creditors shall be treated as general unsecured claims. 
Secured Creditor Collateral Description 
F. All Other Secured Claims. Any creditor filing a claim as secured that is not otherwise provided for by 
this plan or Court order shall be treated as a claim secured to the extent of the value of the collateral set forth in the 
proof of claim, to be paid inside the plan with interest at the contract rate. 
G. Orders Granting Relief From Stay. If at any time during the life of the plan an order terminating the 
automatic stay is entered, no further distributions shall be made to the secured creditor obtaining stay relief until 
such time as such creditor files an amended claim. Any allowed claim for a deficiency shall be treated as a general 
unsecured claim. 
IV. TREATl\IENT OF PRIORITY CLAIMS. 
Priority Claims To Be Paid Inside the Plan. The following claims are entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507 
and shall be paid inside the pian in full, in deferred cash payments, after administrative claims and secured claims 
are paid and before unsecured non-priority claims are paid. (Claims entitled to administrative priority are paid 
pursuant to Section IT of the plan). 
Creditor Holding Priority Claim Description of Claim Estimated Amount of Claim 
v. TREATMENT OF UNSECURED CLAIMS. 
A. Estimated Amount of Unsecured Debt (from Schedule F): __ 
B. General Unsecured Claims. 
1. The claims of creditors holding allowed unsecured claims shall be paid pro-rata over the period of 
the plan after payment of administrative, secured and priority claims. 
2. 
o 
o 
o 
General unsecured claims shall be paid (check one): 
In full; 
OR 
To the extent of __ cents on the dollar ("fixed percentage plan")*; 
OR 
To the greatest extent possible from payments to be made by the Debtor ("pool plan"). 
* A fixed percentage plan shall be treated as a 36-month pool plan if unsecured creditors will receive more. 
H-9 
3. No interest accruing after the date of the filing of the petition shall be paid on the claims of· 
creditors holding unsecured claims. 
C. Co-Signed Debts To Be Paid in Full. The following creditors holding unsecured claims for which a non-
filing debtor is also liable shall be paid in full, without interest, concurrently with other unsecured creditors. 
Creditor Description of Claim Co-Signer Relationship to Debtor 
VI. REJECTION OF LEASES AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. 
The Debtor hereby rejects the following leases and executory contracts and will surrender the leased property. 
Creditor Description of Leased Property or Nature of Contract 
Vll. SPECIAL PROVISIONS. 
The Debtor proposes the following special provisions. 
DATED: __________________ __ 
DEBTOR 
DEBTOR 
ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR 
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FORM NO. 4 
(rev. 08/01100) 
INRE 
DEBTOR(S} 
UNnED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR mE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
____ DMSION 
CASE NO. ___ _ 
ORDER CONFIRMING CHAPTER 13 PLAN 
DATED ____ _ 
A plan under chapter 13 having been filed and served by the debtor on all creditors, and it appearing that 
the plan meets the requirements for confirmation, IT IS ORDERED: 
The plan is confirmed. 
The trustee shall serve copies of this order on the persons named below. 
Dated: 
By thecoun-
Bankruptcy Judge 
Copies to be served by the chapter 13 trustee on: 
H-ll 
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Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
~ Chapter 13 § 341 Meeting Procedures ..... 
effective June 1,2000 
Attendance by debtors: The court has instructed the trustee that 341 meetings are not to 
be continued unless the trustee has an order sustaining a mo"tion to continue the meeting. If the 
trustee does not have an order sustaining a motion to continue the 341 meeting, the trustee is 
required to file a motion to dismiss. Any motion to continue the 341 meeting must be 
accompanied by an affidavit of the person so requesting (debtor or counsel) and must be served 
on the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and all creditors listed on the debtor's mailing matrix. 
In the event an emergency prevents the debtor from attending the 341 meeting and 
counsel is thereby unable to obtain an order continuing the 341 meeting prior to the meeting, it is 
advisable for counsel to file the motion to continue, accompanied by the requisite affidavit, and 
notice it for hearing at the same time as the trustee's motion to dismiss. The court generally does 
not consider "I couldn't get off work" to be a sufficient reason to avoid dismissal. 
If a debtor is incapacitated and physically unable to attend the 341 meeting even at a later 
date, a motion requesting that the debtor be permitted to undergo the 341 examination by 
interrogatories should be filed. 
Attendance by counsel for debtor: Failure of an attorney to appear or to make advance 
arrangements for a colleague to appear in hislher behalf could result in the filing of a motion" to 
dismiss. The trustee does not object to another attorney volunteering at the 341 to fill in for the 
absent attorney so that the debtors do not suffer as a result of the attorney's failure to appear. 
However, unless the absent attorney subsequently files a motion to excuse the attorney's absence 
and an affidavit in support thereof, the trustee will likely object to counsel's fees. 
Production of documents: When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an Order to Debtor is 
issued by the court within a day and is served on the debtor immediately. The Order requires the 
debtor to send to the trustee within 10 days of the Order (which usually means 10 or 11 days 
after the petition is filed) the following documents: 
> a copy of all deeds, land contracts, etc. 
~ a copy of recorded mortgages, liens, etc. 
~ a copy of certificates of title for cars, mobile homes, 4-wheelers, boats, trailers, motor 
homes, motorcycles, campers, motor homes, etc. 
> a copy of the last state and federal income tax returns 
> a copy of paycheck stubs for the preceding month 
The Order provides that "Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the 
debtor complies with this order." 
The Order further provides that "Failure to timely comply with this order will result in 
the filing of a motion to dismiss the within case." 
H-13 
Although some attorneys have their clients send the documents to the trustee directly, 
most attorneys collect the documents from their client and forward copies to the trustee. The 
trustee prefers the latter practice and is especially appreciative when the documents are 
accompanied by a checklist showing what is included. No matter how the documents are 
transmitted to the trustee, the debtor's name and case number must be identified either on each 
document or in a cover sheet affixed to the documents. 
In the past debtors were directed to bring documents to the 341 meeting. Because of the 
fast-track confinnation procedure, it is imperative that documents be provided as ordered. 
Please note that the chapter 13 trustee does not need bank statements, pleadings in 
foreclosure actions, proof of insurance, contracts for the purchase of personal property, and other 
documents other than those required to be produced by the Order to Debtor. The trustee will 
request additional documents on an as-needed basis. 
Examination of debtor: The trustee will swear in the debtor. Counsel for the debtor will 
then ask a series of questions as prescribed by the trustee, and the trustee will also ask a series of 
questions as appropriate and necessary. Any creditors in attendance will also be given an 
opportunity to ask questions. If necessarY, the trustee may continue the 341 if additional time is 
needed to complete the examination. 
Counsel should advise their clients immediately preceding the examination to speak up, 
to answer all questions ''yes'' or ''no'' rather than by head-nodding or "uh-huh", and that both 
debtors must answer all questions in a joint case. 
Payments: The trustee will not accept plan payments at the 341 meeting (or at any 
hearing). All payments must be mailed to the trustee's lockbox address. 
In all divisions but Lexington, by the time of the 341 meeting, the debtor should have 
made the first payment due under the plan. In some instances if the plan was filed subsequent to 
the petition, the first payment might not yet be due. The trustee will verify this, and the debtor 
will be expected to know when the first payment is due. Please refer to the "Chapter 13 
Delinquency Procedure" for further infonnation. 
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CHAPI'ER 13 BANKRUPI'CY 
EASI'ERL~ DlSIRIcr OF KENTUCKY 
(tee) 233-1527 
's~ BEVERLY M. BURDEN, 'IRUS'IEE 
... PA)1MENTS ... 
1. Monthly payments to the Trustee are: 
2. Your fia:t payment is due on or before: 
3. Man your personal check or money order to: 
Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
P. O. Box 1766 
Memphis, 'IN 38101-1766 
CAS t ;Ii: 
4. Write your CASE NUMBER AND NAME on every check, 
money order or cashiers check. 
s. DO NOT SEND CASH OR POST DATED CHECKS III 
6. Office hours are from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM weekdays. 
... PA'l?R.OIJ, DEPUCI]ON ... 
./11 
can us with the exact NAME and ADDRESS of your Employer IE you 
want your Chapter 13 payments taken directly from your paycheck. 
payron Deducdons should begin within a week or two. Check w.1th 
your employer If they do not! You will get a copy oCthe Order 
when your employer does •.. (We cannot set up pa-yments to be sent --
directly from your checldng or savings- account.) 
Yellow or Golden Rod 
H:"15 
.. ··l\USCELLANEOUS INFORMATION'" 
1. The Trustee's office advises Bankruptcy Court whether or not 
your Chapter 13 plan should be approved. We also handle the 
money to pay your creditors (people you owe) after Court 
approves or ·confirmsn your plan. 
••••••• Paym.ents wn not be made to your creditors until 
your case Is conf1rm.ed by the Court ....... . 
S,'" 
2. We mall a report oCyour case to you every "hy e. months. 
CHECK TInS REPORT CAREF1JLLY. All your creditors that 
med a clajm will be Bsted on the report. ICyou disagree with 
any oCthe amounts given to us by your creditors, call your 
attorney immediately to me an objection to the claim. 
3. You must get the permission oCthe Trustee and Bankruptcy 
Court beCore seJling, giving away or getting rid of any of your 
property or possessions whlle in bankruptcy. (Thls permission' 
needs to be In the Corm. of,a written Order). 
4. Do not buy anything on credit without the permission oCthe 
Trustee and the Court. 
5. Do not make any direct paym.ents to creditors without court 
approvaL (This may not apply to your house or car payments). 
Ask your attorney iCyou are supposed to make any direct . 
paym.ents ·outside the plan.. 
6. Give us: Your NEW address and phone number iCyou move. 
Your NEW employers name and address iCit cbanges. 
Give: Bankruptcy Court your NEW address also (606-233-2608). 
7. You must pay your regular home mortgage paym.ents on time. 
Call your attorney iCyour mortgage company does not accept 
your paym.ent. 
8. Call your attorney With any quesdons about your Chapter 13 
plan. 
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Chapter 13 Trustee's Office 
Payment Schedule M.CfM8!.( looo} 
11I[~£ LAIJrl5 WIL.L 
Please use this check-list to help you keep track of IJl (JR.~v' be ~ A1 rtf [. 
the Chapter 13 payments you have made. 341 ftf.til JJ~. 
Day of Month Payments are Due: XX 
May-04 
June-04 
July-04 
(OVfIJN /3001($ WILL 
No L.o,,}G-£ R. 8[ PRo'l' Md 
A fTtl( C<J,v n~""A1'I(J/J. 
August-04 
September-04 
October-04 
Some plans are set up for less than 60 payments. Please check your plan to see 
how many months you need to pay and how much your payments are. 
Attached are labels printed with your name and case number. 
Please place these labels in the "note" or "memo" section of every check or money 
order you send to ensure that your payment is posted to your case. 
Send payments to: 
CHAPTERI3TRUSTEE,EDKY 
POBOX 1766 
MEMPHIS TN 38101-1766 
We are also enclosing labels with this address for your convenience. 
We will not accept payments at our Lexington office or at any court hearing. 
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Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 J Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 j Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY I 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY J 
Debtor 99·99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
I Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99·99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99·99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 J Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY I ': 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY J 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
I Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99·99999 
Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 J 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99·99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99·99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 Debtor 99-99999 I Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY 
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Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY Chapter 13 Trustee, EDKY r!. O. Box 1766 P. o. Box 1766 P. O. Box 1766 
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PAYROLL DEDUCTION INFORMATION. 
IF you would like your Chapter 13 Bankruptcy payments 
to be deducted from your paycheck by your employer, 
please provide us with the following inform.ation: 
Your Chapter 13 Case Number _________ _ 
Payroll Deducdon Is for: 
(Your Nam.e) 
Name and Address of Your Employer: 
(Where your payroll actually comes from) 
Phone Number and Person to Contact at Payroll Office: 
How Do You Get Paid: 
Weekly Bi-Weekly Monthly 
(every 2 weeks) 
. (Circle one below) 
Semi-Monthly 
(15th, 30th) 
The Trusteels Office will send a Court Order to your 
Employer. It should take a week or two for payments to 
begin. (CONTINUE MAKING YOUR REGUlAR 
PAYMENTS TO 'I'IIE TRUSTEE UNTn.. YOU SEE IT HAS 
STAR.'IED COMING OUT OF YOUR PAYCHECK!) 
MAIL TInS FORM TO: PDO CLERK 
CHAPI'ER 13 rmUS'IEEIS OFFICE 
(859) 233-1527 P. O. Box 2204 
Lexington, KY 40588-2204 
IIA payroll deduction order can only be started by a 
signed Court Order by the Judge and can only be stopped 
by a signed Court Order by the Judge:1 
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In rc: 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
Lexington Division 
Case No: i ... 
aka/dba: 
Debtur(s) 
Chapter: 13 
Trustee: Beverly M Burden 
100 E Vine St #500 
PO Box 2204 
Lexington, KY 40588-2204 
859-233-1527 
CHAPTER 13 ORDER TO DEBTOR 
The debtor shan send the following documents to the trustee, whose name and address appear above, 
within] () days from the date of thIS order. The debtor's name and case number must be Identified on 
each document or in a cover letter affixed to the documents: 
1. A copy of all deeds or contracts under which the debtor holds title to or any interest in 
reaT estate (copies may be obtained from the office of the county cOUl1 Clerk of the county in 
which the real estate is located); 
2. A copy of all recorded mortgages, liens, or encumbrances on all real estate in which the 
debtor holds an interest (copIes may be obtained from the oiIice of the county court clerk of 
the county in which the real estate is· located); 
3. A coPY of all Certificates of Title on which the debtor's name appears as owner 
indIvidually or jointly of any motor vehicles, mobile homes, trailers, boats, motor homes, 
campers, motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles (do not send Oliginals)(if original titles have 
he en lost, duplicates must be obtained from the office of the county court clerk of the county 
in which the vehicles are registered); 
4. A copy or the debtor's last state and federal income tax returns (do not send originals); 
5. A cop)' of paycheck stubs or equivalent documents issued by the debtor's employer 
showing gross earnings and an deductions for the month ended just before the filing·of the 
casco 
The debtor is rcstrained and enjoined from selling, transferring, abandoning, releasing to ("Teditors, or 
in any way disposing of property until further orders of the COUl1. 
Failure to timely comply with this order will result in the filing of a motion to dismiss the 
within case. 
Counsel for the debtor is responsible for seeing that the debtor complies with this order. 
Dated: 
By the court-
• 
. - . 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
H- 21 
MESSAGE TO CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS 
ABOUT TODAYS MEETING OF CREDITORS 
Today you are attending the "341 Meeting" 01' a "Meeting of Cl'editors." Someone 
from the Chapter 13 Trustee's Office presides at the meeting. This meeting is tape 
recorded. You will be asked to take an oath that everything you say is true and 
COl"rect to the best of your knowledge. You will be asked questions about YOUl' 
bankruptcy case. Your testimony is under penalty of perjury. 
• Please speak up so that your voice can be heard on the tape. 
• Please answer the questions "yes" or "no" instead of "uh-huh" or nodding your 
head. 
• If you have filed a joint petition with your spouse, both of you need to answer 
every question. 
• If you do not understand a question, please say so. 
• Please feel fi.·ee to explain your answel'S. 
• Remember, you must answer all questions truthfully and completely .... 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAPTER 13 CREDITOR MEETINGS 
Please state your name and social security number for the record. 
{SHOW DEBTOR A COPY OF PAGE 2 OF PETITION) Is this your signature? 
In the paperwork you filed with the Bankruptcy Court, did you list everything that you 
own? 
Did you list everyone that you owe money to? 
Is all the information contained in the petition and schedules true and correct to the best 
of your knowledge? 
Has anything changed since you filed your bankruptcy? 
Are there any corrections or additions you need to make? 
Have you ever filed bankruptcy before? 
(IF YES): When? 
Have you made your first chapter 13 payment yet? 
(IF A DEBTOR IS EMPLOYED): Are there any deductions from your paycheck for: 
retirementJ401 k 
profit sharing 
stock purchase plan 
Christmas club or vacation account 
credit union or other savings 
child support 
garnishment 
car payment or other debt 
H-23 
QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED BY TRUSTEE (as appropriate or necessary) 
Can you afford $ __ per month for your chapter 13 payment? 
Do you receive overtime on a regular basis? 
Do you receive (or have you in the past received) bonuses? Howoften? How much? 
Do you expect your income to change within the next 3-5 years as a result of retirement, 
loss of child support or maintenance, change in disability status, loss of unemployment 
payments or workers' comp payments, or other reason? 
Do you have any claims, pending lawsuits, or potential lawsuits against anyone? 
[IF YES]: Describe the nature of the claim or lawsuit. 
State the name of any attorney you have consulted about the lawsuit. 
If you own real estate, how much do you think it would sell for today? 
Child support: paid: __ 
for how many children 
how much $ 
how long 
current? 
Notes: 
received: 
--
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Inre: 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
________ Division 
Case No. ______ _ 
Debtor(s) 
MOTION TO DISMISS CH. 13 CASE 
The trustee asks the Court to dismiss this case because 
[ ] the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting of Creditors. 
[ 
[ 
] the attorney for the debtor(s) did not appear at the §341 First Meeting 
of Creditors. 
] the debtor(s) did not timely provide the documents required by the 
Court's Order to Debtor. 
DATE: ____ _ 
Trustee 
NOTICE 
This motion to dismiss will be· brought on for hearing at ____ on ___ _ 
__ ,20-, United States Bankruptcy Court _____________ _ 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that the above motion was served on the parties listed below on this the 
__ day of ,20_. 
Trustee 
H- 25 
\L·· ________ ----------------------
Inre: 
Debtor(s) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
Division 
--------
Case No. 
-------
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Comes now counsel for the above-captioned debtor(s) and moves the Court for an order 
continuing the scheduled §341 First Meeting of Creditors. An affidavit in support of said 
motion is attached. 
DATE: ____ _ 
Counsel for Debtor( s) 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that the above motion was served upon the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and 
all creditors listed on the debtor's matrix on this the date of .20_. 
Counsel for Debtor( s) 
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Inre: 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
________ Division 
Case No. ______ _ 
Debtor(s) 
ORDER 
Upon the timely-filed motion of the debtor(s) to continue the §341 First Meeting of 
Creditors and the Court having reviewed the record and being otherwise properly and 
sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the §341 First Meeting of Creditors be 
and same is hereby continued to a date and time to be set by the trustee. 
DATED: ________ __ 
JUDGE 
Copy to: Trustee 
Attorney for Debtor(s) 
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Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District Of Kentucky 
~ Chapter 13 Confirmation Procedure ~ 
effective August 1, 2000 
Chapter 13 Plan: A standardized plan has been adopted for this district for all 
chapter 13 cases filed on or after August 1,2000. Sff fO~M it 2. Of LoeA. L iUtCS 
The standardized plan is the centerpiece of the revised chapter 13 confinnation 
and delinquency procedures. It will: 
)- facilitate the review of the plan for feasibility 
)- offer consistency in the language of common plan provisions while 
retaining the flexibility needed to address debtors' special circumstances 
>- eliminate common reasons for defective plan notices and pre-confinnation 
plan amendments 
>- provide secured creditors with early infonnation about how their claims 
are to be treated, which in tum means an early bar date for filing 
objections to confinnation can be set 
>- speed up confinnation so that some plans can be confinned immediately 
following the 341 meeting of creditors, and most plans should be 
confinnable within 30 days after the 341 
)- enable more accurate tracking of plan payment requirements as compared 
to payments actually made 
The plan is presently available as a Microsoft Word 2000 template or in 
WordPerfect 8 from the Chapter 13 Trustee or the Bankruptcy Court. Please visit 
www.kyeb.uscourts.gov or www.13network.comllexhome.htm; www.chI3edky.com is 
under construction and will be operational soon. Instructions for using the standardized 
plan explain the reasons for including certain provisions, and point out variances between 
current practice and the standardized plan. 
With the use of a standardized plan, the time-frame needed for confinnation can 
be abbreviated. The first confinnation hearing will be about 30 days after the 341 
meeting, and the second confinnation hearing, which will be conducted by the court, will 
take place approximately 30 days after the first confinnation hearing. Previously, the 341 
meeting and confinnation hearings were scheduled 60 days apart. 
Defective Plan Notice: The Trustee will notify debtor's counsel if there are 
problems preventing plan confinnation by serving on debtor's counsel a Defective Plan 
Notice ("orange sheet"). The Defective Plan Notice may be amended and supplemented 
prior to confinnation as necessary. 
Creditors' Objections to Confinnation: Any creditor objecting to the treatment of 
its claim in the chapter 13 plan must file with the Court and serve on the Trustee an 
objection on or before the date and time first set for the Meeting of Creditors in Divisions 
other than Lexington. In Lexington Division cases, creditors' objections must be filed 
H-29 
with the Court and served on the Trustee within ten (10) days following the Meeting of. 
Creditors. Creditors and creditors' counsel should be aware that in the absence of an 
objection, the value of their collateral is established by the debtor's plan. The Trustee in 
this district does not make an independent determination of the value of property subject 
to liens. 
If an obj ection to confirmation is filed, the Court will schedule an evidentiary 
hearing to be conducted approximately 60 days following the Meeting of Creditors. This 
evidentiary hearing and second confirmation hearing will be conducted by the Court at 
the same time. 
341 Meeting of Creditors:. If no objections to ·confirmation haveb.een timely 
filed, and if the Trustee has not served on debtor's counsel a Defective Plan Notice and 
does not intend to serve a Defective Plan Notice following the 341 meeting, the Trustee 
will tender to the Court an order confirming the chapter 13 plan. 
First Confirmation Hearing: The notice of the confirmation hearing is combined 
with the notice of the meeting of creditors that is sent to all creditors. The first 
confirmation hearing is conducted by the Trustee's office about 30 days following the 
meeting of creditors. The debtor is not required to attend the confirmation hearing; 
however, the debtor's presence may be beneficial to the parties depending on the nature 
of the objections to the plan. 
If the Trustee has served a Defective Plan Notice on counsel for the debtor, or if a 
creditor has filed an objection to confirmation and the objection is unresolved, or if a 
motion for relief from stay has been filed, debtor's counsel is required to attend the first' 
confirmation hearing. At that hearing any problems that can be resolved by the parties 
should be resolved, and the appropriate amendments, agreed orders and· other needed 
documentation should be filed within 15 days thereafter to allow for confirmation. 
The confirmation hearing will be continued for approximately 30 days and will be 
scheduled for hearing on the Court's docket. The Trustee is instructed not to continue the 
confirmation hearing to the Trustee's docket for any reason, and not to continue the 
confirmation hearing for a longer period than the approximately 30-40 days until the next 
date on which the court will conduct hearings in the division in which the case is 
pending. 
If there are no unresolved objections to confirmation from the Trustee or any 
creditor, counsel for the debtor is not required to attend the hearing. The Trustee's office 
will give notice of cases which can be confirmed without a hearing (the "short-list'') to 
the Court and to the appropriate counsel for the debtors no later than approximately 5 
days prior to the. date of the first confirmation hearing. The Trustee will tender to the 
Court an order confirming the plan. 
The Trustee will not file a Trustee's Report and Recommendation prior to the first 
conf11ll1ation hearing. The TR&R is not needed to advise debtors' counsel of whether the 
plan is confirmable; the Defective Plan Notice will serve that purpose. And the TR&R is 
no longer needed to advise secured creditors of how their claims are to be treated under 
the plan; the standardized plan serves that purpose. 
Second Confirmation Hearing and Valuation Hearing: Problems addressed in the 
Defective Plan Notice must be cured within 15 days after the first confirmation hearing in 
order to obtain a favorable recommendation from the Trustee as to confirmation. The 
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Trustee will file a Trustee's Report and Recommendation approximately 7 to 10 days' 
prior to the second confmnation hearing. If the Trustee recommends confirmation of the 
plan and objections to confirmation have been resolved by agreed order or otherwise, the 
Trustee's office will tender to the Court an order confirming the plan. The Trustee's 
office will give notice of cases which can be confinned without a hearing (the "short-
list'') to the Court and to the appropriate counsel for the debtors approximately 5 days 
prior to the date of the confinnation hearing so that the cases can be removed from the 
Court's docket. 
The confirmation hearing in cases which are not "short-listed" will be conducted 
by the Court. The Court does not require attendance of the debtors at confirmation 
hearings which it conducts. In addition, any valuation hearing or other hearing on a 
creditor's objection to confirmation will be conducted by the Court at the same time as 
the second confirmation hearing. 
At the second confinnation hearing, the Court will not take any papers for filing 
such as last minute agreed orders, last minute amended plans, etc. The Court will 
consider only what has been properly and timely filed in time for all parties to react to it. 
Motion to Continue Confirmation Hearing: If a debtor has special problems such 
as tax claims that require more time to address, debtor's counsel should file a motion to 
continue the second confirmation hearing and set forth in the motion the reasons for' the ' 
requested continuance and a proposed time frame needed to resolve the issues. The 
motion to continue must be noticed for hearing no later than the date of the second' 
confirmation hearing. The Court may, upon request of the Trustee or of any secured 
creditor, direct counsel for the debtor to tender agreed orders of adequate protection so ' 
that payments can be made to secw:ed creditors during the extended period needed for 
confirmation. 
Payment Delinquencies at Time of Confirmation: No case will be confirmed 
unless the debtors are substantially current in payments, both to the Trustee and to 
secured creditors. If the debtors have not made any payments within 40 days after the 
plan is filed, the Trustee will file a motion to dismiss the case which will be heard by the 
Court in lieu of the first confirmation hearing. Cases in which the debtors are not 
substantially current in payments at the second confirmation hearing will be dismissed at 
that hearing. The failure of debtors to be substantially current in payments is not a valid 
reason for requesting that the second confmnation hearing be continued. 
Notice of Allowance of Claims: After the bar date for filing proofs of claims by 
governmental units, the Trustee will file with the Court and serve on debtor, debtor's 
counsel, and all creditors a Notice of Allowance of Claims, which will set forth how the 
Trustee's office has set up all filed claims for payment. By the time this Notice is served, 
disbursements on claims filed as secured will have commenced. It is advisable that 
debtor's counsel review all claims filed as secured so that disbursements will not be made 
on claims which were filed as secured but which the debtor believes are unsecured. See 
Standardized Plan Instructions, Section ITI.F, for more information. Parties will have 10 
days in which to object to the Notice of Allowance of Claims. In the absence of 
objections, the claims will be deemed allowed. 
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Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District Of Kentucky 
~ Standardized Plan Instructions .... 
effective August 1, 2000 
Section I.A.I. Step Plan Payments: 
Generally the plan will call for payments of $X for X months. However, for a variety of 
reasons, debtors' payments may need to vary during the life of the plan. In those instances, the 
monthly step payment schedule should be used. Examples: 
• income is expected to increase (anticipated job promotion; car loan is almost paid in full). 
• income is expected to decrease (loss of child support when child turns 18). 
• plan payments will increase for a period of time to cure a delinquency. 
• income fluctuates seasonally. 
• ***plan payments need to be amended (pre-confirmation) or modified (post-
confirmation). *** 
The use of a step payment schedule is a significant change in local practice and is 
required for the trustee's new delinquency program. Consider the following example: 
Debtor's plan calls for payments of $1 00 per month for 60 months. Debtor makes 
two payments (total paid in: $200). Debtor's plan then must be amended (pre-
confirmation) to increase payments to $200 per month. The amended plan looks 
just like the original plan except it now says "Debtor will pay $200 per month for 
60 months." The tnlStee's new system will show payments are due from month 1 
through month 60 at $200 per month for a total pool amount of $12,000. When the 
plan is confirmed, the debtor will be behind $200, because in month 1 and 2 he paid 
only $100 per month, not $200 per month. The correct way to show the amended 
payments is using the step payment plan: month 1-2: $100; month 3-60: $200,· 
total pool: $11,800. Another option, which is rarely feasible, is for the debtor to 
catch up the past due amount so that the pool amount remains $12,000. 
The importance of using the step payment schedule cannot be emphasized enough. It is 
the key to the trustee's delinquency program, and along with the total pool amount (Section I.C.) 
will accurately track the balance remaining to be paid in to the plan at any given time. 
Section I.A.2. Periodic Plan Payments: 
In addition to making regular payments, the debtor may also need to make periodic 
payments, for example, quarterly bonuses or annual tax refunds; or one-time lump-sum 
payments, for example, proceeds from the sale of real estate or non-exempt proceeds from a 
personal injury action. (See also Section VII). 
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Estimated Payments: If the debtor must pay the entire bonus or tax refund or sales 
proceeds or whatever into the plan but the amounts of those payments are unknown~ the amount' 
to be received should be estimated so that a dollar amount can be used in evaluating feasibility of 
the plan. If the amount of the payment is less than estimated, the debtor will not be delinquent. 
Actual Payments: On the other hand, if the debtor knows she must pay, for example, 
$1,000 of her tax refund every year into the plan in order to make the plan work, that payment 
should be identified as "actual." If the debtor fails to make the entire actual payment, she 
becomes delinquent, and arrangements must be made to cure the delinquency. 
Section I.C. Total Amount To Be Paid (pool Plan Only): 
The plan must specify the total amount to be paid over the duration of a pool plan. A 
separate "pool plan calculator" is available to use with the monthly step payment schedule. The 
pool plan calculator allows the user to input specific dates, and it will calculate the number of 
months. 
The amount of the pool is important if a subsequent plan modification is needed to cure 
plan delinquencies. Also, having a fixed pool amount will help debtors and debtors' counsel 
quickly determine how much remains due under the plan (pool amount minus total paid in equals· 
payoff amount). 
Section I.D. lVlethod of Payment: 
If the debtor is employed, a request for a Payroll Deduction Order (PDO) may be made in 
the plan. The trustee will process the PD~ so that payments can commence within 30 days. 
Because a debtor's chances of succeeding in chapter 13 are greater when plan payments are 
payroll-deducted, the trustee strongly recommends payments by PDO. 
Section III. Treatment of Secured Claims: 
Every secured claim listed in Schedule D must be itemized in the plan. This is a 
significant change in local practice. Many plans used by debtors' attorneys do not identify the 
value of collateral in the plan. Instead, reference must be made to the· Schedules. The 
standardized plan requires that all information, including value of collateral, must be set forth in 
the plan. 
Section III is the most likely place to identify how a secured claim will be treated. 
However, the debtor may want to treat all or part of the claim in a manner not addressed in 
Section III. For example, a third party may be paying the mortgage arrearage outside the plan. 
Section vn should be used if Section III does not fit the debtor's needs. 
Ifa secured claim is listed in Schedule D (Creditors Holding Secured Claims) and is not 
specifically addressed in Section III or Section vn of the plan, by default the claim will be paid 
inside the plan at the contract rate of interest. If the contract rate is greater than the present 
market rate of interest, the trustee will object to payment of contract rate, confirmation will be 
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delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary. See Section ill.F. Do not omit from the plan 
any secured creditor listed in Schedule D. 
Section III.A. Secured Claims to be Paid Inside the Plan: 
The name of the creditor, collateral description, amount of claim, and proposed secured 
value come straight from Schedule D (Creditors Holding Secured Claims). Of course, if for 
example the debtor owes ABC Credit Union on a car and on a boat and wants to pay the car 
inside the plan and surrender the boat, separate values need to be placed on each item of 
collateral in the plan itself. 
An interest rate must be specified for each claim to be paid inside the plan. If the 
interest rate field is blank for any creditor, the default interest rate in the plan is the contract rate. 
If the contract rate is higher than the current market rate of interest, the trustee will object to 
payment of contract rate, confirmation will be delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary. 
Do not leave the interest rate field blank on any row in this section. 
Section III.B.l. Payments "OSEA" - Outside Except Arrearages: 
By default, any claim to be paid outside the plan will be treated as being "outside except 
arrearages," and the arrearage claim will be treated inside the plan (see Section ill.C.). The 
monthly payment on an OSEA debt must be reflected in Schedule J (Current Expenditures of 
Individual Debtors) (the budget). 
The plan also asks for the date on which the note matures. If the note will be fully paid 
during the life of the plan, plan payments must increase at that time. Asking for the maturity 
date of the note will serve as a reminder to use the step payment schedule (See Section LA. I.). 
It is important to identify "OSEA" claims because of the effect of such claims on 
feasibility issues. If, for example, a mortgage debt is listed in Schedule D (Creditors Holding 
Secured Claims) and the plan does not specify it is to be paid outside the plan, it will be treated 
as a secured claim to be paid inside the plan. See Section ill.F.; see also11 U.S.C. § 1326(c) 
(unless the plan provides otherwise, "the trustee shall make payments to creditors under the 
plan"). That of course will make the plan, not feasible. This is a common reason for Defective 
Plan Notices. 
If the debtor believes there is an arrearage on a debt to be paid outside the plan, put the 
estimated amount of the arrearage and the interest rate at which the arrearage claim should be 
paid in this section. Ifno interest is to be paid, insert 0%. If the debtor does not believe a 
prepetition arrearage is owed, insert an interest rate - even 0% if appropriate - anyway. 
See Section III.C. 
Section III.B.2. Payments "OSTP" - Outside by Third Party: 
List claims that someone other than the debtor will pay. The name of the third party and 
the relationship of that person to the debtor is also required. 
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It is important to distinguish OSTP claims from OSEA claims. Frequently a plan will 
state only that the debt is to be paid outside the plan without reference to the fact that it is to be' . 
paid by someone other than the debtors. The trustee will object to the plan if that outside 
payment is not listed on Schedule J (CUlTent Expenditures of Individual Debtors) and will 
question whether the debtor can afford both the chapter 13 payment and the outside payment. Or 
it may be that a boat or extra car is to be paid by the debtor's parents, for example, but that fact is 
not disclosed in the plan. The trustee will object to the debtor keeping unnecessary property, and 
confirmation is delayed while an amendment to the plan is prepared. 
Section III.C. Arrearages: 
Frequently the debtor does not believe he is in arrears, yet the proof of claim flIed by the 
creditor has an arrearage amount listed. In the past, this caused problems because the plan did 
not specify how that arrearage claim should be paid, and a Defective Plan Notice was sent so that 
the plan could be amended. 
The standardized plan provides that by default any arrearage claim will be paid inside the 
plan as a secured debt. That means it will be paid concUlTently with all other secured debts. The 
plan also specifies that interest on the arrearage claim will be paid at the contract rate unless the 
plan specifies otherwise. Once again, if the contract rate is higher than the market rate of· ,. 
interest, the trustee will object. That is why it is important to state an interest rate that will be 
paid on any arrearage claim that might be flIed by a creditor listed in Section ill.B.I., even if the 
debtor does not believe an arrearage is due. 
Arrearage claims can be treated differently. For example, if the arrearage is to be cured 
by the debtor's parents when they assume the debtor's mortgage payment, Section VII can so 
specify, and the arrearage claim will be set up as OSTP. 
Section III.D. Surrender of Property: 
Specify the property which the debtor intends to sUlTender to the secured creditor. 
Include any collateral repossessed prepetition if the debtor does not wish to regain possession 
and the collateral had not been sold by the creditor as of the date of the filing of the petition. 
This information is necessary so that when the claim is filed, the trustee will not make 
disbursements on the claim as a secured claim. 
This section also provides that the automatic stay will be deemed terminated upon 
confirmation of the plan as to property sUlTendered pursuant to this section of the plan. This is a 
new practice. Furthermore, this section reminds secured creditors that they need to flIe an 
amended proof of claim for any deficiency remaining after the collateral is sold. See also 
Section ill.G. 
Section III.E. Avoidance of Liens Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). This paragraph reflects current 
practice that liens can be avoided under section 522(f) in the plan itself. 
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Section III.F. All Other Secured Claims: 
This paragraph provides a default treatment of secured claims and is required in the 
standardized plan. There are three primary situations this default paragraph is intended to 
address. Section III.F makes a significant change from current practice with respect to the 
second and third situations. 
The first reason for the default paragraph is to make sure every claim listed in Schedule D 
(Creditors Holding Secured Claims) is treated in the plan. Frequently a claim listed in Schedule 
D is not addressed anywhere in a plan. The trustee must send a Defective Plan Notice because 
the treatment of a particular claim was not specified, and the plan must be amended before it can 
be confirmed. If a secured claim is listed in Schedule D and is not specifically addressed in 
Section ill or Section VII of the plan, by default the claim will be paid inside the plan at the 
contract rate of interest. In many instances this will correct the oversight. However, if the 
contract rate is greater than the present market rate of interest, the trustee will object to payment 
at contract rate, confirmation will be delayed, and an amended plan will be necessary. It is 
important to include in the plan every claim listed in Schedule D. 
The second scenario occurs when a secured creditor listed in Schedule D has mUltiple 
items of collateral, including property that the'debtor does not list as owning. Perhaps the 
collateral was repossessed pre-petition and the debtor does not want to regain possession. Or it 
may be that the collateral is in the possession of the debtor's former spouse in accordance with 
the pre-petition property settlement agreement. In current practice the trustee makes an 
assumption that such claims are unsecured as to the debtor. The standardized plan will treat such 
claims as secured to the extent ofthe value of the collateral set forth in the creditor's proof of 
claim unless the plan provides otherwise. It is important that the plan specifically address those 
claims ("to be surrendered"; "OSTP"; etc.) so that the default provision does not apply. 
The third situation involves a discrepancy between the plan or schedules and the proof of claim. 
For example, the debtor schedules a claim as unsecured (or forgets to list the creditor at all), but 
the creditor files a proof of claim as secured. In the past the trustee has treated these claims as 
unsecured. The standardized plan will treat such claims as if secured to the extent of the value of 
the collateral as set forth in the creditor's proof of claim, to be paid inside the plan with interest 
at the contract rate. The debtor or the trustee can always object to the claim if appropriate, and 
the claim will be paid only to the extent it is allowed. The drawback to applying Section ill.F in 
this third situation is that if the contract rate of interest is higher than the current market rate, the 
trustee will object to confinnation, or may require.the debtor to modify the plan. 
While debtor and.debtor' s counsel have control over the first two scenarios and can take 
steps to prevent the default paragraph from being applied, they may not be able to prevent the 
third situation. For example, a creditor may file a proof of claim as secured under the mistaken 
belief that it holds a security interest. This happens on occasion. On the other hand, the situation 
often occurs when the debtor did not provide to counsel all the necessary documentation to 
enable counsel to determine that a particular claim is secured. 
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Debtor's counsel will need to review claims carefully to make sure an unsecured claim is 
not set up to be paid as a secured claim; There are two alternatives for debtor's counsel. First,·· 
Section VII can provide that if any claim is scheduled as unsecured but the creditor files a proof 
of claim as secured, the claim will be treated as an unsecured claim. Second, the plan can be 
amended or modified as necessary to address the particular claim ("to be surrendered"; "OSTP"; 
522(f); etc.). 
Debtor's counsel will need to be especially vigilant with respect to creditors claiming 
nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interests in household goods that can be avoided 
under II.U.S.C.§ 522(f) so that an appropriate amendment to the plan or an objection to the 
claim or a motion to avoid the lien can be filed. 
It is important to remember that the trustee will no longer presumptively treat certain 
claims as unsecured if the proof of claim indicates it is a secured claim. Instead, such claims will 
be treated as specified in the proof of claim absent some instruction in the plan to the contrary. 
Section III.G. Orders Granting Relief From Stay: Upon entry of an order granting relief 
from stay, the trustee will not make any further disbursements to the secured creditor obtaining 
stay relief until the creditor files an amended claim for any deficiency. This provision reflects 
current practice. The purpose of putting it in the plan is to negate the need for the trustee to file 
a memorandum of understanding as to each order terminating the automatic stay. 
Section IV. Treatment of Priority Claims: 
All priority claims listed on Schedule E (Creditors Holding Priority Claims) must be 
listed in Section IV or in Section VII of the plan. Otherwise a Defective Plan Notice will be 
sent. 
Section V.A. Estimated Amount of Unsecured Debt (from Schedule F): 
The purpose of requesting the total dollar figure of unsecured debts from Schedule F 
(Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims) in the plan is to facilitate the evaluation of 
feasibility and the liquidation test. General unsecured claims do not need to be itemized in the 
plan. 
Section V.B. General Unsecured Claims: 
There are three ways unsecured claims can be treated: paid in full, paid X% (the "fixed 
, percentage plan"), or paid to the greatest extent possible from the "pool" of funds paid in by the 
debtor (the "pool plan"). 
Generally speaking, the fixed percentage plan is an anomaly, but it is still used by several 
attorneys. One of two problems frequently arise in fixed percentage plans. The first problem 
arises when it will take fewer than 36 months to pay X%. This might occur when, for example, 
several unsecured creditors did not file proofs of claims, or claims were filed but disallowed as 
tardy. The debtor is required to pay all of his disposable income into the plan for at least 36 
H-37 
months (unless unsecured debts are paid in full). In the past, either a Defective Plan Notice 
required the debtor to amend the plan, or the trustee filed a plan modification after confinnation:.! 
to convert the fixed percentage plan into a 36-month pool plan. The standardized plan will now 
automatically change a deficient fixed percentage plan into a 36-month pool plan. 
The second problem with fixed percentage plans is at the other end of the spectrum. The 
problem arises when it will take more than 60 months to pay the fixed percentage. The trustee 
will continue to send Defective Plan Notices in these instances because the plan is not feasible. 
The use of a pool plan will usually prevent this type of defect, but it will be up to debtor's 
counsel to file amendments to cure any' plan that exceeds 60 months. 
The fixed percentage plan is strongly discouraged, but is 'pennitted, with a standard 
proviso now that it will automatically convert to a 36-month pool plan if it is detennined that the 
plan will pay the. fixed percentage in fewer than 36 months. The pool plan is preferable. 
Section V.C. Co-Signed Debts to be Paid in Full: 
The debtor may not want to pay in full every debt listed on Schedule H (Co-Debtors), so 
the plan should specify which co-signed debts are to be paid in full. 
Section VII. Special Provisions: 
If the debtor's intended treatment ofa claim will not fit anywhere else in the plan, it 
should be addressed here in Section VII. Also, there may be additional provisions needed to 
address situations such as the sale of real estate or the addition of personal injury proceeds to the 
plan. The trustee's office has prepared draft Addenda to address these situations which will 
provide guidelines as to what infonnation is necessary to evaluate these special circumstances. 
"Business" chapter 13 cases may also require special attention in Section VII. 
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ADDENDUM No. 
ADDITION OF NON-EXEM-P-T-P-R-OCEEDS 
TO THE PLAN PAYMENTS 
(Lawsuits for Personal Injury, Breach of Contract, etc.) 
1. The Debtor(s) have certain causes of action identified below. Upon 
confirmation of the plan, said causes of action shall revest in the Debtor for 
prosecution during the pendency of the case. Upon receipt of an offer to 
compromise any cause of action, the Debtor(s) shall notice all parties in interest, 
creditors, the Trustee and the Court by providing appropriate notice and sufficient 
opportunity to object to the proposed compromise. 
Description of Cause(s) of Action 
2. Any non-exempt recovery arising from the aforementioned causes 
of action exercised by the Debtor(s), net of Court costs and attorney fees and 
cost, shall be paid to the Trustee for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and 
disbursed as follows: 
(a) First, to administrative claimants and costs whose efforts and 
actions resulted in recovery benefiting the estate; 
(b) Second, to unsecured and undersecured creditors pro-rata 
pursuant to the priorities set forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec 726; 
(c) Third, to the secured creditors, pro-rata; and 
(d) Fourth, after payment of all remaining claims, administrative 
costs and expenses of the estate, the balance shall be refunded to the 
Debtor(s). 
3. Any non-exempt recovery by the Debtor(s) shall be paid to the 
Trustee in addition to the plan payments and shall not alter or reduce the periodic 
payments due under the plan, nor shall the duration of the plan be shortened, 
except to the extent said recovery shall result in payment in full to all creditors 
and administrative costs. 
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ADDENDUM ADDING NON-EXEMPT SALE PROCEEDS 
DERIVED FROM REAL PROPERTY 
(Sale by Realtor) 
1. The Debtor(s) are proposing to sell certain real property commonly 
known as 
("Property"). Debtor(s) attaches herewith copy of the proposed Listing 
Agreement setting forth the asking price and terms of the sale offer. Upon 
receipt of a bona fide offer to purchase. the Debtor(s) shall notice all parties in 
interest. creditors; the Trustee and the Court by providing appropriate notice and 
sufficient opportunity to object to the proposed sale. 
2. Debtor(s) shall cause the Property to be listed with 
("Realtor") for __ _ 
months. Should the Property fail to receive a written offer to purchase. Debtor(s) 
shall then offer the Property for sale to the highest and best bidder at public 
auction within months after expiration of the aforementioned listing period. 
3. Upon confirmation of the plan. the Realtor shall be approved to 
offer the Property for sale. and to receive compensation as·· set· forth· in the 
attached Listing Agreement upon closing the sale. 
4. Any non-exempt proceeds received from aforementioned sale of 
property net of commissions. fees and costs of sale. shall be paid to the Trustee· 
for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and disbursed as follows: 
(a) First. to administrative claimants and costs whose efforts and 
actions resulted in the sale benefiting the estate; 
(b) Second, to unsecured and undersecured creditors pro-rata 
pursuant to the priorities set forth in 11 U.S.C. Sec 726; 
(c) Third, to the secured creditors. pro-rata; and 
(d) Fourth. after payment of all remaining claims. administrative 
costs and expenses of the estate, the balance shall be refunded to the 
Debtor(s). 
5. The non-exempt proceeds shall be paid to the Trustee in addition to 
the plan payments and shall not alter or reduce the periodic payments due under 
the plan. nor shall the duration ofthe plan be shortened, excepUo the extent said 
recovery shall result in payment in full to all creditors and administrative costs. 
H-40 
J 
J 
J 
J 
j 
j 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
j 
j 
• 
• 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
DIVISION 
IN RE: 
DEBTOR(S) 	 CASE NO.: 
Defective Plan Notice 
This plan will not be recommended for confirmation for the following reasons: 
[J Is the regular monthly Mortgage Payment to be paid inside or outside the plan? 

[J Is the Mortgage Arrearage to be paid inside or outside the plan? 

[J Is this plan a pool or percentage plan? 

[J The Trustee interprets the pool amount to be $_________ 

[J The plan goes over 60 months. 

[J Secured and/or priority creditors will not be paid in full. 

[J The plan doesn't provide an adequate percentage to be paid to unsecured creditors. 

[J Plans lasting less than 36 months must pay unsecured creditors 100%. 

o The plan should not specify the amount of monthly payment to be made by the Trustee to any creditor. 

[J The plan lists conflicting interest rates. 

[J The plan should not forbid the Chapter 13 Trustee from filing claims on behalf of any creditor. 

[J The plan proposes to pay undersecured creditors outside the plan. ____________ 

[J 	 The liquidation test is not met. See attachment. 
o 	 The plan should specify that non-exempt proceeds from tort claims will be paid to the Trustee in addition 
to regular plan payments. 
[J The budget contains questionable expenses as follows:________________ 
[J Expenses are included on the budget for debts that are to be paid by the Trustee. 
[J The plan proposed does not comply with the standardized plan required to be used with all cases filed after 
08/01/00. 
[J Other: ____________________________________ 
Dated: 11/16/00 
To: Attorney for the Debtor 
Beverly M. Burden, Trustee 
P.O. Box 2204 
Lexington, KY 40588-2204 
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SUMMARY: 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
~ Chapter 13 Delinquency Procedures ~ 
effective November 1, 2000 
~ first payment is due 30 days after plan is filed 
~ plan will be confirmed only if all payments are current 
>- plan arrearages must be cured, usually with double payments 
>- probation order means automatic dismissal if a single payment is 7 days late 
> payroll deduction order will not cover payments to cure plan arrearage 
~ plan modification may be necessary to cure arrearages in older cases 
~ debtor's attorney must be more active in delinquent cases 
~ do not have debtors call the trustee's office about a motion to dismiss 
Pre-Confirmation: 
The debtor is required to commence making the payments proposed by a plan within 30 
days after the plan is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The plan must be filed within 15 days after 
the petition is filed. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 301S(b). The preferred practice given the fast track 
procedures on confirmation is to file the plan with the petition and schedules. When the plan is . 
received, the trustee sends to the debtor a letter on bright yellow- or goldenrod-colored paper 
containing payment information. This is the only notice the debtors receive from the trustee 
about the amount and due date of their payments. 
If the trustee's office has not received and posted the debtor's first payment within 35 
days after the petition date, the trustee will send a letter to the debtor and debtor's attorney, and if 
the debtor is employed, a payroll deduction order will be entered immediately. We wait 35 days 
because of the time it takes for checks to be mailed to the trustee's lockbox in Memphis, 
Tennessee, and the resulting 2-day delay for the payment to be posted to the debtor's chapter 13 
account. In addition, at the 341 the debtor will be instructed to make the first payment 
immediately_ If the first payment is not made forthwith, or if a payroll deduction order is not 
possible, and certainly if the debtor misses a second payment, a motion to dismiss will be filed. 
Sometimes there is a delay between the time a payroll deduction order is requested and 
when monies begin to be deducted from the debtor7 s paycheck .. If a payment is due before the 
payroll deduction order has been effectuated, the debtor needs to make at least a partial payment 
directly on or before the payment due date and be prepared to pay the balance of the payment 
due by the end of the month if the payroll deduction still has not come out ofthe debtor's check. 
That way the debtor has made a full monthly payment in the first month. 
H-45 
The trustee in the Eastern District of Kentucky does not accept payments at the 341 
meeting or at any hearing. All payments must be mailed to the trustee's lockbox address: 
Chapter 13 Trustee EDKY, PO Box 1766, Memphis TN 38101-1766. 
Because of the new fast-track confinnation procedures, it will be rare that a case will be 
confinned if even one payment has been missed. The debtor needs to establish a willingness and 
an ability to make payments for the plan to be confinned. 
Post-Confirmation: 
Until June of2000, the trustee had some flexibility in working with debtors to arrange for 
them to catch up on missed payments. When in June of this year the judges began to preside 
over the trustee's motions to dismiss, the trustee was instructed that motions to dismiss could be 
withdrawn only if the trustee had received payments sufficient to bring the debtor completely 
current in payments prior to the hearing. 
Also, in the past, motions to dismiss were generated when the debtor missed consecutive 
payments. A skipped payment here and there did not usually trigger the filing of a motion to 
dismiss. Now, however, the judges have instructed the trustee to file motions to dismiss in every 
case in which the dollar amount of the total delinquency during the life of the case is the 
equivalent of two or more monthly payments, three or more bi-weekly payments, or five or more 
weekly payments. The purpose of doing this is twofold. One, by detecting a delinquent case 
early (Le., when the debtor has missed only two payments), there is an increased likelihood the 
debtor can cure the plan arrearage and remain in chapter 13. The greater the delinquency, the 
harder it is (and the longer it takes) to catch up. Two, dealing with delinquencies immediately 
will decrease the chance that the plan will not complete within 60 months. If a debtor who 
missed two payments can double up on payments for two months, the duration of the plan is not 
affected. The judges have now taken a hard-line approach on cases that exceed 60 months and 
will dismiss a case that is in its 61st month. 
The trustee is still in the process of adopting a new delinquency program that will be able 
to detennine a delinquent case based on the money paid in to date compared to what should have 
been paid in to date. Cases in which the debtor has recently missed two payments will continue 
to be the subject of motions to dismiss. The court has prescribed several acceptable ways of 
curing plan arrearages in these cases, which are discussed below. However, this revised program 
will also generate motions to dismiss in cases in which the debtors are presently current but have 
missed payments in the past. No longer will the court pennit these missed payments to be tacked 
on at the end of the plan in 60-month cases. This holds true with suspended payments as well. 
Instead, debtor and debtor's counsel will have to take action to eliminate the past arrearage. In 
the coming months there will be an increased number of motions to dismiss filed, especially in 
older cases, even though the debtor is presently current in payments. And because the trustee is 
no longer able to work out payment plans with a delinquent debtor, debtor's counsel must 
assume a more active role in addressing plan arrearages than in the past. Any proposal to cure 
plan arrearages must be approved by the court. 
At the request of the judges, all motions to dismiss will soon disclose the amount of the 
plan arrearage and the equivalent number of months it would take to cure the arrearage .. In 
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addition, we will provide to debtors a printout showing the payments we have received. Counsel 
has access to the receipt history via the 13network.com website. 
"Present Delinquencies". We will use this tenn to describe cases in which the debtor has 
missed two or more monthly payments in the past twelve months. Please note that for purposes 
of filing a motion to dismiss, it does not matter when the delinquency occurred; only the dollar 
amount of the delinquency in relation to the monthly payment due is relevant. However, from 
the perspective of the trustee (and debtor's counsel), the age of the arrearage may have some 
bearing on how it should be addressed, as discussed below. 
The methods of curing arrearages as prescribed by the court are well-suited to cases with 
recent delinquencies. The court generally pennits the debtor to cure an arrearage comprising up 
to 4 (sometimes 5}months' worth of payments. The court generally requires that plan arrearages 
be cured within a relatively short period of time, and the cure must start reasonably soon after the 
hearing. We tried last year using tax. refunds to cure arrearages, and the result was an abysmal 
failure. Consequently, that is no longer an option. Most frequently the judges require double 
payments or a payment and a half to be made until current, with extra payments to start on the 
next due date following the date of the hearing. Sometimes, based on representations of debtors 
that they can become current right away (a frequent response to the court's question "how soon 
can you get caught up?" of a debtor who is fearful that the case will be dismissed), the judge will 
grant them a brief period (generally not exceeding 30 days) in which to bring payments 
completely current. Your clients might be well-advised to offer double payments, and if they are 
able to be current in 30 days (without skipping a mortgage payment), great; if not, they still have 
a chance to get caught up. There are no brownie points given for curing a plan arrearage in 10 
days versus 4 months. 
It is important to note that payroll deduction orders will not be amended to capture 
the extra payments required to cure plan arrearages. Besides the fact that it would impose 
an administrative burden on my office, in my view the debtors should have to expend some 
effort to make the missed payments themselves. Therefore, debtors whose payments' are made 
via payroll deduction need to know how much to pay each month, how long to make the extra 
payments, and where to send the payments. We will.not calculate this for debtors or counsel, but 
by providing the amount of the arrearage and the receipt history with the motion to dismiss, we 
have given the debtor and counsel the infonnation they need to figure it out. 
Regardless of how the arrearage will be cured, a probation order is sure to be issued. The 
probation order is effective for one year .. During the next twelve months, if any single payment 
is received by the trustee more than 7 days after the due date, the trustee must file a notice of 
noncompliance and tender an order of dismissal, which will be entered immediately without 
further hearing or opportunity to cure. It is the ultimate "drop-dead" order. Whether it will have 
any bearing on eligibility issues if a subsequent case is filed within 180 days after the order of 
dismissal is entered is an open question right now. 
Prior Delinquencies. In the coming months there will be an increased number of motions 
to dismiss filed, especially in older cases,' even though the debtor is presently current in 
payments. It is the trustee's intention to notify counsel by letter of cases in which missed or 
suspended payments are likely to cause a plan to exceed 60 months as measured from the date of 
confinnation and give you sufficient opportunity to resolve the matter before a motion to dismiss 
the case is filed. If you have older cases that are at risk of being dismissed because of prior 
H-47 
unaddressed delinquencies, or because delinquencies and suspensions will cause the plan to 
exceed 60 months, you have several options. Please note that the methods of curing plan 
arrearages prescribed by the court and discussed above will not work if the arrearage is 
substantial (e.g., more than 5 months' worth of payments). The judges have made clear that it is 
too late to catch up a substantial delinquency by making double payments; those cases are being 
dismissed. Consequently, other options should be considered. 
You might want to file a plan modification to keep the case from being dismissed. You 
can increase the debtors' monthly payments so that they still pay in the total "pool" amount 
within 60 months. That would have no adverse effect on creditors, ~o you would only need to 
notice the trustee. In fact, that can easily be done by agreed order signed by the debtor (and 
counsel) and the trustee. 
However, sometimes the debtors can't afford to increase their payments and may in fact 
need to reduce their payments. In those instances you might want to modify the plan to reduce 
the total "pool" amount being paid into the plan. The plan modification may also provide for a 
decrease in monthly payments, depending on the debtors' present financial condition. You 
might be able to wipe out a delinquency by modifying the plan to "total paid in as of x date plus 
$x per month for the remaining x months of the plan". This would require notice to all creditors, 
and an amended Schedule I and J must be filed in support of reduced payments. 
Remember that any modified plan still has to be feasible, and the debtor still must satisfY " 
the liquidation test, so a plan modification may not work in all cases. You can use the claims 
information and the summary information in the "debt breakdown" section from the 
13network.com website to assist you in your evaluation of the feasibility of a plan modificatiolt 
Don't forget to include in your calculations an estimate of the amount of the supplemental " fee to" " 
which you will likely be entitled (upon application and order approving) for your efforts in 
keeping your client in chapter 13. 
Of course the other available options are to convert the case to a chapter 7 case or to 
allow the chapter 13 case to be dismissed and consider whether the debtor would benefit from 
refiling. Regardless of which route you choose, all proposals to cure plan delinquencies are 
subject to court scrutiny and approval, and there is no guarantee that the trustee's agreement to 
the proposal will ensure it will be approved by the court. 
Because the trustee can no longer work with debtors to arrange for them to catch up on 
missed payments, please do not tell your clients to call my office. There is nothing we can do. I 
have instructed my staff to inforin debtors who call about a motion to dismiss that they need to 
call their attorneys. Also, we will soon be sending a letter to debtors along with the motion to 
dismiss advising them to call their attorneys. 
This is a significant change from past practice, but it is necessary given the emphasis the 
court is now placing on the 60-month limit. We need to consider not only a debtor's monthly 
payments, but also the total ''pool'' amount to be paid into the plan and the time it will take for a 
debtor to complete payments under the pool plan in light of missed and suspended payments. 
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CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
POBOX 2204 
LEXINGTON KY 40588 
Dear Chapter 13 Debtor: 
The Chapter 13 Trustee's office has filed a Motion to Dismiss your bankruptcy 
case because you have fallen behind on your plan payments to the Trustee. 
This motion to dismiss does not mean that your case will automatically be 
dismissed. You might have several options to keep your bankruptcy case from being 
thrown out. 
I urge you to contact your bankruptcy.attorney-as soon as possible. Your attorney 
can advise you on your options. For example, you might be able to file a new plan to 
change your payments. Or you might be able to bring your plan current by making extra 
payments. You might even decide that chapter 13 no longer works for you. Only you 
and your attorney can decide what is best for you. 
The Trustee's office cannot cancel or withdraw this motion to dismiss, so please 
do not call this office asking that we do so. Do plan to attend the hearing on the date and 
time listed on the motion. But first contact your attorney. 
cc: Debtor's Counsel 
Yours truly, 
Beverly M. Burden 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
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PROBATION NOTICE 
The court has placed you on probation in your chapter 13 
case. For the next year, if any single payment is 7 days (or 
more) late, your case will· automatically be dismissed. The 
trustee must receive and post your payment within the 7 -day 
grace period. 
PROBATION NOTICE 
The court has placed you on probation in your chapter 13 
case. For the next year, if any single payment is 7 days (or 
more) late, your case will automatically be dismissed. The 
trustee must receive and post your payment within the 7 -day 
grace period. 
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Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
.. Chapter 13 Payment Suspension .... 
effective November 1, 2000 
The trustee generally does not object to requests that plan payments be suspended 
for a period not to exceed 90 days where the motion shows cause to suspend the 
payments. In the past, suspended payments have been tacked on to the end of the plan. 
However, with the court's emphasis on the 60-month limit for plan durations, that may 
not be possible, and other arrangements must be made for the debtor to make up the 
suspended payments. If the plan was confinned as a 55-month plan (for example) rather 
than a 60-month plan, the trustee would not object to payments continuing past the 55th 
month until the suspended payments are completed, provided the plan does not thereby 
last longer than 60 months. 
It is the position of the court that if the debtor is delinquent at the time the motion 
to suspend payments is filed, the missed payments are to be· counted in the suspended 
period. In other words, the debtor cannot miss two payments, ask for a 3-month 
suspension, and thereby avoid making payments for 5 months. 
The trustee would prefer that the order granting the suspension of plan payments '. 
specify the months in which payments will not be made rather than requestiIig a vague 
"60-day" or "90-day" suspension. Also, the order should specify how the debtor will 
make up the suspended payments. The attached order should be used as a guideline (and 
can be modified as necessary). 
There may be times when the suspension is due to a significant change in the 
debtor's financial condition (e.g., loss of employment) such that the debtor is unable at 
the time of the suspension to project whether and how suspended payments can be caught 
up. In that instance the debtor may want to wait until the suspension is over, slhe has 
resumed payments, and then propose a cure for the suspended· payments. This delayed 
proposal should be filed within 30 days after the date on which plan payments resume. 
The debtor must resume payments at the current monthly payment until a subsequent 
plan modification is confinned. A plan modification will require notice to all creditors, 
and an amended Schedule I and I must be filed in support of the modification. In the 
alternative, an agreed order signed by the trustee and requiring the debtor to make 
additional payments until the suspended payments are caught up will not require notice to 
creditors as they are not adversely affected. 
If a payroll deduction order is in effect, counsel for the debtor, not the trustee, 
is responsible for serving the debtor's employer. Also, when payments are to resume, 
the debtor is responsible for making payments if the employer does Dot resume the 
payroll deduction. 
H-55 
INRE: 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
____ DIVISION 
CASE NO. 
DEBTOR(S) 
ORDER SUSPENDING PAYMENTS 
This matter having come on for hearing on the debtor's motion to suspend plan 
payments, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. The debtor's plan payments are suspended for the following month(s) [please specifY]: 
____ 20 . 
2. The debtor shall resume payments in the month of ____ ---', 20_. 
3. [if applicable] The Payroll Deduction Order is also suspended for the months 
specified. 
4. The debtor shall make up the suspended payments by: 
o increasing payments to $ __ per month for the remaining duration of the 
plan, which shall not exceed 60 months; 
o making [ double] payments when payments resume for months, 
provided that if a payroll deduction order is in effect, the debtor shall 
make the extra payments to the trustee directly and not through payroll 
deduction; 
o making a lump sum payment in the amount of $ on or before 
___ ,,20 ; 
o filing a motion to modify the plan, which motion shall be filed within 30 days 
after the date on which payments are to resume; OR o other (describe) __________________ _ 
5. [if applicable] Counsel for the debtor shall serve this order on the employer if a 
Payroll Deduction Order is in effect. 
Dated: 
By the court -
Bankruptcy Judge 
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Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
~ Claims in Chapter 13 Cases ~ 
"under construction" 

see Defective Claim Letter, Objection to Claim, attached. 
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3E,\TSRLY IV!. 5u'KDElT I C==--;'?TE~ 13 TRUSTEE 
SUITE 500, CGlVl..ND"1'TITY TEUST BUII.:DING 
P. O. BOX 2204 
L:2:XINGTON, K::::NTliCK.Y 40582-2204 
(606) 233-1527 
August 24, J.999 
'7 
NO 5'1AlfJv\fJ\JT OF' Ace 0 UN! 
Re: 
~SSN: L 22 

AQi~-??12_66S6IL!3£6 

Chapter J.3 Bankruptcy Case No. 51 - - 0 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
This office Ser--;res as the: Trustee in the above refere!lced Chapte2:' l3 
case. As Trustee, we must object to claims that are lacking ac.e·~..::.ate 
documentation. Your claim in the amount of $ 13Q~u.~7 is not supoortea 
by a statement of account that correlates with the:amount of your claim. 
The statement of account can take the form of a ledger card or computer 
printout. Regardless, your statement must clearly demonstrate how you 
arrived at the amount of your claim. 
Please provide us with ade~..::.ate documentation along with a copy of this 
letter and mail to: Chapter J.3 Trustee, P.O. Box 204, Lexington, KY 
40588-2204. If we do not receive the requested documents within thirty 
days, we have no choice other than to object to your claim in its entirety. 
If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to 
contact us. 
Yours truly, 
Chapter 3.3 Office 

AccotL~ting Department 
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•• 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

, T7 ' iT DIVISION 

IN 	RE: 
• it • 
DEBTORS 	 CASE NUMBER: ........S__.:lC 

SSN: 7 - m_ 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING 

AND OBJECTION TO CLAIM 

TO: !)t'3"(J~'S CO\l.N~H.. 	 C~rbITOA... 
1) 	 277-PSS. . !Ii. 

i I lUI i£O 
 2)~~==:::::::::i""""""
• 	 1111 
& 	 I .. • 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Notice is hereby given of this Objection to Claim. Unless a 
Response and Request for Hearing, stating gro~~ds for opposing the 
Objection is filed within thirty (30) days of service of this Notice, 
an Order will be tendered sustaining the Objection and the matter will 
be submitted to the Court for decision. No hearing will be held u."less 
a timely request for hearing is filed. Notice is further given that 
the attached order sustaining this objection is being tendered herewith. 
CERTIFIC~TE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified that a true copy of the foregoing was 
mailed on this the \~-t\.Jday of ()~1nb{.r" 1m, to the persons and 
addresses indicated above. 
OBjECTION TO CLAIM 
The Trustee objects to the claim of 4iiMlI••"_".III!C!!I!."L!'.,,-'IJII!IllilIiiT"73171i511i·iliTiI~ii-Ii'ilT_-.-ii·Ti:i'~T, 
filed as claim number 0009 in the amount of $13,974.27 on the grounds 
that the claim was defective when filed and was never amended. 
Beverly Burden, Trustee 
P.O. Box 2204 

. Lexington, ~~ 40588-2204 
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see attached forms 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
~ Application to Incur Debt ~ 
H-61 
Dear Practitioner: 
Beverly M. Burden 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
P.O. Box 2204 
Lexington, KY 40588-2204 
(859) 233-1527 
We have received an inquiry from one of your clients regarding the· 
; . possibility of incurring additional debt and/or re-financing a mortgage 
for the purpose of paying out their Chapter 13 case. We have asked 
your client to contact you directly for assistance with this matter. 
Enclosed is the information you and your client need: an application to 
incur additional debt ,an order, a creditor's commitment, and 
instructions. In addition, amended Schedules I and J (the budget) 
must accompany the application. Please retain this packet as a master 
copy and use it when any of your clients desire to incur additional 
debt, or refinance existing debt, while their Chapter 13 case is open. 
These forms are also available on our website at www.ch13edky.com. 
Also enclosed is our policy on obtaining payoff balances. Please review 
this policy and share it with your clients. It is especially important to 
note that we will not provide payoff balances to prospective lenders. 
We will provide the information only to the debtors or their attorneys. 
Yours truly, 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
H-62 
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BEVERLY M. BURDEN, CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE 
SUITE 500, COMMUNITY TRUST BUILDING 
P.O. BOX 2204 
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40588-2204 
(859) 233-1527 
November 20, 2000 
VIRGIL JACKSON and SANDRA JANE FRYMAN 
#1, BOX 164 
BERRY KY 41003 
Re: 	 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
Case Number: 5-00-1332 
1) 	 The approximate balance of your Chapter 13 case is $ 
2) 	 This balance is an ESTIMATE ONLY. 
3) 	 If you intend to either refinance your home, or borrow funds, in 
order to payout your Chapter 13 case, you are REQUIRED to obtain 
an order from the U. S. Bankruptcy Court before doing so. Contact 
your attorney for infor.mation about this process. 
4) 	 The exact payoff will not be determined until your case has 
audited. 
5) 	 An estimate of your balance will only be provided once every 
sixty (60) days. 
6) 	 If you prefer to make your future requests bye-mail, you may 
send your request to erogers@ch13edky.com. 
Thank you, 
Erin 	Rogers 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

APPl JCATlON FOR ADDITIONAl, DEBT 

(Type forms and complete fully for approval) 

1. 	 Fill out, sign and date the application. 
2. 	 File an amended schedule I and J with the U. S. Bankruptcy Court and 
provide a copy to the Trustee's office with your completed application. 
3. 	 Have your attorney approve and sign the application also. 
4. 	 Have the lending institution complete their part of the application. 
5. 	 The Chapter 13 Trustee's office reviews the application and then, if 
approved, forwards it to Bankruptcy Court for approval. It takes 
approximately 2-3 weeks to process the application. (The Trustee's office 
has no control over the length of time required for Court to review the 
application). 
6. 	 Call your Attorney if you have any questions or need help in filling out 
this application. 
7. 	 The Trustee's office will not give specific information about your Chapter 
13 case to any lending institution. We will mail a print out of your case to 
you if requested. You may share this information with any potential 
creditor. 
8. 	 We only send nne payoff letter to your Attorney, if you intend 
payoff your case. This amount will be mailed to you only after we have 
audited your case. 
*** Only COMPLETED APPLICATIONS will receive an audit *** 
9. 	 You must provide a written estimate if your application to incur debt is 
for home or vehicle repairs. 
Return the completed application to: 
H-64 

Chapter 13 Trustee 
P. O. Box 2204 
Lexington, Kentucky 40588 
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UNITtDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENtUCKY 

RE: CASE NO. 
DEBTOR(S) 
APPlICATION TO INCIIR ADDITIONAl DFBI 
The Debtor hereby applies to the Court for approval of additional debt to be repaid by way of 
direct installment payments. 
The additional debt is as follows: 
PURCHASE PRICE: 
(If this debt does not involve a purchase, skip down to "TOTAL AMOUNT OF DEBT"). 
DOWN PAYMENT: 

TRADE-IN: (if applicable) 

TOTAL A.t\10UNT OF DEBT: 

MONTHLY INSTALLMENT: 

PURPOSE OF DEBT: 

NAME OF CREDITOR: 

SECURITY: (Describe) 

The debt is for property or services necessary for the Debtor(s) performance under the plan. 

The Debtor(s) will be able to make the payments on the new debt as well as maintain 

payments Under the plan. Attached is a current income and expense budget form. The Trustee 

has reviewed the budget and believes it is a fair account of the Debtor(s) current financial 

situation. 

Previous application to incur additional debt? 

Dated: 

Debtor Debtor 
Attorney for Debtor(s) Chapter 13 Trustee 
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CREDITOR'S COlVThllTlVIENT 
It is hereby acknowledged that _____ -------------
(Name of Borrower) 
has applied to ____ ---:::-""""':"'"-:---------- for credit as follows: 
(Leuder) 
PURCHASE PRICE: 
(If the new debt does not involve a purchase, skip down to "TOTAL NEW DEBT"). 
DOWN PAYMENT: 
TRADE-IN: 
(If Applicable) 
TOTAL NE\V DEBT: 
MONTHLY INSTALLlVIENT: ___________ _ 
SECURITY: (DESCRIBE) 
INTEREST RATE ON LOAN: 
It is understood that the applicant is in an active Chapter 13 case in the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Kentud-y. 
Approval of the credit extension is hereby granted subject only to the approval of said 
Bankruptcy Court which the Borrower undertakes full responsibility to obtain. 
DATE: 
BY: __ ---~------------(LENDER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE) 
H-67 
INRE: 
DEBTORS 
mUTED STATES BA1~1{R,(JPTCY COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CASE NO: 
ORDER APPROVING ADDITIONAL DEBT 
The debtor(s} have applied to the Court for approval of debt (after filing Chapter 
13). The Trustee has no objection to such additional debt and feels that the additional debt 
should not interfere with the performance of the plan. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court approves the application of the above 
Debtor(s} to incur additional debt in an amount not to exceed for 
thepurposeof ________________________________________________ __ 
The parties agree and it is so Ordered that such additional debt shall not be affected 
by any Chapter 13 discharge entered in this case. The Chapter 13 Trustee shall not be 
responsible for administering this additional debt. 
Thisthe _________ dayof ____________________ ,19 ___ . 
BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
Approve Entry: 
Attorney for the Debtor 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
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Log-in SCI-een 
til 13 netWork Home - Microsoft Internet Explorer !I~ f3 
Cleve Reding (Montgomerv) 
Arkansas: David D Coop (Little Rock) 
Arizona: Russell Brown (Phoenix) 
Dianne C. Kerns(Tucson) 
California: David Burchard (Foster City) 
Edwina E. Dowell (Los Angeles) 
Elizabeth F. Rojas (Los Angeles) 
Russell D. Greer (Modesto) 
Martha BroniWo/(Oakland) 
Rod Danielson (Riverside) 
Jan P Johnson (Sacramento) 
Lany Loheit (Sacramento) 
Thomas Billingslea (San Diego) 
David L. Skelton (San Diego) 
· ... M ......... _ •...•.. ~ ...... __ ._ .. h._.~ .... __ .•. _·.* . 
... ~ ..... : ': ~. ~','~ .:.- ::', . :.:.::;:.~~:? ::.:~~ :iF":'~': .:~:~~.<~::;. 
Indiana: 
Illinois: 
Kansas: 
Kentucky: 
Louisiana: 
Maryland: 
• . ~Go 
> ..... :.':~ " ', .. 
: ....... ' 
',:.,'," '.' .; .... 
: . :.:.~ .' 
S\/Ivia Ford Brown (Savannah) Ohio: 
Donald M Aikman (FtWayne) 
Tom Vaughn (Chicago) 
Glenn Stearns (Lisle) 
William Griffin (Kansas City) 
OklahOMa: 
Oregon: 
Pennsylvania: 
Puerto Ri... J 
==x...:.::.:~=~==.::::.:;v South Caroli... ' 
Keith Rodriguez (Lafayette) 
Paul H Davidson (Shreveport) 
Ellen Cosby (Baltimore) 
Joel Goldberger(Baltimore) 
Tom lackey@owie) 
Timothy P. Branigan (Laurel) 
Tennessee: 
Texas: 
': .. : .. ,' 
ww 0. 13 NCrWORK. CoM 
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U sel· Log-in 
"!i BeveT1y Btuden. Chapter- 13 Trustee - Micl"Osoft Internet Explore.- . ~ ~ - ~ 1!!Ir;) f3 
--_._-IJ Eile I;dit ~ew FAvorites tools J:1eIp .. 
Ij ~ .., @ ~ ·GJ../ Lil I~.. ~ I Seck F<:";w~rd stop Refresh Home· Favorites I Mal Prlr4 
I j As(cIress Ii] hltp:/f'llVww.13network.comAexhome.hlm 
Office Hours: 
Mailing Address: 
P<lyment Address: 
8:00 am - 4:00 pm EST 
Chapter 13 Trustee EDKY 
PO Box 2204 
Lexington. KY 405B8 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
PO Box 1766 
:EiI 
iii 
Edit 
Chapter 13 Inquiry 
Other Links 
To obtain a user ID and 
password eli ck here 
Weh Access A(J[eemenT~ 
;-;-feD Internet ----
... 
Edit 
o CHASE THE RIGHT RELATlCIISH1P IS £YEITTHIJUi." 
0- Bantrup(cy Informlrtlon Symms. klc..· Hcne I 
13network.c~ 
P/e3se ellter yotlr User ID alld Passworc/. 
Click 011 tile Submit buttoll whell dOlle. 
User Id: I 
Password: Jr-----
Submit I Reset I CanCel 
J 
.... """'......... .1,,.,,.,,,,, .. ~".,.~: •• ,. fflt~ ·: .. ~,.., .... ~~.,.:A .............. I.~.'A "'.A " .. ~" ..... .,.. ... n .. .-\. .... "'-/ .1 ..... 1"'1.~n..,. ...... ~ , ..... 4'"'.,.~ 
. ~ 
lID http://206.160.1 ~3.1 o~xI~~,:.bi~html·dlJlcblshdr .htrnAnap I r-; S) internet 
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Sem-ch fOI- Case Nlunbel-
r fjle: ~cIit ~w Fl,vOrttes <Iools. Help···::·'.··· lD1 
I~~--~~~--~~~~~~--~----~~~~~~--~--~--~----~-----j ~.:¢:>. ..... '@' ~ G1 I CiJ I'~ .. a'li] ~ ... I.' Back .~. Forward sto~ Refresh Home Favorites Mail Print Edit . Size 
I J Asldress I@J http://2OS.1S0.143.10SAexl1oginfrm.htm '. ..... 3' ~Go 
!.:!IJ_W_·nks_....;iJ=-CU ___ st_om_Ize_Li'l.;...·. _kS..,.:· .-=:@J;::·:...;,Fr:.....ee_··..,:.. tI_Otman.-; .. ;,;.;.: ~.·....;. • ;.:iJ=-.,..",,;_·_·do_W_S.;... .• ;...::....:..J=···::.p_er'-' so.;,... _ri_ai_F..;.;ile_S...:,,;..;~'.;:;;..·,::_· .:..-~.;-.:.;.,,--__ ._ .... .;...., _ ..... ...;,' .. ..:..-,;....;.--'-__ -1 
.. 0 CHASE THI: RIGHT Rl:lATJOMSHIP IS I:VUrTTlfI.G.- . 
Cbaae Buntruptq' lnfona.tioll Sywaro, In!:-· HonIe [ 
13network.co~ 
I Case Number 
.:J 
or J 
Usl cases where I Case Number ::1 I Equals ::1 
; .... _ •••• ,Ia- .... ~ .. _ ••••• -: ___ ,_ .... _ ...... _ TI ...... ~~~~~~_II.I~~~: _. __ 1 •• _1_ •• : •• AI,: ••• , •. A.I.A I ••• :ow...:.l 
'. , . }..r 
r .. r-Is ln1:ernet 
~ 13r1etwork Login - Microsoft Internet Explorer ____ '____ 1!I!!Ir:=:J f3 
jAlidress I~ http://206.1S0.143.105I1exJioglnfrm.htm 3 ~Go 
jUnks @J CustOJ'!lize Link~,iJ F.ree tiotmall. @] tlVlnd~' ...:JPersonaf Files;:" .';." . ' ... 
...... 
::.' 
:." 
13network.co~ 
...... ~. $( 
Cas;e Query 
Click on the case number to view detail Information. 
Debtor 1 Last Name Debtor 1 Fid Name Debtor 2 Last Name Debtol 2 Filst Name 
. '.r--r-I~ Internet 
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Case Infol-ulatioll 
~CaselnquiJy-MicroSoftlntemaExplorer ____ - , 1!I~13 
JAUclress I~ ~P:/J206.160.1;3.105JIexlcasefrm.~--·-·- --3 ~Go 
J Links @] Customize LInks iJ F~ Hobnail @]\o'\4ndows ..•. ....:...JPers~,a1 Fdes 
I.:.J_Eil_. e_·_~_._ .. ·:'_~.;..ew....;._·_FAV_ora_es_ .....;,·  ..,...IOoIs...;., ... _ _::::_.tte_Jp_·_'.,·_,· -,-"_' <...,.i~ .... ...;..." _'.,;.." ....;.,: ';..,.' _. _,,_. _ ... '_:_::_:,:;..;. • . ~_._, .. _._.::_ .. :_~:._.'...;., .. _--,I,a I ~ .. ~ .: ... :.,: . @." ,.:~ ~ I .. [l] I !~. ~ til &. I 
J Back . forward'" '. Stop" Refresh.' Home Favorites ':Mall Print Edit Size 
J AgcIress Ii] hltp:/J206~160.143~1 OSAex/c8sefrm.hlm . . ... 
13network.c~ 
... 
. ~. .. . 
... --. - r III) Internet 
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Date Infol-Illaiton 
I J file C-cIIt ~ew Favorites lools 1::1e1p. . :111 j ~ .. @. ~ t::J., CiJ··' I ~ .. ~ iii -& .. I Back F.:;.r'."arc! stop Refresh Home.·· Favorites· Mail Print Edit Size ! J As;!clress Iii htt;:/J206.160.143.1 05.4eXlcaSefrm.ht~-. -. -- U __ •_____ •• _u __ ••• uo •• ···-··---···--·-·-3-~-~-·1 
jUnkS @:JCustomize LInks@)Free HotmiIii:··il·~ncioWs. ~~~~o~~f.ii~:\lJ;~~:~.</.(: .,... ':;' I 
_ 0 CHASE THI: IlIGHT RH ... nONSill~ .s I:V£lrn'Hllu •• <J> • • 
C'- Bankruptx;y Infonnlltion Symm-, me. ~ Home I 
13ne~r~.co~ 
Plan Payments 
jAlII.clress lil http://206.160.143.10SAexJcasefrmJ1tm Um. •••• • 3~GO I 
o CHASE TNI: !i.[GHT IlELATlOIISHIP IS £Y[.TTHIIlCi.~ 
Chase Baokru~ IrffilnnWcn SflJt!I.-. me.. ~ I 
3network.c~ 
$ .. 
Debtor 
I EMPLOYER INFI 
....... -.: ... : .. : , ........ _ .. 
,; ~ ,-, '~.' .,,:: .. ,:-'J\:~ll. Internet· 
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Case SllllllllaI-Y 
J E.De ~dit ~ew Favorites' Ioois Help" 
I ~ oato @) @J at I r!£I I~" ~ iii ~.. j 
I J Back F,;,c,uf6rd Stop Refresh Home Favorites Mail Print Edit Size ~
~J~A_~_~ _ s_s~I-~iO~·-_htt_~_:~_~ __ 6_~_60_._14~3~~_O_5_Ae_~ __ a_se_f_rm_~~~.~ ______________ ~~~ ______ ~~ ____ -_-_--~~ j>Oo 
J Links @] CUstomize LI~s @]Free HOtmaI '@J ~.o.""s. :..:.JPersor\al FlIes' . ··e·· . i'e' 
3network.co~. 
Iplan Base ---I ----=J 
I~T~~-a~IP~a~id-i-n-to~P-I~an~~----__ --------__ --____ -----lr------__ --________ ___ 
IT otal Disbursed to Creditors I 
ITemporary Hold Ii-----'-------------
~ ~~~~~~~~~==~~~~~~==~~=================rl==~l==ri~~··~~~e-m-~~-------
I~T~~~a-ID-n-b-w~s~e-d~to-a-"-P-a-rti-es------------------------1 ______________ _ 
IBalance on Hand I I~P~e~rm-a~n~en~t~H~O~ld~-----------------------------1 
, . ~. .' 
1:;';1 . ;'" . I!!U; ',' 
'Eall ... Size 
J Altdress Ii] http://206.160.143.1 05l1exlcasefrm~ 
J links i] Customize Llrlks iJ Free Hotina.1 . @Jlr'\I1ndows ...:JPersonal Files I 
o CHASE THE IlIGIH RELATIONSHIP IS EVlIITTHII"_.a • '-
Chne Bankruptcy lnfom1ation Synams.lnc.· .'HormJ I 
3network.c~ 
',. " 
I MAX RECOVERY, 
iltU;. 
..... ---rSTATE 
i $82,801 
I I 
,---------' .!------~-----
1$1.054,82 1. 
;...------1 $1.200.00 /;---
I ~'.072.451 i----
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3network.co~ 
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~J 
3network.co~ 
.. 
H-76 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
I 
r 
r 
r 
r 
Case Ledge.-
o CHAse THE RIGHT RELAnOJlSIHP IS EV£IlYTHIIl<h'" • ~ < • 
C'- Bankruptcy ktfcrmatlcn S)'lItmmll.Inc:." HonIe t 
. 3network.co~ 
. .. ..' Forward (Calculated· :...J 
I"'N~t-~~.--"'"'------'------....... --'rl:1=8_1-4=9=99=8=!JtRODNE~. . ~ 
I N/A I 18150838 WROtlRY ,- $40 
r----li-tUe.---·--~-----G4821918 I6'Wtl: r-mo 
1------;.--------1 tU8 125478 I EMPLOYER ~ ~-----;'------i-----------~------' IPDO I .Iww I N/A 125511 li~ciLOYER ~
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,-. II~ Internet 
Delinqllency SCl-een 
JA!i!.dress J.@] http://206,160.,143,105I1exleasefrm.htm .. .::J 
o CHASe THE RIGHT RELATIONSHIP IS EVEIlTTHI.Ci.4I 
Chaoia Bankru~ information SysbImlJ. In<:..· Home I 
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Beverly Burden Web Access Agreement Page 10f3 
Beverly M. Burden 
Chapter 13 Standing Trustee 
Website Access Agreement 
This Agreement is made and entered into by and between the Office of the Trustee, Beverly M. Burden, Chapter 13 Standing Trustee 
(hereinafter referred to as a TRUSTEE), AND 
INDIVIDUAL USER NAME: ________________ _ 
AND 
COMPANYIFIRM NAME: _____________ ----
Both the INDIVIDUAL-USER AND COMPANY/FIRM are liable under this Agreement and may only access cases in which they are a 
creditor or debtor. 
The Trustee is a duly appointed Chapter 13 Standing Trustee for the Eastern District of Kentucky, vested with the duties as set forth in 
U.S.C. Section 1302(b), including the duty to fumish information concerning debtors' estates and the administration of these estates. The 
Trustee maintains records and files in computerized form. The Trustee permits approved Internet Access to the User for the purpose of 
viewing and inspecting files of debtors for selected information regarding receipts and disbursements of funds. 
The User desires Internet access to view and inspect these selected files. 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained in this agreement and the satisfactory performance of all 
conditions stated, the Parties agree that 
1. INTERNET ACCESS TO RECORDS - The User shall be given Internet Access to, and the Trustee shall provide that access to 
selected records and data maintained by the Trustee. 
2. LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS AND USE - User hereby acknowledges and agrees to Internet Access. 
PURPOSE - Shall be for the sole purpose of viewing and inspecting the selected data and records under the control and custody of the 
Trustee, and User shall neither make nor attempt to make any data entry changes or modification to any record or data. 
USE - Is provided solely for the use of User in User's business. User hereby expressly agrees that it will not use nor allow the use of 
records, data or information obtained through the Intemet Access for the purpose of solicitation or any other use or practice not 
specifically permitted by this Agreement 
MANNER - Will be accessed and used by User only in the manner expressly authOrized and permitted by the Trustee. User agrees that 
it will neither use nor permit use of the Website in any manner or fer any purpose which is not authorized by the Trustee or which is 
unlawful or which is likely to cause damage or disrepair to the equipment, software, records or Website of the Trustee. 
3. CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF RECORDS - User hereby expressly acknowledges and agrees that the records and data for which 
access is provided under this Agreement are and shall remain records under the control and custody of the Trustee, and access is 
provided only under the direct supervision of the Trustee, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and all reasonable and necessary rules 
and procedures adopted by the Trustee. 
User, further, expressly acknowledges and agrees that while accessing, viewing and using the Trustee's selected records, the User shall 
be under the same duties, responsibilities, and obligations as the Trustee to protect and carefully keep and preserve the records, subject 
to the same penalties for any violation of those duties and obligations. 
4. CONDITIONS FOR USE AND ACCESS 
A. EQUIPMENT AND CONNECTIONS - The User shall obtain and supply, at its sole cost. all equipment. including computer, 
peripherals, modems, software and connections and shall be responsible for and pay any and all other fees or costs necessary to 
implement this Agreement 
5. TERM OF AGREEMENT -This Agreement shall continue until such time as it is terminated pursuant to the provision in the following 
subsection. 
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6. TERMINATION - This Agreement may be terminated by either the Trustee or by the User, at any time, for any reason whatsoever, 
without notice. 
7. INDEMNIFICATION - User shall and hereby agrees to indemnify the Trustee for, and to hold Trustee harmless from any claims, 
demands, suits, damages or costs, of any kind, arising out of or relating to use and access provided under this Agreement, caused or 
claimed to be caused by any act or failure of Trustee. 
8. ASSIGNMENT OR SUBCONTRACT - This agreement shall not be aSSigned nor shall any use or access provided under this 
Agreement be subcontracted, co-opted or allowed to any other person, firin or other legal entity without the express written consent of the 
Trustee, and such consent may be conditioned upon such terms and conditions as the Trustee may require. 
9. ENTIRE AGREEMENT - This Agreement, together with any rules or procedures adopted by the Trustee shall constitute the entire 
Agreement between the parties, and User hereby expressly acknowledges that it is not relying upon any other representations or 
agreements not expressed in writing as a part of this Agreement. This Agreement may not be amended or modified, except in writing, 
and signed by all parties. 
10. DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY: 
A. NO WARRANTIES - The Trustee hereby expressly disclaims any express or implied warranties of the software program, computer 
equipment or computer, and User hereby expressly assumes all risk related to the use and access provided under this Agreement. 
B. NO REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF RECORDS - The Trustee hereby expressly 
disclaims any representation or assurance conceming the accuracy, completeness or substantive nature of any data to which access is 
being provided and User hereby acknowledges this disclaimer and waives any claim or reliance upon such representations or 
assurances. 
C.NO LIABILITY FOR ERRORS OR FAILURES - The Trustee shall not be liable in any manner under this Agreement for any error, 
inaccuracy or incomplete information contained in the records for which access is provided, and User hereby expressly releases the 
Trustee from any claim, demand or suit arising from or as a result of any such error, inaccuracy or incomplete information. 
Further, the Trustee shall not be liable in any manner under this Agreement for any failure, malfunction or other delay, Inconvenience, or 
inability of the computer system, software or equipment, and User hereby expressly releases the Trustee from any claim, demand, or suit 
arising from or as a result of any such failure, malfunction, delay, inconvenience or inability of the system software or equipment. 
D. NO WARRANTY AS TO CURRENT DATA OR INFORMATION - The data and information available in the Trustee's records is as 
current as pOSSible, depending on work flow, work needs, holidays, weekends, restraints on the Trustee, and any elements or factors 
outside the control of the Trustee. 
Payoff balances are only approximated due to the aforementioned conditions, recent receipts or disbursements, claim changes, court 
orders or accruing interest. Exact payoff amounts should be obtained through the Trustee's Office by specific written request. 
E. ADMISSIBILITY AS EVIDENCE - The Trustee makes no representation that the data and information available by accessing the 
Trustee's Website will be admissible in Court as a Hearsay exception pursuant to Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
.• User. shall forward.an original of this ,signed and da~d Agreement to the attention of Danatia Coulter. Upon receipt, and approval by 
Trustee, Trustee will promptiy sign and return a copy of this Agreement to User along with a user-id and password. 
11. CorporationS/Companies: Firms, and/or any parties or Individual using the aSSigned user-id and password are liable under this· . 
agreement. . 
Print or type all information. 
Enter Company Name: 
Enter User Name: 
Titie: 
Address: 
City, State Zip: 
PhonelFax Number: 
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. 
r Signature of User: 
r Print Name: 
Date: 
r 
r Mail with self· User 10 Request addressed, stamped Chapter 13 Trustee envelope to: PO Box 2204 
LeXington, KY 40588 
r Or fax to: (859)255-3143 
r 
r 
r 
r Office of The Trustee 
r Beverly M. Burden By: 
r Beverly M. Burden 
Chapter 13 Standing Trustee 
r 
r , 
Date: 
r Internet Website: www.13network.com 
Chapter 13 Use Only 
r Userl.D.: 
r User password: 
;r 
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CHAPTER 13 ORIENTATION 
• 
• ASHLAND 
FRANKFORT" " 
• LEXINGrON 
OW&~SBORO 
• • 
BOWLING GREEN 
Beverly M. Burden, Trustee 
Eastern District of Kentucky 
100 East Vine Street, Suite 500 
Community Trust Building 
P. O. Box 2204 
Lexington, Kentucky 40588-2204 
H- 83 
. . .. J 
J 
Introduction 1 J 
----------------------
T Calling the Office 
----------------------
1 I 
A .J 
B Payments 
----------------------
1 
L Direct Payments ----------- 2 j Payroll Deductions 
----------------------
2 E Monthly Payment Chart 
----------
3 
Stopping Payroll Deductions 
---------------------
4 J 0 Returned Checks 
----------------------
4 F Extra Payments 
----------------------
4 J Outside Payments 
----------------------
4 
C Length of Chapter 13 Plan 5 
----------------------0 J N Case Summaries 
----------------------
5 
T Claims Filed by Creditors 
----------------------
6 J E Payments to Creditors 6 N ----------------------
T Co-Signed Debts 
----------------_._---
7 J s Permission for Credit 
----------------------
7 
Selling Your Property 
----------------------
7 J Income Taxes 8 ----------
Completion vs Dismissal of Plan 
-._------------._ .. _. 8 j 
Non-Discharged Debts 
---------------------
9 
Voluntary Dismissal of Your Case 
----------------------
9 J Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
---------------------
9 
Final Report and· Audit 
----------------------
10. J 
Your Credit Rating -----_._--- 10 
J Three Major Reporting Agencies 
------- 11 I 
.j 
Important Documents 
------- 12 
Chapter 13 Responsibilities 
---------- 13 .. 
Definitions of General Bankruptcy Tenns 
------------
14 
Where Your Money Goes 
-----------------------
16 .. 
Reasons for Filing Bankruptcy 
-----------------------
17 
• 
ii 
• 
H-84 
r 
r·: 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r. 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
Introduction 
This· booklet will help to answer some of the most common 
questions or problems arising from being in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. 
Please refer to this handbook often as a reference guide. If you need 
more information with a particular problem, feel free to call the office. 
Calling 3 
theOffice ~ 
Office hours are from 9:00 
AM until 4:00 PM Monday 
through Friday. The phone 
number is (859) 233-1527. A 
staff of 12 is well qualified to 
answer your questions. The 
receptionist can direct your call 
to the proper person. 
Have a question about your 
payments? 
Call: 233-1527 (See below list 
for extension numbers) 
Covington cases -
Corbin cases -
Frankfort cases -
Pikeville cases -
Lexington cases-
Ashland cases -
Ext. 101 
Ext. 101 
Ext. 105 
Ext. 105 
Ext. 106 
Ext. 111 
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Payments 
Chapter 13 is commonly 
called the Wage Earner's Plan. It 
involves payment of debt to your 
creditors and allows your 
property to be protected from 
creditors. You may be able to 
complete your plan early if you 
are able to increase the amount 
of money you payor if some 
creditors do not file a claim in 
your case. Plans usually last 3-5 
years but should never exceed 5 
years in length. 
Generally, you pay us and 
we pay your creditors, according 
to your plan. We make payments 
to your creditors once a month. 
We pay all secured creditors 
first, then priority creditors and 
finally, unsecured creditors. 
, 
'., 
Direct Payments 
You should have received a 
·Payment Information- letter with 
exact details about your particular 
case, such as due date each month 
and payment amount. you must 
remain CUrrent on all . payments. 
You may pay by personal check, 
money order or cashier's check -
made payable to the Chapter 13 
Trustee. Write your case number 
on all payments. 
If you fall behind or 
become I'delinquent'l In 
your payments, one or 
more of your creditors 
could file for a "rell~f 
from the automatic . '. 
stay'l on your case •.... 
This means· a creditor ... ·· . 
·can get·theCourt's 
permission .to .. 
repossess your 
property. Call your 
attorney If you receive a 
motion for relief from 
stay. Your attorney can 
tell you what your 
options are. 
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MAIL ALL PAYMENTS TO: 
Chapter 13 Trustee. EDKY 
P. O. Box 1766 
Memphis, TN 38101-1766 
Payroll Deductions 
Call the office IF you would 
like your Chapter 13 payments 
taken straight from your paycheck. 
Ask for the Case Manager for your 
case. We need your employer's 
exact name and address (where 
your payroll comes from). This 
Payroll Deduction Order (PDO) is 
signed by the Judge and can only 
be stopped by a court order signed 
by the Judge. This deduction must 
stay in place as long as you are in 
bankruptcy or as long as you work 
for this employer. It usually takes 
1 '!'2 . weeks to get the deduction 
started from. your paycheck. 
Contlnye mailng yoyr payments to 
Memphis until you see it has 
started coming out of your check. 
If you change jobs often, 
the Trustee may not let you use 
payroll deduction. 
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If you are paid every week or twice a month, your payment to 
the Trustee will be divided up and taken out of each paycheck. 
See the following chart to see how payments are determined. 
IF YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE $500.00/MONTH: 
To find out what the Weekly amount would be: 
Multiply 
x 
divide by 
-
-
$500.00 
12 
52 
$115.38 . 
(months) 
(weeks per year) 
weekly 
To find out what the Bi-Weekly amount would be: 
(Every two weeks - this means 3 pay periods in some 
months) 
Multiply 
x 
divide by 
$500.00 
12 
26 
$230.77 
(months) 
(pay periods per year) 
bi-weekly 
To find out what the Semi-Monthly amount would be: 
(Paid twice a month) 
$500.00 
divide by 2 
- $250.00 
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(pay periods per mo) 
semi-monthly 
Stopping Payroll 
Deductions 
When your case is paid in full, 
the Trustee's office will send your 
employer written notice to stop your 
payroll deductions. Please be 
patient and allow a little time for 
deductions to stop coming out of 
your check. 
Anything extra paid to the 
Trustee will be sent back to you the 
following month. 
Returned Checks 
Memphis will send a personal 
check back through the bank one 
time only if it comes back marked 
"insufficient or non-sufficient funds". 
If it doesn't clear a second time, we 
will send you a letter notifying you 
that your check has been returned. 
You will need to send another 
check to Memphis immediately. 
Two NSF checks mean that you will 
no longer be allowed to pay by 
personal check. After that, you 
would need to pay by money orders 
or cashier's checks only. 
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Extra Payments 
Extra payments are 
certainly allowed, and even 
encouraged, if you are able to 
do so. You do need to keep 
making your regular monthly 
payments even if you have paid 
"extra" on your case. Your plan 
calls for a disbursement 
(payment) to be sent to your 
creditors each month! 
Outside Payments 
Your payments are 
governed by law once you have 
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
You cannot pick and choose 
which particular creditor you 
would like to pay ahead of others 
or which creditor you might like 
to pay directly, "on the side." 
You are responsible for paying 
all normal living expenses that 
come due after you file 
bankruptcy. Your mortgage is 
usually paid directly by you also. 
Make sure you know which 
creditors you must pay directly 
and which will be paid through 
your Chapter 13 case. 
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Length of Ch. 13 Plan 
Most plans last 3 - 5 years. It 
is rare that a plan will last the exact 
number of months it was originally 
scheduled. Sometimes, a creditor 
will file a claim for a larger amount 
. than you' thought you owed, or 
interest rates might be changed. 
You may have even forgotten to list 
a debt in your petition. All these 
things will lengthen the time it takes 
to payoff your case. 
On the other hand, some-
times one or more creditors may 
not file a proof of claim with the 
Court. This could possibly 
shorten the time to pay aft your 
case. Therefore, the length of 
your plan can change'over the 
3 - 5 year period. 
Case Summaries 
The Trustee will mail a 
print-out of your case semi-
annually, in January and July. 
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This is a summary of your creditors 
who are being paid by the Trustee's 
office, based on your plan and 
claims filed by creditors. Please 
look this over carefully for any 
errors. If you object to a claim that 
has been filed in your case' 
because, for example, the amount 
is wrong or you do not owe that 
creditor at all, you need to call your 
attorney to file an objection with the 
Court. DO NOT CALL THE 
TRUSTEE~S· OFFICE. 
Your case summary also lists 
payments you have made to the 
Trustee for this particular six month 
period. If you believe you have 
made a payment that is not on this 
report, call the Trustee's office and 
ask to speak to the Controller. 
IMPORTANT NOTE: 
The Trustee's office can only 
change a claim when, and if, 
the creditor files a new claim 
with the Court. 
Claims Filed by 
Creditors 
Money you send to the 
Trustee's office goes toward the 
Trustee's fees, any additional 
attorney's fees and the people you 
owe (your creditors). Creditors 
generally have 90 days from your 
first date set for the Meeting of 
Creditors to file a claim with the 
Court. The Trustee can only pay 
those creditors who filed a claim 
with Bankruptcy Court. The 
Trustee cannot pay a creditor who 
did not file a claim with the Court. 
Sometimes, you need to make 
sure a certain creditor files a claim. 
Call your attorney to help you get 
a claim filed if a creditor that you 
listed on your petition does not 
appear on your summary. 
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Payments to Creditors 
Generally, creditors have 3 
types of debts or claims: 
.. Secured Creditors: 
Have claims against property 
that has been pledged as 
collateral such as a 
home, car or furniture. 
.. Priority Creditors: 
Have claims for taxes, past 
due child support, attorney's 
fees or Chapter 13 fees. 
These 
unsecured. 
claims are 
.. Unsecured Creditors: 
Are owed debts that have no 
collateral such as credit 
cards, medical·· expenses; 
signature loans, etc. 
All your secured debts are 
paid first, then priority, and finally 
unsecured debts. Unsecured debts 
are not always paid in full, 
depending on your plan. 
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Co-Signed Debts 
Chapter 13 usually protects a 
co-signer or guarantor on your 
debts from collection activity by a 
creditor. This protection lasts only 
as long as you remain in 
bankruptcy. Creditors should not 
call your co-signers and try to get 
payments from them. Call your 
attorney if this happens. 
Permission for Credit 
If you need to repair a furnace, 
replace a broken-down car, or 
borrow money for any reason while 
you are in bankruptcy, you must get 
the Trustee's written approval and a 
court order. The Trustee has forms 
that you and the lender must fill out 
and sign. Your attorney must also 
sign the forms. These forms are 
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called an "Application to Incur 
Debt. II 
The Trustee generally will 
not approve the application 
unless you are -facing an 
emergency situation or unusual 
circumstances. 
Selling Your Property 
Similar rules apply here as 
they do for obtaining new debt. You 
cannot sell, give away or trade any 
of your property without the Court's 
permission while in bankruptcy. 
Call your attorney to discuss any 
special circumstances. 
Income Taxes 
The Court requires you to file 
an income tax return each year in 
a timely manner. Returns are 
handled by the IRS Special 
Procedures Staff and are 
processed manually. causing a 
delay of your refund. Tax refunds 
are generally sent directly to you. 
The Trustee will sometimes 
require you to sign an Agreed 
Order to send us money from your 
tax refund the following year, if 
you fall behind in your plan 
payments. If an I RS tax claim has 
been 
filed 
in your 
Chapter 
13 case, 
the IRS 
will 
probably 
withhold 
any refund and apply it toward the 
. debt you owe them. 
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CompletionIDismissal 
of Your Ch. 13 Plan 
Compl~.tlvrl 
Successful completion of your 
Chapter 13 case means everything 
was set up and paid according to 
your plan. An Order of Discharge 
will be sent to you from Washington 
D.C. when your case is paid out. 
Dis!l11ssaJ 
An "Order of Dismissal" is sent 
when you have failed to follow one 
or more of the conditions of your 
approved plan. Falling behind on 
your payments Is a major reason 
most cases are dismissed. You are 
no longer under the protection of 
the Court· and creditors are' free to' . 
start collecting payments, foreclose 
on or repossess your property. 
Your unsecured creditors are also 
free to obtain judgments against 
you or to garnish your wages. The 
IRS can take over your wages 
and/or bank acco~nts until your tax 
debts are paid in full. 
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Non-Discharged 
Debts 
There are some debts you 
may owe that may not be 
discharged or closed out at the end 
of your bankruptcy case unless 
they have been paid in full through 
your Chapter 13 plan. These 
include student loans, back child 
support or alimony, and money 
owed because of a death or 
personal injury claim. 
Voluntary Dismissal 
of Your Case 
Since Chapter 13 Bankruptcy . 
is a voluntary plan, yo.u may ask to 
have your case dismissed at any 
time. Your attorney will need to file 
the proper paperwork with the 
Court. Please discuss this 
thoroughly with your attomey. 
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Filing Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy 
It sometimes becomes 
necessary during your bankruptcy 
to change your case to a ·complete 
bankruptcy·., This is called 
converting your case to Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy. You need to discuss 
this thoroughly with your attorney. 
The Chapter 13 
Trustee's Office 
cannot give you 
any legal advice 
on filing Chapter 
7 Bankruptcy. 
We only 
administer 
Chapter 13 cases! 
Final Report and Audit 
The Trustee's office will send a Final Report 
to Bankruptcy Court once your case is paid in full 
and all payments made to your creditors have 
cleared the bank. We do an in-house audit to 
make sure everything was set up and paid 
correctly. You will get a successful completion 
letter at that point from the Trustee's office. It 
may be a few months before you get the official 
Order of Discharge from the federal government. 
Your Credit Rating 
Your bankruptcy is a matter of public record. It will appear in the 
newspaper and on credit reports. Generally, the Chapter 13 information 
will stay on your credit report for 10 years. It is up to any potential 
lending institution to evaluate your credit record for future credit 
purposes. 
You should wait about 3 months after your bankruptcy case has 
been closed out to request a copy of your credit report. Check to see 
if there is anything that needs to be corrected ot updated. 
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Three Major Credit Reporting Agencies 
Experian (formerly TRW) 
PO Box 2350 
Chatsworth, CA 91313-2350 
(800) 682-7654 
Equifax 
PO Box 740241 
Atlanta, GA 30374 
(800) 685-1111 
Trans Union Corporation 
PO Box 390 
Springfield, PA 19064-0390 
(800) 888-4213 
Please send a copy of my credit report 
One free copy per year 
$8.00 per person in 
most states 
$8.00 per person 
Name: ___________________ ~ ______ ___ 
Spouse Name: ________________________ _ 
Current Address: 
-----------------------------
Previous Address: _______________________ _ 
Social Security Number __________________ _ 
Spouse Social Security Number: ___________ _ 
Date of Birth: _________________ _ 
Date of Birth - Spouse: ______________ _ 
Signature Spouse Signature 
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Important Documents 
There are several documents you 
need to keep when you file 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, as well as 
those sent to you after you 
complete your Bankruptcy. 
1. Copy of your Petition 
2. Plan Amendments or Plan Modifications 
3. All Schedules 
4. Trustee1s Final Report 
5. Order of Discharge 
Important questions you need to ask yourself: 
1. Did all your creditors file timely claims? 
-
(Remember a creditor can still refuse future credit because 
your debt is viewed as a loss if it was not paid in full). 
2. Were there other debts not paid through the bankruptcy? 
3. Were all liens cancelled? 
4. Do you have all clear titles due you? 
REMEMBER: 
You may still need to pay any liens, judgments, tax debts 
or student loans if they were not paid in full through your plan. 
H-96 
j 
J 
J 
J 
, 
... 
j 
J 
J 
I 
J 
1 
... 
• 
• 
r 
r··: 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r' 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
CHAPTER 13 RESPONSIBILITIES 
DEBTOR 
Files plan with Bankruptcy Court through Attorney 
Attends 341 Meeting of Creditors 
Attends Confirmation Hearing 
Makes timely payments to Trustee's office 
Continues regular payments to mortgage company 
Calls Attorney with any changes needed to plan 
Notifies Trustee of any changes in: 
employer or salary; marital status; address; phone number 
Notifies Bankruptcy Court Clerk of change of address 
ATTORNEY 
Advises Debtor on any legal matters 
Files petition and plan with Bankruptcy Court Clerk 
Attends 341 Meeting of Creditors with Debtor 
Attends Confirmation Hearing with Debtor 
Files any changes to the plan with Bankruptcy Court Clerk 
TRUSTEE 
Recommends approval or confirmation of plan 
Sends monthly payments to creditors who file claims 
Notifies the Court when Debtors miss payments 
Sends quarterly reports to Debtors 
Recommends approval of applications to go Into debt 
Audits case upon completion 
CREDITORS 
File proofs of claim with Bankruptcy Court Clerk 
Unsecured creditors have 90 days from 341 meeting to file a claim 
Governmental creditors (IRS) have 180 days from petition date. 
BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Final authority on any matters of dispute (by court hearing) 
Approves bankruptcy plan 
Receives all correspondence filed on case (clerk's office) 
Dismisses or converts case If terms of plan are not followed 
Officially "Discharges" case after successful completion 
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DEFINITIONS 
OF 
GENERAL BANKRUPTCY TERMS 
Arrearage - amount of payments the debtor is behind at time 
of filing bankruptcy. 
Automatic Stay - creditors stop trying to collect payments 
listed in bankruptcy. Goes into effect when debtor files. 
Bar Date - last date for a creditor to timely file a proof of 
claim. 
Chapter 13 - wage earner's plan - allows debtor to pay back 
debts over a period of 3-5 years. 
Chapter 7 - straight bankruptcy - allows certain assets or 
property to be sold to pay back creditors. 
Co-Debtor Stay - automatic stay which protects people who did 
not file bankruptcy but are listed on same debt as the debtor 
who filed bankruptcy. 
Confirmation - Court approves the debtor's filed plan. 
Conversion - .changlngabankruptcycase from"one chapter to 
another. 
Delinquency - plan payments made to the Trustee are past due, 
case could get dismissed. 
Dismissal - a Court Order ending the bankruptcy case. The 
debtor is no longer under the protection of the Court. Creditors 
have the right to begin collecting on debts again. This is not 
the same as completing, or paying out, a case. 
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DEFINITIONS - Continued 
Meeting of Creditors - also known as 341 Meeting or First 
Meeting. Trustee and Creditors question the debtors under 
oath about their plan. 
Modification of Plan - changes the plan in some way, has to be 
approved by the Judge. 
Order - a ruling by the Judge that requires some action to be 
taken in the case. 
Post Petition - something that happens after the bankruptcy 
petition is filed. 
Pro Se - a debtor who files bankruptcy without an attorney or 
legal counsel. 
Proof of Claim - a creditor files a form with the Bankruptcy Court 
Clerk in order to start receiving payments on a case. 
Relief from Stay - an Order allowing one particular creditor to 
start collecting payments again from the debtor. 
Secured Creditor - any party holding a lien on property or who 
has issued a loan with some type of collateral used as security. 
Special Class -an unsecured claim, such as a co-signed debt, 
which is treated differently from other unsecured claims. 
Trustee - person appointed to handle bankruptcy cases. 
Unsecured Creditor - one whose debt is not secured by any 
property or collateral, such as credit card debt or a signature 
loan. 
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Where Your Money Goes 
Write down an estimate of your expenses in these categories. 
Spending Category 
1. Savings 
2. Housing 
3. Groceries 
4. Cigarettes 
5. Clothing 
6. TransportationlParking 
7. MedicallDental 
8. Car Payment 
9. Car Insurance 
10. Gasoline 
11. Insurance (Life, Car, Other) 
12. Utilities (Heat, Water,Gas) 
13. Telephone 
14. Garbage 
15. Taxes (IRS, Property, etc.) 
16. Support & Child Care 
17. Tuition and Books 
18. School Loans 
19. Haircuts 
20. Recreation & Entertainment 
21. Gifts and Donations 
22. Newspaper 
23. Basic Cable 
24. Eating Out 
25. Lunches/Snacks 
26. Pets 
27. Miscellaneous 
Monthly Average 
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
$_-----
TOTAL: $ 
------
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BANKRUp.TCY FRAUD 
IS A 
FEDERAL CRIME I!! 
It is against the law to: 
• Hide your property from creditors or the 
bankruptcy Trustee. 
• Give your property to a family member in 
order to keep the property away from your 
creditors or the bankruptcy Trustee. 
• Lie about your finances under oath! 
• ·Make false statements in··your bankruptcy 
petition or schedules. 
• File a false claim against a person in 
bankruptcy. 
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I. Western District Of Kentucky: Chapter 13 Trustee 
A. Generally 
Chapter 13 practice under the United States Bankruptcy Code is basically the same allover 
the United States, but different local rules and practices create differences which are worthy of note. 
In the Western District of Kentucky there were approximately 2,400 Chapter 13 filings for 
the fiscal year ending September 30,2000. We are averaging about 205 filings per month for the 
year ending September 30, 2000. Chapter 13 First Meetings of Creditors are held in four (4) 
locations in the Western District of Kentucky with approximately 85% of the cases being heard in 
Louisville, 7% in Paducah and the balance almost equally divided between Owensboro and Bowling 
Green. Chapter 341 Hearings are held 3 full days per month in Louisville and 1 day each in 
Paducah, Bowling Green and Owensboro. 
B. Confirmation Hearings 
Of particular interest to Chapter 13 debtor and creditor representatives is the fact that 
Confirmation Hearings are usually held on the same day as the 341 Hearings. Objections to 
confirmation must be filed promptly so that the Trustee and counsel for the debtor will be aware of 
them and they can be presented to the court at the conclusion of the 341 docket. Chapter 13 cases 
are routinely confirmed by the court upon the recommendation of the Trustee unless there is an 
objection to confirmation by a creditor or the Trustee or the case proposes to pay less than 70% to 
unsecured creditors. In the event of a Trustee or creditor objection, or if the case proposes to pay 
less than 70% to unsecured creditors, a Confirmation Hearing is held before the court the same day 
as the 341 Hearing. The time and place of that hearing will be noted on the Notice to creditors 
regarding the meeting of creditors. 
C. Filing Of Claims 
The Bankruptcy Code provides ninety (90) days to creditors to file claims from the date of 
the first scheduled Meeting of Creditors. Local rules in the Western District of Kentucky provide 
that secured and priority claims of creditors should be filed in the Clerk's office at least three (3) 
business days preceding the Meeting of Creditors and should contain a statement of the net balance 
as of the date of the filing of the petition and any appropriate documentation. This is particularly 
important so that the Trustee, debtors and creditors will have an opportunity to establish the secured 
value of any such claim and to also establish the interest rate to be applied to that secured value. As 
the local rules provide, the contract rate of the secured creditor may be modified to the market rate 
by agreement of the parties or by hearing before the court if no agreement can be reached regarding 
a modified interest rate. 
D. Property Appraisal 
In the Louisville Division of the Western District, the court has appointed an appraisal 
company to appraise personal property of debtors. This personal property typically includes 
automobiles, furniture, appliances and other property which appears from the petition to serve as 
collateral for a debt. These appraisals are typically available at the First Meeting of Creditors so that 
a value for secured claims can be established. With the help of an objective third party appraisal, 
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it is much easier to reach an agreement as to the value of the automobile or other collateral which 
J 
J 
secures a debt. In most Chapter 13 cases, valuing collateral is a very important function. As such, J 
it is important for secured creditors to have their claims filed on a timely basis so that the amount 
of the claim, the secured portion, and the interest rate can be established at the First Meeting of 
Creditors and then included in the Order of Confirmation. J 
E. Orders of Confirmation 
Orders of Confirmation reflecting the amounts, secured values and interest rates for secured 
claims, the amounts of priority claims and a percentage proposed to be paid to unsecured creditors 
are prepared by the office of the Chapter 13 Trustee for submission to the court after the 
Confirmation Hearing. The Order of Confirmation also provides for the amount of the payment to 
be paid by the debtor and how it is to be paid (monthly, weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly or other). 
The question of a payroll deduct order is addressed at the Meeting of Creditors, and unless there is 
a good reason why it should not be done, the court will typically order a payroll deduct to ensure the 
Plan payment is made. Approximately 75% to 80% or more of the Chapter 13 cases in the Western 
District of Kentucky have payroll deduction orders, and the Trustee has found that these cases work 
much more effectively than cases in which payroll deduct orders are not possible. Obviously there 
are some cases, such as where the debtors are self-employed, on Social Security or otherwise unable 
to provide a payroll deduction, where such deductions are not possible. 
F. Attorney Fees 
It has been the custom and practice in Chapter 13 cases in the Western District of Kentucky 
for the debtor's counsel attorney fees to be paid through the Chapter 13 Plan rather than being paid 
directly by the debtors. The Court has set attorney fees in typical Chapter 13 cases and has reviewed 
those fees on an annual basis such that for the year 2000, attorney fees in a typical Chapter 13 case 
are $1,140.00 for work done from the beginning of the case through the submission of the Schedule 
of Allowed Claims. If counsel believes that a particular case has taken more time and merits greater 
compensation, counsel should advise the Trustee at the Meeting of Creditors that an application for 
a fee will be filed. The fee application will then be acted upon by the court. Whether the fee is the 
standard set amount or the amount approved by the court pursuant to a fee application, normally 
one-half of the fee will be paid with the first distribution to secured creditors with the balance being 
paid after the Schedule of Allowed Claims has been filed with the court. 
G. Section 341 Hearings 
In preparing for the Section 341 Hearing, counsel for the debtor must be aware that 11 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1326 requires debtors to begin making payments within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Plan. 
Due to the fact that in some cases the Section 341 Hearing is longer than thirty (30) days after the 
filing of the petition, counsel for the debtor should collect and hold in escrow the amounts of the 
proposed Plan payments from the debtors so that they will be available at the time of the Section 341 
Hearing. This will allow the debtor to be current with the amount of the proposed payment at the 
time the case is considered for confirmation. If the debtor is not able to make payment at the time 
of the First Meeting of Creditors, it may be a basis for denying confirmation of the case. If a case 
is confirmed, but the debtor gets behind in his payments by thirty (30) days or more, the Trustee will 
file a motion with the court asking the court to require the debtor to show cause why his case should 
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not be dismissed for failure to make the Plan payments. A hearing will then be scheduled on this 
request. 
As was mentioned earlier, unsecured creditors have ninety (90) days from the date ofthe first 
scheduled 341 Hearing to file claims. The Order ofConfirmation will provide that the attorney for 
the debtor will have a period beginning at the end of that ninety (90) day period and extending for 
thirty (30) days to file a Schedule ofUnsecured Claims which have been timely filed which are to 
be paid in the Plan. After the filing of the schedule, the second installment of the attorney fees is 
paid. 
H. Less Than 100% Plan 
In any case proposing to pay less than 100% to unsecured creditors, the Order of 
Confirmation provides that the attorney for the debtor is to compute the amount ofunsecured claims 
which have been filedto see iflessthan all the claims scheduled were in fact filed on a timely basis. 
Ifso, the attorney for the debtor should compute the amount ofunsecured debt to be paid in the Plan. 
In other words, ifall the unsecured debt is not paid, the percentage to be paid to the filing claimants 
should increase. 
I. Tax Returns, Tax Refunds, and Revised Budgets 
An additional requirement imposed by local rule is that any debtor with less than a 100% 
Plan is to file with the Trustee annually a copy of his federal and state income tax returns and a 
revised budget. Additionally, so as to be sure that all disposable income is paid into the Plan, the 
debtor is required to pay to the Trustee any income tax refund which he is to receive from the state 
or federal government. This refund is to be used to pay the percentage of unsecured debt which is 
not proposed to be paid in the Plan. In other words, if the Plan is a 70% Plan and an income tax 
refund is received, that refund is applied toward paying the 30% that was not to be paid under the 
Plan rather than to satisfying the provisions ofthe 70% Plan. The court has ruled that earned income 
credit is not considered to be a refund and is not covered by this rule. As a result, earned income 
credit is not required to be paid to the Trustee. Tax returns and budgets have to be filed with the 
Trustee by May 15 of each year and the tax refund paid to the Trustee when received. 
J. Semi-Annual Debtor Report 
The Trustee is required by regulations ofthe United States Trustee to provide a semi- annual 
Debtor Report to all debtors in Chapter 13 cases and their attorneys. These reports are typically 
mailed on or about march 30 and September 30 of each year and show the amounts paid by the 
debtor, the distribution ofthe amounts received by the Trustee for the payment ofcreditors, and the 
balances due the creditors after their payments. Since there are more than 5000 pending cases in the 
Western District ofKentucky, debtors are requested to ask any questions concerning these reports 
in writing so that the Trustee can appropriately respond. 
K. Priority And Mortgage Payments 
Secured claims are paid in a Chapter 13 Plan prior to a payment of priority claims. 
Unsecured claims are paid last. With respect to claims that are secured only by the principal 
residence of a debtor, ifthere is a default in the payments owed to the mortgage lender prior to the 
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bankruptcy filing, the Bankruptcy Code requires that such a default be cured within a reasonable 
period of time. The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District ofKentucky has determined that a 
reasonable time is twenty-four (24) months or less. As a result, the default 011 any mortgage loan of 
this type must be cured within twenty-four (24) months while the debtor continues to pay the current 
payments owed to the lender. Virtually all mortgage payments are made directly to the creditor 
("outside the Plan") while all payments to cure a default are made through the Trustee. 
L. Trustee Commission And Expenses 
The Trustee is entitled by law to charge a commission and expenses which cannot exceed 
10%. The current charge for the Trustee ofthe Western District ofKentucky is 2.75%, an amount 
set by the United States Trustee based upon the budget ofthe Chapter 13 Trustee. That fee is subject 
to change effective October 1 of each year. 
M. Plan Period 
The Bankruptcy Code requires debtors to pay all oftheir disposable income into the Plan for 
only thirty-six (36) months. However, most of the Plans confirmed in the Western District of 
Kentucky are longer than thirty-six (36) months. The reason for this seems to be that if the debtor 
is going to make payments for sixty (60) months rather than thirty-six (36) there is not as much 
scrutiny of the disposable income question. Additionally, in cases in which there is a question of 
the "liquidation" test, (the Code-imposed requirement that creditors get for their claims as least as 
much as they would get ifnon-exempt assets ofthe debtor were liquidated by a Chapter 7 Trustee) 
the longer time period increases the ability ofthe debtor to meet that test in a Chapter 13. 
N. General Trustee Office Information 
The Office ofthe Chapter 13 Trustee, Western District ofKentucky , is located at 310 Legal 
Arts Building, 200 South Seventh Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202. This building is located at 
the corner of Seventh and Market Street in downtown Louisville. The telephone numbers for the 
office are (502) 581-9042 and (502) 581-9087. However, any creditor seeking a report regarding 
the status ofa particular case and when payment will be made should request that report in writing. 
Alternatively, the Trustee has available in the office a terminal which may be accessed by a creditor 
representative to obtain information about cases in which they are involved. To make an 
appointment to use this terminal, the representative should contact the Trustee's office. 
In dealing with the Trustee's office, the creditor seeking a report and the debtor making a 
payment should be sure to use the applicable case number. This will ensure that the creditor gets 
the correct information and that the debtor's payment is credited to the proper case. 
o. Case Closure 
Once a case is completed or dismissed for any reason, the Trustee's office will file a final 
report with the Bankruptcy Court showing all receipts and disbursements and to whom 
disbursements were made. This final report cannot be filed with the court until all the checks used 
to make disbursements in that particular case have cleared the bank and been returned to the Trustee. 
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P. Debtor Creditor Rehabilitation 
In conjunction with the International Credit Association of Kentuckiana and ACCEPT, a 
consumer credit counseling service of the American Red Cross, the Chapter 13 Trustee presents a 
program by which Chapter 13 debtors completing 100% plans can attend two seminars, each 
approximately 3 hours long, one at the beginning of the Plan and one at the time that the Plan is 
completed. The seminars deal with consumer financial matters such as budgeting, credit reports, 
applying for credit and other similar topics. 
The purpose of the seminar is to provide Chapter 13 debtors with information that will be useful 
to them in avoiding the problems that led to the bankruptcy filing. The benefit of being involved 
in the program is that a number of potential creditors have agreed that they will look favorably 
upon credit applications of persons in this program who have both completed their Plans and 
attended the seminars. The program is coordinated through the office of the Chapter 13 Trustee 
and is taught by attorneys, credit counselors and a representative from the Chapter 13 Trustee's 
office. 
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I. STAY LITIGATION IN CHAPTER 13 CASES 
A. Stay Relief Against Co-Makers 
As in all bankruptcy fIlings, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362 is imposed 
immediately upon the entry of the Order for relief. In addition, a second stay is imposed in 
Chapter 13 cases by 11 U.S.C. Section 1301. This stay applies to any action against 
co-makers on consumer debts. (In other words, business debt would not be subject to the 
co-maker stay of Section 1301.) 
There are three grounds for stay relief against a co-maker under Section 1301. These 
are as follows: 
1. Ifthe co-maker received the benefit of the loan proceeds, 
2. Ifthe creditor's interest would be "irreparably harmed", or 
3. If the plan does not propose to pay a particular debt. 
The following are examples ofhow each of these grmmds can come into play. 
Co-maker received the benefit ofthe loan proceeds 
Son goes into a car dealership to purchase his first car. Since the son has not 
established a credit history yet, the dealership requires him to get a co-maker. Dear old Dad 
comes to the rescue once more and co-signs the debt with the son. 
Dad is laid offat work and files Chapter 13 bankruptcy proposing to pay 100% to all 
unsecured creditors. Can you get the co-maker stay terminated? The answer is yes. 
The non-bankrupt co-maker (Son) is the party that got the benefit ofthe loan. He is 
not the bankrupt, so you have grounds to have the co-maker stay terminated. If this is a 
100% plan, why would you want to do that? Remember, the stay under § 1301 is just like 
the stay under § 362 as to the co-maker. Technically, you should not be contacting the co­
maker, sending him notices, sending him monthly statements, etc. This would include the 
creditor's ability to repossess the vehicle upon a future default. By getting the co-maker stay 
terminated, you allow your creditor client to deal with the co-maker directly without fear of 
violating the § 1301 stay. 
Irreparable Harm 
This is the same kind of "harm" that you would show in order to get a temporary 
restraining order. Some examples are the co-maker taking the car out of the jurisdiction 
while he is stationed in Germany, the vehicle has been abandoned in a repairman's shop, the 
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vehicle has been seized by the police for transporting drugs and you need to file a petition 
for remission or risk forfeiture of the unit, etc. The point is that this cannot be some run of 
the mill inconvenience. It has to be something severe that endangers the creditor's interest 
in the collateral. 
The plan does not propose to pay the debt 
If a Plan proposes to pay unsecured claims at the rate of 70 percent (with no interest 
paid thereon), a creditor would be entitled to co-maker stay relief for the 30 percent of its 
unsecured claim not being paid by the Chapter 13 debtor. The creditor would also be entitled 
to co-maker stay relief for the interest which is to accrue on the entire loan, plus any attorney 
fees allowable pursuant to its loan documents. Similarly, ifa Plan proposes to pay a secured 
creditor's claim as "fully secured" but at a reduced rate of interest, the creditor would be 
entitled to seek co-maker stay reliefin order to collect the difference between its contract rate 
of interest and the interest rate proposed by the Plan (as well as any attorneys fees 
recoverable pursuant to the terms of the loan documents). 
Once the co-maker stay is terminated you may file suit in state court for the sums that 
you are not being paid through the bankruptcy. The natural tendency it to file suit only for 
the amounts that you are not being paid in the Chapter 13 plan (in the example above, the 30 
percent, the unpaid interest and attorney fees). This is a mistake. You would sue for your 
entire debt, including court costs, interest on the entire amount owed and attorney fees. 
The trap lies in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 55.03. It states in pertinent part 
that: 
A judgment by default shall not be 
different in kind from or exceed in amount 
that prayed for in the demand for judgment 
Here is what will happen. You will get the co-maker stay terminated, and then 
you file suit for what you are not being paid in the Chapter 13. You get a judgment by 
default. Then, the bankrupt either converts his petition to one under Chapter 7, the 
bankruptcy gets dismissed and the former barlkrupt skips or he dies with no assets before 
completing the plan.. By receiving a judgment in the amount of the shortfall from the 
Chapter 13, only, you have foreclosed yourself from ever collecting all that you were 
owed on the debt. 
The solution is to sue for the entire debt, but be very careful to collect only the 
amount that you are not being paid through the bankruptcy. Yes, you will have to keep 
very close tabs on what you are collecting, but you prevent a potential malpractice action 
by your client for limiting their recovery on the debt. 
The customary $75.00 filing fee for stay relief motions is not required to be paid 
when a motion to terminate the co-maker stay is filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1301. 
Bankruptcy Rule 9014 states that: " ... reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing 
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shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought." Accordingly, a copy ofthe motion 
must be sent to the co-maker. Therefore, one must question whether the creditor and debtor 
can enter into an AgreedOrder Terminating the Co-maker Stay unless the co-maker signs off 
on it, or unless a motion is made for approval ofthe Order pursuant to 4001 ( d) [which speaks 
only to the termination ofthe § 362 stay and does not mention the stay afforded co-makers 
under § 1301]. This is but another one of those questions that cause the bankruptcy 
practitioner to wake up screaming in the middle of the night. 
B. Termination Of Section 362 Automatic Stay 
The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362, which is applicable to both the debtor 
and "property of the estate," may be terminated for a myriad of reasons, which are less 
clearly delineated. These reasons include "lack ofadequate protection" and "good cause". 
While the latter is a rather amorphous standard, the standard of"lack ofadequate protection" 
is more easily defined. 
1. Proposed Plan does not Amortize Claim Over Plan Term 
"Lack ofadequate protection" would include the fact that the Plan as proposed would 
not amortize a secured creditor's claim over the three to five-year term ofthe Plan. The Plan 
as proposed must provide for payment of the creditor's allowed secured claim (as that is 
defined in 11 USC § S06(a» plus a "market" rate of interest over the term of the Plan since 
the debtor usually will not be able to pay creditor's allowed secured claim on the "effective 
date ofthe plan," i.e., upon confirmation. (See, 11 USC § 132S(a)(S)(B)(ii» Ifthe Plan does 
not generate sufficient monthly payments to amortize the allowed claim, stay relief would 
be appropriate. 
The amount that the creditor is to receive under the plan must also keep pace with 
depreciation of creditor's collateral. For instance, if the creditor's claim is secured by a 
vehicle that is depreciating at the rate of $1 00 per month and the amount that the creditor is 
receiving under the plan is only $30 per month, then the creditor is not adequately protected. 
The entire debt may get paid out over the life ofthe plan, but ifthe case were to be dismissed 
or converted to Chapter 7, then creditor would be much worse offthan when the bankruptcy 
commenced. 
In order to get a good idea of rate ofdepreciation on an automobile, you could take 
several months' worth ofNADA blue books and see how the value ofyour client's collateral 
changes from month to month. If the payments that your client receives from the plan 
monthly are not equal to or greater than this, your client is not adequately protected. 
2. Plan Payments Deferred For Extended Period 
Additionally, even ifthe total payments to a secured creditor over the five-year term 
ofthe Plan will amortize its claim, stay relief may still be appropriate ifthose payments will 
be deferred for a great length oftime. Specifically, the payment of administrative expenses 
or real estate mortgage arrearages may be paid prior to disbursements to general secured 
creditors. If it will take an inordinate amount oftime to pay administrative expenses (such 
as attorneys fees, appraiser's fees, Trustee's fees, etc.), then a secured creditor may be 
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entitled to stay relief if many months will elapse before the Trustee disburses to general 
secured creditors. 
For example, a Plan might propose a payment to the Trustee of$200.00 per month. 
If the debtor's attorney is allowed a fee of $975.00, and the Court-appointed appraiser 
(particular to the Western District ofKentucky) is allowed a fee of$100.00 then the debtor 
will have to pay approximately $1,075.00 to the Chapter 13 Trustee before disbursements 
to secured creditors begin. If the debtor is paying $200.00 per month to the Trustee, it will 
take approximately eight (8) months before secured creditors ever receive the first 
disbursement from the Chapter 13 Trustee. In the interim, your client's collateral is 
presumably depreciating, and thus the secured creditor's interest in its collateral is not being 
adequately protected during this delay. See In Re: Estes, 185 B.R 745 (BImcy. W.D.Ky. 
1995). 
One resolution to this dilemma is request that the creditor receive some adequate 
protection payment during the time that the administrative claims are being paid. Some 
courts are hesitant to do this, so your only option may be to file your motion. 
3. Payments to One Secured Creditor Ahead of Another 
Even ifadministrative expenses are being promptly retired (so that disbursements to 
secured creditors will begin quickly), sometimes certain secured creditors are paid ahead of 
other secured creditors, thus resulting in a lack ofadequate protection to the secured creditor 
which is being paid later. Specifically, if the debtor has substantial real estate mortgage 
arrearages, these must be retired by the Chapter 13 Trustee within 18-24 months (pursuant 
to local practice). Thus, a situation can arise where the Trustee must pay substantial 
mortgage arrearages within 24 months, and must devote substantially all ofthe monthly Plan 
payments for this period in order to retire these sums. This can result in the Trustee's 
inability to make any payments to other secured creditors until the third year of the Plan! 
Obviously, other secured creditors are not being adequately protected in such a situation, and 
should move for stay relief and/or adequate protection. Note, however, it you have not 
objected to the plan on these grounds, you may be barred by res judicata from bringing such 
a motion at a later time. 
4. Failure to Maintain Insurance on Collateral 
An additional basis for stay relief (lack ofadequate protection) would be the debtor's 
failure to maintain insurance on a creditor's collateral. In fact, in the Western District of 
Kentucky, a debtor's failure to provide satisfactory proof of full coverage insurance on a 
motor vehicle at the Section 341 Meeting results in the immediate termination of the 
automatic stay, without further notice or hearing. See Appendix containing Local Rules. 
[NOTE: At the writing of this Chapter the Courts for the Eastern and Western 
Districts of Kentucky are investigating the possibility of having joint local rules. This 
could affect or modify the relief mentioned in the Western District's Local Rule] 
However, it is important to note that this Local Rule is only in effect in the Western 
District ofKentucky, and thus a motion to terminate the automatic stay is necessary in the 
Eastern District ofKentucky when the debtor fails to provide insurance on a motor vehicle. 
1-4 

5. Cancellation of Certificate Insurance and Accident and Health Insurance 
The cancellation ofcredit life insurance and accident and health insurance (which are 
financed by many creditors) is an additional area which may require stay relief. Many 
creditors finance credit life insurance and accident and health insurance on behalf of their 
customers. The substantial premiums for these insurance coverages are then added into the 
principal amount of the loan and financed over the term of the contract. If the debtor is 
unwilling to increase the amount ofthe creditor's allowed secured claim by the value ofthese 
separate contracts, the creditor should move the Court to cancel the credit life insurance and 
accident and health insurance (if the debtor is unwilling to permit these cancellations 
voluntarily). The rebated premiums can then be applied to reduce the unsecured portion of 
the debtor's loan. 
6. Repossession of Collateral 
A final area where stay relief is necessary is with respect to collateral which has been 
lawfully repossessed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. If it has not yet been sold, a 
motion for stay relief is necessary to enable the creditor to consummate the sale. 
Frequently, though, the pre-petition repossession spawns the filing of the debtor's 
Chapter 13 petition, so that the debtor may seek "tum-over" of the repossessed collateral. 
Prior to June 4, 1999, there was no obligation on a creditor's part to return the vehicle if the 
pre-petition repossession was lawful. Ifthe debtor wanted the vehicle returned, then he had 
to file an adversary proceeding, rather than by motion. See, BR 7001(1) and In Re Estes, 
185 B.R 745 (Bkrtcy. W.D.Ky. 1995). The creditor was under no obligation to return the 
repossessed collateral simply upon the debtor's request for same. See In Re Young, 193 B.R. 
620 (Bk. D.C., 1996). Rather, the Court must have found that the creditor's interest in its 
collateral will be "adequately protected" before the Court orders the return ofthe collateral. 
While the answer probably has not changed in Kentucky, The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel for the Sixth Circuit has held to the contrary. In the case of Transouth Fin. Corp. v. 
Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676 (BAP 6th Cir. 1999), the BAP upheld the decision ofthe 
lower court mandating that the creditor return the vehicle to the debtor upon the filing ofthe 
Chapter 13 petition There the court found: 
Nothing in §§ 362 itself suggests the "adequate protection" exception 
to the automatic stay argued by TranSouth. As demonstrated above, 
the presence of"property ofthe estate" triggers the proscription in §§ 
362(a)(3). There is no "exception" to property of the estate for 
property with respect to which a creditor claims a right of "adequate 
protection." To the contrary, as recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Whiting Pools, §§ 541 and 542 of the Code work together to draw 
back into the estate a right of possession that is claimed by a lien 
creditor pursuant to a prepetition seizure; the Code then substitutes 
"adequate protection" for possession as one of the lien creditor's 
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rights in the bankruptcy case. (Citations Omitted) 
Sharon at 683. 
Decisions from the 6th Cir. BAP are not binding precedent in Kentucky. In fact, 
for a succinct summation of the other side of this coin, see the dissenting opinion from 
Judge Stosberg ("The panel's automatic turnover approach sanctions a procedure used to 
bludgeon creditors by employing the petition as a device to recover a repossessed vehicle 
without a hearing. "). See also, Barringer v. EAB Leasing (In re Barringer), 244 B.R. 402 
(Bkrtcy E.D. Mich., 1999); In re U.S Physicians, Inc., 235 B.R. 367 (Bkrtcy E.n. Pa., 
1999); In re Bernstein, 252 B.R. 846 (Bkrtcy D.D.C. 2000). Be that as it may, this is 
another factor to consider when advising your client on how to handle the situation. It is 
advisable to immediately make a motion to terminate the stay and ask the court for an 
expedited hearing if the debtor is clamoring for return of the collateral. That should 
assuage the debtor and minimize the chance that the court may impose sanctions for a 
creditor's inaction. 
Caveat: If the collateral is inadvertently repossessed post-petition, however, then it 
must be returned to the debtor immediately! In the case of a post-petition repossession, the 
debtor is not required to file a complaint for turn-over, but simply make demand on the 
creditor. A creditor's failure to immediately make amends will quickly turn its innocent 
violation of the automatic stay to a willful one, thus subjecting the creditor to the penalties 
found under 11 USC § 362(h). 
II. OBJECTION TO PLAN CONFIRMATION 
. A. Filing Of Objections To Confirmation 
Objections to confirmation must be filed in writing, and it is imperative that the 
deadlines for same be observed. The if a creditor fails to object and the plan is confirmed, 
then the creditor is stuck with the result and will not be able to convince the court to 
reconsider absent fraud or extraordinary circumstances. 
B. Bases For Objections To Confirmation 
Typical bases for Objections to Confirmation include the following: 
• Valuation of collateral 
• Feasibility 
• Failure to commit all "disposable income" to the Plan 
• Liquidation analysis 
• Interest rate 
• Lack of good faith 
• Debtor's proposal to surrender collateral "in full satisfaction 
1-6 

of debt" 
• Attempted "write-down" of home mortgages 
• Disparate treatment of classes ofunsecured creditors 
1. Valuation of Collateral 
A creditor is secured, and paid post-petition interest, only to the extent ofthe value 
of its collateral. See 11 U.S.C. Section 506(a). Not surprisingly, Chapter 13 debtors and 
their creditors have very divergent views on the value ofparticular items ofcollateral. In the 
Western District ofKentucky , Louisville Division, the Court sends an appraiser to value the 
debtor's personal property. The appraisal is filed prior to the Section 341 Meeting. It is not 
binding on either party, but is usually followed by the Judge, unless the creditor can show 
that it was obviously in error. The creditor does have a right to demand a valuation hearing, 
though, pursuant to Rule 3012. 
What measure ofvalue should be used? Retail? Wholesale? Something in between? 
Everyone thought when the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the case of 
Associates Commercial. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S. Ct. 1879,1997 U.S. LEXIS 
3688,138 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1997) that the question had been answered. Specifically, the Court 
held: 
is the value ofthe collateral to be determined by (1) what the secured 
creditor could obtain through foreclosure sale of the property (the 
"foreclosure-value" standard); (2) what the debtor would have to pay 
for comparable property (the "replacement- value" standard); or (3) 
the midpoint between these two measurements? We hold that 
§506(a)directs application of the replacement-value standard. 
Rash at 956. 
Most people originally reading the opinion thought that this meant that 
"replacement value" would be equated with retail value. However, what the text of the 
opinion giveth, the footnotes taketh away. The now infamous footnote 6 reads: 
Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure­
value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy 
courts, as triers offact, identification of the best way of ascertaining 
replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether 
replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, 
or some other value will depend on the type ofdebtor and the nature 
of the property. We note, however, that replacement value, in this 
context, should not include certain items. For example, where the 
proper measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its retail 
value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor 
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should not receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the 
value ofitems the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle, 
items such as warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning. Cf. 
90 F.3d at 1051-1052. Nor should the creditor gain from 
modifications to the property--e.g., the addition of accessories to a 
vehicle--to which a creditor's lien would not extend under state law. 
Where does all this leave us? Pretty much back to where we were before the Rash 
decision. In the Western District ofKentucky, Louisville Division, value is established 
by an appraiser that is paid from by the estate as an administrative expense. Those values 
come close to retail. While there is no appraiser in the Eastern District ofKentucky, or in 
the other Divisions of the Western District, values there generally come close to 
approximating retail, "blue book" (NADA) value. 
If a secured creditor is being paid directly ("outside the plan") is valuation of the 
collateral important? It is, and this is another trap for the unwary. 
Many times a debtor will propose to pay a creditor its entire claim directly, that is, 
the payments do not go through the Chapter 13 trustee. The creditor, being thrilled with 
the prospect that they are not going to incur a loss on the account, will continue to get 
their contract payments on time and pay no attention to the value placed on the collateral 
by the debtor. They think, "why do I care? I am going to be paid in full? I don't care if 
they value my collateral at half the value, it does not matter." It does not matter unless 
the debtor converts the Chapter 13 petition to one under Chapter 7. 
§ 348(£)(1) states that: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under chapter 13 ofthis 
title is converted to a case under another chapter under this title ­
(A) property ofthe estate in the converted case shall consist 
of property ofthe estate, as of the date of filing of the 
petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the 
control ofthe debtor on the date of conversion; and 
(B) valuations of property and of allowed secured claims in the 
chapter 13 case shall apply in the converted case, with allowed 
secured claims reduced to the extent that they have been paid in 
accordance with the chapter 13 plan. (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, even if the debtor is paying you directly, they, would be able to redeem 
the collateral upon conversion for the remaining balance of the allowed secured claim. See, 
11 USC § 722. An example will help explain. 
1-8 
A creditor has a $10,000 loan secured by an automobile worth $7,000. The debtor 
proposes to pay this debt outside the plan, but Schedules B, C and D show the value of the 
vehicle at $5,000. Three years into the plan, the debtor loses his job and has to convert to 
Chapter 7. By that time, the debtor has paid down $4,000 on the principal and all of the 
interest to that time. Since the value ofthe collateral as established and unchallanged in the 
Chapter 13 was $5,000, the debtor could redeem for $1,000. The remaining $2,000 in value 
and the undersecured portion of the loan would be discharged. Unless the creditor could 
show that the setting of the value was incident to some sort of fraud, the creditor can do 
nothing. 
Being paid directly can be a wonderful thing, but the creditor must be wary. 
2. Feasibility 
Creditors' counsel should review the debtor's budget ofmonthly income and 
expenses (Schedules I and 1) carefully to determine whether the debtor has sufficient 
income to fund the Plan. At a minimum, the debtor's net income should equal or exceed 
the monthly living expenses and the proposed Plan payment. Any budget showing a 
negative cash flow would be subject to a feasibility attack. 
However, even if the budget purports to show that the debtor has sufficient income 
to fund a Plan, the creditor's counsel should look carefully at the individual items in the 
budget of monthly expenses to determine if they are reasonable. The debtor may have 
estimated hislher monthly expenses much too low, and an argument can be made that this 
particular debtor cannot reasonably be expected to live the next five years ofhislher life on 
such a "spartan" budget. For example, the debtors may have budgeted too little for food, or 
may have nothing in the budget for medical expenses. Additionally, a review ofthe debtor's 
automobile insurance policy may indicate that the actual monthly premium is much higher 
than the monthly expenditure reflected in the budget. 
Other places to look to see if the Schedules I & J may need to be amended are 
How many tax deductions has the debtor taken? Is he trying to inflate his 
refund? 
Has the debtor confused a "union due" with a payment to a credit union on an 
unsecured debt? 
How regular is overtime? 
Ifthe debtor is self-employed, is there an allowance for the payment of taxes? 
Is the debtor sure that his mortgage payment does not include taxes and 
insurance? 
If the debtor is paying a creditor directly ("outside the plan") has that expense 
item been deducted from Schedule 17 
If only one spouse has filed is the other one working and has that spouse's 
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income been included in the Schedule I? Ifnot, are the expenses in Schedule J 
ALL the family expenses, such that it appears that the bankrupt is paying for all 
the family expenses? 
Is there any cushion for emergencies, birthday presents for children? If so, is it 
reasonable? 
3. Failure to Pay all "Disposable Income" to the Plan 
If a review of the debtor's budget of income and expenses shows that the budget 
appears feasible, the next question which the creditor's counsel should address is whether 
the debtor is in fact committing all "disposable income" to the Plan. See Section 
1325 (b)(1 )(B). In other words, if the debtor's budget shows excess "disposable income" 
which is left-over after payment ofmonthly living expenses and the proposed Plan payment, 
the creditor should object to the fact that the debtor is not paying all disposable income into 
the Plan. If the debtor pays more into the Plan, the Plan may be able to be shortened from 
sixty (60) months to thirty-six (36) months, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1322(d), or the 
percentage paid to unsecured creditors may be increased. 
The creditor's counsel should also look closely at the withholdings from the debtor's 
wages. Frequently, debtors have payroll deductions to repay unsecured loans to their credit 
unions, or payroll deductions for savings plans, such as 401-K's. This is additional 
"disposable income" which can and should be committed to the Plan, thus resulting in a 
higher monthly Plan payment (which correspondingly results in a faster pay-back to 
creditors). 
4. Liquidation Analysis 
Section 1325(a)(4) provides that the debtor's Plan must propose to pay creditors as 
much as they would receive in a liquidation ofthe debtor's assets under Chapter 7. Thus, the 
debtor's Schedules ofReal Property and Personal Property should be reviewed, to determine 
if the debtor has non-exempt equity in either his realty or personal property. 
Ifthe debtor's assets could be liquidated in a Chapter 7, so that all general unsecured 
creditors would receive more by such a liquidation than they would through the plan, then 
the court cannot confirm that plan. This could be true even if the debtor proposes a 100% 
plan. 
Is a dollar today worth the same as a dollar 36 or 60 months from now? Of course 
not. Therefore, ifthe debtor's estate could be liquidated today and all creditor. paid in full, 
then the debtor has to pay those unsecured creditors the time value of their money. Call it 
interest, call it a discount factor, call it a net present value, call it whatever you will. The 
bottom line is that the unsecured creditors must be paid their claim plus interest if the 
debtor's estate is solvent. See In Re: Hardy, 755 F.2d. 75 (6th Cir. 1985). 
5. Interest Rate 
The Plan must pay creditors the value of their claim as of the effective date of the 
plan, i.e., the confirmation date. See, Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) Since few debtors (at least 
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none that the authors have ever seen) can pay all claims upon confirmation, they must 
provide a market rate of interest, to compensate for having to wait to be paid (see discussion 
immediately above). Occasionally, Plans are proposed which provide for no interest 
whatsoever to secured creditors. This is a clear violation of § Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and 
confimlation of those plans should be summarily denied. 
Other plans may propose a grossly insufficient rate. Such Plans are obviously 
objectionable. An appropriate "market" rate of interest has not been conclusively 
established, but presumably varies on a case-by-case basis. The creditor should stress, 
though, that it is a market rate for similarly situated borrowers, i.e., borrowers who 
presumably have no equity in any of their assets, and are obviously financially distressed. 
In other words, the current "market" rate to a financially distressed borrower, such as a 
Chapter 13 debtor, will presumably be higher than the "market" rate to an average bank 
customer. See, Memphis Bank and Trust Company v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 
1982). Moreover, if the creditor's loan was made close to the filing of the bankruptcy, one 
can probably safely assume that the contract rate is reflective of the "market" for this 
particular debtor. 
6. Lack of Good Faith 
Section 1325(a)(3) requires that the .Plan be proposed in "good faith". This is an 
elusive and evolving standard. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth 
twelve factors to be considered in making this determination. See Caldwell v. Hardin, 851 
F.2d. 852 (6th Cir. 1988) and 895 F.2d. 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); see also In re Okoreeh-Baah, 
836 F.2d 1030 (6th Or. 1988); In re: Barrett, 964 F.2d. 588 (6th Cir. 1992). The twelve 
points to be considered as follows: 
a. the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the 
debtor's surplus; 
b. the debtor's employment history, ability 
likelihood of future increase in income; 
to earn and 
c. the probable or expected duration ofthe Plan; 
d. the accuracy of the Plan's statements of the debts, expenses 
and percentage repayment ofunsecured debt and whether any 
inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court; 
e. the extent 
creditors; 
of preferential treatment between classes of 
f. the extent to which secured claims are modified; 
g. the type ofdebt sought to be discharged and whether any such 
debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7 (also, how much ofthis 
type debt is the debtor seeking to discharge in his plan); 
h. the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate 
medical expenses; 
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1. 	 the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act; 
J. 	 the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 
13 relief; 
k. 	 the burden which the Plan's administration would place upon 
the trustee; and, 
1. 	 whether the debtor is attempting to abuse the spirit of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Typical "bad faith" objections which can and should be filed include debts which 
were incurred immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing, debts premised on false financial 
statements, and debts which would otherwise be nondischargeable in Chapter 7. However, 
the fact that a debt would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case does not automatically 
require the Court to deny confirmation ofthe debtor's Plan. As noted parenthetically above, 
ifonly a small percentage ofthe debt that is sought to be discharged in the Chapter 13 would 
not be discharged in a Chapter 7, then that is not enough. Additionally, ifthe percentage that 
the debtor is proposing to pay to unsecured creditors is relatively high such that creditors 
with this type debt are not being significantly harmed, then this element alone will not be 
sufficient to challenge confirmation. This is simply one of the factors to be considered by 
the Court in determining whether the Plan has been filed in "bad faith". The more factors 
that are present, the stronger the objection to confirmation. 
7. Debtor's Proposal to Surrender Collateral "In Full Satisfaction ofDebt" 
Debtors frequently propose to surrender collateral in Chapter 13 Plans. However, a 
creditor is not required to accept its collateral in full satisfaction of its indebtedness. The 
creditor is entitled to sell the collateral, and have any deficiency balance treated as a general 
unsecured claim. See In re Claypool, 122 B.R. 371 (Bk. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
This may happen even after the plan has been confirmed. Example: the debtor 
will have been in the Chapter 13 for several years, and will want to return a vehicle. The 
debtor will want the creditor to sell the vehicle and then reclassify the remaining debt as 
unsecured, while at the same time moving the court to incur new credit to purchase 
another vehicle. Another scenario would be where the debtor wrecks the car, but the 
insurance proceeds are less than the remaining balance on the creditor's allowed secured 
claim (as established in the Order of Confirmation). Here the debtor will want the 
creditor to take the insurance proceeds and reclassify the remaining portion of the debt as 
unsecured. Can the debtor avail himself to the provisions of 11 USC § 1329(a) and 
reclassify these debts? 
The answer is now a resounding "NO." The Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit 
recently held in the case of In re Nolan, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26642, 2000 FED App. 
0376, Bankr. L. Rep (CCH) P78,284 that Congress did not intend for 11 USC § 1329(a) to 
permit debtors to modify a plan and reap a windfall. Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan 
binds ALL parties, including the debtor. See, 11 USC § 1327(a) Upon confirmation, both 
1-12 

parties accept the risk of depreciation and deficiency. In rejecting cases to the contrary, the 
Sixth Circuit held: 
First, section 1329(a) does not expressly allow the debtor to alter, reduce or 
reclassify a previously allowed secured claim. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1329(a) (1993). 
Instead, section 1329(a)(1) only affords the debtor arightto request alteration 
of the amount or timing of specific payments. A debtor cannot use section 
1329(b)(1) to enlarge the modifications pernlitted by section 1329(a), since 
section 1329(b)(1) does not apply unless the proposed modification first 
complies with section 1329(a)(1). See, Chrysler Fin. Com. 234 B.R. at 394 
(quoting Taylor, 99 B.R. at 904-05). A modification that reduces the claim 
of a secured debtor would add a claim to the class ofunsecured creditors, a 
change prohibited by section 1329(a). [footnte omitted] See, 234 B.R. at 394­
95 (quoting Taylor, 99 B.R. at 905 n.3). Section 1329(a)(1) should not be 
read so broadly as to authorize the reclassification of claims. See, Coleman, 
231 B.R. at 400. 
Just like a creditor, the debtor is bound by the valuations of collateral fixed by the 
entry of the Order of Confirmation. What is grease for the goose is grease for the gander. 
8. "Write-Down" of Home Mortgages 
Section 1322(b)(2) provides that loans secured only by mortgages on the debtor's 
principal residence cannot be modified by a Chapter 13 plan. However, Section 506(a) 
provides that a claim is treated as "secured" only to the value ofthe collateral. Ifa mortgage 
loan is "under-secured" (with collateral value being less than the balance owed), can a debtor 
invoke Section 506(a) and (d) to modify the home mortgage debt? 
Fortunately, the answer is generally "no". Debtors are no longer able to 
"write-down" home mortgages to the value of the real estate collateral. Despite a majority 
oflower Court opinions to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Nobleman 
v. American Savings Bank, 113 S.Ct. 2106 (1993), that Chapter 13 debtors cannot modify 
the rights of home mortgage lenders by "bifurcating" the debt, i.e., by "writing-down" the 
debt to the value of the collateral, and treating the balance as unsecured. (But see, Judge 
Lee's opinion in the In re Hiler case, 94-50299 that can be found on the Eastern District of 
Kentucky's website). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Nobleman, debtors' Plans 
frequently provided that home mortgages would be treated as secured only to the value ofthe 
collateral. However, this is no longer permissible, so long as the creditor's only collateral 
is a mortgage on the debtor's principal place ofresidence, for which the last payment is due 
after the Plan is complete. The debtor's Plan must provide that all post-petition mortgage 
payments will be paid pursuant to the contract schedule. 
The debtor can "cure" pre-petition arrearages, though, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 
1322(b)(5). However, this must be done within a "reasonable" time, which is typically 
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limited to twenty-four (24) months in the Western District of Kentucky. 
9. Disparate Treatment ofClasses ofUnsecured Creditors 
A further basis for objection to a Chapter 13 Plan is if the debtor proposes to treat 
unsecured creditors differently. With the exception ofco-signed unsecured or undersecured 
debts (which can be paid as a separate class, in order to protect the co-signers - See, 11 USC 
§ 1322(b)(I)), all general unsecured debts must receive the same treatment. However, 
debtors frequently propose to treat student loans as a special class of unsecured debt, and 
sometimes even seek to have the student loans given a "priority" status. This constitutes a 
basis for objection, pursuant to an unpublished opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District ofKentucky, In re Crenshaw, Bankruptcy No. 5-91-0926. Crenshaw held 
that it is impermissible for debtors to propose to pay student loans as priority debt, or to 
otherwise provide for student loans to receive "better" treatment than other general 
unsecured creditors would receive under the Plan. 
However, there may be a new ploy in town that is a different slant on this same 
subject. 
Student loans are usually long term in nature. 11 USC § 1322(b)( 5) allows the debtor 
to propose a plan that provides for the "maintenance ofpayments while the case is pending 
on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on 
which the final payment under the plan is due." One interpretation of this section would 
allow the debtor to propose to maintain contract payments on this long term debt during the 
term of the Chapter 13 plan. While this is not a classification per se, it is classification in 
practice. See also, 11 USC § 1322(b)(4). 
Similarly, many debtors propose to pay signature loans to their credit unions 
"outside" of the Plan, by payroll deduction. This is clearly objectionable, because such a 
proposal allows the credit union to receive its contract payments (including post-petition 
interest), while other general unsecured creditors receive less than 100 percent of the 
principal amount oftheir debt (and receive no post-petition interest whatsoever). See In Re 
Harshbarger, 66 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1995). If you are representing a general unsecured 
creditor (or even ifyou are representing a secured creditor, which could benefit from having 
more money paid into the Plan on a monthly basis), an Objection to Confirmation is 
appropriate ifthe debtor is proposing to pay unsecured loans to a credit union, etc., by payroll 
deduction. 
III. CONFIRMATION AND DISMISSAL LITIGATION 
A. Confirmation 
In addition to the specific bases for Objections to Confirmation set forth above, an 
additional issue which can be raised at the Confirmation Hearing is whether the debtor is 
current in his escrowed Plan payments (in the Western District) or in his payments to the 
trustee (in the Eastern District). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1326(a)(l), the debtor is to 
commence Plan payments within thirty (30) days after the date of filing. Thus, on the date 
ofthe Confirmation Hearing, the debtor is required to have made all Plan payments accrued 
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to that date. 
It is important that the Plan payments be current on the date of confirmation of the 
Plan, or the Plan will obviously be in default immediately following confirmation. These 
are the creditor's adequate protection payments. It is much more cost-effective to bring this 
fact to the Court's attention at the Confirmation Hearing, rather than to wait until after 
confirmation to file a motion for stay relief or dismissal. Obviously, if a creditor is aware 
ofthis prior to the hearing on confirmation the motions to convert to a Chapter 7, to dismiss 
and a motion to terminate the § 362 and § 1301(if applicable) stay(s) could be filed and 
noticed for the confirmation hearing. 
B. Dismissal 
The most obvious basis for a post-confirmation Motion to Dismiss is Plan default in 
payments. The Trustee's office should monitor the debtor's compliance with the terms of 
the Plan, and ifthe debtor is not making the payments as required, the Trustee will frequently 
file a Motion to Dismiss the case (sometimes known as a "show cause" motion). However, 
creditors are not required to wait for the Trustee to file a "show cause" motion. Creditors are 
free to file Motions to Dismiss and/or Motions for Stay Relief at any time (assuming, of 
course, that good cause exists for the filing of same). 
Ifa creditor's claim is not being paid post-confirmation, it is prudent to order a copy 
of the Trustee's report, to ascertain why the creditor's claim is not being paid. If the debtor 
is making all payments to the Trustee as agreed, then a Motion to Dismiss would not be 
appropriate. Rather, a Motion to Temlinate the Automatic Stay due to lack of adequate 
protection for this particular creditor's interest might be in order. However, as noted above, 
if the debtor is paying in accordance with the provisions of the plan, a plan to which the 
creditor did not object, then the creditor may be precluded from seeking stay relief by the 
doctrine of res judicata. Additionally, it may be prudent to make a courtesy call the trustee 
in this instance. Your client's not getting paid may be due to situation in the trustee's office 
that can be remedied by picking up the phone. 
However, if the debtor is not making his Plan payments per the terms of the 
confirmed plan, then a Motion to Dismiss would be appropriate (unless the Court has 
authorized a payment suspension). Ifthe debtor is in default in the Plan payments without 
prior Court authorization, then a Motion to Dismiss should be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
Section 1307. A sample Motion to Dismiss is attached as Appendix B to this chapter. 
At the hearing on the dismissal motion, the debtor's counsel will invariably have a 
proposal for curing the defaulted Plan payments. Obviously, though, this proposal must be 
analyzed in terms of feasibility. After all, if the debtor has been unable to make the plan 
payments, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to make increased Plan payments in order 
to promptly cure the default. Ifthe court is inclined to grant such a forbearance, then request 
a provision in the order 
When a post-confirmation default has occurred, the creditor can file either a Motion 
to Dismiss or a Motion to Terminate the Automatic Stay. One potential benefit to filing a 
Motion to Dismiss (as opposed to a stay relief motion) is that no $75.00 filing fee is required. 
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Also, ifthe debtor's Plan default is not substantial, a Motion to Dismiss may serve to get the 
debtor "back on track" with the Plan payments. 
However, remember that ifthe plan is dismissed, then it will be a free-for-all amongst 
creditors to vie for the debtor's remaining assets. Itmay spur the debtor into converting the 
petition to on under Chapter 7 where any deficiency balance remaining due after liquidating 
your collateral would be discharged rather than paid as an unsecured claim in the Chapter 13. 
Also, from a cost standpoint, remember that with a motion to dismiss, ALL creditors have 
to be noticed. 
Ifthe default is substantial, and a voluntary conversion by the debtor is a potential (or 
has even been mentioned by debtor's counsel), then it may be wise to file the motion to 
terminate the stay to take advantage of 11 USC § 109(g). If a debtor requests a voluntary 
dismissal following the filing of a motion for relief from the automatic stay, then that 
individual may not qualify as a debtor for 180 days after the dismissal. This is a little know, 
yet powerful weapon. 
Likewise, make sure the individual qualifies for relief under Chapter 13 ofthe Code. 
11 USC § 1 09( e) sets out the debt limits for an individual in order to qualify to be a debtor 
under Chapter 13. Currently, the individual must have less than $269,250 in noncontingent, 
liquidated unsecured debt, and less than $807,750 in noncontingent, secured debt. If the 
individual is over these limits, then they do not qualify for relief under Chapter 13 and may 
h~ve to file a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 petition. This is not uncommon for small, sole 
proprietorships. 
This is not the only tool available to a creditor in order to limit a debtor's ability to 
file another bankruptcy petition. Say for instance you represent a client that is secured by 
rela estate. You are at the courthouse steps ready to sell the debtor's home when you get a 
notice of a Chapter 13 filing. This, in an of itself is pemlissible. What if, however that this 
is your third trip to the courthouse steps, because each time you get the stay terminated, the 
debtor dismisses that petition and files another on the eve ofthe foreclosure sale. You will 
file an objection to the plan on good faith grounds and a motion to dismiss. You are 
confident that the judge will grant the motion to dismiss (again), but anticipate the filing of 
yet another Chapter 13 petition. What can you do? 
In your motion, ask the judge to condition the dismissal so the debtor may not file 
another petition under any chapter for (as an example) 120 days. You set out the history of 
filings in the case and tell the judge that you think that denying the debtor the ability to file 
another petition for 120 days will allow you time to get the property sold. You predicate 
your motion on the language in 11 USC § 349(a) that says: "[u]nless the court, for cause, 
orders otherwise, the dismissal ofa case under this title does not ... prejudice the debtor with 
regard to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title... ." Such an abuse of the 
bankruptcy process may be the "cause" the judge needs to afford your client this relief. 
IV. PRACTICE ISSUES IN CHAPTER 13 CASES FOR CREDITORS 
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Unless your creditor client is a large bank, consumer finance company or business 
which has a significant number of its collection accounts in bankruptcy proceedings, it is 
unlikely that the creditor has a complete understanding ofthe differences between a Chapter 
7 liquidation and a Chapter 13 consumer reorganization. It is important to give your client 
a basic understanding ofhow a Chapter 13 works. One ofthe leading Treatise's on Chapter 
13 Bankruptcy practice, Judge Keith Lundin's .Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, Second Edition (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994) [a new edition of this book is being sold at the writing of this 
article - your writers have ordered it, but it has not yet arrived. The citation above will be 
dated] recommends that attorneys discuss the following topics with their creditor clients to 
ensure that they can protect their rights in a Chapter 13 proceeding: 
1. 	 Differences between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 
2. 	 Existence and role of the Chapter 13 trustee 
3. 	 Handling of the notice of filing of a Chapter 13 case 
4. 	 The automatic stay and the codebtor stay 
5. 	 When to refer a Chapter 13 case to counsel 
6. 	 The meeting of creditors 
7. 	 Negotiation of (favorable) treatment in the plan 
8. 	 The special rights of secured claim holders; valuation, 
interest, and periodic payments 
9. 	 The (more) special rights of real estate secured claim holders 
10. 	 The special rights of landlords and lessors 
11. 	 The best-interest-of-creditors test, disposable income test, and 
other rights ofunsecured claim holders 
12. 	 Effects of confirmation 
13. 	 Importance of filing a proof ofclaim 
14. 	 Dividend checks - when they can be expected and in what 
amounts 
15. 	 Monitoring the debtor's performance after confirmation - how 
to know when a plan is failing 
16. 	 When conversion or dismissal is appropriate 
17. How to get reports and information on a pending case. 
Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy at §1.130. 
By the same token, there are several important issues which creditors attorneys should 
consider in approaching a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. While this list is clearly not a 
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comprehensive guide to Chapter 13 Creditor practice, it does provide an excellent "quick 
reference" to several important issues. 
A. File Your Proof Of Claim Early 
Unless a creditor has a litigation based claim against the debtor for which it may be 
entitled to a trial by jury, Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 896 (1990), that creditor should 
always file a proofofclaim. See 11 U.S.C. §§501, 502, 503, 506, 507 and 1305; Bankruptcy 
Rules ofProcedure 3001,3002,3004,3007 and 3012. Under the amendments to section 502 
enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, the failure to file a timely proofofclaim can 
result in the disallowance of that claim. See generally, In re Schaffer, 173 B.R. 393, 395 
(BkrtcyN.D. Ill. 1994); Inre Weissman, 126B.R. 889 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ill. 1991)(failureto file 
claim for nondischargeable debt prevents Creditor holding the claim from receiving a 
distribution from Chapter 13 Plan); In re Crooker, 159 B.R. 790 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Ky. 1993), (a 
late filed claim may not be accepted in a Chapter 13 case) 
In the event your client does not timely file a proofofclaim, check and see ifyou can 
claim that an "informal" proof of claim has been filed in the Chapter 13 case. See In re 
McCoy Management Services, Inc., 44 B.R. 215 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky. 1984). See also, In re 
Southwest Equip. Rental, 193 BR 276 (Bkrtcy E.D Tenn., 1996) (five elements necessary for 
a valid informal proofofclaim. One, it must be in writing; two, it must contain a demand by 
the creditor on the debtor's estate; three, it must express an intent to hold the debtor liable 
for the debt; four, it must be filed with the Bankruptcy Court; and five, the facts of the case 
must make allowance equitable); But see, In re M. J. Waterman and Assoc., 227 F.3d 604 
(6th Cir., 2000) (Upheld: lower court's refusal to treat creditor's pre-bar date filings as an 
informal proof of claim and his objection to debtor's bankruptcy reorganization plan as an 
informal ballot in a Chapter 11) Ifany writings filed with the Court and sent to the debtor's 
counsel contain the claim, then you may be able to have the claim allowed in the Chapter 13. 
Finally, even secured claim holders should file timely proof of claim in Chapter 13 
cases. While a majority of cases hold that liens and mortgages will survive a bankruptcy 
discharge even if no proof of claim is filed (See Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th 
Cir. 1995)), there is substantial authority to the contrary. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 
1995). Therefore, care should always be taken when notice of a bankruptcy is received to 
file your proof of claim. 
B. Review The Debtor's Plan: You May Not Like What You See 
Under 11 U.S.C. §1327, the provisions ofa confirmed Chapter 13 plan are binding 
on both a debtor and Creditor even ifthe claim ofthe creditor is not provided for by the Plan. 
See generally, In re Ivory, 70 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 1995); Homebanc v. Chappell, 984 F.2d 775 
(7th Cir. 1993); In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Cen-Pen Corp. v. 
Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1995). Therefore, ifyou represent a creditor and fail to file an 
objection to a Chapter 13 Plan provision which is unfavorable to your client, that client will 
be bound to the terms of the Chapter 13 Plan under the doctrine of res judicata. See In re 
Rodgers, 180 B.R. 5q4 (Bkrtcy E.D. Tenn. 1995) (Creditor'S failure to object to Plan which 
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proposed to pay the Creditor nothing on its $338,746.20 timely filed proof of claim meant 
that the Plan was binding on the Creditor even though it was unconfirmable). While there 
is no direct Chapter 13 authority from either the Sixth Circuit or Kentucky Federal Courts 
on this issue, the Sixth Circuit decision in Thompson v. Kentucky Lumber, 860 F.2d, 674 
(6th Cir. 1984), a Chapter 11 case, clearly supports the line of cases which holds that a 
confirmed Plan is binding on a non-objecting Creditor. 
It is important to note that where a Creditor does not receive adequate notice of a 
Chapter 13 filing or the contents ofa Plan, that a confirmation ofa Chapter 13 plan will not 
be binding on that creditor if to do so would result in a denial of due process. Piedmont 
Trust Banks v. Linkous, 990 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1993). 
Perhaps the most controversial issue in this area concerns whether a lien can be 
removed by a confirmed Chapter 13 Plan. The majority position, lead by the cases of 
Cen-Pen Com. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1995); Sun Finance Co. v. Howard, 972 F.2d 
639 (5th Cir. 1992); and Southtrust Bank of Alabama v. Thomas, 883 F.2d 991 (11 th Cir. 
1989) hold that the confirmation of a Chapter 13 Plan cannot, by itself, adversely affect the 
lien rights of a secured claim holder. These are in opposition to a growing line of cases 
which holds that if a Chapter 13 Plan treats a claim as an unsecured claim, that claim will 
lose any lien it had ifthe Chapter 13 Plan is confirmed without objection. See In re Penrod, 
50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Chappell, 984 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1993); and In re Pence, 
905 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1990). These cases interpret the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §1327 
literally, and hold that a confirmed Plan is binding on both the debtor and his or her creditors, 
even to the extent of releasing an otherwise valid lien. While there is no Sixth Circuit or 
Kentucky case on point, the better practice is to avoid this problem by carefully reviewing 
Chapter 13 Plans and objecting ifyour claim is not properly treated. 
The cases cited above seem to ignore the clear mandate ofBankruptcy Rule 7001(2) 
which states that any proceeding to determine the validity, priority , or extent of a lien or 
other interest in property (other than the avoidance ofa lien pursuant to BR 4003( d)), must 
be done by adversary proceeding. Your writers would submit that rule, alone, makes such 
provisions in plan void (versus voidable). However, with courts allowing the dischargability 
ofstudent loans and the creation ofexemption where none previously existed (see discussion 
ofTaylor case, infra) when a creditor rests on its rights, prudence dictates a close inspection 
of the plan and objection where necessary. 
Another area where ignoring the provisions ofa plan can adversely affect a secured 
creditors is in the area of release of a lien upon payment of the creditor's allowed secured 
claim plus interest. 11 USC § 506( d) states that to the extent that a claim is undersecured, the 
creditor's lien is void. Does that mean that upon payment ofthat allowed secured claim, plus 
interest the creditor must release that lien prior to completing the plan? If a creditor does 
not object to such a provision in a plan, then the debtor could demand release ofthe lien. If 
the collateral is sold, and the bankruptcy later dismissed prior to completion, then the creditor 
could be out in the cold. 
However, there is case law that does support an objection to such a plan provision. 
Judge Howard held in the case onn re McPherson, 230 B.R. 99 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky., 1999) that 
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a creditor may not be required to release its lien until all payments under the plan have been 
made. Here, a plan was confirmed with a provision stating that "the holder ofany allowed 
secured claim provided for by the plan shall retain a lien securing such claim until the 
amount for which the claim is allowed as secured is paid in full. 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1325(a)(5)(B)(I), 1327(c)." Upon payment in full of the allowed secured claim, the debtor 
requested the creditor to release its lien, which request was refused. Thereafter, the Chapter 
13 trustee filed a motion to require the creditor to release its lien and for penalties against the 
creditor. In overruling the trustee's motion, the Judge Howard observed at page 101 of his 
decision that: 
This Court believes, however, that in order to protect the creditor 
from premature lien termination, and insure that the debtor is not held 
hostage beyond the time he/she has performed according to the 
confirmed plan, that the better approach is to require that a lien be 
released upon successful completion of the Chapter 13 plan, but 
before a discharge is entered. 
Your authors suggest the better practice is to object to such provisions at the outset 
so that you are not play~ng "catch up" later. 
C. The Automatic Stay In Chapter 13 Cases 
As discussed elsewhere in this Monograph, 11 U.S.C. §362 applies in Chapter 13 
proceedings. That means that upon the filing ofa Bankruptcy petition, nearly all collection 
activities against a debtor or debtor's property, including all lawsuits, all efforts to repossess 
property and all acts to obtain, perfect or enforce a lien. However, in two important respects, 
the scope of the automatic stay is far broader in Chapter 13 proceedings than it is in other 
bankruptcy cases. 
1. Post Petition Property 
As noted above, the automatic stay protects both the debtor and the debtor's property. 
Under 11 U.S.C. §1306 property of the estate includes a debtor's post petition earnings and 
property acquired by the debtor after the filing ofthe Chapter 13. See generally, In re Scott, 
142 B.R. 126 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Va. 1992); In re Euerle, 70 B.R. 72 (Bkrtcy. D.N.H. 1987);.Jn 
re Koonce, 54 B.R. 643 (Bkrtcy. D.S.C. 1985) ($1.3 million prize won in Lottery by debtors 
after confirmation of their Chapter 13 Plan was property of the estate). Contra In re 
Tschiderer, 73 B.R. 133 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.Y. 1987). This means that even creditors holding 
post petition debts must take care when attempting to collect so as not to violate the 
automatic stay. See In re Heflin, 145 B.R. 560 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1992). 
2. The Codebtor Stay 
One ofthe unique features of a Chapter 13 case is 11 U.S.C. § 1301, which protects 
people who are jointly liable with a debtor or a consumer debt from having the creditors 
holding such joint debts proceed against them until the conclusion oithe Chapter 13 case or 
until they obtain relief from the Codebtor stay. See 11 U.S.C. §1301. See also In re 
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Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. 700 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing broad scope of Section 
1301). 
It is important to note that the protection of the Codebtor stay only applies to 
consumer debts. See U.S.C. §101(8). See In re Green, 157 B.R. 496 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 
1993); Norman v. Norman, 13 B.R. 894 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 1981). Therefore Codebtors on 
business or commercial loans are not protected. 
Further, a creditor may obtain relief from the Codebtor stay by showing: 
A). the nonbankrupt Codebtor received the consideration for the 
debt. See generally, In re Motes, 166 B.R. 147 (Bkrtcy. E.D. 
Mo. 1994); In re Rhodes, 85 B.R. 64 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ill. 1988); 
B). the Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan does not propose to pay the 
creditor's claim in full. See Friendly Finance Discount Com. 
v. Bradley, 705 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Fink, 115 
B.R. 113 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1990); First National Bank v. 
Garrett, 36 B.R. 432 (Bkrtcy. MD.Tenn. 1984); or 
C). that the Creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by a 
continuation of the codebtor stay. See Harris v. Ft. 
Oglethome State Bank, 721 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1983). 
However, if a Creditor files a Motion for Relief from the Codebtor stay, either the 
debtor or the nonbankrupt codebtor must object to that motion within 20 days after it is filed 
or relief from the Codebtor stay will be automatically granted. See 11 U.S.C. § 130l. 
D. Review A Debtor's Claimed Exemptions 
As in other Bankruptcy proceedings, Chapter 13 debtors in Kentucky are entitled to 
claim their state law exemptions. Property which is exempt is excluded from the liquidation 
test of 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4). See In re Alderman, 150 B.R. 246 (Bkrtcy. D.Mont 1993). 
See also, In re Soloman, 67 F .3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995). 
In 1992 the Supreme Court in Taylorv. Freeland & Kronz, 507 U.S. 976 (1992) held 
that unless a timely objection to an exemption is made within thirty (30) days after the 
meeting ofcreditors, any exemption will be deemed allowed even ifthere is no basis for the 
claimed exemption under applicable law. Therefore, it is extremely important for creditors 
to review the debtor's claimed exemptions at the beginning of the case or they may forfeit 
their ability to look to those assets in a Chapter 13 Plan. But see In re Walker, 153 B.R. 565 
(Brktcy. D. Or. 1993) (Creditor can object to improperly claimed exemption as objection to 
confirmation of Plan, even if no timely objection to exemption was made). 
E. Leases And Other Executory Contracts: A Forgotten Issue 
In the current financial climate ofcar leases, time shares, rent-to-own furniture, leases 
and executory contracts are an increasingly important aspect of Chapter 13 practice. Under 
11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(7), a Chapter 13 debtor may assume or reject an unexpired lease or 
executory contract in either the Chapter 13 Plan or by separate motion under the provisions 
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of 11 U.S.C. §365. Creditors need to be aware of the special protections creditors holding 
executory contracts are entitled to in Bankruptcy proceedings. 
The initial issue which a creditor must determine is whether an "executory contract" 
is actually a contract or a disguised security agreement. See In re Terrell, 892 F.2d 469 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (Michigan Land Sale contract); In re Yost, 54 B.R. 818 (Bkrtcy W.D. Ky. 1985). 
Ifan agreement has been validly terminated before the bankruptcy filing then there could be 
nothing left to assume. See generally In re Morgan, 181 B.R. 579 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ala. 1994). 
Further, a Debtor may not be allowed to reject a contract ifthe rejection is in bad faith. Shell 
Oil Co. v. Waldron, 785 Ed.2d 936 (11 th Cir. 1986). Unless the contract in question is a true 
lease and not a disguised security agreement, the protections of 11 U.S.C. §365 are not 
available and a secured debt can be "crammed down" to the value of its collateral under 11 
U.S.C. §1325. See Ledford v. NRM, Inc., 94 B.R. 103 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
Ifa contract is found to be executory, then in order to assume the contract ifthere has 
been a default in the contract, a debtor must: 
1) cure, or provide adequate assurance that the default will be 
promptly cured; 
2) compensate, or provide adequate assurance of prompt 
compensation to any party other than the debtor, for any 
actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default; and 
3) provide adequate assurance offuture performance under such 
contract. 
How prompt is a prompt cure or prompt compensation for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 
§365 is not exactly known and will have to be determined on a facts and circumstances basis. 
See Inre Yokley, 99 B.R. 394 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1989). However, the rule in the Western 
District of Kentucky on an automobile lease is six months. See, In re Reed, 226 B.R. 1 
(Bkrtcy W.D Ky. 1998). 
Further, if the agreement in question is a lease of nonresidential real property, then 
either the motion to assume the lease or the Plan containing an assumption ofthe lease must 
be filed in court no more than sixty (60) days after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Ifone of 
these filings is not made, then the lease is deemed rejected by operation oflaw. In re Anuro, 
72 B.R. 424 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1987). 
Finally it is important to note that the rejection ofa lease or executory contract may 
give rise to an unsecured claim for damages which arise as a result ofthe breach ofthe lease. 
See 11 U.S.C. §502. Subject to certain limitations, tlle rejection of a lease of a house or 
apartment can give rise to a claim of damages for up to one (1) year's rent. Also, the 
resulting deficiency balance may also give rise to an administrative priority expense if the 
lease is accepted, and there is a post-confirmation default. See, 11 USC § 365(g)(2)(A) and 
Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy at §4.89. 
F. Homes Are A Lender's Castle: 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) 
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As a general rule, debtors may "write down" a secured debt to the value of the 
collateral under 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2). However, in light ofNobleman v. American Savings 
Bank, 506 U.S. 1020 (1993) a debtor may not generally "write down" a claim "secured only 
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence ... " This general 
rule has a narrow exception in the Eastern District ofKentucky for second mortgages which 
have no equity to which to attach. See In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27 (Bkrtcy RD. Ky 1993); 
In re Moncrief, 163 B.R. 492 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky 1993). The Western District ofKentucky has 
not yet considered this issue. 
However, in order to obtain the protection of Section 1322(b)(2) a lender must have 
1) a security interest; 2) secured only; 3) by real property that is 4) the debtor's principal 
residence. Each of these elements must be met or the secured claim may be modified. 
1. A Security Interest 
Under 11 U.S. C. § 101(51) a security interest is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as 
a "lien created by agreement." Therefore any nonresidential liens on a debtor's principal 
residence will be subject to foreclosure. The only exception to this general rule is when a 
creditor has a judgement lien against debtors arising from the foreclosure of a mortgage on 
the debtor's principal residence. See First National Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
2. Secured Only by Debtor's Principal Residence 
In the Sixth Circuit, it is settled law that credit life, credit disability or other similar 
insurance are not "additional security" for the underlying loan for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 
§1322(b)(2). In re Davis, 989 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993). Further, other intangible collateral 
such as "Hereditaments, appurtenances, rents, royalties, profits and fixtures" will generally 
not be considered as additional security so as to destroy the protections of § 1322(b )(2). Id. 
However, if the collateral is more tangible in nature, then the protections of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b )(2) will be lost. See Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F .2d 123 (3rd 
Cir. 1990). Unfortunately, there is no clear guidance on what "boilerplate" mortgage 
language is acceptable and what is not. See In re Hammond, 27 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994). 
However, prior to the filing ofbankruptcy a creditor may be able to abandon or waive 
a security interest in additional collateral oflittle value (for example household goods). See 
Southern Discount v. Ivey, 13 B.R. 27 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1981). See also, In re Amerson, 
143 B.R. 413 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Miss. 1992). Unfortunately for creditors, attempts to "clean up" 
its security interest post filing will not allow a creditor to obtain the benefits of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b )(2). See Dent v. Associates Equity Services, Co., 130 B.R. 623 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 
1991). 
3. A Security Interest in Real Property 
One ofthe most unusual issues in Bankruptcy is whether a mobile home is real estate 
for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2). This issue turns on whether a mobile home is 
considered real property or personal property under applicable state law. See In re Weaver. 
69 B.R. 554 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1987) (discussing Kentucky law on mobile homes); Hiers v. 
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Hiers,3 Ky. AR 15 at p.l0 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1996). As noted by one authority "this 
question will be ... [detennined] on whether the mobile home is really affixed to the ground 
or... merely stuck in the mud. Debtor's counsel might be tempted to suggest that the debtor 
put the wheels back on the trailer if modification... is a goal ... Creditor's counsel might 
consider stealing the wheels or at least getting pictures before the home becomes mobile 
again." Lundlin, 1 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 4-41 (1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.). 
4. The Real Estate is Used as the Debtor's Principal Residence 
It is clear from the language of the statute that the protections of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b )(2) do not protect claims secured by second or vacation homes. See In re Saglio, 
153 B.R. 4 (Bkrtcy. D.R.I. 1993). A difficult question arises, though, when a debtor lives 
on a tract ofproperty which is used for agricultural or commercial purposes or a business of 
the debtor is located in the same structure as the debtor's principal residence. Several courts 
have held that where the debtor's residence contains both substantial income producing 
property and the principal residence, the obligation will be modifiable. See In re Del Valle, 
186 B.R. 347,349 (Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1995); In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499 (Bkrtcy W.D. 
Mich. 1992). See also In re McVay, 150 B.R. 254 (Bkrtcy. D. Or. 1993) (Bed & Breakfast 
home). However, depending on the facts of a given case, such property may be given 11 
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) protection. See Paulsen v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Com., 179 B.R. 
492 (E.D. La. 1995). 
G. Dischargeability OfDebts In Chapter 13 
Finally, even if you represent an unsecured creditor, your debt may be 
nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1328, debts which are for 
restitution or a criminal fine, debts which are provided for under §1322(b)(5) (long tenn 
secured debt which will not be relieved until after the tennination of a Chapter 13 Plan), 
certain unauthorized post-petition consumer debts under 11 U.S.C. § 1305 and debts which 
are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)( 5)(alimony and child support), (a)(8) (student 
loans) or (a)(9) ("drunk driving" debts) are nondischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings. 
With respect to these debts, to the extent a Chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay these 
debts in full, any unpaid balance will survive the Chapter 13 discharge. Further, if the 
debtors acquire any assets which are not property ofthe estate, stay relief could be sought so 
the creditor can attach these assets. 
As a general rule, there is little a creditor can do if it holds a nondischargeable Chapter 13 
claim during the case given the broad definition ofproperty of the estate, unless you can 
convince the debtor to separately classify your claim and pay it in full. However, except 
for nondischargeable debts under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) which have the status as priority 
claims, a classification which would give a de facto priority position to nondischargeable 
debts will probably be disallowed if challenged because it would unfairly discriminate 
between similar classes of creditors under 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(1). See Groves v. 
LaBarge, 39 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1994); McCullough v. Brown, 162 B.R. 506 (N.D. Ill. 
1993); In re Hiner, 161 B.R. 688 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993). There is some caselaw to the 
contrary, but it is clearly a minority position. See In re Tucker, 159 B.R. 325 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Mont. 1993); Inre Strictland, 181 B.R. 598 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ala. 1995). 
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V. APPENDIX 
Note: many of the forms relative to Chapter 13 practice in the Eastern and Western 
Districts of Kentucky are subject to change upon the adoption of Joint Local Rules 
for these two Bankruptcy Districts. At the writing of this Chapter, proposed Joint 
Local Rules have been submitted to the judges for both Divisions, subject to change, 
amendment and comment by the Bar. Check the web sites for the Eastern District at 
http://www.kyeb.uscourts.gov/ and the Western District at 
http://www.kewb.uscourts.gov/ for changes in these rules and forms. 
A. Notice Of Commencement OfCase Under Chapter 13 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
546 U.S. Courthouse 
601 W. Broadway 
Louisville, KY 40202 
NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF CASE UNDER CHAPTER 13 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, ORDER FOR RELIEF 
MEETING OF CREDITORS, AND FIXING OF DATES 
Case Number: IN RE (Name ofDebtor) 
Date Filed (or Converted) 
ADDRESS OF DEBTOR 
NAME/ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR 
NAME/ADDRESS OF TRUSTEE 
William W. Lawrence 
310 Legal Arts Bldg. 
200 S. Seventh Street 
Louisville, KY 40202 
Telephone Number: (502) 
581-9042 
DATE/TIMEILOCATION OF MEETING OF CREDITORS 
September 26, 1996 at 3:00 pm 
509 U.S. Courthouse (use 6th Street Elevators) 
1-25 
601 W. Broadway 

Louisville, KY 40202 

Filing Claims: Deadline to File a Proof of Claim is 12/26/96 - The debtor has filed a plan 
AVOIDANCE OF LIEN. All motions to avoid liens shall be filed within 60 days 
following the first date set for the 341 meeting. Failure to file within said time shall 
result in denial of such motions. 
NOTICE: Confirmation hearings will be held in Courtroom #3 on the same date as the 
341 meeting. For cases having 341 meetings in the a.m., confirmation hearings will be 
held at 11 :30 a.m. For cases having afternoon 341 meetings, confirmation hearings will 
be held at 4:00 p.m. 
THIS CASE MAY BE DISMISSED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE IF THE 
SCHEDULES ARE NOT FILED WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE THE 
PETITION WAS FILED. 
COMMENCEMENT OF CASE. An individual's debt adjustment case under chapter 13 
of the Bankruptcy Code has been filed in this court by the debtor or debtors named above, 
and an order for relief has been entered. 
CREDITORS MAY NOT TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS. A creditor is anyone to whom 
the debtor owes money. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is granted certain 
protection against creditors. Common examples of prohibited actions by creditors are 
contacting the debtor to demand repayment, taking action against the debtor to collect 
money owed to creditors or to take property of the debtor, and starting or continuing 
foreclosure actions, repossessions, or wage deductions. Some protection is also given to 
certain codebtors of consumer debts. If unauthorized actions are taken by a creditor 
against a debtor, or a protected codebtor, the court may punish that creditor. A creditor 
who is considering taking action against the debtor or the property of the debtor, or any 
codebtor, should review Sec. 362 and 1301 ofthe Bankruptcy Code and may wish to seek 
legal advice. The staff of the clerk of the bankruptcy court is not permitted to give legal 
advice. 
MEETING OF CREDITORS. The debtor (both husband and wife in a joint case) is 
required to appear at the meeting of creditors on the date and at the place set forth above 
labeled "Date/TimelLocation of Meeting of Creditors" for the purpose of being examined 
under oath. Attendance by creditors at the meeting is welcomed, but not required. At the 
meeting, the creditors may examine the debtor and transact such other business as may 
properly come before the meeting. The meeting may be continued or adjourned from 
time to time by notice at the meeting, without further written notice to the creditors. 
Failure to attend the Sec. 341 Meeting shall result in dismissal unless the court orders the 
meeting continued upon motion of debtor. 
PROOF OF CLAIM. Except as otherwise provided by law, in order to share in any 
payment from the estate, a creditor must file a proof of claim by the date set forth above 
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labeled "Filing Claims." The place to file the proof of claim, either in person or by mail, 
is the office of the clerk of the bankruptcy court. 
All creditors filing claims shall serve a copy on the attorney for the debtor. 
PURPOSE OF A CHAPTER 13 FILING. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is 
designed to enable a debtor to pay debts in full or in part over a period of time pursuant to 
a plan. A plan is not effective unless approved by the bankruptcy court at a confirmation 
hearing. Creditors will be given notice in the event the case is dismissed or converted to 
another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. 
ALL SECURED CLAIMS MUST BE FILED IN THIS OFFICE THREE (3) BUSINESS 
DAYS PRECEDING THE MEETING OF CREDITORS. ALL SUCH CREDITORS 
WHO FAIL TO DO SO WILL NOT BE TREATED AS SECURED CREDITORS FOR 
PURPOSES OF DISTRIBUTION. 
OBJECTION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN MUST BE FILED BY THE 
FIRST DATE SET FOR THE CONFIRMATION HEARING. 
For the Court: Diane S. Rohl 8/23/96 
Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court Entered 
FORM B 91 0011 
US Bankruptcy Court UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY 
COURT 
200 Merrill Lynch Plaza Eastern District of 
Kentucky 
100 East Vine Street Covington 
Lexington, KY 40507-1406 
NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF CASE UNDER CHAPTER 13 OF THE 

BANKRUPTCY CODE, 

MEETING OF CREDITORS, AND FIXING OF DATES 

CASE NUMBER: DATE FILED: 
NAME OF DEBTOR(S)/akaldbalSSNIEIN: ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR(S): 
ADDRESS OF DEBTOR(S): TRUSTEE: 
Sidney N. White 
100 E. Vine St. #500 
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PO Box 2204 
Lexington, KY 40595 
MEETING OF CREDITORS: 
HEARING 
April 16, 1996 at 10:00 am 
US Bankruptcy Courtroom 
Greenberg Bldg 2nd FI 
513 Madison Ave 
Covington, KY 41011 
(606) 233-1527 
CONFIRMATION 
June 4, 1996 at 10:15 am 
US Bankruptcy Courtroom 
Greenberg Bldg 2nd F1 
513 Madison Ave 
Covington, KY 41011 
FEE APPLICATIONS BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEADLINE TO FILE A 
PROOF OF CLAIM: 
DEBTOR(S) FOR SERVICES PERFORMED IN 
REPRESENTATION OF THE DEBTOR(S) IN THIS 90 DAYS AFTER 
THE DATE SET FOR THE 
CASE FOR AN AMOUNT NOT IN EXCESS OF $500 MEETING OF CREDITORS 
SHOWN ABOVE. 
MAY BE RECEIVED AND ACTED ON BY THE COURT 
AT THE CONFIRMATION HEARING. FEE 
APPLICATIONS IN EXCESS OF SUCH AMOUNT WILL 
BE ACTED ON ONL Y AFTER NOTICE TO ALL 
CREDITORS AND PARTIES IN INTEREST 
COMMENCEMENT OF CASE. An individual's debt adjustment case under chapter 
13 of the Bankruptcy Code has been filed in this court by the debtor or debtors named 
above, and an order for relief has been entered. You will not receive notice of all 
documents filed in this case. All documents filed with this court, including lists of the 
debtor's property and debts, are available for inspection at the office of the clerk of the 
bankruptcy court. 
CREDITORS MAY NOT TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS. A creditor is anyone to 
whom the debtor owes money or property. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is 
granted certain protection against creditors. Common examples ofprohibited actions by 
creditors are contacting the debtor to demand repayment, taking action against the debtor 
to collect money owed to creditors or to take property ofthe debtor, and starting or 
continuing foreclosure actions, repossessions, or wage deductions. Some protection is 
also given to certain codebtors ofconsumer debts. If unauthorized actions are taken by a 
creditor against a debtor or protected codebtor, the court may penalize that creditor. A 
creditor who is considering taking action against the debtor or the property of the debtor, 
or any codebtor, should review sections 362 and 1301 of the Bankruptcy Code and may 
wish to seek legal advice. The staff of the clerk of the bankruptcy court is not permitted 
to give legal advice. 
MEETING OF CREDITORS. The debtor (both husband and wife in ajoint case) is 
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required to appear at the meeting of creditors on the date and at the place set forth above 
for the purpose ofbeing examined under oath. Attendance by creditors at the meeting is 
welcomed, but not required. At the meeting the creditors may examine the debtor and 
transact such other business as may properly come before the meeting. The meeting may 
be continued or adjourned from time to time by notice a the meeting, without further 
written notice to creditors. 
PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 13 FILING. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is 
designed to enable a debtor to pay debts in full or in part over a period of time pursuant to 
a plan. A plan is not effective unless approved by the bankruptcy court at a confIrmation 
hearing. Creditors will be given notice in the event the case is dismissed or converted to 
another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. 
PROOF OF CLAIM. Except as otherwise provided by law, in order to share in any 
payment from the estate, a creditor must fIle a proof of claim by the date set forth above 
labeled "Deadline to File a Proofof Claim." 
The place to fIle the proof of claim, either in person or by mail, is the offIce of the clerk 
of the bankruptcy court. Proof of claim forms are available in the clerk's offIce of any 
bankruptcy court. 
****FILE CLAIM FORM ON REVERSE SIDE IN DUPLICATE WITH: US 
BANKRUPTCY COURT, 
200 MERRILL LYNCH PLAZA, 100 EAST VINE STREET, LEXINGTON, KY 
40507-1406**** 
DATED: FOR THE COURT 
FORMB91 
Betty L. Jennette, CLERK 
B. Motion To Dismiss 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
____DISTRlCT OF __---,_ 
INRE: ) 
) 
) CASE NO. 
) 
DEBTOR ) 
) 
1-29 
MOTION TO DISMISS 

Comes . , a creditor, by counsel, and respectfully moves 
the Court to dismiss the within Chapter __ proceeding, and as basis therefor states that 
the debtor is $ is arrears on hislher plan payments. 
WHEREFORE, respectfully requests that this case be 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COUNSEL FOR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was this 
__ day of , 19-, served by mail upon the following. 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
____ DISTRICT OF ____ 
INRE: 	 ) 
) 
) CASE NO. 
) 
DEBTOR ) 
) 
1-30 
ORDER 

On motion of_______, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently 
advised; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the within case be, and it hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
JUDGE, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DATE 
1-31 
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Case Mana emenf 
Electronic Case Fifes 
The Case ManagementlElectronic Case Files (CMlECF) 
system uses Internet technology to give the U.S. federal judiciary a 
new mechanism for infonnation handling. Attorneys can file 
pleadings from their offices via a Web browser; judges, court 
staff, and attorneys have immediate access to new and historical 
documents; and case data and documents are managed effectively. 
CMlECF is currently used in four district and five bankruptcy 
courts around the country. Since its inception, CMlECF has 
handled over 15,000 cases and 175,000 documents and docket 
entries for a user community of 75 judges, 400 court staff, and 
1000 attorneys who use it to file their documents. Because of its 
initial success, CMlECF service will be expanded throughout the 
federal courts over the next few years. Consequently, the federal 
courts are reexamining traditional policies, practices, and rules 
that may need to be adjusted for the Internet world 
The prototype for CMlECF was developed by the 
Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Courts with the 
participation of nine volunteer courts. The AO's Technology 
Enhancement Office (TEO) designed and programmed the 
software and was assisted by the Applications Management and 
Development Division (AMDD). This prototype for bankruptcy 
and civil cases was evaluated against various commercial and 
court-developed alternatives and was chosen as the basis for a 
CMlECF system to serve all appellate, district, and bankruptcy 
courts. An AO project team under AMDD is managing the 
ongoing development and implementation of CMlECF. 
Features of CMlECF 
)- Next-generation case management, tracking of motions, 
answers, deadlines, and hearings. 
)- Up-ta-date reports, queries, and docket sheets produced. 
)- Electronic delivery of documents to, from, and within the 
co~rts. 
)- Electronic retrieval of case documents and dockets by all 
users. 
)- Electronic document management, storage, security, and 
archiving. 
)- Automatic creation of docket entries from attorney filings. 
)- Electronic notices of filing to other CMlECF participants. 
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The CM/ECF Project 
The goal of the CM/ECF project is to create a system that 
allows nearly all documents associated with a court case to be 
handled electronically. 
CM/ECF supports the unique interests of different commu-
nities (the courts, the attorneys, and the public) while providing 
the same range of document processing capabilities to all. 
We expect that many people will file documents electroni-
cally over a network by using a standard Web browser, even 
though CM/ECF does allow people to submit the same docu-
ments on a computer disk or even on paper if they prefer. The 
documents submitted electronically must be in Portable Docu-
ment Format (PDF). 
The network used to access CM/ECF is the DCN (the Judi-
ciary's private network), in the case of the courts, or the Internet, 
in the case of the attorneys and the public. 
Interaction with CM/ECF is via a Web browser, HTML 
forms that enable document "attachments," and interactive soft-
ware. The Web server application software collects the forms 
data, processes it, and forwards data and documents to a private 
server for storage. 
As byproducts of the filing, case management information is 
created and notices of filing are transmitted to case participants. 
Immediately upon filing, the case docket sheet and associated 
documents become available on-line to both the case participants 
and the public. 
For example, an attorney prepares a motion on her PC with 
her word processor of choice. She saves the document and 
"prints" it using Adobe's PDFWriter. Using her Web browser. 
she then connects to the home page of the federal court associ-
ated with the filing and "files" the motion. The attached PDF 
document is automatically forwarded to the court's CM/ECF 
Web site. Once the data is validated, it is stored in the court's 
CMlECF database. 
CM/ECF was first introduced as a prototype in the fall of 
1996 and has been used by other federal district and bankruptcy 
courts since late 1997 and early 1998. CM/ECF activity has 
steadily increased with more than 1,000 new cases and 15,000 
additional entries each month. 
The nine prototype demonstration courts have helped us pri-
oritize and refine the capabilities of the system. By combining 
our systems expertise with the courts' business expertise, we 
have developed a system that exactly matches the needs of the 
federal courts. 
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CM/ECF ... designed 
for the federal courts 
CMlECF is being developed by the AO's TEO and 
AMDD in cooperation with federal district, bankruptcy, and 
appellate courts. These organizations have been involved in 
the development of virtually every national case management 
system for the federal judiciary since 1976. The six original 
TEO application developers have, in total, over 120 years of 
experience with computer systems for the federal judiciary; the 
full implementation team has more than 250 years of experi-
ence. 
The designers understand that, while staffing and money is 
tight in the federal courts, the caseloads continue to increase 
and the case document management challenges are enormous. 
They know that any new system cannot add to the worldoad. 
For these reasons, they designed the CMlECF architecture in 
such a way that it allows for: 
> Use of the networks, machines, and word processing fa-
cilities in use today by the federal courts and legal com-
munity. 
> Gradual implementation of electronic filing at each court's 
chosen pace. 
> Tailoring of the system to local court preferences and 
practices. 
The system design is based on the following key 
"enablers" - the standards, hardware components, and soft-
ware components that minimize the cost to create, modify, 
support, and deploy the CMlECF system: 
> DCN ("inside'') access to enable the courts to use the 
communications network already in place. 
> Internet ("outside") access to enable easy and inexpensive 
electronic communication from the attorneys (unlike other 
case management systems, CMlECF enables information 
submission over the Internet). 
> Web browser is free and available to everyone, to replace 
the previous requirement for PC-based software. 
> PDFWriter, which enables any word processor on any 
platform to be used. 
> Any existing PC or Macintosh with a network connection; 
federal courts already have DCN access and most attor-
neys have Internet access. 
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The CM/ECF Technical Solution 
The success of CMlECF is largely due to the chosen 
technical solution, which is characterized by the following 
practices. 
Use of commerical products and standard languages 
• Commercially available products (Informix and StrongHold) 
are used to manage the database and the Web servers, 
respectively. 
• Standard programming languages (perl, HTML, and 
JavaScript) are used for the application system. 
Ease of maintenance through high-level tools 
The CMlECF design team created some programming tools 
that combine the developers' programs together in such a way that 
many standard programming tasks are eliminated. These include 
complicated processes associated with the latest technology, such 
as maintaining accurate page context information as the Intemet 
user navigates between pages, collecting data from those pages 
and saving it for special database interface procedures, checking 
the user's access rights to those pages, and issuing special 
database commands when appropriate. Because of these support 
tools, changes can be made faster and a programmer's learning 
process is simplified. 
The provision for user customization 
Three basic activities occur when a person selects a docket 
category from a CMlECF menu: 
• User identifies the specific event type to be docketed, such as 
"answer to cross-claim." 
• CMlECF prompts for preliminary information, such as the 
case number and parties. 
• CMlECF runs the processes for that event type. 
For each event type, the court's CMlECF administrator can 
J 
J 
J 
J 
, 
J 
J 
specify (using a simple Excel spreadsheet) which processes to ..J 
run, the sequence in which to run them, and certain behaviors of 
the processes, such as how the user will be prompted and what 
data will be collected. The administrator can also set up overall J 
CMlECF parameters that are unique to the particular court site, 
such as court name and date formats. 
CMlECF provides special tables that enable these tailoring .. 
activities. 
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Graphical User Interface 
Once a person logs into CMlECF, he is immediately pre-
sented with a series of very simple, interactive pages that provide 
choices and input fields and that hyperlink to other pages, based 
on the person's selection. 
We learned a very important lesson from prior systems:' 
keep it simple. We are in the process of refining the interface to 
, ensure this is true in every aspect of a person's interaction with 
the system. 
Isolation of the public and private systems 
The Outside Environment 
CMlECF is publicly accessible from the Internet. Any 
authorized user, such as an attorney, can access the system by 
using a standard Web browser, such as Netscape. His or her 
CMlECF requests and data are submitted through the Common 
Gateway Interface (CGI) recognized by Internet browsers. 
An "outside" server, protected by a special "firewall" de-
signed for the Internet, processes all public requests. The 
frrewall software protects against intruders and unauthorized ac-
tivities. 
The Inside Environment 
CMlECF is privately accessible by the federal courts from ' 
their Data Communications Network (DCN). They submit sim- ,:r;: ;:,;:"2, 4-/louf 
pIe requests and data over this network. 
An "inside" server, protected by special frrewall software 
designed for the inside environment, processes all court user re-
quests. 
Both servers have identical software to enable this separa-
tion of public and private activity and to handle access to the 
Internet. 
Use of Portable Document Format 
All documents uploaded to CMlECF must be in Portable 
Document Format (PDF). This format enables regular docu-
ments to be viewed electronically and shared with others on the 
Internet without loss of any document formatting characteristics. 
PDF is also a secure format that doesn't allow hidden text or 
links, as do many word processors. Saving a document in PDF 
requires only afew clicks of your mouse. ' 
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Filing with CM/ECF 
You can see from the following example that CM/ECF is very easy to use. These windows show 
the steps you would take to file a motion using CM/ECF. Although each court can tailor specific aspects 
of docketing processes, such as the selections and text displayed, the basic process is the same for all 
court types. 
1. Prepare the document 
You can create the document to be filed by using any ~=!= 
word processor. Then select Ambal PDFWriI" as the i 
printer to prepare your document for CM/ECF. 
In filing a document, you just show CM/ECF that this is 
the document you want to file (see Step 8). 
2. Log into ECFp 3. Select a function 
All 
4. Select the document type 
Civil Even .. 
--Ior--
--
,,-,A' __ 
"niaeC'!mcw 
-
-liiio: 
--
~ 
-
-
u.s. DIstrIct Court 
DIstrtct DewIopment S)'sIem 
Ofllclol Court Electraalc Document FII1nI s)'IIeID 
5. Enter the case numbel 
Fit ....... 
,I-UlI 
..................... [1:]H[ ........ 1ZMS. 
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6. Select the party 
-_ ....... 
.. . .., .... 
............. _ ......... 0.."" 
~; ;AI.,... r-.. --:i .... - -"""',.",-
;;:1 .... _ 
t.! 
:!!!J ~ You can select the individual 
party already associated with 
the case, or you can use the 
"group" option. 
.......... " ....................... ¥'~g1 
You can browse your file list to 
select the filing document by 
using the Browse button. 
10. Review the docket text 
File a Motion 
You can modify the generated 
docket text or just press the 
Next button. 
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7. Select the relief(s) 
The list items shown for selection are 
determined by the court. 
r.: .................................. _'.,...cIMk ... t.) 
1iD1E: ........ ,. ........ .....-...-..,..wiII ...................... __ fw iIII ..... __ ...... __ ~_ ................................. ,. .. --.. 
---
The details provided in this window are 
detennined by the court. In this window, the 
person has selected a response deadline by using 
a pop-up calendar. 
11. Done! 
File a Motion 
c..~ I-.k 
=-_~-'I\I\ CMlECF gives you a filing receipt to 
_T_ print or store on your computer. A 
_ ......... :_ .... _ ....... '1 notice oCtile filing is also sent via e-
mail to other participants and interested 
~=====:".a1 parties, who can view the document and D docket sheet without logging into CM! 
ECF. 
Reports 
Cooo(o) __ 
ilia. 
-
'-iiIIt 
CelewlrInrC-CJwler 
.... Dn'in'&Miw 
-
....... e!eeIP'II .. 
--
I:a.a.. 
Mi1}jMj&s4jM~ 
_ .. 
---
o-m __ 
,...m., 
QjelpM'-a 
....----UfC!!rMu... 
Ilw ..... LieI 
yiew ..... lefilt 
View .... 'nw.tjpa las 
............. 
CMlECF offers a wide variety of 
reports. You can select one of these, 
the Docket Sheet. to verifY the filing 
we just completed in this example. 
The Docket Sheet shows the filing just 
completed. You can click on the 
document number to display the 
associated PDF document. 
-.,--,011: ..... 
_DC .... ' 
........ 
_ ... 
_(1-.. _--__ .--<1 
_ .... .,---_<1,.. ....... ---... -__ .0/1"''''' L... ___________ -.--I._ •• __ ,e_'Mw 
The following can be found at the Judiciary's Internet site (www.uscourts.gov): 
"Electronic Case Files in the Federal Courts: A Preliminary Examination of Goals, Issues and the Road Ahead," 
March 1997. 
"Local Rules and Procedures Governing Prototype Electronic Case FOe (ECF) Systems in the Federal District and 
Bankruptcy Courts," December 1998. 
"Electronic Case Files: Interim Technical Standards and Guidelines." February 1998. 
Inquires can be directed to: 
Electronic Case Files Initiative, Gary Bockweg, Project Manager 
(202-273-2736; bockweg@teo.uscourts.gov) 
Electronic Case Fdes Prototype, Michael Greenwood, Project Manager 
(202-273-2748; greenwoo@teo.uscourts.gov) 
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UMITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
REQUESTS FOR CASE INFORMATION 
The Bankruptcy Clerk's Office for the Western District of Kentucky is located at 601 W. Broadway, Suite 
546, Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502-627-5700). There are several different means of obtaining case information 
from the Bankruptcy Court 
1) VCIS The Voice Case Information System (VcrS) allows a caller to access basic case 
information from any touch-tone telephone at any time by dialing 502-627-5660 or 800-263-9385. 
There is no fee charged with this service. The information that can be obtained from vcrs 
includes the debtor's name, case number, date case was filed, type of case, trustee, debtor's 
attorney, debtor's attorney's phone number, discharge date, closing date, creditors' meeting date 
and whether assets appear to be available for distribution. [Cases available on vcrs are those that 
were filed on or after July, 1992. *] ~ 
2) WebCIS. All information available on vcrs may be obtained via the Internet at 
WWW.kywb.llSCOUrts.gov by clicking on WebCrS. There is no fee charged for this service. 
3) PACER The local PAC~R system allows computer access to not only basic case information b~t 
also to recent docketing entries, claims registers, and case reports. This system, like vcrs, is .. 
available at any time. PACER subscribers also have access to the Natio1ial U.S. Party/Case 
Index. which provides case name, case number, filing date and the court in which the case was 
filed. Information on registering for these services and the fees charged may be obtained from the 
PACER Service Center at www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov or by calling 1-800-676-6856. RegisterCd 
PACER users can access the local PACER system via the Internet at www.kywb.uscourts.gov or 
modem at 502-627-5664 or 1-800-263-9389. The National U.S. Party/Case Index can be accessed 
at www.pacer.llspci.uscourts.gov or by modem at 1-800-974-8899. [Cases available on the local 
4) 
5) 
.. PACER are those that were filed on or after July, 1992*, and cases available on the National Index 
vary by each court.] 
PUBLIC TERMINAL A computer terminal for use by the public to obtain case infonnation is 
available in the Louisville Clerk's Office .. This terminal may be used at no cost during normal office 
operating hours (8:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday). 
CLERK'S OFFICE PERSONNEL 
If you are unable to obtain information from vcrs, PACER, or the public terminals, you may be 
able to obtain the following information from the Clerk's Office without charge: 
a) If the exact name of the debtor or the case number is provided and the information 
is easily retrievable from the Court's automated database (case filed in'this federal 
judicial district on or after July 1, 1992*), you may obtain the followin~basic 
information: debtor's name, case number, whether a debtor has filed for 
banlauptcy, whether the case is voluntary or involuntary, chapter of case, attorney 
for debtor, trustee, whether there are assets, date of section 341 meeting, 
discharge/dismissal date (if entered), debtor's soc~al security number, and a general 
status of the case. You may contact the Clerk's Office staffwith up to two case 
requests either by telephone or a visit to the Clerk's Office. 
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6) 
b) 
c) 
If the exact name of a party or an adversary proceeding number is provided and 
the information is easily retrievable from the Court's automated database 
(adversary proceedings filed in this federa1judi~ial district on or after July 1, 1992), 
you may obtain the following basic information: adversary name, adversary 
number, date the complaint wac; filed, name of party's attorney of record, the 
related case number and a general status of the adversary proceeding. You may 
contact the Clerk's Office staff with up to two adversary proceeding requests 
either by telephone or a visit to the Clerk's Office. (Limited information is also 
available on adversary proceedings filed from 1980 to1992. Additional information 
will require a review of the closed record. See Item 5-e.) 
Requests for photocopies of case or adversary proceeding documents can be made 
in writing, in person or by phone. If the requestor provides a clear document 
reference (i.e., document number or date document entered where very few 
documents entered on such date) and the document is available within the Couit 
premises, the Clerk's Office will provide the copies free of any additional search 
charge (copywork fee ofS.50 per page still applies). 
d) All pending cases & adversary proceedings may be reviewed in 
person :free of charge. 
e) Information on reviewing or obtaining copies of documents in closed cases and 
adversary proceedings can be obtained from Clerk's Office personnel or our web 
site at www.kywb.uscourts.gov. 
A S15 search fee is required in the following requests: 
t) 
g) 
h) 
Requests for docketing events that are not basic information. 
Requests for basic information regarding cases filed before 1986; such information 
is maintained on microfiche film, and requires a physical search by the Clerk's 
Office. 
Requests to examine or copy a document where the requestor does not provide an 
accurate case number and docket number and the deputy must physically search 
the Court's record. 
i) Written search requests, which require a written response by the Clerk's Office. 
PROCEDURAL iNFORMATION The Clerk's Office personnel will furnish general procedural 
information, but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 955, the Clerk's Office is PROHIBITED FROM 
GIVING LEGAL ADVICE. 
*Limited information is available on cases filed between 1986 and June 1992. Additional 
information on these cases will require a review of the closed case (see Item 5-e). For basic 
inf~rmation on cases filed prior to 1986, see Item 5-g. 
' .. 
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Caselaw Update on Bankruptc)' Ethics 
Claude R. Bowles, Jr. 
1. In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996) The leading case out of the Sixth Circuit on the application 
of Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 9011 and section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Sixth Circuit held 
that if a debtor's attorney violated a fiduciary duty, the attorney's minimum sanction would be total 
denial of an fees. 
2. In re Bonneville Pacific Cmp .. 196 B.R. 868 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1996), afCd in part rev'd in part, 
Hansen. Jones & Leta v. Sepl. 1998 WL 111673 (D. Utah 1998) The leading pair of cases discussing 
in exhaustive detail what are counsel for the debtor-in-possession's duties to a Bankruptcy estate. The 
District Court comes to the strange (and wrong) conclusion that counsel for DIPs do not owe a 
fiduciary duty to the Bankruptcy estate they represenL 
3. Kentucky Bar Association v. Devers, 936 S.W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1997) A detailed analysis of how not to 
represent a debtor at a 341 meeting. A copy of I;his case is auached to this update. 
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936 S. W.2d 89 
(Cite as: 936 S. W.2d 89) 
KEN'lUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION, 
Complainant, 
v. 
Robert L. DEVERS, Respondent. 
No. 96-SC-239-KB. 
Supreme Court of Kentucky. 
Dec. 19. 1996. 
As Corrected Jan. 30. 1997. 
In attorney discipline proceeding, the Supreme 
Court held that three-year suspension was warranted 
for attorney's failure to appear on behalf of clients, 
failure to communicate adequately with clients, and 
closure of attorney's practice without returning fees 
paid to attorney. 
Suspension ordered. 
[1] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~42 
4Sk42 
Attorney violated rule prohibiting lawyer from 
knowingly making false statement of material fact or 
law to tribunal, by filing answer on behalf of client 
which stated that civil proceeding was stayed due to 
pending banlauptcy action ~hen there was· no such 
bankruptcy action. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules 
of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.3(a). 
[2] ATfORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1 
4Sk37.1 
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
client and providing that lawyer having direct 
supervisory authority over another lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that other lawyer 
conforms to rules of professional conduct. by failing 
to adequately explain to bankruptcy trustee that his 
clients could not produce title to trailer in which 
they were living and by sending untrained and 
uninformed representative from attorney's office to 
represent clients in bankruptcy proceeding. 
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, 
Rules 1.3, S.I(b). 
[2] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1) 
4Sk44(1) 
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
client and providing that lawyer having direct 
supervisory authority over another lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that other lawyer 
conforms to rules of professional conduct, by failing 
to adequately explain to bankruptcy trustee that his 
clients could not produce title to trailer in which 
they were living and by sending untrained and 
uninformed representative from attorney's office to 
represent clients in bankruptcy proceeding. 
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct. 
Rules 1.3, S.l(b). 
[3] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1 
4Sk37.1 
Attorney violated rule providing that lawyer shall be 
responsible for another lawyer's violations of rules 
of professional conduct under certain circumstances, 
when another attorney in a attorney's office filed 
answer to civil action using client's alias. 
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130. Rules of Prof.Conduct, 
Rule S.I(a-c). 
[4] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~42 
45k42 
Attorney violated rule prohibiting lawyer from 
knowingly making fals~ statement of material fact or 
law to tribunal when another attorney in attorney's 
office filed answer in civil suit on behalf of client 
under alias undisclosed to courts. Sup.Ct.Rules, 
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.3(a)(I). 
[5] AITORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1) 
45k44(1) 
Attorney violated rule requiring lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
client when neither attorney nor anyone from 
attorney's office ·appeared in civil suit to defend 
clients against plaintiffs motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. Sup.Ct.Rules. Rule 3.130, Rules of 
Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.3. 
(6) AITORNEY AND CLIENr ~44(1) 
4Sk44(I) 
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to keep 
client reasonably informed about status of case, 
represent client competently, and act with 
reasonable diligence, when attorney advised client 
that she should stop making payments to bankruptcy 
trustee, which resulted in dismissal of client's 
bankruptcy case, and when no appearance was made 
by either attorney or representative from attorney's 
office at meeting of creditors after client filed 
Copr. C West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. GoV(. Works 
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another bankruptcy petition. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4. 
[7] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1) 
4Sk44(1) 
Attorney violated rule stating level of competence 
required . and rule holding that lawyer must 
adequately communicate with hiS clients, by failing 
to inform clients that their motion to amend their 
bankruptcy plan had been overruled as a result of 
absence of counsel for clients at hearing on motion. 
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, 
Rules 1.1, 1.4(a). 
[8] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~37.1 
4S1c37.1 
Attorney violated rule prohibiting aiding in 
unauthorized practice of law by operating office 
which was staffed by unlicensed employees, persons 
whose daily activities consisted of activities which 
constituted practice of law. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule S.S(b). 
[9] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1) 
4Sk44(I) 
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to 
communicate adequately with his clients and 
requiring lawyer to refund unearned fees upon 
termination of representation, by closing office 
without informing clients and by failing. to refund 
fees paid to attorney by clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 
3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.4(a, b), 
1. 16(d). 
[9] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2) 
4Sk44(2) 
Attorney violated rules requiring lawyer to 
communicate adequately with his clients and 
requiring lawyer to refund unearned fees upon 
. termination of representation, by closing office 
without informing clients and by failing to refund 
fees paid to attorney by clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 
3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.4(a, b), 
1. 16(d). 
[10] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(1) 
4Sk44(I) 
Attorney violated rules holding that lawyer must be 
diligent, that lawyer may withdraw from case only if 
withdrawal will create no prejudice to client, and 
that lawyer must refund any uneamed fee upon 
termination of representation, by closing his office 
without any notice to client, without refunding any 
portion of monies that client had paid and without 
filing petition for relief on her behalf, and by closing 
out client's file without notifying her. Sup.Ct.Rules, 
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.3, 
1.16(b, d). 
[10] ATI'ORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2) 
4Sk44(2) 
Attorney violated rules holding that lawyer must be 
diligent, that lawyer may withdraw from case only if 
withdrawal will create no prejudice to client, and 
that lawyer must refund any unearned fee upon 
termination of representation, by closing his office 
without any notice to client, without refunding any 
portion of monies that client had paid and without 
filing petition for relief on her behalf, and by closing 
out client's file without notifying her. Sup.Ct.Rules, 
Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.3, 
1.16(b, d). 
[11] ATIORNEY AND CLIENT ~44(2) 
4Sk44(2) 
Attorney violated rule holding that lawyer shall 
refund any unearned fees upon termination of 
representation, by closing clients' file and attorney's 
practice without informing clients that he was no 
longer allowed to practice and without informing 
clients that no bankruptcy petition had been filed for 
them. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of 
Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.16(d). 
[12] A'ITORNEY A..1\ffi CLIENT ~S8 
4SkS8 
Three-year suspension was warranted for attorney's 
actions of, inter alia, failing to appear on behalf of 
clients, failing to communicate with clients, and 
closing offices without refunding fees paid to 
attorney, despite attorney's loss of office managers 
and staff and inability to find competent 
replacements. 
·91 Barbara S. Rea, Kentucky Bar Association, 
Franlcfort, for Complainant. 
Stephen G. Montoya, Robert L. Devers, Phoenix, 
AZ, for Respondent. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
The Inquiry Tribunal issued eleven charges, 
containing a total of twenty-six counts, against 
respondent, Robert L. Devers. The Board of 
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Governors of the Kentucky Bar Assocjation found 
respondent to be guilty on sixteen counts and not 
guilty on ten counts. The Board recommended a 
two year suspenSion accompanied by an order to pay 
costs. Respondent filed a notice of review with this 
Court. Due to the voluminous nature of the counts 
of which respondent was found guilty, each one will 
be taken in tum. 
[1] 1. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-3.3(a) which probJ."bits a lawyer from 
knowingly maIcing a false statement of material fact 
or law to a tribunal. 
Respondent filed an answer in Knott District Court, 
on behalf of a his client, Bill Smith, which stated 
that the civil proceeding was stayed due to a pending 
bankruptcy action. However, there was no such 
bankruptcy action. It was not actually filed until 
two months after the District Court had continued 
the civil matter. 
There was ample evidence to support a fmding of 
guilt on this charge. 
[2] 2. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-1.3 which requires a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client. Respondent was also found guilty of 
violating SCR 3.130-S.I(b) which provides that a 
lawyer having direct supervisory authority over 
another lawyer shall make' reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the rules of 
professional conduct. 
Respondent failed to adequately explain to the 
Bankruptcy trustee that respondent's clients, Sidney 
and Violet Johnson, could not produce the title to the 
trailer in which they were living due to the fact that 
the Johnson's were purchasing the trailer via a land 
contract and therefore did not possess title although 
the residence was listed on the Johnson's bankruptcy 
schedules as personal property. 
Also, at the meetings of the creditors, an untrained 
and uninformed representative from respondent's 
office was sent to represent the ]ohnsons. The 
bankruptcy petition was ultimately dismissed and the 
representative from respondents office told the 
]ohnsons that they mtist wait a period of time prior 
to refiling when in actuality, the Order dismissing 
the petition stated that the ]ohnsons could refile 
immediately. 
There is ample evidence for fmdings of guilt on 
these charges. 
[3] 3. Respondent was found guilty of a violation 
of SCR 3.130- S.I(a), (b) and (c) which provides 
that a lawyer shall be responsible for another 
lawyer's violation of the rules of professional 
conduct only if the lawyer orders or, with 
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the 
conduct involved or the lawyer is a partner in a law 
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has 
direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, 
and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails 
to take adequate remedial action. 
Warren Kent Williams and Donna ]0 Williams 
came to respondent's office for the purpose of filing 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action. After the filing, 
Mr. Williams was sued upon a deficient loan. 
However, in the civil suit, Mr. Williams was sued 
under a name that he had previously used, Kent A. 
Williams. The bankruptcy court was not aware of 
this additional name. Mr. Williams returned to 
respondent's office and met with another attorney 
who filed an answer to the civil .action under the 
name Kent A. Williams, stating that Kent A. 
Williams did owe the debt bUt that he (Kent A. 
Williams) was preparing to file for bankruptcy and 
therefore the proceedings should be stayed. The 
attorney also assured Mr. Williams that she would 
take care of the civil suit. 
There is ample evidence to support a rmding of 
guilt on this charge. 
[4] 4. Under the above stated facts, respondent was 
also found guilty of violating ·92 SCR 
3. 130-3.3(a)(I) which prohibits a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact 
or law to a tribunal. 
The Board looked to the filing of the answer by an 
attorney in respondent's office under an alias 
undisclosed to the courts in this instance and 
determined that it amounted to a false statement of a 
material fact. 
There is ample evidence to support a finding of 
gUilt on this charge. 
Copr. C West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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[5] 5. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-1.3 which requires a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client. . 
Neither respondent nor anyone from respondent's 
office appeared in the civil suit t~ defend against the 
plaintiff's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. 
Judgment was entered against the respondent's 
client, Kent A. Williams, due to the lack of any 
defense and due also to the fact that the court was 
never adequately informed of the actual status of the 
Williams' case in bankruptcy; the only information 
that the civil court had was a boiler plate statement 
that Kent A. Williams intended to file bankruptcy. 
There is ample evidence to support a rmding of 
guilt on this charge. 
[6] 6. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-1.4 and 3.1~0-1.1 and 1.3 which 
require a lawyer to keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of the case, represent the 
client competently and to act with reasonable 
diligence. 
Respondent filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court for 
a hardship discharge of a Barbara Jo Deering's 
Chapter 13 payment schedule. The motion was 
overruled but Respondent advised Ms. Deering that 
she should stop making payments to the Chapter 13 
trustee. Ms. Deering followed this advice and, as a 
result, the trustee moved to db:miss her C2Se, which 
the court did. Therefore Ms. Deering was left with 
no bankruptcy protection. Thereaftet, Ms. 
. Deering's creditors initiated vigorous efforts toward 
collection. . 
Ms. Deering was unable to contact respondent 
personally, but filed a Chapter 7 petition pursuant to 
advice she received from an associate in 
respondent's office. No appearance was made by 
either respondent or a representative from his office 
at the first meeting of creditors and Ms. Deering 
was never informed by respondent or his office that 
respondent had been banned from further practice in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky . 
There is ample evidence to support a finding of 
gUilt on this charge. 
[7J 7. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-1.1 which states the level of competence 
required and SCR 3.130-1.4(a) which holds that a 
lawyer must adequately communicate with his 
clients. 
Respondent failed to inform Jerry Owens and 
Barbara Owens that their motion to amend their 
Chapter 13 payment plan had been overruled as a 
result of the absence of counsel for the Owenses at 
the hearing on the motion. Due to this failure to 
inform, the Owenses systematically reduced their 
payments to the trustee in accordance with the 
reduced payment plan that their motion had 
requested. In response to the delinquency in 
payments, the trustee moved the court to dismiss the 
case, which was granted at a hearing of which the 
Owenses had no knowledge. No one from 
respondent's office appeared on the Owenses behalf. 
There is ample evidence to find guilt on this 
charge .. 
[8] 8. Respondent was found guilty of violating 
SCR 3.130-S.5(b) which prohibits aiding in the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
Respondent operated an office which was staffed by 
unlicensed employees, persons whose daily activities 
consisted of activities which constituted the practice 
of law as defined as, -any service rendered 
involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether 
of representation, counselor advocacy in or about of 
court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, 
obligations, liabilities, or business relations of one 
requiring the services. - SCR 3.020. 
There is ample evidence to support a rmding of 
guilt on this charge. 
*93 [9] 9. Respondent was found guilty of 
violating SCR 3.130- 1.4(a) and (b) which requires 
a lawyer to communicate adequately with his clients 
and KRPC 1.16(d) which requires a lawyer to 
refund unearned fees upon the termination of the 
representation. 
Respondent was hired to represent Hughey Rice and 
Imagene Rice in the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 
The Rices were informed of the Respondent's fee 
and accompanying court costs. The Rices began 
installment payments of the respondent's fee. When 
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over half of the fee had been paid, Mrs. Rice 
discovered that the respondent's office had been 
closed. When she inquired at respondent's office in 
another town, she was told that the office was 
unable to help her and therefore she was unable to 
complete the payments. Respondent never filed a 
bankruptcy petition for the Rice's and there is no 
evidence that any legal work was undenaken on 
their case. 
Respondent refunded $300 of the $525 paid by the 
Rices, but only upon the instigation of these 
proceedings. 
There is ample evidence to fmd guilt on these 
charges. 
[10] 10. Respondent was found guilty of \iolations 
of SCR 3.130-1.3 which holds that a lawyer must be 
diligent, SCR 3.130-1.16(b) which holds that a 
lawyer may withdraw from a case only if the 
withdrawal will create no prejudice to the client and 
SCR 3.130-1.16(d) which holds that a lawyer must 
refund any unearned fee upon the termination of the 
representation. 
Respondent was retained by Judith Stanley in a 
Chapter 7 proceeding. Mrs. Stanley paid 
respondent $700, via his office employees, at his 
Pikeville office. Respondent then closed his eastern 
Kentucky offices, without any notice given to Mrs. 
Stanley, without refunding any portion of the monies 
that she had paid and without ming a petition for 
relief on her behalf. Respon(fent also closed out or 
inactivated Mrs. Stanley's file without notifying her; 
she continued to believe that she was being 
represented by respondent. 
Ther~ is ample evidence to support a fmding of 
guilt on these charges .. 
[11] 11. Respondent was found guilty of \iolating 
SCR 3.130-1.16(d) which holds that a lawyer shall 
refund any unearned fees upon the termination of the 
representation. 
Respondent accepted $700 from David Murphey 
and Sonda Murphey as a fee for services to be 
rendered in a bankruptcy proceeding. Respondent 
closed the Murphey's file as well as respondent's 
practice, without informing the Murpheys that 
respondent was no longer allowed to practice in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky. Respondent also faUed to 
inform the Murpheys that no petition had been filed 
for them. 
Respondent refunded $700 to the Murpheys, but not 
untU two weeks before the hearing before the Board 
of Governors was scheduled to take place. 
There is ample evidence for a finding of guUt oil 
this charge. 
[12] Respondent argues that the recommendation of 
the Board of Governors is excessive due to a list of 
circumstances over which respondent had no 
control. Such circumstances include the loss of 
office managers and staff in several of respondent's 
offices and respondent's inability to fmd competent 
replacement employees who could effectively 
manage a practice that ·was growing rapidly. 
Respondent also requests that his past practice 
history and reputation in the legal community be 
considered. 
The Court considered the facts as presented by 
respondent, but there is no way to overcome the 
obvious, egregious and serious nature of the charges 
of which respondent has been found guilty. Due to 
the nature of these fmdings and the pattern of ethical 
misconduct they reflect (KBA v. Frazer. Ky.. 883 
S.W.2d 878 (1994); KBA v. L.M. Tipton Reed, 
Ky., 631 S.W.2d 633 (1982», it is unnecessary to 
go further with our legal analysis. The evidence 
overwhelmingly supports the suspension 
recommended by the Board of Governors of the 
Kentucky Bar Association. 
Pursuant to SCR 3.370(9), this Court adopts the 
decision and recommendation of the Board of 
Governors as to all matters *94 pertaining to the 
respondent, Robert L. Devers. 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as 
follows: 
1. That the respondent, Robert L. Devers is hereby 
suspended from the practice of law in Kentucky for 
a period of three (3) years. The period of 
suspension shall commence on the date of entry of 
this Order and continue until such time as he is 
reinstated to the practice of law by order of this 
Court pursuant to SCR 3.510. 
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2. Respondent is directed to pay the costs of this 
action in the amount of $7,723.22. 
3. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, respondent shall, within 
ten (10) days from the entry of this Order, notify all 
clients in writing of his inability to represent them 
and to furnish CWies of said letters of notice to the 
Director of the Kentucky Bar Association. 
STEPHENS, C.J.,. and COOPER, GRAVES, 
JOHNSTONE, LAMBERT, STUMBO and 
WINTERSHEIMER, IJ., concur. 
ENTERED: December 19, 1996. 
lsI Robert F. Stephens 
Chief Justice 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. Q West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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SCR 3.130{ 1.1) C07\lPETEI'CE 
SCR 3.130(1.1) CO;\tPETE~CE 
A lawyer shall pro\·ide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge. skill. 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. . 
[Adopted by Order 89-1. cIT. 1-1-90) 
Commentary 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
Lf!gctl I\l1mrlf!c~,!f! cmel Skill 
[I] In detennining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant fhctors include 
the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter. the lawyer's general experience. the lawyer's training and 
experience. in the field in question. the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to 
refer the matter to. or associate or consult with. a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many 
instances. the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of la\\: may be required in 
some circumstances. 
[:!] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the 
lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important 
legal skills. such as the analysis of precedent. the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting. are required in all legal problems. 
Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of detennining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve. a skill 
that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly 
novel field through necessary study; Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of 
established competence in the field in question. . 
[3J In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily 
required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency. 
however. assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances. for ill considered action under 
elllergency conditions can jeopardize the cliem's interest. 
[41 A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation . 
. 11tis applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2. 
TllOr(}lIgI1l1l! ...... ~1~1c1 Prel'Ctrttl iOI1 
(5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the tactual and legal elements of the 
problem. and lise of methods and procedures meeting the stnndards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate 
preparation. The required attention and preparation are detennined in part by what is at stake: major litigation and complex 
transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. 
.\lClIIllUil1ll1,t!. ('(JlllPI!II!I1CI! 
[6) To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill. a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education. If a system of 
peer review has been established. the lawyer should consider making usc of it in appropriate circumstances. 
SCR 3.130( 1.5) FEES 
SCR 3.130(1.5) FEES 
(a) A lawyds fcc shall be reasonable. Some factors to be considered in detennining the reasonableness ofa fee include the 
Ii.lllowing: 
( I ) TIle time and labor required. the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. and the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly; 
(2) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer: 
(3) TIle fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services: (·n The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances: 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: 
(7) TIle experience. reputation. and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client. the basis or rate of the fee should be communicated to the client. 
preferably in writing. before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered. except in a matter in which.a 
contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. Such a fee must meet the requirements of Rule 1.15(a). A 
contin!!ent fee a!!reement shall be in writin!:! and should state the method b\' which the fee is to be detennined. includin!! the 
percentage or p~rcentages that shall accru'"e to the lawyer in the event o"f settlement. trial or appeal. litigation and ~ther 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery. and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is 
calculated. Upon recovery of any amount in a contingent fee matter. the lawyer shall provide the client with a written 
statement stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to the client and the method of its detemtination. 
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for. charge. or collect: 
(I) Any fee in a domestic relations matter. the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of 
a divorce or upon the amount of alimony. maintenance. support. or property settlement. provided this does not 
apply to liquidated sums in arrearage; or 
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. 
(e) A division ofa fee between lawyers who are not in the same finn may be made only if: 
( I ) (a) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or. 
(b) By written agreement with the client. each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation: 
and 
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and 
(3) The tqtal fee is reasonable. 
[Adopted by Order 89-1. err. 1-1-90] 
COi\1;\lENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
(II When the lawyer has regularly represented a client. they ordinarily will have e\"olved an understanding concernin!! the 
basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship. howewr. an understanding as to the fee sho~lld be prol~ptly 
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~stablishcd. It is nOl necessary to recite nIl the factors that underlie the bnsis of the fee. but only those that are directly 
in\'olved in its computation. It is sufficient. for example. to slntc tllnt the basic r:lie is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or 
an estimated nmoulll. or 10 identil~' the factors that mny be taken illto nccount in tinnily fixing the fee. When developments 
occur during the representation that render an earlier estimntc substantially inaccurate. a revised estimate should be provided 
to the client. A \\Titll!n statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a 
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary I~e schedule is suflicient if the basis or rate of the fee is set f0l1h. 
/2) A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee. but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.I6(d). A 
lawyer may accept property in payment for services. such as an ownership interest in an enterprise. providing this does not 
involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule I.SO). 
However. a fee paid in property instead of money Illay be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning 
both the value of the services and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property. 
(3) An agreement may not be made whose tenns might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or 
perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example. a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby 
services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be 
required. unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise. the client might have to bargain for further 
assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However. it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the 
client's ability to pay .. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful 
procedures. When there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest. the lawyer should offer 
the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent 
lees. such as a ceiling on the percentage. 
[-I] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A 
division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as 
and most otien is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. 
Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee on either the basis of the proportion of services they render or by agreement 
between the participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is advised and 
does not object. It does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive. Joint responsibility for 
the representation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5.1 for purposes of the matter involved. 
Displlles owr Fees 
[5] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes. such as an arbitration or mediation procedure 
established by the bar. the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for 
detemlining a lawyer's fee. for example. in representation of an executor or administrator. a class or a person. entitled to a 
reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party 
concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. 
[6] Factor (3) is intendl~d to prohibit unreasonably high fees and does not prevent a lawyer from sharing fees that arc less than 
"customary." 
K-13 
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SCR 3.130(1.6) CO~FIDEI'iTIALITY OF INFORl\lATION 
(;ll ,\ lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents alier consultation. 
except for disclosures that arc impliedly authorized in order to carry Ollt the representation. and except as stated in paragraph 
(b). 
(h) A lawyer may re\·eal such infonnation t.o !be extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(I) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent 
death or substantial bodily hann: or 
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client. 
to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the 
client was involved. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of 
the cI ient: or 
(3) To comply with other law or a court order. 
IAdopted by Order 89-1. eft: 1-1-90] 
CO:\1MENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: II] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the la\\". One of the lawyer's functions is to advise 
clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. 
[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only 
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek 
early legal assistance. 
[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to detennine what their rights are and what is. in the maze of 
laws and regulations. deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be 
protected from disclosure. Based upon experience. lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given. and the law 
is upheld. 
(4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain contidentiality of intormation 
relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to 
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. 
[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law. the attorney-client privilege (which includes 
the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The 
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise 
required to produce evidence concerning a client. TIle rule of client-lawyer contidentiality applies in situations other than 
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compUlsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to 
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all intornlation relating to the representation. whatever its 
source. A lawyer may not disclose such infomlation except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. See also Scope. 
[6\ The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of inlonllation relating to representation applies to government lawyers 
who may disagree with the policy goals that their representation is designed to advance . 
..,wJuwi=ec! Disclosure 
(7\ A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in catTying out the representation. 
except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circlllllstances limit that authority. In litigation. lor example. a 
lawyer Illay disclose information by admitting a tact that cannot properly be disputed. or in negotiation by Illaking a 
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disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. 
IS) I.awyers in a linn may. in the course of the !irm's practice. disclose to each other information relating to a client of the 
linn. unlcss the c1icnt has instructed that panicular information be confined to specified lawyers. 
Disdtl.wre .·'dn'rsL' to ( '1iL'1Il 
(q) TIle conlidentiality rule'is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming priv)' to information about a client. a lawyer may 
lorcscc that thc client intends serious hann to another person. However. to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to 
disclose a clicnt's purposcs. the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against 
a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if 
it is inhibited. 
[10] Several situations must be distinguished. 
111] First. the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). Similarly. a 
lawyer has a duty undcr Rule 3.3(a)(ol) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance of the dUly 
prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. 
(12] Second. the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In 
such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2(d). because to "counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent conduct requires 
knowing that the conduct is of that character. 
[13] Third. the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospecti\'e conduct that is criminal and likely to result in imminent 
death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b)( I). the Ia'wyer has professional discretion to reveal information in 
order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to pre\'ent homicide or serious bodily injury 
which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a heinous 
purpose will actually be carried out. forthe client may have a change of mind. 
[14] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with 
the client and with those who might be injured by the client. the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that 
may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical. the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. 
In any case. a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary 
to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)( I) does not violate this Rule. 
Withdroll'al 
[15] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially funhering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct. the 
lawyer must withdraw. as stated in Rule 1.16(a)( I). 
[16] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the clients' confidences. except as otherwise 
provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of 
withdrawal. and upon withdrawal the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion. document. affimHltion. or the like. 
(17) \\11ere the client is an organization. the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried 
out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule. the lawyer may make inquiry within 
the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13(b). 
L18) Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of 
the lawyer involving representation of the client. the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a tOrlner 
client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does no't 
rcquire the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding. that charges sllch complicity. so that the ddi:nse 
may be established by responding directly to a third pany \\ho has made such all assertion. The rig.ht to delcnd. of course. 
;lpplies wherc a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the 
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defense. the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In 
,111\' e\".:l1I. disclosure should be no !!reater than the Iawver reasonablv believes is necessarv to vindicate innocence. the 
di~c1osure should be made in a mann~r which limits acces~ to the infon~lation to the tribunal ;r other persons having a need 
to know it. and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent 
practicablc. 
!I9) If thl! lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated. the rule of confidentiality should 
not prevcnt the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil. criminal or professional 
disciplinary proceeding. and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client. or on a wrong 
alleged by a third person: for example. a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A 
lawyer entitled to a Ice is pernlitted by paragraph (b)(2) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. ntis aspect of 
the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the 
liduciary. As stated above. the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information 
relating to a representation. to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it. and to obtain protective orders or make 
other arrangements minimizing the risk ofdisclosure. 
DisdoSlires Otherll'ise Required or AIII/wrizec/ 
(20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give 
testimony concerning a client. absent waiver by the client. paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is 
applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the 
lawyer to give information about the client. 
(21] The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose infonnation relating 
to the representation. See Rules 2.2. 2.3. 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions. a lawyer may be obligated or pernlitted 
by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a 
matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules. but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. 
(22) Paragraph (b)(4) gives the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such information as the lawyer reasonably believes is 
necessary to comply with a court order. 
Former Clief71 
[23] nle duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. 
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SCR 3.130(1.7) COl"FLlCT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a cliell! iflhe representation oflhat client will be directly adverse to another client. unless: 
(I) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client: and 
(2) Each cI ient consents alier consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person. or by the lawyer's own interests. unless: 
(I) TIle lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversdy affected: and 
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken. the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and 
the advantages and risks involved. 
(Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90] 
COl\lMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
Loyulty 10 (( Cliel1/ 
(I] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impemlissible conflict of interest may exist 
before representation is undertaken. in which event the representation should be declined. If such a conflict arises after 
representation has been undertaken. the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than 
one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation. whether the lawyer may 
continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer 
relationship exists or. having once been established. is continuing. see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope. 
[2] As a general proposition. loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that 
client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses that general rule. Thus. a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person 
the lawyer represents in some other matter. even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in 
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse. such as competing economic enterprises. does riot 
require. consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only when the representation of one client would be directly 
adverse to the other. 
{3] Loyalty to. a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider. recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses altematives 
that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself 
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and. if it does. whether it 
will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses 
of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client 
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. 
CIi/1SU/WI;()/1 ClIIlI COI7Si:11! 
(-l J A c1il!nt may consent to representation notwithstanding a contliet. HoweVer. as indicated in paragraph (a)( I) with respect 
to representation dircctly advcrse to a c1icnt. and paragraph (b)( I) with respect to material limitations on representation of a 
clicnt. whl!n a disintcrestcd lawyer would concludc th:ll thc clicnt should not agrec to the representation undcr thl! 
circumstances. the lawyer involved cannot propcrly ask for such ag.reement or prO\-idc representation on the basis of thl! 
client's consent. Whl!n morc th:1Il one client is in\'olwd. thc qUl!stion of contliet must bl! resolved as to each client. Moreover. 
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th~r~ may h~ circumstances wh~re it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example. when the 
lawyer represents diftcrent clients in rd:ned matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to 
~rmit the other client to make an informed decision. the law~w cannot properly ask thc latter to consent. 
151 The lawy~r's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on reprcsentation of a client. For example. a 
lawyer's need for incomc should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a 
reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question. it may 
be diflicult or impossible for thc lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to 
affect representation. for example. by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. 
("(Jllliia~ ill Lit~~ation 
(6] Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation. Simultaneous representation of parties whose 
interests in litigation may contlict. such as coplaintiffs or codefendants. is governed by paragraph (b). An impennissible 
conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony. incompatibility in positions in relation to an 
opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in 
question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing 
multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one 
codefendant. On the other hand. common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse 
effect is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving interntediation between clients. 
[7] Ordinarily. a lawycr may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter. even if the other 
matter is wholly unrelated. However. there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For 
example. a lawycr representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the 
enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct 
of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token. government lawyers in some circumstances may 
represent government employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of 
concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example. a suit charging fraud entails confl ict to a 
degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. 
[8J A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases. unless 
representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus. it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases 
pending in different trial courts. but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court. 
IIlIt:r::st ofPerson Payin~for a Lall)'er's Scm'ice 
[9J A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client. if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the 
arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See· Rule 1.8(f). For example. when an insurer 
and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement. and the insurer is required to 
provide special counsel for the insured. the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So 
also. when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, 
the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees. if the clients consent after 
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. 
Other Conjlict SilUatiol1S 
[10] Conflicts of intercst in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be diflicult to assess. Relevant factors in 
determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with 
the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer. the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and 
the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is olien one of proximity and degree. 
, 
[11) For cxample. a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic 
tt) cach other. but common representation is permissible wherc the clients are generally aligned in interest evcn though there 
is some ditTerence of interest among them. 
[I::!) C"ontlict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare 
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SCR 3.I3U( 1.7) CO;\FLlCT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE 
wills for sc,oeral family members. such as husband and wife. and. dep~nding upon the circumstances. a conflict of interest 
may arisc. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under 
dne view. the client is the fiduciar\": under another view the client is the estate or trust. including its beneficiaries. The lawver 
should make clear the relationship'to the parties involved. - • 
(13] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine 
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may contlict. TIle lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters 
involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise. the 
potential intensity of the conflict. the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the po~sibility of the corporation's 
obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the 
lawyer's independence of professional judgment. the lawyer should not serve as a director. 
Cm!flici C""'"Keel hy el/1 Opposing Par(l' 
(14J Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In 
litigation. a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a 
criminal case. inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents mUltiple defendants. Where the conflict is 
such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice. opposing counsel may properly raise the 
question. Such an o~iection should be viewed with caution. however. for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See 
Scope. 
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(a) A lawyer 5hallnot enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly a~quire an ownership. possessory. security 
or other pecuniary interest ad\'erse to a client unless: 
(I) The transaction and tenns on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client 
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood 
b\' the client: 
C!) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction: 
and 
(3) TIle client consents in writing thereto. 
(b) A lawyer shall not use infonnation relating to representation ofa client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client 
consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent. child. sibling. or 
spouse any substantial gift from a client. including a testamentary gift. except where the client is related to the donee. 
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client. a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer 
literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on infonnation relating to the representation. 
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation. except 
that: 
(I) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation. the repayment of which may be contingent 
on the outcome of the matter: and 
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the 
client. 
(0 A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless: 
(I) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement between the client and the third party or the client 
consents after consultation; 
(2) There is no interference with the iawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer 
relationship: and . 
(3) Infonnation relating to representation ofa client is protected as required by Rule 1.6. 
(g) A I~~\'yer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or 
against the clients. or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas. unless each client 
consents after consultation. including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the 
participation of each person in the settlement. 
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless 
pennitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement. or settle a claim for such liability with 
an unrepresented client or fonner client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is 
appropriate in connection therewith. 
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent. child. sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation 
adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after 
consultation regarding the relationship. 
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is 
conducting for a client. except that the lawyer may: 
( I ) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses: and 
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SCR 3.130( 1.8) CO:'\ FLI CT OF I?\TE'REST: PROHI BITED TRANSACTIONS 
C!) Contract with a cJi~nt for a r~asonabl~ conting~nt f~e in a ci\'il case. 
(Adopt~d by Order 89-l.l!ff. 1-1-90) 
CO;\[\IE~TAR\, 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
TrCIIl.w,,·tiolls Betweell CIiI!I1I Ullel LClw)"er 
[I] As a general principle. all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. In such 
transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore. a lawyer may not exploit 
infornlation relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example. a lawyer who has learned that the client is 
investing in specific real estate may not. without the client's consent. seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would 
adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not. however. apply to standard commercial transactions 
between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others. for example. banking or 
brokerage services. medical services. products manufactured or distributed by the client. and utilities' services. In such 
transactions. the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client. and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and 
impracticable. 
[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client. if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example. a simple gift 
such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires 
preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance. however. the client should ha\'e the detached advice that another 
lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not 
substantial. 
Litc:ralJ' Rights 
[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a 
conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of 
the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer 
representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shalt consist of a share in 
ownership in the property. if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j). 
Persoll Payillg/or Luwyer~~ Ser"iccs 
[4] Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party unless such 
paymeQt is provided for in an agreement between the client and the third party. Such an arrangement must also confoml to 
the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a 
class. consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure. 
Limitil1g Liuhili(l' 
[5] Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and memoranda. 
FClmi(\' Rel(lli(}llships Betweel1 LCllIrers 
[6] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different finns. Related lawyers in the same firm arc governed by 
Rules 1.7. 1.9. and 1.10. The disqualification stated in paragraph (i) is personal and is not imputed to members of tinns with 
whom the lawyers are associated. 
.. kCfllisitit)ll t~r IIllC!rr!st ill l.ilig(lfioll 
[i) Paragraph (j) states thl! traditional gcn~ral rule that lawyers arc prohibited Ii'om acquiring a proprietary interest in 
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litigation. This gcneral rule. which has its basis in COllllllon-law champcrty and maintcnance. is subject to specific exceptions 
de\ eloped in decisional Jaw and continued in these Rules. such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in 
Rule 1.5 and the exception for cCl1ain ad\"anccs of the costs of litigation set forth in pamgraph (c). 
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SCR 3.130(1.9) CO:--:FlICT OF I:'\TEREST: FORMER CLIENT
-
A lawye," who has fonnedy represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; 
(b) Represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer fonnerly was 
associated had previously represented a client 
(I) whose interests are materially adverse to that person: and 
(:!) about whom the lawyer had acquired infornlation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter: unless 
the fonner client consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter of whose present or former finn has fonnerly represented a 
client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(I) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the fonner client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 
would pemlit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known: or processed by the 
Clerk. excepting. however, any communication between the parties concerning negotiations for an agreed sanction which 
shall not be transmitted to the Disciplinary Clerk or Trial Commissioner nor filed of record unless the sanction proposal is 
approved by the Court. No sllch paper or copy thereof shall be sent by. or on behalf of. any party to the Court. the Board. the 
Trial Commissioner. Inquiry Commission. or any member thereof. 
(2) reveal infonnation relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a 
client. 
{Amended by order 99-1, eff. 2-1-00; adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90] 
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SCR 3.130(1.10) IMPUTEDDISQUALIFICA TlON: GENERAL RULE 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a linn. none ofthelll shall knowingly represent a client when anyone of them practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7. 1.8(c). 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a linn. the linn is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person 
with interests matl!rially adverse to those of a client represented by the fomlerly associated lawyer and not currently 
represented by the linn. uniess: 
( I ) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented 
the client: and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the 
matter. 
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
(d) A liml is not disqualified from representation ofa client if the only basis for disqualification is representation ofa former 
client by a lawyer presently associated with the firm. sufficient to cause that lawyer to be disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9 
and: 
( I ) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no specific part 
of the fee therefrom: and 
(2) written notice is given to the former client. 
(Amended by Order 99-. I eff. 2-1-2000: prior admendment eff.I-I-90] 
COMMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
Definition of "Firm " 
[I] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct. the term "firm" includes lawyers in a private firm. and lawyers 
employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization. or in a legal services organization. Whether two or 
more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example. two practitioners who 
share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a finn. 
However. if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm. 
they sh.ould be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers 
are relevant in determining whether they are a firm. as is the fact that they have mutual access to confidential information 
concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore. it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule 
that is in\·olved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not 
represent opposing parties in litigation. while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by 
one lawyer is attributed to another. 
(2J With respect to the law department of an organization. there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department 
constitute a liml within the mean in!! of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However. there can be uncertaint\' as to the 
identity of the client. For example. it-may not be clear whether the law department ora corporation represents a sl~bsidiary or 
an atliliated corporation. as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar 
question can arise conceming an unincorporated association and its local afliliates. . 
(3) Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service 
organization constitute a linn. but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent 
practitioners. whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is 
involved. and on the specilic facts of the situation. 
K-24 
j 
j 
J 
j 
J 
J 
j 
J 
j 
J 
J 
.1 
j 
J 
J 
• 
• 
• 
• 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
SCR 3.130( 1.10) IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE 
Hl Where a lawyer has joined a private firnl after ha\'ing represented the government. the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 
(a) and (b): where a lawyer represents the go\'ernment after ha\'ing served private clients. the situation is governed by Rule 
1.11 (c)( I ). The individual lawyer il1\'oh'ed is bound by the Rules generally. including Rules 1.6. 1.7. and 1.9. 
[5] Dim'rent pro\'isions are thus made for mo\'ement of a lawyer from one private tirnl to another and for movement of a 
lawyer between a private finn and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences. and 
therefore to the protections provided in Rules 1.6. 1.9. and 1.11. However. if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10 
were applied to former go\'ernment lawyers. the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The 
government deals with all private citizens and organizations. and thus has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than 
does any pri\'ate law firm. In these circumstances. the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if 
Rule 1.10 were applied to the government. On balance. therefore. the government is better served in the long run by the 
protections stated in Rule 1.11. 
Principles of Imputed Disqualification 
[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies 
to lawyers who practice in a law firnl. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially 
one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound 
by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the 
lawyers currently associated in a firin. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another. the situation is governed by 
paragraphs (b) and (c). 
Luu:rers MO\'il11{ Between Firms 
[7] When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association. however. the problem is more complicated. 
The fiction that the law finn is the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. TIlere are several competing 
considerations. First. the client previously represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is 
not compromised. Second. the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having 
reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third. the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from fonning 
new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection. it should be 
recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms. that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another. 
and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification 
were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one 
practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. 
[8] Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted under two rubrics. One approach has been to 
seek per se rules of disqualification. For example. it has been held that a partner in a law firm is conclusively plesumed to 
have access to all confidences concerning all clients of the firm. Under this analysis. if a lawyer has been a partner in one law 
firm and then becomes a partner in another law firm. there is a presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the 
first firm are known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances. 
especially where the client has been extensively represented. but may be unrealistic where the client was represented only for 
limited.purposes. Furthermore. such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law 
firms. 
[9] The other rubric formerly used for dealing with vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in 
Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First. the appearance of 
impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that 
meaning were adopted. disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former 
client. Second. since "impropriety" is undefined. the tenn "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It therefore has to 
bc recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolvcd either by simple analogy to a lawyer 
practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety. 
{IO] A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two 
lunctions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client. 
( ·OI~ficll.!lUidli(\· 
[II} Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to infornlatioll. Access to infonnatioll. in turn. is essentially a question 
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of fact in particular circumstances. aided by inferences. deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made 
about the wa\" in which law\'ers work together. A law\"er may have general access to files of all clients of a law finn and mav 
regularly participate in disc~lssions of th-eir affairs: it should· be infe"fred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all informatio~ 
about all the fiml's clients. In contrast. another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and 
participate in discussion of the afTairs of no other clients: in the absence of information to the contrary. it should be inferred 
that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. 
[11] Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry. the burden of proof 
should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. 
[13] Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b). Thus. if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of information relating to a 
particular client of the firm. and that lawyer later joined another firm. neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is 
disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients 
conflict. 
[lot] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm. a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing 
duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9. 
Acll"er:re Positions 
[\5] The second aspect ofloyalty to client is the lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions 
adverse to a former client arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse 
representation by the individual lawyer involved. but does not properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed 
disqualification. Hence. this aspect of the problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus. if a lawyer left one firm for another. the 
new affiliation would not preclude the firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in the same 
or related matters. so long as the conditions of paragraphs (b) and (c) concerning confidentiality have been met. 
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SCR 3.130(1.13) ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT 
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly 
authorized constituents. 
(b) I f a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer. employee or other person associated with the 
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation 
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might 
be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to 
proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, 
the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the 
apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and 
any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the 
organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the 
organization. Such measures may include among others: 
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) Advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to 
appropriate authority in the organization; and 
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by 
the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on 
behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is 
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 
1.16. 
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's 
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(e) AJawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's 
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate 
official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90] 
COMMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: 
The Emity liS the Clielll 
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[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, 
employees, shareholders and other constituents. 
[2] Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational 
client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other 
constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees 
and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. 
[3] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's 
lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by 
way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, 
interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or 
other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an 
organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents 
information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the 
organizational client in order to cany out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. 
[4] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be 
accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and 
operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, 
different considerations arise when the lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured 
by action of a constituent that is in violation of law. In such a circumstance, it may be reasonably 
necessary for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of 
sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer 
to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. Clear justification 
should exist for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it. The stated 
policy of the organization may define circumstances and prescribe channels for such review, and a 
lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in the absence of organization policy, 
however, the lawyer may have an obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the 
seriousness of the matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance 
with the organization's interest. Review by the chief executive officer or by the board of directors may 
be required when the matter is of importance commensurate with their authority. At some point it may 
be useful or essential to obtain an independent legal opinion. 
[5] In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the 
organi~ation's highest authority. Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or similar governing body. 
However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions highest authority reposes 
elsewhere; for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. 
Relatioll to Other Rilles 
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in paragraph (b) are concurrent with the authority and 
responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's 
responsibility under Rule 1.6, 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1. I f the lawyer's sen'ices are being used by an 
organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.2(d) can be applicable. 
GOl'ernmelll Agency 
[7] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Howe\'er, when the client is a 
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality 
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SCI{ 3.I3UlI.13) ORGANIZATlOl\ AS CLIENT 
and assuring that the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified. for public business is involved. In 
addition. duties of lawyers employed by the govemment or lawyers in military service may be defined 
by statutes and regulation. Therefore. defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the 
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the gO"ernment context. Although in 
some circumstances the client may be a specific agency. it is generally the government as a whole. For 
example. if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the 
bureau is a part or the government as a whole may be the client for purpose of this Rule. Moreover. in a 
matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority to 
question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar 
circumstances. This Rule does not limit that authority. See note on Scope. 
Clarifyillg the Lawyer's Role 
[8] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more 
of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the 
lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the 
lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent 
representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual. understands that, when there is such 
adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that 
constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual 
may not be privileged. 
[9] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent 
individual may tum on the facts of each case. 
Dual Represelllatioll 
[10] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or 
major shareholder. 
Derivative Actions 
[11] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to 
compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members 
of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought ~ominally 
by the'organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. 
[12] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The 
proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative 
actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer 
like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of 
the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's 
relationship with the board. In those circumstances. Rule 1.7 governs \vho should represent the directors 
and the organization. 
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SCR 3.130(2.2) INTERMEDIARY 
(a) A lawyer may only act as internlediary between clients if: 
( I) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implication~ of the common 
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-
client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common representation; 
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with 
the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed 
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any 
of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and 
(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken 
impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the 
clients. 
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be 
made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately infonned 
decisions. 
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions 
stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent 
any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation. 
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90] 
COMMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: This Rule explicitly recognizes the special role of the lawyer acting as an intermediary, to be 
distinguished from joint representation as an advocate. 
[1] A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with 
potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share· 
respon.sibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may be inferred from other 
circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately 
represented, it is important that the lawyer make clear the relationship, and obtain the client's consent, 
preferably in writing. 
{2] The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting ·as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who 
are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the 
parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the 
Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American 
Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association. 
[3] A lawyer acts as internlediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an 
amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example. in helpina to oroanize a business in which two 
. . ,:) ;:, 
or more chents are entrepreneurs, workmg out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two 
or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or a marital 
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SCR 3.130(2.2) INTERMEDIARY 
division or mediating a dispute between c1iel'its. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting 
interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to 
obtain separate representation. with the possibility in some situations of incurring additional cost, 
complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the 
lawyer act as intemlediary. 
[4] In considering whether to act as internlediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if the 
intemlediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some 
situations the risk of failure is so great that internlediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer 
cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or 
who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has 
already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by 
intermediation ordinarily is not very good. 
[5] The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. FomlS of intermediation range from 
informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides 
the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though 
not entirely compatible. One foml may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other 
relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis 
and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one. 
[6] In some circumstances a lawyer wiII undertake representation of a party in litigation or negotiation. 
and be forced to deal with an unrepresented party. For example, the lawyer representing a spouse in a 
divorce case may deal with the unrepresented spouse within the limits of Rule 4.3. The fact that that 
lawyer negotiates with the unrepresented spouse does not make the lawyer an intermediary, or subject 
the lawyer to the special rule of disqualification contained in Rule 2.2(c). 
Confidentiality and Privilege 
[7] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on 
client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is 
still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of infomlation 
relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as 
intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common 
representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege. the prevailing rule is that as 
betwe.en commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if 
litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege wiJ) not protect any such communications, and the 
clients should be so advised. 
[8] Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intemlediation is 
improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one 
of the clients for a long period and in a variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between 
that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced. 
COllsultation 
[9] In acting as intemlediary between clients. the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the 
implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation. The consultation 
should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship nornlally expected in other 
circumstances. 
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[10] Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is 
intcnncdiary. the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each 
client is independently represented. 
Wirlulra"'al 
[11] Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship. 
Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 
1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a fonner client. 
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SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPO~SIBILlTlES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER 
SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR 
SUPERVISORY LAWYER 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the finn has in effect measures giving reasonable 
assurance that all lawyers in the finn confonn to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other 
lawyer confonns to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct only if: 
(I) The lawyer orders or. with knowledge of the specific conduct. ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law finn in which the other lawyer practices. or has direct supervisory 
authority over the other lawyer. and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or 
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. 
[Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90] 
COMMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: [I] Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the professional w~rk of a finn or legal 
department of a government agency. This includes members of a partnership and the shareholders in a law firm organized as 
a professional corporation: lawyers having supervisory authority in the law department of an enterprise or government 
agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a finn. 
[2] The measures required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the finn's structure 
and the nature of its practice. In a small finn. infonnal supervision and occasional admonition ordinarily might be sufficient. 
In a large finn. or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate 
procedures may be necessary. Some finns, for example. have a procedure whereby junior lawyerS can make ·confidential 
referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Finns. whether large or 
small. may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event. the ethical atmosphere of a finn can 
influence the conduct of all its members and a lawver havine: authoritv over the work of another mav not assume that the 
subordinate lawyer will inevitably confonn to the R~les. - • • 
(3] Paragraph (c)( I) expresses a general principle of responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a). 
[4] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty ofa lawyer having direct supervisory authority over perfonnance of specific legal work 
by anot~er lawyer. Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners 
of a private finn have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the finn. while a partner in charge of a 
particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over other finn lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by 
a partner would depend on the immediacy of the partner's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. The supervisor 
is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct 
occurred. Thus. if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation. 
the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. 
{51 Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the 
supen'isory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction. ratification or 
knowledge of the violation. 
(6] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a). a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner. associate 
or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond 
the scope of these Rules. 
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SCR 3. 130(5.2) RESPO~SIBILITIES OF A SUnORDI~ATE LAWYER 
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another 
~rson. 
(b) A subordinate law\"er does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a 
supervisory lawyer's re~sonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty. 
[Adopted by Order 89-1. eff. 1-1-90] 
CO;\1MENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: [I] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction 
of a supervisor. that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a 
violation of the Rules. For example. if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction ofa supervisor. the subordinate 
would not be guilty ofa professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. 
(2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical 
duty. the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position 
could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are 
equally responsible for fulfilling it. However. if the question is reasonably arguable. someone has to decide upon the course 
of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor. and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example. if a 
question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7. the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the 
question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. 
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SCR 3.130(5.5) U;\:\uTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
SCR 3.130(5.5) UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or 
(b) Assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
(Adopted by Order 89-1. c:rf. 1-1-90] 
COMMENTARY 
Supreme Court 
1989: TIle definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the 
definition. limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by 
unqualified persons. Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and 
delegating functions to them. so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. 
See Rule S.3. Likewise. it does not prohibit lawyers from providing professional advice and instruction to non lawyers whose 
employment requires knowledge of law: for example. claims adjusters. employees of financial or commercial institutions. 
social workers. accountants and persons employed in government agencies .. ln addition. a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers 
who wish to proceed pro se. 
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PROBLEM #1 
"And you can pay our fees with Chickens" 
You have a client who operates a small gift shop. He and his wife clearly qualify 
for a Chapter 13 and could propose a 100% 60-month plan. Unfortunately, they need 
about $3,000 in tax and other nonbankruptcy legal work pre-petition before their Chapter 
13 would be a success and they have no extra funds and no way to borrow the money to 
pay the needed pre-petition fees. They propose to pay you by giving you $3,000 in 
country hams, Kentucky Crafts, and a $1,000.00 watch. The bank, which has a mortgage 
on the inventory of the Gift shop, has no problem with this payment and you can use the 
items. 
ISSUE A. Can you accept this type of payment for doing the pre-petition work and 
still represent the debtors in their Chapter 13? If so, what disclosures should you make to 
the Bankruptcy Court? 
ISSUE B. Your Spouse likes the Gift Shop's merchandise and as the debtors are 
short of funds they would like to reduce their monthly payments under the plan and pay 
your fees through gift certificates. Can you do this? 
ISSUE C. Shortly before you file the Chapter 13 you determine that it would be 
better for the wife to file a Chapter 7. Unfortunately, the debtors have no extra funds and 
need the Gift Shop's entire inventory for the Christmas Holidays. The debtors' offer to 
pay your normal fees from the wife's salary from the gift shop within the next six months 
after you file her Chapter 7. Can you agree to the debtor paying your fees after you file 
the Bankruptcy? Can you attempt to collect your Chapter 7 legal fees after the 
Bankruptcy is filed and the wife's debts are discharged? 
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PROBLEM # 2 
"You own a What!" 
You have a client who needs to file a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. He went through a 
divorce 8 months ago and has closed his small motorcycle repair shop. The Bank 
repossessed all the equipment in full satisfaction of its secured debt and has no claim on 
the remaining inventory which your client values at approximately $600.00. The only 
other property the debtor tells you he owns is a car worth $1,000.00, $700.00 in clothing, 
and $500.00 in tools. The Debtor owes about $35,000.00 in credit card debt, $20,0000.00 
in bad business debts, and $4,000.00 in back Federal taxes. The agreed divorce decree 
has as part of the property settlement section an agreement by the debtor that he will hold 
his fonner spouse harmless for all of the above debts. You review the schedules with the 
debtor, fully disclose his duties under the Bankruptcy Court and file them On December 
1,2000. On December 3,2000 the Debtor's fonner spouse calls you and says she knows 
they Debtors schedules are false and wants to meet with you to tell you about the 
problems. You call your client who tells you the divorce was bitter and his fonner spouse 
will do anything to "get him" and that you should not waste your time talking to her. 
ISSUE A. Do you have to meet with the Debtors fonner spouse? Even if you are not 
required to meet with the fonner spouse should you meet with her? 
ISSUE B. Assume you meet with the Debtor's fonner spouse and she tells you that 
he has a 1967 Corvette, in perfect condition, which he keeps at his fathers farm. When 
you discuss this matter with the debtor, he tells you that the car was purchased by his 
brother 4 years ago just before his brother got a divorce and is held in the name of his old 
motorcycle repair shop. The car was titled in the shop's name so his brother's fonner 
spouse would not fmd out about the car. He presents you with proof that his brother 
purchased the car with his own funds as well as a copy of his will (which was prepared 4 
years ago) which states that the car is the property of his brother. The debtor says he did 
not disclose the car because he did not want to get his brother in trouble. What should 
you advise the debtor to do? Should you disclose this infonnation to anyone? Assuming 
your client refuses to amend his schedules, what should you do? 
ISSUE C. Assume the fonner does not disclose any new infonnation to you. 
However, 2 months after the case is closed a motorcycle collector visits the debtor and 
discovers that the room full of outdated spare parts contains several hundred rare Indian 
and HD motorcycle parts which have never been removed from their original cases. Your 
client calls and asks you to draw up a sale agreement to sell the parts for $100,000.00. 
You know that the trustee did not have the parts appraised because both you and your 
client assured the trustee that the old parts were outdated and of little value. What do you 
do? Assuming your client did not know these used parts were in the back of his old shop 
K-39 
and did not intend to deceive the trustee when he filled out his schedules, what should 
you do if the debtor now refuses to reveal these facts to the trustee? 
ISSUE D. Nine months after the case is closed, you are at state court motion hour 
and see the Debtor settle a car accident case for $40,000.00 with the Witless Insurance 
Co. The Debtor PI attorney states in open Court that the accident occurred 4 weeks before 
the Debtor filed his chapter 7 case. You review the debtor's schedules and find no 
mention of the accident claim. You review your notes and find that the debtor expressly 
told you that he had no outstanding claims, including claims from accidents. The debtor 
refuses to take your phone calls or respond to your letters. What should you do? What 
should you do if you see the Debtor's PI attorney and he tells you he is glad the accident 
occurred after the bankruptcy was file or the Debtor ''would not have gotten the money". 
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BANKRUPTCY ETHICS: 

A DIFFERENT WORLD? 

C. R. Bowles, Jr. 

INTRODUcnON 
As a general rule, BanIcrupk:y law is truly a different world from the rest of "'normal legal 
practice"'. TheBankruptcyCode'sdetailedand complex provisions, the mass oftechnical opinions from 
the specialized Bankruptcy courts and the broad equity powers of courts under the Bankruptcy Code 
make bankruptcy an extrelnely difficult area of the law in which to practice. However;. as noted by a 
leading commentator in the field ofbankruptcy ethics, there is some goodnews because: "'uyou know 
anythingabout therulesgoverning lawyer proCessional respollSlDility (aka 'legal ethics'), thenyouknow 
most of whatyou need to lcnowabout bankruptcy~.t 
Thisgeneralobservatio~whitecorrect, doesnotmean that thereareonlya few "special"Bank­
ruptcy ethics issues. Indeed,1ega1 ethics may play a greater role in bankruptcy proceedings than any 
other area of the law due to four general factors which arise from the unique natwe of practice under 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
~ it is important to note thatunlilcemost tribuna1s, courts ovesseeingBankruptcy proceed­
ingsbave toappove the retention ofcounsel forbankruptcyestatesunderChapler 11 anda.pter122, 
creditors committees inQapter11 casefIand BanIcrupk:y trustees4.Therefore, there isanopen judidal 
reviewofanattomey'sdedsionto ta1ce a c1ientin the majorityofbanlcruptcycases,which isnormallya 
privatematter in most other litigation settings. 
Second, there is extensive judicial review of legal fees in BanIcrupk:y cases. While most cases . 
involve fee requestsofmunsellordeblors-in-posse~unsecuredcmditorscommittees,and trustees, 
a Ban1cruptcy Court will review any legal fees for which a party is seeIdng reimbursement from the 
BanIcrupk:yestate'.This judicial review and the fact that payment ofbankruptcy professionals reduces 
the "pot of Il'lOI\e}'" available for disbibution to a debtor's creditors means that any fee application in a 
bankruptcy proceeding must be prepared withcare, and. in general accordance with certain guidelines . 
set forth by the Office of The United States 'Ih1stee under the provisions of 28 US.C§ 586'. 
A third reason why legal ethics are more complex ina bankruptcy setting is the w\usual nature 
of the parties to a bankruptcy case. Ina Jaw suitor the purchase or sale ofa business, there are generally 
a small number of legal interests whiCh must be considered by an attorney in the representation of a 
particular client However, in a Bankruptcy case you have a debtor, upwards of thousands of creditors 
as well as other interested parties, each of whom have wildly differing interests vis-a-vis the debtor, and 
most, if not all, other interested parties' . Indeed evendoing a simple conflict check can bea nightmare in 
a large case where an attorney would have to cross check thousands of creditors and other interest 
holders to see if he or she can accept the representation of any party in a bankruptcy cases. 
_ A final factor which also complicates bankruptcy ethical considerations is the seemingly simple 
issue of "who is yourclient"? As noted throughout this Chapter, situations involving closely held busi­
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nesses where attorneys outside ofbankruptcy may have no problem in representing both the business, 
the primary shareholders and/or the corporate officers, become conflict ridden dilemmas, due to the 
"differing" interests of the bankruptcy estate (i.e. collecting the mostmoney for creditors) and the indi­
viduals who have the fiduciary duty to operate the businessof the estate. 
Itis the purpose of thisChapter to review indetall someofthemost importantethical consider­
ations' which an attorney must deal with when representing a debtor, bankruptcy estate, or creditor's 
committ=.iWhile attorneys whoare representingaeditorsinbankruptcyalso haveethical issuesarise10, 
these iss1lesare almostalways issues which would also arise inanon-banlcruptcycontextand are there­
fore beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, in the alleged words of the great Yogi Berra, "Let's 
begin at the beginning!" 
n. u U.s.C§§ 327 AND 1103: EMPLOYMENTOFPROFESSIONALS 
A. 11 U.s.C §327(a): Employment OfProfessionals 
11 U.s.C§327(a) governs the employmentofall professionalsu~ including attorneys, whoare to 
behired by trustees or debtors-in-possession. Under this provisio~an attorneycanbeemployed as the 
"general counsel" for a bankruptcy estate only if: 1) theattorney is "disinterested12"; and 2) theattorney 
neither representsnorholdsaninterest which isadverse to thebankruptcyestateD.While these tests are 
somewhat similar in nature, they are independent tests, each of which must be met by prospective 
attorneys, if they wish tobe employed as counsel for a Ban1cruptcyestate14• Foranexcellent discussion 
of these two requirements, see In reOmegas Group. Inc., 195 iJ.R. 875 (BkrtcyW.o. Ky. 1996). 
In theSixthCircuit, the two-part test of11 U.s.C§327(a) isapplied both literallyand strictlyby 
courts in reviewingwhethera professionalcanbeemployedbya bankruptcyestateU.TheSixthCircuit 
has refused to allow either a broad readingof 11 U.5.C.§ 1107(b)1', whichprovides tbatanattomey will 
notbedisqua1ified from repesentinga debtor solelybecause of the attomey's pre-petition represents­
tionof thedebtor, or thegeneralpowersof11 U.5.C.§1(617 tooverride thepJainJanguageofsedion.327. 
Therefore, ifanattorneydoesnot fall within theHteraldefinition ofa disinterested person then there is 
no chance that his or her employment willbe approvedll. 
Other than failing to meet the statutory definition of disinterestednesS, there are two broad 
classesof "situations" whJch muld preventa lawfirm frombeingable to represent a banlauPtcYestate 
under 11 U.s.C§ 327(a)1': (1) multiple representstion of related entities by the proposed attorney, and 
(2) co~between the debtor and the attorney due to interests, unre1ated to the debtor, which the 
attorney either holds or represents. 
1. Multiple Representation ofRelated Parties 
The problems related to a law firm's representation of related parties probably causes more 
disqualifications or rejections of proposed counsel under 11 U.S.c.§ 327(a) than any other ethical prob­
lem20. While, representation of multiple related entities does not require a ~ disqualification of a 
law firm seeking to represent a bankruptcy estate under 11 US.C§ 327(a)21, a law firm's employment 
should not be approved under section 327(a) if there is even lithe appearance of conflict irrespective of 
the integrity of the firm or person under consideration22l1• Among the situations which can give rise to 
either the appearance of improprietyor an actual conflict warranting a rejection of a law firm's employ­
ment application are: 
a. Representation of a partnership and its partnersll 
b. Representation of a corporation and related corporations24 
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c. 	 Representation of a corporation and its owners2S 
d. 	 Representation of a corporation and its officers ·or directors2' 
e. 	 Representation ofan individual'sban1ciuptcy estate and the individua127 
. ~ 
f. 	 Representation of related bankruptcy estates for the same bankruptcy 
trustee2'. 
The leading test on whether a law firm should either be refused employment or removed as 
counsel for a banlaupkyestatecanbefound in theThhdOreutt'sdedsionmin reBHIEP, Inc.2t. In that 
case the court was faced with the question of wbether a baDkruptcy tnIStee and his attorneys, who 
served as aChaplel'7 trustee in theQapter7aaesof a mrporationaDd each oflis two priDdpalsbad 
tobe disqualified due to the fad that the thIee Qapter 7banlaupkyestatesheld claims against each 
other.TheThird Cireuitnoted that there were two separate situations undersection327(a) where ooun­
sel for a bankruptcy estate muId be disqualified: 1) where the p-ofessional had an actual conflict of 
interest; and 2) where there is onlya -potentiat- conflictof interespt.1n the former casecourt's have no 
discretion and must refuse to approve a professional's employment under section 327(a). However, in 
the latter case a court could approve the retention of the professional, even in light of the potential 
conflict, if such an appointment would be appropriate under the facts and cin:umstances of the case3l. 
2. Confl.icts Between the Debtor and its Attorney 
There are a number of situations which prevent an attorney from representing a debtor under 
the provisionsof11 USes327(a) thatdo not involve the representationofentities related to thedebtor. 
While such conflicts are rather uncommon, they canbe broadly grouped into 4 categories. 
a. RepresentationofThitd Parties 
As notedby the BankruptcyoominMatterofAUied A,ttists PictureS Cmp.: (TheABA's] Code 
. ofProfessional Responsibilif¥ provide[s] that theprofessional judgmentofa lawyer mustbe~
solely for the benefit of this.dient, free ofcompromising influences and ~ties,and ptedudes [his or 
her] acceptance ofemployment that will adversely affect his judgment or di1u~·hisloyal~. Inbank­
ruptcy cases. this means that the debtor's or the tnJsteefs oounsel can generally not represent creditors 
of the debtor'sestate», although someexceptions havebeen made in laJge <l1apleI' 11 cases where law 
firms represent creditors in ·small'" matters not related to thebanlauptcyc:ast!!'. Further,counselcannot 
also represent noncreditorparties who may be targets of a lawsuit by a bankruptcy estate!S. 
b. . . Business and Financial TtesBetweenthe Debtor and the Proposed Attorneys 
As a general rule, Bankruptcy Courts have refused to allow the employment of attorneys to 
represent theestatewhere theattorneys, their law firms or somememberof their law firms havea direct 
financial orbusiness tie to the debtoror thedebtor's principals. While this obviously includes attorneys 
who are disqualified because they are notdisinterested under the express tenns of 11 U.S.C§ 101(14)as 
they had an ownership interest in the debtor1li, it also includes cases where members of an attorney's 
law finn have served as officers or directors of a debtor corporation!1, co-owned property with the 
debtor", possibly owed money to the debtor» orhas some other connection to the debtorfll. Therefore, a 
law finn should carefully examine all of its ties and its attorneys' ties to a debtor before applying to be 
counsel for a Bankruptcy estate. 
c. Retainer and Pre-Petiti,on Payment Problems 
One of the oldest41 and most critical problems facing attorneys in representing a bankruptcy 
estate is "How do you get paid"? The problem of getting paid for representing the debtor in a bank­
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ruptcy proceeding is often complicated by the real and practical need to get your own pre-petition bills 
paid before the bankruptcy is filed.Q. The primary probleins are: 1) do pre-petition payments of out­
standing bills by a debtor- render an attorney ineligible to be approved as counsel for the estate under 
section 327(a) because the payments may have been a pleference; and 2) do certain types of retainers 
(i.e. retainers in the form of liens or mortgages on the debtor's propertyG) disqualify a law finn from 
seeking employment as a bankruptcy estate's general counsel. ' ~ 
Jlhe. initial problem, of pre-petition payments to law firms, is bankruptcy's version of the fa­
mous Reatch 22'~. As noted by the Bankruptcy court in the caseof In Ie Decor CoIporation: 
Regarding the issueof thepre-petitionpaymeuts.but lor [thedebtorpaying its 
attorney's pre-petition legal biDs, the debIor's attomey) would have been a 
aeditorof theestateand subject10 thestatutlJryctisqualifkationmandateciby 
section 101(14XA). In absence of a waiver of itsUI\SeCUIed claim- the ultimate . 
-curative'" measure- [the debtor's attorneys) would have been non-disinter­
ested. Here, aeditor status has been awided by ~ving payment within 
ninety(90) days prior to the filing, and such transfers may well constitute pref­
erential payments. This role as a prospective defendant may constitute a dis­
qualifyingadverse interest and render the[debtor'sattomeys) ineligt"ble to claim 
the designation ofa Rdisinterested.", professionaL_* 
The best advice which canbe given in tIjs situation is to review the case law in this area4S and 
make a careful judgment as to Whether it would be practical to perform the ultimate curative measure 
and waive any pre-petition claim which the law firm may have against the debtor. 
The second major problem facing law firms iswhethera lawfinn can takea retainer in the form 
of a lien against the debtor's property? In the Sixth Orcuit, such retainers do not automatically dis­
qua1ify an attorney from being employed under section 327(a). In the Ohio case of In Ie Watson46, the 
~ adopted a ten (10) element test to determine wbetheI' under the facts ofa particu1at case such a 
retainerwould cause the disqualification of anattorney&pmemploymentas counsel for a bankruptcy 
estateunder section 327. Therefore, while it is risky to take a lien as a retainer, it is notper se improper 
and could be approved by a court underappropriate c:in:umstances. 
d. Oiher Problems 
F"mall~ there are some situations, which arebeyond characterization, that prevent an attorney 
from being employed as Counsel for the estate41. These situations generally involve ethical consider­
ations wbich will notbe discussed in detail here. Perhaps, themost famous of these cases is In Ie Phila­
delphia Athletic Oub. Inc.4S where the court refused. to appoint a law finn to represent a Chapter 11 
trustee where the law firm represented. two of the debtor's three partners against the third partner in 
bitter litigation. 
B. 11 US.e. §327(e): Employment As Special Counsel 
Under 11 US.e. §327(e) an attorney can be hired for a IIspecified special purpose", if.the attor­
neydoes not represent or holdany interest adverse to the estate". This provision cannot be used to "end 
run" section 327(a)'s requirements by appointing a de facto general counsel in the guise of a IISpecial 
counsel"so. The leading case from courts in the Sixth Circuit discussing this issue is Matter of F & C 
Intern., Inc.51 from the Southern District of Ohio. In a well reasoned opinion, the court held that counsel 
who had been jointly representing the debtor and several of the debtor'sdirectors in securities litigation 
had an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to merely being disinterested, and refused to e?Cpand the 
special counsel's role in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court also held, on it's own motion, that in 
order for the law firm to continue as special counsel for the bankruptcy estate, it would have to with­
draw as counsel for the directors. 
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c. 11 us.c. §1103(b): Employment As Counsel For A Committee Of Creditors 
Under section 1103(b), a oommittee of creditors may retain attorneys and have them oompen­
sated by the debtor's banlauptcy estate, if the attorneys do not hold or represent having an adverse 
interest to the interests represented by theoommittee'2. Merely representing individual creditors of the 
same class as the creditors represented by the oommittee does not, per se constitute representation on 
an adverse interest. 
-. -In theSixth Circuit, there are two recent appeUate decisions, National UQl1iciatorsD and Dadio 
~whichrecently addressed whatconstitutedanadverse interestundersection 1103(b). InNational 
Liqyidators the Us. District Court for theSouthernDistrictofQUo reversed and remanded a dedsion 
of the BanlcrupIcyCourtwhere the BaDkru.ptqanut~ denied all fees to counsel for the unsecmed 
creditor's coaunittee due to an undi8clQsed sepeaeatatIonofcertainamunittee members in a related 
SEC investigation of the debtor which the BaDkru.ptqCourt held was the representation of an adverse 
interest due to the committee members' possible M~ to pn!felence and or fraudulent convey­
ance actionsby the debtor. 
The District Court carefully reviewed the requirements of Section 1103(b) and found that the 
adverse interest rUle was clearly designed to prevent Mattorney oonflicts of interest"55. It found that 
while there was a slight potential for a conflict of interest in the case, there was no actual conflict of 
interest and that disallowance of the entire fee was unwarranted. It remanded the case to the bank­
ruptcy court for a reduction in fees due to the lack of appropriate disclosUre concerning the related 
representation56• 
InDaidoSteel, theDistrictCourtaffirmed theBanlauptcyCourt'sorderallowingthecommittee's 
counsel to remain employed under Section 1103(b) even though one of the law firm's clients became 
interested in pun=hasing the debtor's assets. One of the key elements to this decision was the fact that 
the committee's attorneys promptly notified the Bankruptcy Court of their ~tion of the pr0­
spective pun:haser in other matters unrelated to the banlcruptcy. The District Court specifically found 
that this representationdid notmnstitutean ·adverse~ for purposesofSection 1103("'0) and that 
disqualification wasnot warranted. 
D. Full Disclosure,The Key Issue? 
Anissuewhich isoften overlooked inthe discussionofmnflictsofinterest iswhether theattor­
ney made a full disclosure of any potential conflictat the beginning of the case? There seems to be an 
erroneous view in some quarters that ignoring MJDinorM potential conflict matters in the disclosure is 
appropriate as it may avoid ·needless litigation"'. Such a view not only conflicts with the requirements 
of theBailkruptcy Code concerning the employmentofcoun.seJS1 but it also isa verydangerous tactic as 
courts are almost universally more offended by the nondisclosure than they are with the underlying 
c6nflict!'. 
Perhaps the leading case concerning the problem with failing to make full disclosure is In re 
National Uqyidators. Inc.59; In that case, the District Court reviewed a Bankruptcycourtdoo.sion which 
had denied all fees to counsel for the unsecured creditors committee due to the committee's undis­
closed representation ofone of the membersof thecommittee inSEC investigations related to the debtor's 
business. The Bankruptcy Court found this representation to be an actual conflict of interest. 
The District Court, after a detailed review of the facts surrounding the representation, found 
that there was no conflict of interest in the law finn's representation of the committee and one of its 
members under these circumstances and held that denial of aU fees was inappropriate. However, the 
District Court did find that the law firm did fail to make an appropriate disclosure and that a reduced 
amount of sanctions was appropriate and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further pro­
ceedings. 
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It is therefore clear that any representation or connection which a law firm has which might 
possibly be a problem in being approved as counsel for a bankruptcy estate or creditor's committee 
must be disclosed in the initial employment application. The worst that can happen is that the applica­
tion may not be approved and you will not work Mfor freft' during the bankruptcy'4. When in doubt, 
disclose. 
. .~ 
E. Nunc Pro Tunc Employment: BetterLateThanNever? 
As o.iscussed in detail above, an attorney's employment must be approved prior to being eli­
gtble to have fees awarded ina bankruptcyproceeding't. Howevea; infar too manycases, attoineys fail 
tomalce timelyapplications forempJoymentandll\U8tNqUest retroadive,m-nuncpro~approval 
of theiremploymentby thecourt. In1984 theSixthCimJit&eeminglyapprowd thepracticeofretr0ac­
tive empJoyment in the Gecqetown of ~ decision whele the murtDOted that such employ­
ment could be approved in appropriate dIcumstances, but overruled the lower court's decisions to 
approve employment in thiscase due to a massive mnflidof inteIest on thepartofdebtor's counsel. 
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have generallyused two tests to determine whether retroactive em­
ployment should be approved. The court in In re VJac;hos" employed a four part test, centering on 
parties' knowledge of the services being provided and the Jack of an otherwise valid objection to the 
employment to determine whether an attorney should be employed as a professional under section 
327(a). Other courts have used the nine part facts and circumstances test of In re Twinton Properties" 
when considering this issue. 
It is important to note that thegeneral ~e"ofGecqetown of I<etterin&isnow in somedoubt 
in lightof theSixthCircuit's recent federated decision. In federated. theSixthCin:uit stated: M Accord­
ingly, we hold that a valid appointment under §327(a) isa condition precedent to the decision to grant 
ordeny compensation under §33O(a) or §328(c)'SM. While this language does not expressly overrule the 
dicta ofGeor&etownofKetterin&- it doescastsomedoubton thestrengthof thatdecisionas to the issue 
of nunc"pm tunc employmentof professionals. 
,. m. u U.s.c.§ 329:· DEBTOR'S nANSACI10NS Wl'IHATI'OKNm'S 
While only attorneys who seek to be employed bya bankruptcyestate oraeditors committee 
need to formally apply to the court to have their employment approved, all attorneys including attor­
neys for Clapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors mustmalce the disclosures required bySection329(a) of the 
Bankruptcy.Code". Under Section 329(a), aU attorneys who represent debtors must file a statement of 
all compensation paid or agreed to by the debtors for services in connection with the bankruptcy case. 
This statement must also disclose-ihe source of these payments. One Sixth Circuit'7 and several Bank­
ruptcy Court" decisions discuss the ease of compliance with this provision and the many problems 
which can arise if it is ignored. 
IV. 11 U.S.C.§330: FEEAWARDS 
While the collection of legal fees is not directly an ethical issue, the relationship of fee awards to 
an attorney's "employability" and the court's control over fees, makes section 330 an important ethical 
section under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 330 isoften involved in key ethical decisions due to the fact 
that many objections to fee awards involve requests for an attorney disqualification as counsel for a 
bankruptcy estate under the provisions discussed above. These issues have been reviewed above and 
will not be-addressed in this section. 
K-45 
Bankruptcy Ethics 
As a general rule, an attorney's fees and expenses are governed. by the "Lodestar" standard of 
compensation which states that a reasonable attorney fee in a given matter is determined by multiply­
ing a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended on the matter". While a 
detailed discussion of this standald isbeyond the smpeof thischapterbelow is a listing of cases which 
in general discuss lodestar and fee application requirements inKentucky: 
1. 	 In re Bodd~ 950 F.2d 334 (6th Or. 1991) 
2. 	 In re A & A Enermr ProJ?erties. 1M 865 F.2d 256 (6th Or. 1988) 
3. 	 In re AtweD. 148B.R. 483 (Bkm.y. W.o. Ky. 1991) 
4. 	 Inrel.F.WJ&ner"SonsCo.,135 B.R.264(Bkrk:y. W.D.Ky.I991) 
5. 	 In re Belknap. Inc.. 103 B.R. 842 (Bkrk.y. W.o. Ky. 1989) 
6. 	 In re Chou-Oten Chemi@Is,Inc.,31 B.R. 842 (B1atcy. W.O. Ky. 1982) 
7. 	 In re Costello. Case No.89-02230 (Bkrtc:y. B.D. Ky. Dec. 31, 1992)(Unpub­
1ished Opinion) 
Recently, the Office of the United States 'Ihlstee announced new technical requirements for fee 
applications under 11 US.C§ 330"'. These guidelines have not yet be adoptedby Kentucky courts in 
bankruptcycases,but shouldbe followed., ifnothing~ to preventanobjection toyourfee application 
by the u.s. 'Dustee'. Office. The u.s. nustee guidelines are in line with the requirements of In re I.F. 
Waper'sSons Co.. the leading Kentucky caseon what information a fee appliCation should contain. 
v. BANI<R.UPTCY RULE OFPROCEDUKE 9011 
WhileanattomeyisunderanethicalobligatiOntoM~ representhisorherclient,Bank­
ruptcy Rule of Procedure (MJSRP') 901171 places Bmitations on how far those actions may go. As ex­
plainedby the Honorable GuyCole in inre R. and D. GrouP, Inc.72: MJWle 9011 delineates two types of 
sanctionable conduct: MOne,'[w]here the papersare frivolous, legally1IDft!8SOnable, orwithout factual 
foundation', and two, ~here the pleading is filed for an improper purpose'.N'13 The first type of pro­
saibed conductunder Rule 9011 addresses whether a partyand/or its attorney's conduct were objec­
tively nmonable, while the second ionnofimproperconductgoes to issuesprimarilyre1ated to subjec­
tive llgood faithll74• InKentucky, the standaniCor imposingRule11 sanctions iswhether utheindividual's 
conduct was reasonable under the circumstancesN7S• 
In determining whether an attorney's conduct is objectively reasonable, the Sixth Oreuit has 
indicated that factors such as : 1) the time available to the attorney for investigation of the claims; 2) 
whether the attorney had to rely on a client for infonnation as to the facts underlying the pleading in 
question; 3) whether the pleading was based on a plaUSible view of the law; and 4) whether the attor­
ney relied upon another attorney's investigation in filing the pleading', must be considered. In deter­
mining whether the pleading was filed. for an improper purpose, the court must examine the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the casi"'. 
Two unpublished decisions, In re Dixon78 and In re Braun" address the method of determining 
damages under Rule 9011 and the procedural requirements for puttinga party on notice ofa request for 
such damages. These opinions, along with R. and D. Group are required reading for any party which is 
seriouSabout pursuing a Rule 9011 motion in a bankruptcy matter. 
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VI. _ 28 U.S.c. § 1927 
28 US.C§ 192~ isa provision which predateSbothFederalRule of Procedure 11 and BRP 9011 

and pennits a court to impose costs, attorney fees and expenseson any attorney who U so multiplies the 

proceedings inany case unreasonably and vexatiously_wit. As 28 US.C§ 1927 is much more limited. in 

scope that Rule 9011, it is no longer used frequently inbankruptcy proceedings. Its main use is for those 

few situaticins where an attorney pursues a non-frivolous claim through the use of "'multiplicative liti­

gation tactics that are harassing-lor} dilatory""2 whicharenotcovetedby Rule 9011. Fora discussion of 

the relationship between Rule 9011 and 28 US.C§ 1927 the Tennessee case of In re Southern Industrial 

Banking Corp.• 91 B.R. 463 (B1atcy. B.D. Tenn. 1988) p-ovides the best treatment of the topic of any 

published decision from the Sixth On:uit. 

VIL DUTY TO THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE: WHO IS YOUR CUENn 
In the typical nonbankruptcycase, it is fairlyeasytoidentifyyourclient.As more thanone legal 

sage has expressed it, ."'your client is the guy [or gal] who pays yout". However, when representing a 

debtor in a reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 orChapter t2'3 sucha generalization justdoes 

not work. To understand this problem we must first discuss the difference between a bankruptcy es­

tateM (i.e. the actual entity undergoing bankruptcy reorganization and which is payingyour bills) and 

the individuals who are managing the estate (and are signing the checks). 

In simple,non-technical terms the bankruptcy estate isanentitywhicharises upon the filing of 
a bankruptcy and consists of the non-exempt assets which were ownedby thedebtor prior to the filing 
of a bankruptcy reorganization. It is the Mpurpose" of the bankruptcy estate to obtain the highest p0s­
sible return for the estate's creditors and, in certain limited. dn:umstances, other interest holders85 The 
individuals who manage the bankruptcy estate's affairs in a IeOIgUUzation proceedingare usuallyei­
tberthedebtor-in-possession (--oIP") ora O1apterll trustee. DIPsaregeneraIlyeitherthemanagement 
ofa business entity debtor or an individual or couple ina so-called Mindividual" Chapter 11. Problems 
in identifying your client arise in JeOJg8IUzation cases when the interestsof the DIP conflicts with the -­
. interests of the bankruptcy estate. Several cases serve to mustrate this point. 
Oneof the leadingcases in this emergingareaofbankruptcy legalethics is In re United Utensils 

Corp.·. In thiscase thecourtwasconfronted with thequestionofwhethera law {innwhichrepresented. 

a bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 11 proceeding could represent a subsequently appointed. bcuUauptcy 

trustee, ip Qctions against the debtor's former officers and shareholders. 1be court in considering the 

objection of a former officer to the employment on the grounds that it violated. his individual attorney 

client privilege with the proposed counsel held that the law finn did not individually represent the 

individual officer' and sole shareholder through its representation of the debtor corporation during the 

Chapter 11. The court held that the finn could be employed as special counsel to the trustee under 

Section 327(e) unless the officerIshareholder could produce specific evidence ofan attorney client rela­

tionship independent of the attorney client relationship between the debtor and the law finn87. 

The case of In re LoveB" shows the special problems an attorney for a bankruptcy estate faces in 
an individual Chapter 11 case. In Love the court was reviewing the attorney's fee application in a com­
plex Chapter 11 proceeding. In the Chapter 11 proceeding the attorneys for the estate, at the direction of 
the individual DIP, resisted efforts of a major creditor to force the DIP to repay unauthorized draws 
from various businesses owned by the bankruptcy estate, and opposed the unsecured creditor's 
committee's efforts to prevent the debtor from settling estate claims against the debtor~s children and 
wife. The court found that the attorneys breached their duty to the Chapter 11 estate by assisting the 
DIP in his efforts to protect his family and ultimately denied their fee application in full89• 
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The full extent of this problem can best bee ~ however, in the case of In re DeVlieg Inc.90• 
Here, counsel for a Olapter 11 bankruptcy estate were fired by the DIP, after the debtor's counsel filed 
suit against several insiders of the debtor, including the debtor's sole officer. However this firing did 
not go unnoticed and the DIP was quicldy replaced by a Chapter 11 trustee who sought to hire the 
Chapter 11 estate's former attorneys as the trustee's special oounsel to pursue the law suit which got 
them fired. Not surprisingly some of the insiders who fired the attorneys in the first place objected to 
this employment. The Bankruptcy Court approved the employment and the insider appealed. After 
re~g 11 U.s.c.§ 327(e) the District Court ruled that the attorneys neither held or n:Presented an 
adverse interest to theestateand that their employment shouldbeauthorized. However ina footnote to 
the opinion the court noted: . 
The mncem with fom8 CD1lDIeI for the debIcr Js that they wDl DOt be in a 
position [to be objective inadvlllDg. trusteeJ-.1n the pesem case, this am­
cerndoes not appear to beimplicated: asevidenced by the timingand appar­
ent circumstances of the fi1ing of theLBO Jitiga~ [theattomeysl mayactu­
allyhave begunacting inthe inteIestof theestate (and, indoingso, not neces­
sarily following thedirectionsofits then~ thedebtor) evenbefore a chap­
ter 11 trustee had. been appointed. Thus the usual COIlC.'eI'I\ with the employ­
mentofformer counsel for the debtor, residual loyalty to that client, would not 
appear to be a problem here__ In so noting, however, the court does not pass 
on whether suchbehavior would comply with applicable standards of profes­
sional responsibility". 
This footnote shows the confusion this situationcan generate for even federal murts in this area. To the 
extent thatDeVlie& suggests that munsel for Chapter 11 bankruptcy estates have an ethical duty other 
than to the bankruptcy estate as their client, such a ruling is dearly wrong and against the weight of 
authori~. 
vm. DUI'YTOTHE COURT 
One of the mOst unusual ~ least explored aspects of legal ethics in the bankruptcy context 
concerns the duty of attorneys, to the court, to dUdose information about the misconduct of the indi­
·viduals who control the bankruptcy estate. Due to the expansive nature of the financial disclosures 
required in a bankruptcy proceeding this duty of disclosure must be balanced against an attorney's 
duty of loyalty to his client. In this respect, state ethical duties can come into some conflict with a bank­
ru~ J.ttomey's duty to the BankruptcyCourtas an officer of the Courtand a Court appointed Coun­
sel for a bankruptcy estate. 
In Chapter 7 cases, it is clear that an attorney cannot counselor assist his. or her client in filing 
false bankruptcy schedules or concealing estate assets" for the same reasons an attorney cannot allow 
his client to commit perjury in a criminal case without protest". These ethical issues are beyond the 
scope of this Chapter and will not be reviewed in detail95• 
However, attorneys in a reorganization proceeding, havea far higher burden. In reorganization 
cases, attorneys are representing clients in a continuing judicial proceeding, not merely counseling cli­
ents about past misconduct or legal problems". In such proceedings, attorneys for the estate are consid­
ered officers of the court, and are fiduciaries to the Bankruptcy Estate97• As noted by the Bankruptcy 
Court in In re Sky Valley. Inc.: 
The unique circumstances which surround insolvency and the filing of a Chapter 
11 case place the attorney for the debtor-in-possession in the unusual position 
of sometimes owing a higher duty to the estate and the bankruptcy court than 
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to his client In fact, the status of the client and the attorney often overlap in a 
Chapter 11 case, as the debtor's attorney must take conceptual control of the 
case and provide guidance for management of the debtor, not only to discern 
what measures are necessary to achieve a successful reolg8llization, but to as­
sure that, insodoing,compliance withtheBanlauptcyCodeandRules issought 
rather than avoided. Debtor's attorney duty as fiduciary of the estate requires . :, 
an active concern for the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries98• 
...1:L 
. Recently, several Bankruptcy Courts have held that counsel for bankruptcy estates have a duty 
to the courts to inform themif the individuals operating a bankruptcy estate's affairsare acting against 
the best interests of the estate. The BankruptcyCourt in InJe United UtensiJsCorp. dearly articulated 
thisdutybyho1ding: "'Ifthedebtor~DOtfulfiDingitsobHga~ to theestale,it istheresponsibilityand 
dutyof Debtor's counsel tobringsuchmatters to the atIeNionof the court""'. 
This developing duty was discussed in detail by the US. Bankruptcy Court for Utah in In re 
Bonneyi1le Pacific CorJ?,196B.R.868 (Bla1cy. D. Utah1996).Thisopinion is, without.doubt" the stron­
gest statement of a court appointed munsel'sduty to the bankruptcyestate and BankruptcyCourt in a 
Chapter 11 proceeding. Bonneyi1le was a complex Chapter 11 case, involving numerous related busi­
ness entities, which was heavily involved in a series ofclassic MJand flips"'(i.e. insider sales of property 
designed to artificiaIly inflate the value of the property in order to defraud third party investors and 
lenders). After a stormy reoIganization attempt, a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed, and evidence of 
serious&aud was unrovered by the trustee. ThisBonneville opinionarose in the contextofa motion to 
reconsider the Bankruptcy Court's earlier denial of the entire fee application of the debtor's Chapter 11 
counsel. 
In this long and harshly worded opinion, the Utah Bankruptcy Court made it clear that all 
counsel who are retained with court approval in a banlcruptcy proceeding have a fiduciary duty to the 
bankruptcy estate and the Bankruptcy Court to disclose suspected wrong doing by the insiders of a 
corporate debto~ 196 B.R. at 885. While this opinion arose in a large Chapter 11 proceeding, it is still 
advised reading for anyattorney who may find himorherself representinga "ess-than-honest" debtor 
in a Bankruptcy case. 
This bend towanl imposing a fiduciary duty on debtor's munsel and ~ for the various 
committees will require all counsel retained with court approval to carefully monitor the activities of 
the person or persons nmning the debtor's affairs or run the risk of being disqualified or having the 
Bankruptcy Court deny their fee applications, due to their failure to fulfill their fiduciary obligations. 
IX. CRIMINAL BANKRUPTCY ATIORNEYS 
This CQSe sadly illustrates the peril ofpracticing law in lin unfamiliarsubjectarea, for, as oneattorneyhas learned, 
ignorance of the law does not excuse an offense. U.s. v. ParkhilPoo 
The ultimate "rules" ofbankruptcy ethics canbe found at 18 U.S.c.§§ 152 - 157101 which are the 
federal statutes directly relating to bankruptcy crimes. 18 :US.C§ 157 relating to "Bankruptcy Fraud" is 
a recent addition to the federal criminal statutes and is especially broad and should be read by any 
attorney who plans to represent a debtor in bankruptcy. 
The problem of "criminal" bankruptcy attorneys in not a new issue. See U.S. v. Switzer, 252 F. 2d 
139 (2d Cir. 1958); CQ&hlan v: U.s., 147 F.2d 235 (8th Or. 1945). Nor is it confined to inexperienced or 
"poor" practioners. See U.S. v. Goodstein, 883 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1989)(Attorney with 40 years of bank­
ruptcy experience). While there is not a large number of reported cases involving attorneys Who have 
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been convicted of "bankruptcy crimes" there are several instructive Court of Appeal cases which ad­
dress the troubling aspect of this topic. 
By far the lcugest class of "'bankruptcy crilne$N for which attorneys have been convicted, in­
volve the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate. In the cases of U.S. y. Smithson102, U.S. v. 
Center101 and U.S. y. Parkhill1CM attorneys were convicted of assisting their clients in concealing assets . 
from the bankruptcy estate through a variety of means. A brief review of these cases shows that the 
atto~ in question were actively involved in the fraud and their convictions were not unexpected. 
Far more troubling is the case of US. \t Zimmerman1G5. There an attorney was~, along 
with clients of his Jaw firm" his Jaw firm" his Jaw partner and one of his associate attorneys, with 
c:onspiracy tommmitaiminalbud inCXJDDeCtionwith thebidiDgofa dient'sassets from itscreditors 
through the_of theJaw finn'sllUst IICCOUDt. TheaUomeyin tbisc:uehidontyminlmalconnectIcms 
with the debtor or the debtor's repn!Sel\tation in the bankruptcy case, but was nevertheless indicted 
and ultimatelymnvictedon the strengthof two Ban1auptcyCourtopinionswhich found the attorney's 
law firm probably was amspiring with the debIor to bide assets. The attomey's conviction was over­
turned and the case remanded for a new trial due to the improper use of the Ban1cruptcy Court opin­
ions, but the case still emphasizes the danger in this ama even when you are not directly overseeing a 
bankruptcy case for your firm. 
Perhaps the most blatant case of defrauding a bankruptcy estate of its assets is US. v. Edgarl06. 
In thatcase theattorney for theowner ofa corporation ina Chapter 11 proceedingnegotiated the saleof 
the debtor's business, drew up the paper work mnceming the transfer of the business, and structured 
the sale so the assets of the debtor and the proceeds of the sale paid to the debtor's owner would be 
difficult to trace'lI7. Needless to say the bankruptcycourt was not informed of the debtor's president's 
excellent salesmanship until seven months after the completion of the sale. The Court of Appeals up­
held the conviction but remanded this case for resentencing • 
. The strangest bankruptcy related crime an attomey has been convicted ofis undoubtedly the 
crimeofciJmmventingtheblind casedrawsystemofassigningjudges tobanlcruptcycases found inthe 
caseofUS. ¥ AUpst101. InAupst, theattomeywashavinganaffairwitha Ban1auptcyCourt~
clerk. Theattorneycxmspired with the intake clerk to ensUre thathiscaseswerenotassigned toa bank­
ruptcy judge who was mnservative in awardingattomeyfees. While thecrimein~isunJikely to 
be repeated, it does illustraJe that any attempt to manipulate thebanlauptcy system ina questionable 
manner could lead to federal aiminal charges. 
x. KENTUCKY CASES ON BANKRUPTCYETlUCS 
As discussed at the beginning of this article, the basic concepts of state ethics law form the core 
of Bankruptcy ethics law. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kentucky's state bar association and the 
Kentucky Supreme Court have a great interest in enforcing their ethical standards against attorneys 
who engage in unethical conduct inbankruptcy proceedings. While a detailed discussion of Kentucky's 
ethical rules and enforcement procedures is beyond the scope of this Chapter, below is a brief list of 
cases dealing with various types of ethical problems. 
1). 	 Failure to TlIl\ely Perform Duties: KBA v. Reeves, 851 S.W. 2d 478 (Ky. 
1993); KBA v. Goodrich, 851 S.W. 2d 479 (Ky. 1993). 
2). 	 Bankruptcy of an attorney is not, in and of itself, grounds for disbar- . 
ment: See Greene v. KBA,904 S.W. 2d 233 (Ky. 1995). However, repayment 
of discharged debts could be a condition of reinstatement: Barrett v. KBA, 
819 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1991). 	 . 
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3). 	 Attonleys may not prosecute individuals who they represented in bank­
ruptcy proceedings: Nunn v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1995). 
4). 	 Giving the Bankruptcy Court a NSF check for bankruptcy filing fee, 
which the clienthas prepai4 is an ethical violation: KBA v. Watson, 867 
S.W. 2d 191 (Ky. 1993). 	 0' 
i.5). Taking payment of attorney fees, prior to paying the bankruptcy filing 
- fee, in violation of Bankruptcy R.ule 1006, is an ethical violation: KBAy. 
Wharton, 810 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1991). ­
6). 	AidiDgiaafrauciuleDt~ .._ethkalvloJaticm: Roberts~KBA.- ., 
771 S.W. 2d.(6 (Ky. 1989). 
7). 	Maldngfalse financial Hatements to leaders is an ethicalviolatiOD:~ 
~ I<BA. 764 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1989). 
8). 	Bankruptcy1kusteestealing money from a BaDkruptcy estate is an ethi­
cal violation: In re Shumate, 382 S.W. 2d 405 (Ky. 1964). 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding the principals ofethics in thepractice ofbankruptcylaw is, in many ways, a far 
simplertask thanunderstanding theintricaciesof theBankruptcyCode. What malcesbanlauptcyethics 
somewhat different from the traditional rule of ethics, is not a different set of rules regulating profes­
sional conduct, but the unusual nature of the underlying bankruptcyproceedings themselves. It is the 
hope of this author that the preceeding Qapter provides a useful guide to all attorneyS who wish to 
practiCE banlcruptcy law and plevents them from fa1Iing prey to some of the unusual ethical consider-­
ations which mustbeaddressed in this field. 
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